It really depends on what time during the battle you're talking about. The famous question to Lee from Mitscher was the night of the 18th. Mitscher saw that had they continued west they could've made contact that night. At the time, Spruance was still concentrated in a cruising disposition although Lee's heavy surface striking force (TG58.7) had already assembled. Meanwhile Ozawa had already deployed into an approach disposition with his van 100nm in front. At this point Lee had a significant advantage in battleships and destroyers, while being deficient in cruisers. The tasking as going into the 19th was as follows:
TG 58.7 VAdm. Lee
- BatDiv 6 (Washington Only)
- BatDiv 7 (Iowa, New Jersey)
- BatDiv 8 (North Carolina, Indiana)
- BadDiv 9 (South Dakota, Alabama)
- CruDiv 6 (Witchita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, San Francisco)
- DesRon 4 (4 DDs)
- Desron 45 (5 DDs)
- DesRon53 (4 DDs)
= 7 BB, 4 CA, 13 DD
Mobile Force Vanguard VAdm. Kurita
- 1st Battle Squadron (Yamato, Musashi)
- 3rd Battle Squadron (Kongo, Haruna)
- 4th Cruiser Squadron (Atago, Takao, Chokai, Maya)
- 7th Cruiser Squadron (Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma)
- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (Noshiro + 1 DD)
- 31st Destroyer Division (3 DD)
- 32nd Destroyer Division (2DD)
- 17th Destroyer Division (1DD)
= 4 BB, 8 CA, 7 DD
Its an interesting opposing disposition with Lee clearly having the advantage in BB and DD strength but severely lacking in cruiser strength. One advantage he has is that the typical cruising disposition puts the battleline at 20Kyds (he was 12nm the next day for the airbattle) which allows him to be reinforced.
I do not recall what the intelligence was on Kurita but if he had a fairly accurate report Spruance had the option to chop additional cruiser divisions to Lees task group. I do know that Spruance was to join TG58.7 in the even of a surface action, he was flying his flag in Indianapolis. Kurita, unfortunately, did not have this option as he was already 100nm from Ozawa. Even at a 10kt overtake it would take any reinforcements 10hrs to join. So I'd imagine he'd be stuck with what he had.
In my opinion, Lee missed his chance here. Despite his reservations, the USN had developed cohesive night doctrine built around their advantages in radar and CIC. He had significantly superior firepower in the battleline and could have easily been reinforced. I'm not as enthusiastic about the chances of a success for a mass torpedo attack for the IJN. For one thing, their success was quite limited after 1942 (2% hit rate actually) and the USN had not only become aware of the threat of the torpedo itself but had capture several important IJN doctrine on their surface warfare tactics.
Anything could have happened and night engagements could certainly deteriorate into a mess. I doubt it would have a "trafalgar-esque" result, but given the desire to coordinate a joint surface-air attack I don't think Kurita's force would have survived (recall he also had 3 CVLs in his formation as well). But who really knows, anything can happen.