Somerville against the Rising Sun...

[Bgile]

Bgile, just a note about one of your statements. You mentioned that the US had large losses even towards the end when they had almost complete air superiority. The main reason that the losses remained high was that the mission had changed. US fliers spent the last 14 months of the war mainly attacking ground targets and the vast majority of the losses occurred in ground attacks. Ground attacks are just inherently dangerous and remain so until the present day (unless you can stand a long, long way off and use smart bombs). That's why planes like the Corsair can have 11:1 kill ratios and yet have to be continually replaced; losses to ground attacks aren't counted in the kill ratios. Incidentally and almost totally off of the subject, I ran into something interesting a couple of weeks ago about kill ratios. When the P-51 Mustang moved to the Pacific to escort B-29s to Japan, they didn't have anywhere near the success that they had in Europe. They destroyed 221 Japanese planes but suffered 114 losses of their own and 43 operational losses in addition. Given the sorry state of Japanese air defenses at this time, this was initially very puzzling to me. However, I can think of two reasons for this anomaly. One is that the P-51 had an inline engine which couldn't take the punishment of a radial (inline engines have vulnerable coolant systems). Unlike Europe where you returned home over land except for maybe a short hop over the English Channel, in the Pacific you had hundreds of miles of open sea over which to nurse a damaged engine. The other reason was that the Mustang had another vulnerability; its engine had an under fuselage air scoop. This protrusion must have made ditching at sea a very dangerous affair. Does anyone have any other thoughts on this subject?

Agree with what you are saying, but there were losses attacking ships as well. I'm sure that night attack losses to AAA would be lower, although operational losses much higher.

During a radar attack you would have trouble distinguishing a CV from other large ships, and have trouble judging your target's course and speed. I know that even the IJN used night attack to drop torpedoes, but it was much smaller scale than day attack and without major success. Being able to see your target counts for a lot.

Actually P-51's suffered heavily in Europe as well because of that water cooled engine combined with the fact that they attacked ground targets on almost every mission. Their losses based in Italy were almost all due to ground fire and accident.

[dunmunro]

dunmunro, you are misstating my assertion. I never said that British planes couldn't sink ships, I said that they rarely sank warships. There is a big difference between even the smallest warship and a merchant ship with very large holds and no possibility of nor training in damage control.

You mention a "vastly superior landbased airforce"; I presume that you are talking about the Germans not the Italians. The Germans were not superior to the Japanese either in attack planes or aircrew. The Stuka was very long-in-the-tooth, only the Ju 88 was still a good plane. The Germans still didn't have torpedo planes, they had to depend on the Italian's S.M.79s. There was no comparison in aircrew. The Germans had little training in attacking ships and not anywhere near the experience of Japanese aircrews who had been fighting in China since 1931 (it was Japanese naval planes, not army planes, that made all of the long range strikes). Some Germans got some experience in the Spanish Civil War but that experience had atrophied somewhat before WWII started and then some more during the "phony war" period. The Germans weren't bad but were never great. The Japanese started out the war great and only deteriorated when attrition ate into those vastly experienced aircrew and their replacement schemes were inadequate.

Somerville did NOT place himself where he could attack and be safe from counterattack. There was no such place. The difference in ranges of the respective airplanes was so great that no tropical night was long enough for the British to retreat far enough. Japanese combat radii were over twice that of the British at this time. That situation would remain until British planes were replaced with lend-lease US ones and Japanese plane's ranges later decreased as their plane's weights increased faster than their engines' horsepower did.

I fear that I must agree with Bgile. Your opinions are so set that you have blinders on and refuse to see any counter evidence. You might consider the raid of Victorious's planes on Kirkenes harbor in arctic Norway. The attack of twenty Albacores and nine Fulmars ran into a mere six Bf 109s and three Bf 110s. The attackers lost thirteen planes and did diddly to the harbor and its contents.

Right, the Luftwaffe was filled with incompetent pilots flying obsolete aircraft...

Yes, the IJN was invincible, that's why they lost 4 carriers at Midway

The Lufwaffe had more than 9 fighters defending Kirkenes and many of the aircraft losses were due to Flak. Again, you just seem to make things up to suit your argument.

The raid on Kirkenes was an example of the RN making a multi-carrier attack but they lost the element of surprise and their weapon loadout included too many torpedoes, when there were no worthwhile naval targets present.

[dunmunro]

During a radar attack you would have trouble distinguishing a CV from other large ships, and have trouble judging your target's course and speed. I know that even the IJN used night attack to drop torpedoes, but it was much smaller scale than day attack and without major success. Being able to see your target counts for a lot.

ASV is used to find the target which is then attacked visually. The IJN did torpedo a number of USN ships during night torpedo attacks from early 1943 onward, but the USN had effective radar and developed VT ammo just in time (both thanks to technology transfers from the UK), so they could defeat such attacks. On the night of 29-30 January 1943 in the Battle of Rennell Island, in IJN TBs torpedoed and crippled the heavy cruiser Chicago, and then sank her the next day. G4Ms attacked US task groups in night attacks and, for example in February 1944 a Betty torpedoed the Intrepid, CV-11.

[Bgile]

During a radar attack you would have trouble distinguishing a CV from other large ships, and have trouble judging your target's course and speed. I know that even the IJN used night attack to drop torpedoes, but it was much smaller scale than day attack and without major success. Being able to see your target counts for a lot.

ASV is used to find the target which is then attacked visually. The IJN did torpedo a number of USN ships during night torpedo attacks from early 1943 onward, but the USN had effective radar and developed VT ammo just in time (both thanks to technology transfers from the UK), so they could defeat such attacks. On the night of 29-30 January 1943 in the Battle of Rennell Island, in IJN TBs torpedoed and crippled the heavy cruiser Chicago, and then sank her the next day. G4Ms attacked US task groups in night attacks and, for example in February 1944 a Betty torpedoed the Intrepid, CV-11.

I don't doubt it was possible, and you have shown two examples of success. I doubt it's efficacy as a decisive mode of attack, and I doubt you could find very many such examples. I think it's a lot harder to see ships and attack them at night than during the day, even when you know where they are. Chicago was illuminated by burning Japanese aircraft, which made her an easier target than would normally be the case.

On that topic, I was under the impression that VT ammunition was ineffective when used against low level attack because the surface of the water activated the fuse. Do you have information to the contrary?

I do admire your ability to come up with specific examples which illustrate the points you are trying to make.

[dunmunro]

I don't doubt it was possible, and you have shown two examples of success. I doubt it's efficacy as a decisive mode of attack, and I doubt you could find very many such examples. I think it's a lot harder to see ships and attack them at night than during the day, even when you know where they are. Chicago was illuminated by burning Japanese aircraft, which made her an easier target than would normally be the case.

On that topic, I was under the impression that VT ammunition was ineffective when used against low level attack because the surface of the water activated the fuse. Do you have information to the contrary?

I do admire your ability to come up with specific examples which illustrate the points you are trying to make.

The IJN did not have radar (or VT ammo), so they would not have the forewarning and the precise direction of the attacks that the USN had. If there was not sufficient illumination the FAA would drop parachute flares to silhouette the target ships. Compared to the IJN attacks, the RN could attack without the target being alerted until the aircraft are sighted visually, and even then it was difficult for the targets to coordinate any kind of defence, and FAA/RAF aircraft sank many Axis ships using night attacks.

VT ammo could be triggered by water but the net effect still produced a kill rate higher than regular MT ammo and new fuzes were rapidly introduced, that performed much better against low level targets:

Feb 1943:

Our report to Pistol Pete on his revolutionary VT fuse was that we believed it helped shoot down one BETTY for sure, but there was plenty of evidence that it was too fragile and no doubt that a large number had gone off prematurely. We now had a “blown up” gun for our trouble and we were heading into “Indian Country” with only three 5" guns.

http://www.destroyerhistory.org/goldplater/crest08.html

Dec 1943:
http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/1315/79/0 (note the extreme efficiency of VT ammo against very low level targets)
and here is the account of Lexington being torpedoed by a night attack:
http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/1315/82/0

[lwd]

... ended up in Davy Jones' locker as did Yorktown (and lots of other USN carriers in 1942),

Lots = 3?

.... The RN carriers were operating in the central Med against a vastly superior landbased airforce, whose aircraft far outpeformed the IJN's.

Care to support this? especially for maritime attack the LW hardly looks suppeior to the IJN air component.

The simple fact is that carriers couldn't protect themselves with CAP alone unless they had overwhelming numerical superiority along with advanced radar and such advancements as VT ammunition for their guns.

The IJN did a pretty good job at Midway up until the fatal dive bomber attacks. I suspect you can find other cases where it happened as well. Of course the opposite is also true occasionally even with the above the defence proved inadequate.

However, Somerville had placed himself in a position where he could strike and avoid any counterstrike. He was able to do this because he had unique night strike and recover capability.

Indeed. However the results of said stirke are very much an open question. It could have been inconsequential or devestating or anywhere in between and I've yet to see a strong case made for just what the result would be.

[dunmunro]

Care to support this? especially for maritime attack the LW hardly looks suppeior to the IJN air component.

Aircraft and attack modes
Luftwaffe aircraft 1941-42 Med theatre
All aircraft are armoured and have SS fuel tanks.
Me109e/f max speed 355/390mph, GB variant - (250kg bomb used during Crete in GB mode)
me110, 345mph, GB variants - 2 x 500kg bombs
Ju-87, 240mph, 250 to 1000kg bomb capacity, 500kg typical, DB, GB, LB
Ju-88 ~300mph, 250 to 2000kg bomb capacity, 2 or 4 x 500kg typical, DB, GB, LB (TB in Arctic)
He-111 275mph, 250 to 2500kg bomb capacity, GB, LB (TB in Arctic)
RIAF 1941-42
SM-79, 285 mph, TB/LB, 1 or 2 x torpedoes, or 1200kg bomb load.
various LBs
CR-42, 275mph
G50, 300mph
Mc200, 315mph
Mc202 370mph
re2001 340mph

IJN 1942
A6M-2-21 Max speed 330mph, no GB capability in 1942
Val - 265mph max bomb load 350kg, max bomb size 250 kg
Kate 235mph TB/GB/LB max bomb load ~800kg
Nel 235mph TB/LB, max bomb load ~800kg
Betty 265mph TB/LB, 1000kg bomb load

[Bgile]

I notice you didn't list comparative range. I wonder why.

Wasn't there a British destroyer captain who wrote a book in which he states that if the Japanese had been the enemy in the Med the British would have lost? The idea was iirc that the Japanese were more competent at attacking ships and more aggressive.

[dunmunro]

I notice you didn't list comparative range. I wonder why.

Wasn't there a British destroyer captain who wrote a book in which he states that if the Japanese had been the enemy in the Med the British would have lost? The idea was iirc that the Japanese were more competent at attacking ships and more aggressive.

The range of the Axis aircraft was more than sufficient given the narrow confines of the Med. HMS Fiji was given the coup de grace by an Me109 fighter bomber, for example.

The Luftwaffe had elite anti-shipping units that were extremely aggressive as well, and they were dropping much heavier bombs than the IJN, whilst operating from "unsinkable" airfields.

[Bgile]

I thought this topic wasn't about being in the Med.

[dunmunro]

I thought this topic wasn't about being in the Med.

It isn't but but I suppose that comparisons are inevitable, especially since there exists a common misconception that the FAA was fighting 2nd line units and aircraft in the Med and Atlantic.

[Djoser]

Given the speed and range of Japanese carrier planes (and even their searching floatplanes), this wouldn't be enough. The British force would have been found, caught, and destroyed. Somerville knew this which is why he had a secret base and retired as he did. His dispatches, of course, wouldn't say bluntly that the British presence in the Indian Ocean was too weak to contest control but that was the reality and both he, Pound, and Churchill knew it. His efforts, therefore, were a mere token to show that he was doing something while really doing nothing or, at least, nothing with any risk attached. It would be about two years before the Royal Navy contested the Japanese control of waters adjacent to South-East Asia; until that time, Japanese land-based airpower made anything else too risky. The Royal Navy hadn't forgot the fate of Force Z.

Agreed.

Expecting the Royal Navy to take on the Japanese in the Indian Ocean was therefore foolhardy. As the British author Peter C. Smith put it in one of his many books on WWII naval and aviation matters, "... India itself seemed under threat and Admiral Somerville was given five old battleships, two carriers with a complement of obsolete and outdated biplanes as their striking force, and an assortment of cruisers and destroyers with which to stop them if he could". A couple of sentences later, he goes on to state, "Fortunately, Admiral Somerville's main fleet never came into conflict with this powerful array of naval power, but two of his heavy cruisers, Cornwall and Dorsetshire, weren't so fortunate". I think this British author's assessment of the situation is accurate.

Do you recall which book it was? I read 'The Great Ships Pass' many years ago and remember him discussing the clear imbalance of power in the Indian Ocean, but I wasn't aware that he had possibly written another. Smith has an interesting way of writing. Very dry humor, which I quite appreciated. A bit biased towards the battlewagons, perhaps, but he makes a good case for their value being generally underestimated--except possibly in the case of the old 'floating coffins' that Somerville had, as Churchill referred to them I believe.

dunmunro, fictitious nonsense???

If I keep repeating myself, it's because you don't address my points. If British carrier planes were so good, why did the Royal Navy replace them with lend-lease planes as soon as they became available? If British carriers didn't accomplish much because of their early losses, why didn't their planes protect them better so those losses didn't happen? Why did they order and not cancel the Firefly when it was going to be slower than planes built five years earlier and over 100 mph slower than its contemporaries? Why did they build biplanes after even the Italians stopped building them? With southern Norway so close to England, why weren't the British better at interdicting the passage of German surface ships between Germany and the arctic? Why wasn't the entire Admiralty and Coastal Command canned or at least caned after Operation Cerberus?

Great posts, BTW. Welcome to KBismarck!

In the attacks against Bismarck, the Swordfish flew 24 attack sorties and scored 3 hits. If we apply the same hit percentage to an Albacore strike of say 40 aircraft, then it would produce about 5 hits.

If we apply the same hit percentage to the Albacore strike of 12 aircraft in daylight against the Tirpitz in March 1942, then it should have produced 1.5 hits.

Your reasoning here is meaningless.

Precisely.

Somerville would have been slaughtered if he had really tried to take on Nagumo.

Though the zero pilots would have been so busy laughing while they shot down the clumsy, mediocre, utterly inferior Fulmars in droves (after catching up to the British carriers even if they did manage to make some sort of night attack) they might have botched the affair somehow.

[RF]

Somerville would have been slaughtered if he had really tried to take on Nagumo.

Not necessarily a certainty, but I think it would be the most likely outcome.

[dunmunro]

Not necessarily a certainty, but I think it would be the most likely outcome.

Historically, the IJN was aware that RN carriers were nearby because they intercepted several Albacore recon flights. Yet despite this knowledge, Nagumo's carriers never found Somerville, but at~1600 hours on April 05 Somerville had an approximate idea Nagumo was. If several Fulmars had been flown off immediately (or if Somerville had simply ordered a strike based upon the best information) they would probably have relayed the exact position of the KB and Somerville could have launched a strike that would have arrived just after sunset, without fear of retaliation. This is all based upon the historical situation at 1600 hours on April 05 1942.

Without radar the KB was very vulnerable to surprise attack, and in fact the KB was attacked without warning on a number of occasions - most notably at Midway. The first such attack was carried out by 9 Blenheims operating from Ceylon on April 09 1942. The first warning that the KB had of the attack was seeing the bomb splashes around Nagumo's flagship. The same attack but carried out by 9 Fulmars or even 9 Albacore DBs would probably have resulted in the crippling or even sinking at least one carrier, while a mass strike by 40+ DBs could have bagged the lot.

[Keith Enge]

Djoser wrote:
Do you recall which book it was? I read 'The Great Ships Pass' many years ago and remember him discussing the clear imbalance of power in the Indian Ocean, but I wasn't aware that he had possibly written another.

It was the book about British cruisers that he wrote with John R. Dominy called "Cruisers in action, 1939-1945"

dunmunro wrote:
while a mass strike by 40+ DBs could have bagged the lot

This was impossible. Given the small aircraft capacity of British carriers, he didn't have 40+ Albacores. You can't count any Fulmars or Hurricanes, they were divebombers and were needed as fighters, escort and CAP, anyway.