Bgile wrote: ... I dont think the US fast battleships carried HC shells unless they were planning a bombardment mission.
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Since their use was invisioned vs DDs and some cruisers I suspect at least some were carried at most times.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-45_mk6.htm states
... During the entire action off Casablanca, USS Massachusetts in 134 salvos fired a total of 786 rounds out ... All of these were AP projectiles, as the ship had not yet received any HC projectiles.
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Which implies she would normally have been carrying them they just weren't available (bombardment was very much in the cards for this one too). Furthermore
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.htm states:
... The HC Mark 13 .... For standardization purposes, the Mark 13 was also issued to all newer battleships,
Not definitive but certainly pointing toward their standard usage.
Dave Saxton wrote:
Yes, that covers most of the likely battle ranges.
Since several battleship actions took place outside those ranges I sugest your defintion of "most likely" is flawed.
Since they can't penetrate Yamato's vitals except at very extreme ranges, short or long, they arn't likely to do much more damage than the Scharnhorst's 11" can do.
Given that they carry considerably more kinetic energy than the 11"er's do I suspect this conclusion is also flawed.
Where did you find this? I've wondered if this tactic was just something that armchair admirals came up with or it was one that navies of the time actually considered. This is the first I've seen to indicate the latter.
GkDos100 speaks to this. The BB59 manual reccomends only using AP on heavily armoured targets.
I've seen references to using HE on lightly armored targest I just hadn't seen any direct references to battleships using it on other battleships.
I agree that two Bismarcks with their own precise RDFC could be a threat to Yamato. However the issue is that whilst the Germans fire (Bismarcks) also do the Japanese.
I'm refering to the likely effect of HE fire from both twins on the soft ends of the ship, its speed, stability, and to the firecontrol sensors and communications, and human resources. If the Germans can hit first (even HE near misses could be effective) and more often, as is likely, the Yamato may not be able to reply very effectively.
That's a point I've been trying to make as well. There's also the chance of a lucky hit doing even more damage. The route to Yamato's secondary magazines being one such possiblity.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:Bgile:
The 16"/50 AP Mark 8 Mods 1-5 begin penetrating Yamato's deck armor at 34,000 yds. It begins to penetrate citadel vertical armor at 14,000 yds, so the immune zone against that weapon is from 14K to 34K yds. She would be vulnerable at the ranges where Kirishima was engaged.
From what I had read there is no evidence that any shell from USN inventory could do that. In this fantasy the Yamato is as vulnerable as Kirishima on the same ranges, which is, by all practical standards, more than absurd.
Then I suggest you do more reading. Actually since we've gone over this many times I suspect you take more time and get a better understanding of what you read.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:And Yamato was not vulnerable to the guns of any other warship at any practical range whatsoever,
This is frankly absurd. Yamato could take damage from even destroyer class weapons at any range they could hit her. Furthermore there is a chance such damage could be quite significant.
South Dakota, if capable of hitting anything on November 1942, could have (very hypothetically) hit Yamato ten times, still the small USN battleship would have gone down to Iron Bottom Sound, with or without USS Washington assistance.
That's your opinion and a possiblity. It is however unlikely IMO, Yamato is very likely to get the worst of this exchange especially at these ranges.