3 German battleships in May 1941.

[lwd]

Acutally the LW didn't prove itself very effective at Dunkirk or Norway or even Crete vs warships at speed with a decent supply of AA ammo and the ability to maneuver at will. Most of the hits on those three occaisons came from warships that were stopped or moving slowly, or had very limited AA ammo, or were overcrowded with evacuees.

Actually the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses both at Dunkirk and Crete

But at Dunkirk it was almost always stationary or slow moving ships or those overload with troops so they couldn't maneuver at will. At Crete again most of the losses occured when the ships were either almost out of or ran out of AA ammo, stopped to help other damaged vessels, or again were over crowded with evacuees. The damage per sorties even then were nothing to brag about and at Crete there were both LW and Italian planes present and the Italians had an arial torpedo that worked at that point.

Acutally the opposite is true. The Germans started the battle with a substantial edge in fighters by the end of the first week or two it had evaporated to the point where they were on a par with or even had fewer fighters than the RAF. The RAF thought they were loosing because they significantly overestimated the LW fighter and pilot production. The LW thought they were winning because they significantly underestimated the RAF fighter and pilot production.

Figures vary widely. But, as you should remember, we discussed this before, in another tread, and we found an interesting memo from a 1995 RAF Reunion dedicated to the battle of Britain. And as you probably remember, there were many aspects to this matter, with some speakers mentioning Aug-Sep as the most difficult and alarming part of the battle, as dead and injured pilots were more numerous than reinforcements.

Indeed but it was difficult and alarming due in large part due to them overestimating the replacement rate of the LW and not having a good handle on exactly what shape they were in. When that's taken into account the LW was in worse shape than the RAF and declining faster. Even if they manage to pull something out are they going to be in any shape to support the invasion afterwards?

And it certainly shouldn't have been reassuring to the LW. Nor were they able to stop the destruction of the amphibious portion of the invasion of Crete or the withdrawl of singificant numbers of British troops from the island.

There were much fewer warplanes there than there would have been massed in France.

And they would have had more to do and be faced by greater opposition and for that matter they were less skilled at antishipping strikes.

Based on the events of Dunkirk and Norway the risk is a lot lower than you seem mto think. The long hours of daylight can be a problem in and of themselves to the LW.

I won't comment anymore... What's the point ? If you start comparing the attacks at Dunkirk and Norway with a real, total concentration of all 5 Luftflotten... than... discussion is pointless...

So you just throw out the only real data points we have and wave your hands. That's a good plan .... not.

[lwd]

. Please note that if the window for an invasion is in summer, then the LW has no time to defeat the RAF. Hence, many of LW dive bombers will be shot down by Hurricanes and Spitfires and lots of barges will be sunk by the RAF.
Francis

I disagree - if the timescale had been followed with the diligence and urgency required then the RAF could have been destroyed within a week in July 1940.

Really? How? German fighters couldn't even reach the fields of 12 Group or 13 Group.

In reality the Battle of Britain only started more than two months after the completion of the Dunkirk evacuations. In that intervening ten weeks period the RAF gained more strength proportionately than the Luftwaffe, not just in terms of the number of Spitfires and Hurricanes, but more significantly in terms of pilot training, especially of the overseas pilots - the Poles, Czechs, Candians etc

But how early can the campaign start realistically? Certainly not June, probably not early July, possibly not until late July or August and then you are about a month from when the BoB started historically.

An air campaign based on joint inter-service military command - in which for example the KM expertise in identifying the Chain Home stations could be fully used - in which airfields were simultaneously attacked by Heinkels and the radar stations by stukas, all under heavy fighter escort, starting around July 20th, would have had a devasting impact on the British within days.

I believe the LW had identified the Chain Home stations. They just weren't very good at taking them out and they could be reparied fairly quickly. In the case above 11 Group would be almost sure to pull back from the fields closest to France. Operational losses would have impacted the LW pretty heavily in this campaign as well.

Once the radar plots have dried up then Parks' air group can largely be caught on the ground at their most vulnerable - at the point of taxing for take off.

Or not. Your forget that electronic interecepts of the LW groups forming up for attacks also played an important part in the early warning network. Thre's aslo little to indicate that the British would have left their planes in the most forward fields where they would be that vulnerable. Historically the RN removed DDs from some of the channel ports for that reason and I beleive the RAF pulled back from some of its coastal fields as well did it not?

[lwd]

The Germans were certainly smart enough to make the crossing under cover of darkness. Some small losses will likely occur but I can't think of a way that the RN or the RAF in 1940 could have stopped them from crossing during the night hours, and once it's done-it's done. The simple historical fact was that Hitler didn't want to do it and the GAF not gaining air superoirity just made it easier to walk away from it.

What are they crossing with? If they are using the barges as per Sea Lion it takes at least 24 hours for them to cross and that's being genereous. From some of the invasion ports to the beaches would it would have been as 36 hours or more. Then of course the landing isn't instantaneous, the invasoin fleet is going to take a while to unload and be subject to attack for that period. Then some at least are going to have to make a return trip or should I say trips. If you look at the Sandhurst game they just assumed that the Germans could make the landing and were relativly safe for I think 3 days, inspite of that the Germans lost (around day 10 I beleive) due to logistical problems brought on by their inability to maintain the sea portion of the supply corridor after that.

[Francis Marliere]

Dave,

I fear that crossing the Channel during darkness would be a very difficult task. I even wonder if it is possible : towed barges are awfully slow and may not reach English coast before daylight. I can't imagine that towing vessels could navigate accurately and many barges would be lost to collisions and cutted tows. I can't neither imagine that convoy reach the good beaches at the right time. We all know that marines often landed on the wrong beach by day despite having specialised amphibious crafts, training, doctrine and support. How could the German perform better without landing craft, training or doctrine ?
Crossing the Channel by night implies that the convoy is left without LW support against a probable attack by surface ships.

[alecsandros]

But at Dunkirk it was almost always stationary or slow moving ships or those overload with troops so they couldn't maneuver at will.

During the evacuation, Ju87s attacked only in 2 or 3 days, because of bad weather.
Even so, 9 destroyers were sunk, (6 British, 3 French) despite heavy opposition by the RAF.

My question would be: how many warplanes were actualy used to attack the ships at Dunkirk ?

At Crete again most of the losses occured when the ships were either almost out of or ran out of AA ammo, stopped to help other damaged vessels, or again were over crowded with evacuees.

AA supplies don't last forever - usualy a few hours of shooting for any kind of vessel.
And of course, the volume of AA fire can make for an "X" number of attacking planes. It's one thing to protect a squadron against 12 Ju87, and another against 200.

Even if they manage to pull something out are they going to be in any shape to support the invasion afterwards?

I guess it would depend on the exact operational moves. Aug-Sep 1940 had GErman fighters all over the southern part of Britain - with all the shortcomings attached.
Keeping them just over the channel, or focusing only on the airfields closest to shore would probably reduce the number of lost German planes. (the range problems would be diminished, and damaged planes could land more often back in France, instead of crash landing on British soil, with the pilot remaining prisoner)
And, again, focus is probably key. Shifting the strategy every 2-3 weeks brings nothing good - continous pressure with all 5 luftflottens, and possibly some Italian/Romanian/Hungarian airforce support may well change the balance of power rapidly.

[lwd]

During the evacuation, Ju87s attacked only in 2 or 3 days, because of bad weather.
Even so, 9 destroyers were sunk, (6 British, 3 French) despite heavy opposition by the RAF. ...

I was going to post some information from this thread but you may want to look at it all as it was a rather spirited debate on both sides:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=121871
The topic being the one under current discussion not the OT. I think those who suggested a split earlier are right someone may want to request it of the admin.

[alecsandros]

During the evacuation, Ju87s attacked only in 2 or 3 days, because of bad weather.
Even so, 9 destroyers were sunk, (6 British, 3 French) despite heavy opposition by the RAF. ...

I was going to post some information from this thread but you may want to look at it all as it was a rather spirited debate on both sides:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=121871
The topic being the one under current discussion not the OT. I think those who suggested a split earlier are right someone may want to request it of the admin.

I don't see any addition to our discusiion. On the contrary...

And the question remains : exactly how many dive-bombers actualy participated in the Dunkirk and Crete attacks ?

[Francis Marliere]

During the evacuation, Ju87s attacked only in 2 or 3 days, because of bad weather.

Gentlemen,

I would like to point out once again that if Ju 87 could attack only 2 or 3 days during the Dunkirk evacuation because of bad weather, they may not be able to destroy every British ship attempting to attack the invasion convoy. The Germans were strong and smart at this time but did not control the weather ...

[alecsandros]

During the evacuation, Ju87s attacked only in 2 or 3 days, because of bad weather.

Gentlemen,

I would like to point out once again that if Ju 87 could attack only 2 or 3 days during the Dunkirk evacuation because of bad weather, they may not be able to destroy every British ship attempting to attack the invasion convoy. The Germans were strong and smart at this time but did not control the weather ...

Absolutely.
But that's why weather reports were so important and demanded by high command.

ANy invasion would be planned only after some clear meteo reports, if only for the reason that the shps couldn't operate to well in rough, or even in moderate seas...

Thus, at any other kind of weather, the invasion ships would be in harbors...

They woudl wait until the weather would be fine, and then loaded and sent to invade... Thus air support would be effective...

[Francis Marliere]

Yes, and a good window fo an invasion would be difficult to find. German need good visibility for air operations, flat calm sea for the convoy as well as favorable tide for the landing. Since the barges are very low, the sea must be calm for a long time.

[alecsandros]

Yes, and a good window fo an invasion would be difficult to find. German need good visibility for air operations, flat calm sea for the convoy as well as favorable tide for the landing. Since the barges are very low, the sea must be calm for a long time.

Yes, I think there was some prognosis done at the time...

[lwd]

... And the question remains : exactly how many dive-bombers actualy participated in the Dunkirk and Crete attacks ?

It is a question but Dunkirk is such a poor analog of what an attack on the RN intercepting German invasion convoys would be like that it's simply not worth much work. Crete might well be closer but of course it's some time later and both the Italians and the LW are better at anti-shipping strikes at that time. Furthermore the LW couldn't simply concentrate on the RN in an invasion and there would almost assuredly be some RAF presence. Then there's the question of just what was the capacity of the French fields.

[RF]

The simple historical fact was that Hitler didn't want to do it and the GAF not gaining air superoirity just made it easier to walk away from it.

This is the main point of the matter. Plus also the open borders to the east, those Romanian oilfields and the Russian bear flexing its muscles. Barbarossa was already in its genesis.

[RF]

. Please note that if the window for an invasion is in summer, then the LW has no time to defeat the RAF. Hence, many of LW dive bombers will be shot down by Hurricanes and Spitfires and lots of barges will be sunk by the RAF.
Francis

I disagree - if the timescale had been followed with the diligence and urgency required then the RAF could have been destroyed within a week in July 1940.

Really? How? German fighters couldn't even reach the fields of 12 Group or 13 Group.

By following the original German plan and sticking to it - by taking out the 11 Group airfields and radar stations, but this time with sustained bombing dawn to dusk. Fighters from 12 and 13 Groups are drawn into this because they are covering 11 Groups airfields and could be reduced by attrition.
Knocking out the airfields and radar stations is the key - yes fighters can be drawn back out of range, but the forward airfields close to the coast have to be kept serviceable so complete withdrawal couldn't be afforded.

I believe the LW had identified the Chain Home stations.

The LW thought they were radio direction finders at first: the KM understood what they were but in the absence of combined military staffs they didn't volunteer the information and the LW didn't ask for the KM intelligence.

. Your forget that electronic interecepts of the LW groups forming up for attacks also played an important part in the early warning network.

No. The intercepts tell you an attack is coming - not when or where the blow falls. The RAF couldn't keep substantial numbers of planes in the air for long and would be dependent on the Observer Corps for directional reports and the other sighting information needed for interception.

[lwd]

Really? How? German fighters couldn't even reach the fields of 12 Group or 13 Group.

By following the original German plan and sticking to it - by taking out the 11 Group airfields and radar stations, but this time with sustained bombing dawn to dusk. Fighters from 12 and 13 Groups are drawn into this because they are covering 11 Groups airfields and could be reduced by attrition.

This is more likely to cause serious attrition to the LW than the RAF. First of 11 Group will pull back from it airfields closest to France. In the mean time dawn to dusk bombing will mean that at least most of the time when 12 or 13 group interfere they will do so from a postion of numerical superiority especially when you consider 12 groups penchant for "large wing tactics". This also sets the LW up for FLAK traps by the way and means flight profiles that will accentuate operational losses.

Knocking out the airfields and radar stations is the key - yes fighters can be drawn back out of range, but the forward airfields close to the coast have to be kept serviceable so complete withdrawal couldn't be afforded.

But there wasn't that much to keeping them servicable was there? A clear hint is that none were ever put out of action for more than 24 hours in a row.

. Your forget that electronic interecepts of the LW groups forming up for attacks also played an important part in the early warning network.

No. The intercepts tell you an attack is coming - not when or where the blow falls.[/quote]
That's an importnat part. The radar didn't tell you where the blow was going to fall either. It just allowed you to track the LW planes to the British coast. Radio intercepts could give you enough warning to get in the air and triangulation could provide at least some clues as to speed and route. Once they were over Britian it would be the Observer corp as it was historically that was providing the information.