Somerville against the Rising Sun...

[dunmunro]

By the way, how did the Albacores find their own carriers and land on them at night?

The RN had developed a homing beacon that couldn't be RDFed but RN radar could identify FAA aircraft through IFF and then they could be contacted via radio and given direction vectors, and of course, ASV could find friends as well as foes.

[Keith Enge]

dunmunro, I don't dispute your hit percentage statistics. However, they are, to a certain extent, meaningless. I was discussing ships sunk, not ships damaged. In fact, that they got that many hits while sinking so few is an important indicator in itself. To win battles and especially wars, you have to sink ships not merely damage them. Otherwise, you'll just have to fight them again later. Note that my statistics included ships that were first damaged by aircraft torpedoes and then sunk by something else (Bismarck, Pola, and Trento). Therefore, the prewar doctrine of wanting a few hits to slow the enemy so that the battleline could finish them off only worked twice (Bismarck and Pola, Trento was finished off by a sub).

[dunmunro]

dunmunro, I don't dispute your hit percentage statistics. However, they are, to a certain extent, meaningless. I was discussing ships sunk, not ships damaged. In fact, that they got that many hits while sinking so few is an important indicator in itself. To win battles and especially wars, you have to sink ships not merely damage them. Otherwise, you'll just have to fight them again later. Note that my statistics included ships that were first damaged by aircraft torpedoes and then sunk by something else (Bismarck, Pola, and Trento). Therefore, the prewar doctrine of wanting a few hits to slow the enemy so that the battleline could finish them off only worked twice (Bismarck and Pola, Trento was finished off by a sub).

To sink ships with aircraft, you typically have to attack in large numbers. I pointed out in a previous post:

Year__CVs__RN*_USN__IJN
1935_______3____3___2
1936_______3____3___2
1937_______3____4___2
1938_______4____5___3
1939_______4____5___4
1940_______7____6___4
1941_______8____7___6

more later....
*The RN also had Eagle but I'm not sure that she was a fleet carrier despite her size, due to her low speed and small aircraft capacity.

The world's CV fleets expanded rapidly from 1938. However, the RN lost 3 CVs from Oct 1939 to Nov 1941and this is why Somerville was so outnumbered in April 1942, and this had squat to do with the fictitious nonsense that you keep repeating. RN CV strikes were small, with a few exceptions, during the early part of WW2 because the FAA's CVs had to be dispersed to meet threats around the globe and to provide cover for slow convoys through to Malta. Taranto, for example, was planned to be 3 CV attack with 72 strike aircraft but losses prior to Italy entering the war whittled the numbers down to single CV.

[dunmunro]

Commonwealth Naval aircraft
Torpedoes dropped_certain hits_probable hits_%_total certain and probable hits
609_____________167________37_______33.5

Naval Weapons of WW2, p81

However, Allied , mainly FAA aircraft, aircraft sank many ships in the Med with bombs and torpedoes:

Who would have thought that naval aero.
planes, and biplanes at that, would have any
contribution to a war fought in a desert! But
both the Swordfish and Albacores were used
in North Africa in the fight against the
Italians and later Rommel's Afrikka Korps.
On 30 May 1941 the Albacores of 826
squadron disembarked from Formidable to
Dekheila. They thought themselves loaned to
the RAF Middle East Air Force for a short
time but which turned out to be 20
months....To keep the crews on their toes the
squadron was withdrawn in January 1942
for torpedo refresher training. They moved
back in the line on 23 January but located at
Berka, near Benghazi so that if required
they were within striking distance of enemy
shipping detected between Italy and
Benghazi.
That same night five Albacores of 826
attacked a convoy 185 miles west of
Benghazi. One aircraft sank the liner
Vittoria and another damaged a destroyer
but the CO was shot down with the crew
becoming POWs. Early in February the
squadron moved back to Ma'ten Bapish
where they combined anti-submarine
patrols with 51 divebombing and flare
dropping desert trips...

...To give some idea of the constant strikes against the enemy, extracts from the squadron record book for 826 during July 1942 states-

Night 1-2 Six Albacores provided flare illumination for an attack by RAF bombers on enemy concentrations west of El Alamein, and on a forward landing ground. Many explosions among parked aircraft Estimate three destroyed and nine damaged) and among vehicles.

Night 2-3 Six Albacores illuminated and dive bombed enemy concentrations in cooperation with the RAF. Hits and violent explosions were observed among parked vehicles; an ammunition dump exploded.

Night 3-4 Seven Albacores dive bombed tank repair unit at Mersa Matruh. Heavy explosions and Germans later admitted that 12-15 heavy tanks put out of action. Ammunition train derailed and left explod~ng.

Night 4-5 Nine Aibacores provided flare illumination for RAF bombers fur Tree hops. Night 5-6

Eight Albacores dive bombed enemy shipping in Mersa Matruh.

Night 6-9 Eight Albacores continually illuminated and dive bombed enemy transports and tanks.

Night 9-10 Four Albacores dive bombed enemy tanks; six Albacores located and dive bombed enemy ship convoy 100 miles north of Tobruk. Two 5,000 ton ships sunk and others damaged; one Albacore bombed oil storage tanks in Tobruk.

Night 10-11 Six Albacores dive bombed enemy shipping in Mersa Matruh and three illuminated and dive bombed enemy concentrations.

Night 1 1 - 12 Six Albacores spotted and illuminated for shore bombardment by RN; six Albacores dive bombed enemy transport.

Night 12-20 Nightly attacks providing illumination for RAF bombers.

Night 20-23 Albacores from 826 and 821 squadrons dive bombed enemy tanks, M/T and troop concentrations.

Night 24-25 Ten Albacores illuminate landing strip for attacks by RAF Wellingtons. One Albacore failed to return.

Night 25-27 Twelve Albacores provide illumination for RAF bombers.

Night 28-29 Three Albacores bomb E-boats in Mersa Matruh, one sunk, one damaged.

Night 30-31 Four Albacores dive bombed enemy shipping in Mersa Matruh. One merchant ship sunk, one damaged. Three Albacores dive bombed enemy repair shops with two direct hits.

Excerpts from Fairey Albacore, by WA Harrison

[Keith Enge]

dunmunro, fictitious nonsense??? What have I said that can be disputed? Name me the warships that British carrier planes (or even land-based planes) sank. You state that, to sink ships, you need large strikes, I agree. However, you say that large strikes weren't possible because the British had few carriers because of early losses. This, however, is only half of the story. British carriers were incapable of large strikes because their aircraft capacity was so tiny too. Then, they would be incapable of follow up strikes (where damaged enemy ships are most likely to become sunken enemy ships) for two reasons. First, their aircraft losses meant that they had even fewer planes left (attacking aircraft losses would be high because the attack planes were so slow and poorly armed and the Fulmar wasn't a high performance escort). Second, the low aviation gasoline capacity of their carriers precluded sustained operations.

If I keep repeating myself, it's because you don't address my points. If British carrier planes were so good, why did the Royal Navy replace them with lend-lease planes as soon as they became available? If British carriers didn't accomplish much because of their early losses, why didn't their planes protect them better so those losses didn't happen? Why did they order and not cancel the Firefly when it was going to be slower than planes built five years earlier and over 100 mph slower than its contemporaries? Why did they build biplanes after even the Italians stopped building them? With southern Norway so close to England, why weren't the British better at interdicting the passage of German surface ships between Germany and the arctic? Why wasn't the entire Admiralty and Coastal Command canned or at least caned after Operation Cerberus?

[Keith Enge]

dunmunro, while I was composing my last post, you posted your pretty pie charts, etc. What do they have to do with the current discussion? Nobody said that the planes couldn't hit and kill stationary land targets and basically defenseless merchant ships. Your original supposition had the Royal Navy duking it out with Japanese Navy warships in the Indian Ocean. How do those pie charts and excerpts prove that the British carriers were capable of contesting those waters with warships. In fact, the excerpts probably prove the opposite. Near the start of the excerpt is the sentence, "On 30 May 1941 the Albacores of 826 squadron disembarked from Formidable to Dekheila. They thought themselves loaned to the RAF Middle East Air Force for a short time but which turned out to be 20 months". What is unstated is the reason that they were available for this deployment. Their carrier, Formidable, had just been badly damaged by II/St.G.2 and was out of war for almost a year. They obviously hadn't been able to protect themselves, what makes you think that they would have done better against the more formidable Japanese foe?

[José M. Rico]

In the attacks against Bismarck, the Swordfish flew 24 attack sorties and scored 3 hits. If we apply the same hit percentage to an Albacore strike of say 40 aircraft, then it would produce about 5 hits.

If we apply the same hit percentage to the Albacore strike of 12 aircraft in daylight against the Tirpitz in March 1942, then it should have produced 1.5 hits.

Your reasoning here is meaningless.

[lwd]

.... To win battles and especially wars, you have to sink ships not merely damage them. ....

Especially in the Pacific or should I say against the Japanese this was not the case. If a ship can be damage enough to take it out of the current action it gives you a better chance then. If it's out of action for some months then it gives you and edge for that period of time. With the new construction the allies had coming damaging could be enough. For a classic example of this look at the battle of the Corral Sea and in particular it's impact on Midway.

[lwd]

To my knowledge we really don't have any good model for determining torpedo hits from a night strike in 42 by British torpedo bombers.
On one hand not having to deal with CAP and having very reduced AA should be a big help. If there is sufficient light that flares aren't needed there's a good chance of achieving surprise as well which means the ships are likely traveling slower and not making evasive maneuvers.
On the otherhand figuring out how fast a ship is moving at night is non trivial and indeed even identifing the class may be difficult. Range determination may also be a problem and given the lack of AA it's even possible that the planes could drop too close.

Would British doctrine favor ganging up on one ship or splitting the attack between several? If the latter how many?

[Bgile]

How does an undetectable beacon work? Halsey had to turn on searchlights to help his aircraft several years later than this hypothetical battle.

How well did IFF work? To my knowledge the USN pretty much gave up on it because if it failed you get friendy aircraft shot down.

The idea of Albacore flying higher than it's radar works effectively and then a vertical dive to torpedo altitude intrigues me. Was this tactic actually used, or did they fly to the target at 5,000 ft like everyone else?

Barracudas were unable to get over a mountain range in the Pacific. Did they have a much lower service ceiling than Albacores?

[dunmunro]

dunmunro, while I was composing my last post, you posted your pretty pie charts, etc. What do they have to do with the current discussion?

They obviously hadn't been able to protect themselves, what makes you think that they would have done better against the more formidable Japanese foe?

You keep contending that the Albacore couldn't sink ships. I showed otherwise and also demonstrated its ability to dive bomb, even at night.

Oddly enough the IJN carriers at Midway, despite their swarms of fighters ended up in Davy Jones' locker as did Yorktown (and lots of other USN carriers in 1942), despite the fact that the IJN had a vastly reduced strike capacity when she was attacked. The RN carriers were operating in the central Med against a vastly superior landbased airforce, whose aircraft far outpeformed the IJN's. The simple fact is that carriers couldn't protect themselves with CAP alone unless they had overwhelming numerical superiority along with advanced radar and such advancements as VT ammunition for their guns. However, Somerville had placed himself in a position where he could strike and avoid any counterstrike. He was able to do this because he had unique night strike and recover capability.

[Bgile]

He was able to do this because he unique night strike and recover capability.

I feel that it was so unique it existed only in your mind. The USN used this method of attack only in very limited ways, even right up until the end of WWII. You have stated in no uncertain terms that it made the attackers essentially invulnerable and that their attack was just as effective as daylight attack (Swordfish vs Bismarck). Why then would anyone EVER attack during daylight? The USN lost many aircraft to enemy action right up to the end, even with air superiority.

I just don't believe this, but of course others can and will have their own opinions as you obviously do. Noone here seemed to believe me when I quoted from the Jurens/Fischer long range gunnery study, so there you go ... I guess we all have our own feelings about what works and what doesn't.

[dunmunro]

I feel that it was so unique it existed only in your mind. The USN used this method of attack only in very limited ways, even right up until the end of WWII. You have stated in no uncertain terms that it made the attackers essentially invulnerable and that their attack was just as effective as daylight attack (Swordfish vs Bismarck).

Where and when in the hell did I say that??? The data I presented on the Albacore night strikes clearly states losses as does the accounts of other FAA night attacks, such as Taranto.

[Keith Enge]

dunmunro, you are misstating my assertion. I never said that British planes couldn't sink ships, I said that they rarely sank warships. There is a big difference between even the smallest warship and a merchant ship with very large holds and no possibility of nor training in damage control.

You mention a "vastly superior landbased airforce"; I presume that you are talking about the Germans not the Italians. The Germans were not superior to the Japanese either in attack planes or aircrew. The Stuka was very long-in-the-tooth, only the Ju 88 was still a good plane. The Germans still didn't have torpedo planes, they had to depend on the Italian's S.M.79s. There was no comparison in aircrew. The Germans had little training in attacking ships and not anywhere near the experience of Japanese aircrews who had been fighting in China since 1931 (it was Japanese naval planes, not army planes, that made all of the long range strikes). Some Germans got some experience in the Spanish Civil War but that experience had atrophied somewhat before WWII started and then some more during the "phony war" period. The Germans weren't bad but were never great. The Japanese started out the war great and only deteriorated when attrition ate into those vastly experienced aircrew and their replacement schemes were inadequate.

Somerville did NOT place himself where he could attack and be safe from counterattack. There was no such place. The difference in ranges of the respective airplanes was so great that no tropical night was long enough for the British to retreat far enough. Japanese combat radii were over twice that of the British at this time. That situation would remain until British planes were replaced with lend-lease US ones and Japanese plane's ranges later decreased as their plane's weights increased faster than their engines' horsepower did.

I fear that I must agree with Bgile. Your opinions are so set that you have blinders on and refuse to see any counter evidence. You might consider the raid of Victorious's planes on Kirkenes harbor in arctic Norway. The attack of twenty Albacores and nine Fulmars ran into a mere six Bf 109s and three Bf 110s. The attackers lost thirteen planes and did diddly to the harbor and its contents.

Bgile, just a note about one of your statements. You mentioned that the US had large losses even towards the end when they had almost complete air superiority. The main reason that the losses remained high was that the mission had changed. US fliers spent the last 14 months of the war mainly attacking ground targets and the vast majority of the losses occurred in ground attacks. Ground attacks are just inherently dangerous and remain so until the present day (unless you can stand a long, long way off and use smart bombs). That's why planes like the Corsair can have 11:1 kill ratios and yet have to be continually replaced; losses to ground attacks aren't counted in the kill ratios. Incidentally and almost totally off of the subject, I ran into something interesting a couple of weeks ago about kill ratios. When the P-51 Mustang moved to the Pacific to escort B-29s to Japan, they didn't have anywhere near the success that they had in Europe. They destroyed 221 Japanese planes but suffered 114 losses of their own and 43 operational losses in addition. Given the sorry state of Japanese air defenses at this time, this was initially very puzzling to me. However, I can think of two reasons for this anomaly. One is that the P-51 had an inline engine which couldn't take the punishment of a radial (inline engines have vulnerable coolant systems). Unlike Europe where you returned home over land except for maybe a short hop over the English Channel, in the Pacific you had hundreds of miles of open sea over which to nurse a damaged engine. The other reason was that the Mustang had another vulnerability; its engine had an under fuselage air scoop. This protrusion must have made ditching at sea a very dangerous affair. Does anyone have any other thoughts on this subject?

[Bgile]

I feel that it was so unique it existed only in your mind. The USN used this method of attack only in very limited ways, even right up until the end of WWII. You have stated in no uncertain terms that it made the attackers essentially invulnerable and that their attack was just as effective as daylight attack (Swordfish vs Bismarck).

Where and when in the hell did I say that??? The data I presented on the Albacore night strikes clearly states losses as does the accounts of other FAA night attacks, such as Taranto.

For the first part, I can remember you saying that night attack avoids AAA and CAP, so clearly invulnerable except to accident.

As to the second part: "In the attacks against Bismarck, the Swordfish flew 24 attack sorties and scored 3 hits. If we apply the same hit percentage to an Albacore strike of say 40 aircraft, then it would produce about 5 hits." In other words, night attack was just as effective as day attack. Didn't the Swordfish attack Bismarck during the day? Otherwise, why would you use that comparison?