How would you improve the IJN?

Historical what if discussions, hypothetical operations, battleship vs. battleship engagements, design your own warship, etc.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

Well it was pretty clear that a long war with either the US or Britain much less the combination meant failure so why expend much effort "planning for failure". On the otherhand it could have helped if they had spent more time planning on how to avoid failure but that probably means avoiding war with the US and Britain....
User avatar
neil hilton
Senior Member
Posts: 339
Joined: Tue Apr 27, 2010 2:31 pm

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by neil hilton »

The absolute wrong thing Imperial Japan did in WW2 was to attack PH without warning. It absolutely enraged the US, from that point on it was a war to unconditional surrender and thus a war Imperial Japan could not hope to win. So it should make sure that when it does go to war with the US it does so in an hounourable manner this may eventually mean it could end the war with favourable terms of some kind.
If the war can be fought in this manner then theoretically the US can be fought to a stalemate with German co-operation, ie grind the US down so that public opinion forces the US government to press for peace terms (this is the problem with all democracies at war).
To that end the Japanese have to avoid pitched naval battles because it will be a long war. Concentrate building ASW destroyers (to protect their own shipping) and submarines and wage a 'guerre de course' on US merchant shipping along the west coast in co-operation with the German efforts on the east coast. The US will eventually cry uncle. This means a doctrine change for the Japanese submarine force, to concentrate on merchant ships not warships. The Japanese had some excellent sub designs which if they had the numbers and used in the right way could have been decisive enough to force a peace settlement.
Veni, vidi, verrimus!
I came, I saw, I swept the floor!
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

I don't think any of this would work.

Any warning of attack on PH would doom it to failure and expose Nagumo's force to counterattack.

More concentration on ASW warfare may seem right except there is an opportunity cost in the use of Japanese resources.

Sub warfare on the US west coast would have far less impact than any U-boat campaign on the east coast, as most of US industry was based toward the west.

No the grand strategy for Japan has to be dealing with only one enemy at any one time, not fighting all of them at once. That means occupying the French, British and Dutch colonies without the US intervening, which in turn means staying out of China. The US can only be tackled succesfully on one front, the central Pacific, which means invading and occupying Hawaii, and also knocking out the Panama Canal. Japan would also need close collaboration with the Germans plus an ally on the American continent with a border with the US - which can only be Mexico.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

There was also the fact that prewar Japanese activities had already raised a fair amount of antipathy as far as the US was concerned.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

This is basically the problem the Japanese face if they were to keep the US out of the war.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

Another problem was lack of control by the Japanese governemnt over the military. Remember that the Sino-Japanese conflict wasn't really one desired or planned by the government but started as a fait acompli by some lower ranking army officers. This means that "staying out of China" is not completely under the control of the Japanese government.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

I think this is an academic point, as from October 1941 the military occupied the chief positions in government and indeed prior to that always had formal representation in the Cabinet as Army and Navy ministers anyway.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

The war with China was not started by the army high command much less the combined high command.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo_Bridge_Incident
Efforts to defuse the escalating conflict failed, largely due to actions by the Japanese Northern China Area Army commanders and militarists within the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff;
The implication is that just because a general is the PM doesn't mean that everyone in the army is going to go along with his plan.
User avatar
neil hilton
Senior Member
Posts: 339
Joined: Tue Apr 27, 2010 2:31 pm

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by neil hilton »

RF wrote:I don't think any of this would work.

Any warning of attack on PH would doom it to failure and expose Nagumo's force to counterattack.

More concentration on ASW warfare may seem right except there is an opportunity cost in the use of Japanese resources.

Sub warfare on the US west coast would have far less impact than any U-boat campaign on the east coast, as most of US industry was based toward the west.

No the grand strategy for Japan has to be dealing with only one enemy at any one time, not fighting all of them at once. That means occupying the French, British and Dutch colonies without the US intervening, which in turn means staying out of China. The US can only be tackled succesfully on one front, the central Pacific, which means invading and occupying Hawaii, and also knocking out the Panama Canal. Japan would also need close collaboration with the Germans plus an ally on the American continent with a border with the US - which can only be Mexico.
The strategy I envisaged would have been for a limited war against the US, no PH no risking everything on the 'decisive battle' just an honourable start with warning and then years and years of unrelenting submarine warfare. The intention would be to war with the US but not enrage them enough to come storming across the Pacific with nukes in hand, similar to what happened in Vietnam.
Prewar antipathy to Japanese actions in China etc is a long way from declaring war, public opinion for war in any democracy has to be almost complete or you end up with a Vietnam and it was that sneak attack on PH that completely sway US public opinion. Without it the US wouldn't I believe have gone all out as they historicially did.
This means it may have been possible to end the war (US vs Japan) on terms rather than with nukes and occupation etc.
Of course historical Japanese militarism I believe virtually guaranteed an all out war so my theory is fantasy.
Veni, vidi, verrimus!
I came, I saw, I swept the floor!
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

neil hilton wrote: ... The strategy I envisaged would have been for a limited war against the US, no PH no risking everything on the 'decisive battle' just an honourable start with warning and then years and years of unrelenting submarine warfare.
The problem the Japanese would have had with this was that they didn't have a large stockpile of oil and they were using more than was coming in. They simply can't maintain a war for all that long. The Japanese are also more vulnerable to a submarine type war than the US. Japan relied on imports of food, oil, and metals. Prior to the embargo's the US was thier major source of the latter two. If the Japanese don't start off aggressivly the US will build up the Philipines and at the very least use them as a base to attack the Japanese lifelines. Support for China is likely to increase as well and the Japanese army will have problems facing the US army in China.
The intention would be to war with the US but not enrage them enough to come storming across the Pacific with nukes in hand, similar to what happened in Vietnam.
That might be the intent but I don't see it happening. If war is declared and the Japanese don't take the Philippines the US will build them up to the point where they are a major base that the Japanse won't be able to take and then start offensive actions agains the Japanese. Since the atomic bomb was developed to defeat Germany they may avoid it in this case but they are going to loose China and perhaps Korea.
Prewar antipathy to Japanese actions in China etc is a long way from declaring war, public opinion for war in any democracy has to be almost complete or you end up with a Vietnam and it was that sneak attack on PH that completely sway US public opinion. Without it the US wouldn't I believe have gone all out as they historicially did.
US public opinion was already strongly in support of taking military action vs Japan. A negoitiated peace will be easier in this scenario but it's not going to be one the Japanese will like.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

lwd wrote:The war with China was not started by the army high command much less the combined high command.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo_Bridge_Incident
Efforts to defuse the escalating conflict failed, largely due to actions by the Japanese Northern China Area Army commanders and militarists within the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff;
The implication is that just because a general is the PM doesn't mean that everyone in the army is going to go along with his plan.
But the senior military went along with the Kwantung Army, including the IJN which quickly found itself involved in the fighting in Shanghai.

General Htdeki Tojo was a prime mover within the Kwantung Army and his appointment in October 1941 as Prime Minister made him dictator in all but name. He wasn't a titular PM.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

neil hilton wrote: The strategy I envisaged would have been for a limited war against the US, no PH no risking everything on the 'decisive battle' just an honourable start with warning and then years and years of unrelenting submarine warfare. The intention would be to war with the US but not enrage them enough to come storming across the Pacific with nukes in hand, similar to what happened in Vietnam.
A ''limited war'' is simply not an option. Who starts this war? As soon as US interests are attacked and American servicemen are killed the stakes will boil up into all-out war. Japan simply cannot win what would be a war of attrition in which its merchant fleet gets sunk by US subs. The Jap treatment of POW's in itself would be enough to inflame American opinion.

Now Vietnam, which you mention, was a limited war. You say the US ''piled in with nukes'' I think you will agree that is an exagerration. Nixon had Hanoi and Haiphong heavily bombed, along with the use of ''Agent Orange'' along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but nuclear weapons weren't used because the USSR and China also had them. George Wallace did advocate all out war, Curtis Le May was his vice-presidential running mate and he got only 13.5% of the 1968 presidential vote.

The US pulled out of Vietnam in 1975/76 because they couldn't win this limited war against the background of the Cold War. Against Japan prior to the Cold War there was no restraining factor. The only way the Japs could defeat the US in open warfare is to get the atomic bomb before the Americans and drop it on US cities.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by lwd »

RF wrote:
lwd wrote:The war with China was not started by the army high command much less the combined high command.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo_Bridge_Incident
Efforts to defuse the escalating conflict failed, largely due to actions by the Japanese Northern China Area Army commanders and militarists within the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff;
The implication is that just because a general is the PM doesn't mean that everyone in the army is going to go along with his plan.
But the senior military went along with the Kwantung Army, including the IJN which quickly found itself involved in the fighting in Shanghai.
But they didn't necessarily go along with it because they thought it was a good idea. The tendency of the more radical memeber of the military to assasinate those that opposed them and the loss of face in admitting that they weren't in control of thier forces were important factors.
General Htdeki Tojo was a prime mover within the Kwantung Army and his appointment in October 1941 as Prime Minister made him dictator in all but name. He wasn't a titular PM.
There were multiple power blocks in the Japanese government. Most of them may have been in the military but that doesn't mean the Tojo had anywhere near the level of control that Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini had. True he wasn't a PM in the sense that western democracies use the term but calling him a dictator is also a bit problematic.
User avatar
neil hilton
Senior Member
Posts: 339
Joined: Tue Apr 27, 2010 2:31 pm

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by neil hilton »

RF wrote:
neil hilton wrote: The strategy I envisaged would have been for a limited war against the US, no PH no risking everything on the 'decisive battle' just an honourable start with warning and then years and years of unrelenting submarine warfare. The intention would be to war with the US but not enrage them enough to come storming across the Pacific with nukes in hand, similar to what happened in Vietnam.
A ''limited war'' is simply not an option. Who starts this war? As soon as US interests are attacked and American servicemen are killed the stakes will boil up into all-out war. Japan simply cannot win what would be a war of attrition in which its merchant fleet gets sunk by US subs. The Jap treatment of POW's in itself would be enough to inflame American opinion.

Now Vietnam, which you mention, was a limited war. You say the US ''piled in with nukes'' I think you will agree that is an exagerration. Nixon had Hanoi and Haiphong heavily bombed, along with the use of ''Agent Orange'' along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but nuclear weapons weren't used because the USSR and China also had them. George Wallace did advocate all out war, Curtis Le May was his vice-presidential running mate and he got only 13.5% of the 1968 presidential vote.

The US pulled out of Vietnam in 1975/76 because they couldn't win this limited war against the background of the Cold War. Against Japan prior to the Cold War there was no restraining factor. The only way the Japs could defeat the US in open warfare is to get the atomic bomb before the Americans and drop it on US cities.
Referring to the use of nukes I meant against Japan not Vietnam. Just like to make that clear.
A trade war conducted entirely at sea is not going to enrage US public opinion as much as taking Panama. Remeber the US didn't declare war against Japan until PH and didn't declare war against Germany at all even while US ships were being sunk in the north Atlantic (and servicemen and civilians killed). Public opinion wasn't high enough for Roosevelt to safely declare war without anti-war riots breaking out. This is the point, there is a huge difference between public antipathy toward a far off peace threatening nation and declaring war (the problem with all democracies especially an historically isolationist nation like the US) it requires immediate and close danger or a catastrophic event such as PH or some really heavy propaganda to get a majority vote for war.
If Japan could somehow not trip this level then US war involvement would be limited as in Vietnam. Your point about George Wallace 1968 presidential vote being only 13.5% shows this, the public did not want all out war.
BTW I would imagine that taking Panama would be absolutely intolerable to the US govt and they would respond with all out war as much as the attack on PH which should be avoided. Not sure about the Phillipines, taking them might or might not enrage the US to all out war.
I think any land war campaign by Japan directly against US territory should be avoided, in this regard the Phillipines would be a difficult problem for the Japanese high command to solve.

The point raised by lwd is well taken, oil and supplies would be a big problem I don't know how much of a problem but subs and ASW escorts don't use as much as BBs and CVs so that sources in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya should suffice.
Veni, vidi, verrimus!
I came, I saw, I swept the floor!
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: How would you improve the IJN?

Post by RF »

The basic problem with this is how a limited war stays limited. They tend to escalate. Especially if opinion becomes inflamed, and public opinion in a democracy like the US can be fickle and subject to abrupt change. Unless Japan has a means of defeating the US and dictating the terms of peace, the Americans are the winners in such a war - they have ten times the war making capacity of the Japanese. And in a depression wars can be very good for business.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Post Reply