alecsandros wrote:lwd wrote:
Acutally the LW didn't prove itself very effective at Dunkirk or Norway or even Crete vs warships at speed with a decent supply of AA ammo and the ability to maneuver at will. Most of the hits on those three occaisons came from warships that were stopped or moving slowly, or had very limited AA ammo, or were overcrowded with evacuees.
Actually the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses both at Dunkirk and Crete
But at Dunkirk it was almost always stationary or slow moving ships or those overload with troops so they couldn't maneuver at will. At Crete again most of the losses occured when the ships were either almost out of or ran out of AA ammo, stopped to help other damaged vessels, or again were over crowded with evacuees. The damage per sorties even then were nothing to brag about and at Crete there were both LW and Italian planes present and the Italians had an arial torpedo that worked at that point.
Acutally the opposite is true. The Germans started the battle with a substantial edge in fighters by the end of the first week or two it had evaporated to the point where they were on a par with or even had fewer fighters than the RAF. The RAF thought they were loosing because they significantly overestimated the LW fighter and pilot production. The LW thought they were winning because they significantly underestimated the RAF fighter and pilot production.
Figures vary widely. But, as you should remember, we discussed this before, in another tread, and we found an interesting memo from a 1995 RAF Reunion dedicated to the battle of Britain. And as you probably remember, there were many aspects to this matter, with some speakers mentioning Aug-Sep as the most difficult and alarming part of the battle, as dead and injured pilots were more numerous than reinforcements.
Indeed but it was difficult and alarming due in large part due to them overestimating the replacement rate of the LW and not having a good handle on exactly what shape they were in. When that's taken into account the LW was in worse shape than the RAF and declining faster. Even if they manage to pull something out are they going to be in any shape to support the invasion afterwards?
And it certainly shouldn't have been reassuring to the LW. Nor were they able to stop the destruction of the amphibious portion of the invasion of Crete or the withdrawl of singificant numbers of British troops from the island.
There were much fewer warplanes there than there would have been massed in France.
And they would have had more to do and be faced by greater opposition and for that matter they were less skilled at antishipping strikes.
lwd wrote: Based on the events of Dunkirk and Norway the risk is a lot lower than you seem mto think. The long hours of daylight can be a problem in and of themselves to the LW.
I won't comment anymore... What's the point ? If you start comparing the attacks at Dunkirk and Norway with a real, total concentration of all 5 Luftflotten... than... discussion is pointless...
So you just throw out the only real data points we have and wave your hands. That's a good plan .... not.