How would you have used the IJN?

[lwd]

If they are willing to throw in a declaration of war vs Germany they might get a much better deal in regards to what happens in China. They also can potentially get a good look at modern British and eventually US equipment. In either 1940 or 1941 the Japanese were looking to import even more oil to fuel their industry this might help them to get it as well. The US and Britian for instance don't have to worry as much about Japan if they not only have an agreement but major portions of the IJN are in the Atlantic or Med. All very far fetched I agree but ...

[RF]

lwd, this assumes the USA does actually go to war with Hitler. It was the attack on PH, following the signing of the Tripartite Pact, that brought the US into the war and even then it was the Germans who declared war on the US. Without these two events it is by no means certain the US would have declared war on Germany. And without an openly hostile Japan the USA would see Germany as less of a threat because there would be no two ocean war scenario.

Yes, the German U-boats started attacking US ships in 1941 but the US didn't declare war.

Without the US in the war I still don't see that the Japs would get a better deal over China, unless the behaviour of the Japanese Army was substantially reigned in. The British had no substantial interest in Japan's actions in China apart from the proximity of Hong Kong, and would have nothing to offer the Japanese.

Had the Japanese behaved with far more restraint in China then there would have been no US trade sanctions against them. Indeed the best solution for the Japs would be to stay in Manchuria and not openly invade the rest of China.

[lwd]

lwd, this assumes the USA does actually go to war with Hitler. It was the attack on PH, following the signing of the Tripartite Pact, that brought the US into the war and even then it was the Germans who declared war on the US. Without these two events it is by no means certain the US would have declared war on Germany.

It's not certain but it's just about as close to it as you can get when discussing a what if.

And without an openly hostile Japan the USA would see Germany as less of a threat because there would be no two ocean war scenario.

From what I've read FDR considered Japan a distraction. Germany was viewed as a much bigger threat.

Yes, the German U-boats started attacking US ships in 1941 but the US didn't declare war.

Indeed. But the public wasn't behind a war until fall of 41 and even then it wasn't by a huge margin. However the trend was very strongly anti German.

Without the US in the war I still don't see that the Japs would get a better deal over China, unless the behaviour of the Japanese Army was substantially reigned in. The British had no substantial interest in Japan's actions in China apart from the proximity of Hong Kong, and would have nothing to offer the Japanese.

China was a major trading partner for Britain also wasn't it? Certainly raining in the IJA would have been one of the things the IJN would have to do in this scenario for their own sake as well as for diplomatic purposes.

Had the Japanese behaved with far more restraint in China then there would have been no US trade sanctions against them. Indeed the best solution for the Japs would be to stay in Manchuria and not openly invade the rest of China.

Concur. But in that case how one uses the IJN becomes very problematic.

[Dave Saxton]

Yes, the German U-boats started attacking US ships in 1941 but the US didn't declare war.

And US warships were attacking German U-boats, escorting British shipping, and enforcing no go zones, war undeclared too.

[lwd]

Indeed the Germans probably had more cause to declare war on the US than the US did on Germany at that point. Which was probably part of the plan.

[RF]

The issue about Germany being a bigger threat than Japan as seen by FDR does need to be put into context.

Germany unlike Japan did not have a substantial surface fleet of fast carriers and battleships, only a collection of ships operating almost singally. Germany had no means of invading any part of the US, even if they conquered Britain or the USSR. Where Germany is superior to Japan is that it had a larger industrial and technological base, where weapons capable of reaching the US mainland might be developed in the future. Until that point is reached Germany cannot defeat the US.

Japan is a distraction yes, but still has a greater capability of compromising US territory with the IJN. It means that the US cannot deploy 100% against Germany.

Without a two front war the US can concentrate against Germany and so Germany must be a lessor threat as a result.

[RF]

Indeed the Germans probably had more cause to declare war on the US than the US did on Germany at that point. Which was probably part of the plan.

Churchill's plan most certainly. Roosevelt quite possibly yes, to get around US public opinion.

[lwd]

The issue about Germany being a bigger threat than Japan as seen by FDR does need to be put into context.
Germany unlike Japan did not have a substantial surface fleet of fast carriers and battleships, only a collection of ships operating almost singally. Germany had no means of invading any part of the US, even if they conquered Britain or the USSR. Where Germany is superior to Japan is that it had a larger industrial and technological base, where weapons capable of reaching the US mainland might be developed in the future. Until that point is reached Germany cannot defeat the US.....

I don't think it was the military threat that Germany represented but the long term economic one. If Germany became THE power in Europe then she would have controled a significant amount of the global markets and resources and likely would have denied US access to these. Indeed in Wages of Destruction Tooze makes the point that this was the main reason Hitler wanted "Lebensraum". He was afraid that GB and the US would because of their access to resources and markets essentiall relegate eveyone else to third world status if things continued as they were in the early 20th century. In this he may have been correct.

[Karl Heidenreich]

We must consider, also, that a priority for FDR was to help Soviet Russian in any possible way, independent of Nazi Germany being a threat or not to the US. FDR's was keen to comunism or, at least his advisers and wife were.

[RF]

Not soi much keen on communism - certainly not in the US itself! - as to keep Russia in the war and Germany engaged in the East. Actually a sensible strategy that Churchill was already following, of creating as many fronts as possible and widening the scope of the war to weaken Germany. And the strategy worked.

[RF]

I don't think it was the military threat that Germany represented but the long term economic one. If Germany became THE power in Europe then she would have controled a significant amount of the global markets and resources and likely would have denied US access to these. Indeed in Wages of Destruction Tooze makes the point that this was the main reason Hitler wanted "Lebensraum". He was afraid that GB and the US would because of their access to resources and markets essentiall relegate eveyone else to third world status if things continued as they were in the early 20th century. In this he may have been correct.

I am not convinced that Germany could pose any economic threat seriously to the US from dominating the European continent. There is no equivalent concern today in the US about the European Union, which does act as a protectionist block and is overtly anti-American, or at least its nomenklatura is.

Tooze is making a set of assumptions and ascribing to Hitler a greater degree of intellectual capacity than he had. Hitler had no knowledge of, or interest in, economics. Hitler was concerned with conquest and acquiring territory. Tooze in his own analysis showed that such a policy was self-defeating and unsustainable, particulary given what the education policies of Berhard Rust would have done to the following generation of Germans. Had Hitler dominated Europe and conquered Britain and the USSR, then like the USSR in the 1960's and 1970's Nazi Germany would have had to import most of its technology from the US. The living standards of the Germans, like that of the Russians, would have fallen way behind those of the US because it would not be a genuine free enterprise economy. I don't think that nazism would have survived for long after Hitler had died from old age, there was no one in the NSDAP of any calibre to take over.

The US post WW1 was clearly a world power, and the Germany of 1939 was far less of a threat to the US than the Germany of 1914 with its large navy and colonial empire. It may be that FDR grossly overestimated German capabilities.

[alecsandros]

........Hitler had no knowledge of, or interest in, economics....

I strongly disagree. Only thinking about some meetings between him and Antonescu, and between him and Speer, makes be believe Hitler had a good grasp of economic fundamentals. Not to mention the war strategy... ?

[RF]

What war strategy? What economic fundamentals?

And how do you measure these set against Germanys' total defeat in 1945 after having started the war?

[alecsandros]

Hello RF,
First of all, I'm sorry for picking only a small part of your above comment; but it's an important statement, IMO...

This discussion is a lenghty one, and, as all important matters concernign politics, history or science, it should be best waged over sources... However, since this portal is the only way we can comunicate, we are bound to a kind of back-and-forth argument over "personal opinions"... as personal as such an opinion can get

My understanding is that Hitler and/or his high-staff worked vigourously towards deminishing un-employment in Germany (in Berlin 1931 it was ~ 40%. In 1934 it was about 20% or lower, IIRC). He/them also worked towards building a trusty partnership with several US industry-giants (Ford and GM are the first taht come to mind), which relocated important production facitilies on German soil. This is not solely the Reich's merit, however, since the first contacts between Ford and the German government were established in early 1928.

And those are only 2 facets... There are many more...

Again, only reading about Antonescu and Hitler's meetings, and what they had to discuss about, is enough to convince me of the fact that Adolf had a good grasp of several key concepts (production facilities, employment, currency rates, trade agreements, and the inlfluence of various policies and politics over them).

That he thought about those aspects as means to an end, the end being winning a global war, is another story. Indeed, my impression is that those elements presented above were only parts of the war mechanism... People were only spare-parts for him...

[alecsandros]

As for the war strategy: conquering France, the low countries, Norway, Poland, and the Balkans, winning over Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, aren't important economic achievements ... ? Which could serve very well into an overall economic program... ?

France - workforce, production facilities, highly educated elite, geographicaly very well placed for attacking Britain and waging war in the Atlantic.
The low countries - excellent harbor facilities
Norway - good mineral deposits, excellent position for bombarding Northern Britain, attacking convoys, etc.
Poland - workforce, productioni capabilities, very good wheat production
Romania - excellent oil reserves and refining capabilities
....

What I want to say is that the objectives set during the war had both political and economical arguments behind them.

(As also, some objectives which weren't attained - the Suez Canal, capturing Egypt's oilfields, or the Caspian oil fields...)