May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Alecsandros wrote: "There are to many eye-witness accounts and maps to show that PoW DID make a turn to avoid Hood immediately after the battlecruiser exploded"
Ciso Alec,
well, we will have to agree to totally disagree on this aspect, many witnesses felt the ship turning and this was due to the heeling...... There is no space/time between PoW salvos to allow any significant turn except an irrelevant one (less than 10°), due to the fact that Y turret was never wooded and an interval of 20 secs is not enough to allow even such an irrelevant turn and counter-turn......

you wrote: "Fire would be done continously. 6:03 - 6:18:"
Possibly, but in some minutes after 6:06 both ships would be back to their full speed and range increase rate would be quite high, so again I don't expect many hits. Historically, in more than 3 minutes with the same geometry, BS and PG were not able to put a single hit on PoW (albeit the distance was already a bit higher).

IMO the very first minuets would have been key in order to slow down PoW, if not done immediately, the probability to slow her later are very limited, except accepting a very long stern chase .
you wrote: just occurred to me that if PoW goes on 180*, Bismarck would better go on 150* and fire with all turrets... If PoW goes 135*, BS can go 105*, etc."
yes but again, I don't think Bismarck could go further than 180° in any case if Lutjens was not asking PG to take care of Norfolk beforehand..... e.g. on 105°the risk to be torpedoed in few minutes (5 mins for a launch of several fishes at extreme range, 10 mins for a launch at very, very short range) is too high.....

Steve Crandell wrote: "The British survive if slowed; the German ships don't."
Hi Steve,
I fully agree, and this is the key reason why Lutjens decision not to risk further was absolutely correct (without hindsight) and Lindemann was wrong..... Even without the torpedo alert, having the door of Atlantic wide open by PoW retreat, I think Lutjens would not have changed his course 220°to finish PoW taking risks he could not afford.


Bye, Alberto
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

Steve Crandell wrote:I'm not aware of a ship ever being hit on shafts or props by naval gunfire. Maybe it happened occasionally, but I think that is pretty unlikely.
Well, we know Kirishima suffered either stearing gear or shaft damage, or both - in battle with Washington.

Giulio Caesare suffered a hit which damaged the funnel uptakes - causing her to lose much speed. There is a possibility that Scharnhrost also such a hit... Musashi suffered a bomb hit that also damaged her funell uptakes...
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

Alberto Virtuani wrote: Possibly, but in some minutes after 6:06 both ships would be back to their full speed and range increase rate would be quite high, so again I don't expect many hits. Historically, in more than 3 minutes with the same geometry, BS and PG were not able to put a single hit on PoW (albeit the distance was already a bit higher).
Well, if correctly done, the pursuit should have offered at least some realistic possibilities of further damage to Prince of WAles. If BS would follow PoW at 6:03, trying to match the enemy's course (or to adopt an own course offset on the enemy to allow all guns to bear), there should be chances of hitting, as range was 14km... I agree that the initial minutes would be the most important, as later distance could increase and fire would become less effective...
I fully agree, and this is the key reason why Lutjens decision not to risk further was absolutely correct (without hindsight) and Lindemann was wrong..... Even without the torpedo alert, having the door of Atlantic wide open by PoW retreat, I think Lutjens would not have changed his course 220°to finish PoW taking risks he could not afford.
The best option (with hindsight) would have been to turn back at 6:03 , and go back through the strait - accepting possible enemys could await him at the northern end*. As it was, with Bismarck/Prinz Eugen taking the long way to Brest, they exposed themselves to the entire Home Fleet arrayed against them, plus several key heavy units which were brought from far away to assist in their destruction (Force H - Ark Royal, Sheffield, Renown; Rodney).

*I personally would have envisaged a short pursuit of Prince of Wales - say until torpedoes are detected (6:16/18), and then , if clear damage is observeable - attempt to destroy PoW, and if not - go back through the strait.

As it was, Luetjens allowed the escape of a dangerous enemy, which became well operational several hours later.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Alecsandros wrote: "The best option (with hindsight) would have been to turn back at 6:03 , and go back through the strait - accepting possible enemys could await him at the northern end"
Hi Alec,
I do agree with you, but I'm not sure that, even after sinking Hood, Lutjens could give up his mission and just come back.

Raeder should have had to explain to Hitler the "failure" of the Kriegsmarine to pose a threat to the British commerce.
It would have been a bit like the Jutland, a tactical victory for Germany but a strategical defeat..... :think:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Alecsandros wrote: "The best option (with hindsight) would have been to turn back at 6:03 , and go back through the strait - accepting possible enemys could await him at the northern end"
Hi Alec,
I do agree with you, but I'm not sure that, even after sinking Hood, Lutjens could give up his mission and just come back.

Raeder should have had to explain to Hitler the "failure" of the Kriegsmarine to pose a threat to the British commerce.
It would have been a bit like the Jutland, a tactical victory for Germany but a strategical defeat..... :think:


Bye, Alberto
Kind of..
But .... at least at 6:30 when the damage was well known... My personal opinion is that the wiser thing to do would have been to turn back.... Bismarck was not in good shape to continue the mission anyway...

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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by Steve Crandell »

alecsandros wrote:
Steve Crandell wrote:I'm not aware of a ship ever being hit on shafts or props by naval gunfire. Maybe it happened occasionally, but I think that is pretty unlikely.
Well, we know Kirishima suffered either stearing gear or shaft damage, or both - in battle with Washington.

Giulio Caesare suffered a hit which damaged the funnel uptakes - causing her to lose much speed. There is a possibility that Scharnhrost also such a hit... Musashi suffered a bomb hit that also damaged her funell uptakes...
I said "shafts or props". Some people think Kirishima's rudder was hit. From the side. We are talking probabilities here, and the same thing could happen to Bismarck. Equally unlikely.
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

Steve Crandell wrote: I said "shafts or props". Some people think Kirishima's rudder was hit. From the side. We are talking probabilities here, and the same thing could happen to Bismarck. Equally unlikely.
From 14km, hits on a PoW-sized target wouldn't be unlikely... Historically the ship was relatively lucky to escape significant damage - which may have come from either of the 7 sustained hits. Imagine hit no 5 would strike the machinery space and explode inside... At 6:02/03... Causing immediate speed drop, probably down to 20kts... Or hit 7 from Prinz Eugen striking the unarmored funnel uptakes and exploding against them...

The stern was indeed a small target, but hits there aren't impossible. Also, the probable geometry of the pursuit would permit hits in the entire after half of the British battlehsip, not against the stern alone...
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by Dave Saxton »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:...
I do agree with you, but I'm not sure that, even after sinking Hood, Lutjens could give up his mission and just come back.

Raeder should have had to explain to Hitler the "failure" of the Kriegsmarine to pose a threat to the British commerce.
It would have been a bit like the Jutland, a tactical victory for Germany but a strategical defeat..... :think:


Bye, Alberto
Here is what actually transpired between Hitler and Raeder following the loss of the Bismarck. From Bekker pg 226:
Why, the Fuehrer demanded to know, had Bismarck, after sinking the Hood, not used its fighting power to knock out the Prince of Wales too? "If Bismarck had to be lost," he declared, "the end result would have been loss of two British capital ships to the German one."

On the face of it, it was a very simple and obvious piece of arithmetic, which to Raeder only showed once again how little the Fuehrer understood the principles of Atlantic warfare. Rising to Luetjens' defense, he referred to the "damage to enemy commerce that the Fleet Commander had to keep in mind as his primary objective." This implied that the responsibility for the loss of the Bismarck and its crew lay with the Grand Admiral himself. In fact he accepted it in full, though without drawing the consequences. Instead he tried to justify his strategic ideas by speculation saying: " had he fought it out with Prince of Wales, however successfully, he would have to reckon with such damage to his own ship as to render impossible the pursuance of his role as a commerce raider."
Thus it was Raeder, not Hitler, that was concerned about the commerce raiding mission aspects. Hitler actually regretted that Luetjens did not fight it out with POW. Hitler viewed it as a missed opportunity.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

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Dave Saxton wrote:
Thus it was Raeder, not Hitler, that was concerned about the commerce raiding mission aspects. Hitler actually regretted that Luetjens did not fight it out with POW. Hitler viewed it as a missed opportunity.
I think in this instance Hitler was right - and that it would have been the right decision by the Fleet Commander if he had gone for POW was confirmed by Captain Leach in immediately breaking off the battle when Hood blew up.

Reverse the situation - I think any RN commander would have gone for the second ship. The British naval domination of the nineteenth century was established on the aggression and the taking of acceptable risks during the Napoleonic wars..

Hitler of course emphasised the no unnecessary risks stance Raeder initiated, but here there was a clear caveat - that Bismarck was lost anyway. Where Hitler was at fault was in not providing a clear directive as to how far KM surface and capital ships were supposed to fight, leaving some discretion to commanders on the spot. Remember this is the same Hitler that had wanted Lotjens recalled when first told that Rheinubung was under way.

I have said on this thread earlier and on other threads that an aggressive Fleet Commander could have eliminated not only the Hood/POW combination but possibly two heavy cruisers as well, preventing any immediate shadowing. This could be justified in terms of the commerce war in that taking these ships out makes it easier to sortie and attack convoys by degrading opposition forces.
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by paul.mercer »

Gentlemen,
Whether Bismarck should have followed PoW has been discussed many times with varying opinions. We should try to put ourselves in Lutyens position, he had sunk Hood but suffered damage that shipped a couple of thousand tons of water into Bismarcks bow and was losing oil. Neither he did not know how badly PoW was damaged or that she had problems with her guns and now he was out into the Atlantic with the certainty that the RN would go all out to get him he could not afford to take any more damage which might slow him down. It is all very well to say that Bismarck was immune to 14" shells at a given distance, but as has been discussed many times before, a shell or shells do not necessarily to penetrate an armoured deck for it to cause serious or possibly crippling damage.
In my humble (and not very expert opinion) Lutyens acted correctly in making for Brest and it was a very unlucky (from his point of view and very lucky from ours!) that he took a torpedo hit in the rudders,otherwise he would almost certainly have made it.
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

paul.mercer wrote:Gentlemen,
Neither he did not know how badly PoW was damaged or that she had problems with her guns and now he was out into the Atlantic with the certainty that the RN would go all out to get him he could not afford to take any more damage which might slow him down.
... Surely it was a hard decision for him to take.
However, my opinion is that he made a wrong decision on the info available to him. Setting to BRest meant a 4-day journey - giving the Home Fleet ample time to concentrate heavy forces along his escape route. Going back to Norway would have meant a 2.5 days journey - risky and with the added problem of aborting his raiding mission - but it gave the enemy half the time to destroy him.

This is the more apparent as we look at the messages sent to him concerning enemy forces. On the 22rd he received a message that all ships are at anchor in Scapa Flow - so his sortie from Norway was not detected. On the 24th in the morning, he was intercepted by 2 capital ships... Which couldn't have come from no place other then Scapa... With contact with the cruisers made on May 23rd 19:30 hours, it wasn;t enough time for Hood to come from Scapa.

So Luetjens knew Hood was on the move to intercept before the cruisers made contact with him - so he was detected earlier...

Thus, the Admiral must have known that other enemy heavy forces may be at sea since at least 1.5 days earlier (night of 22/23 was the latest date from which a ship steaming hard from Scapa could possibly arive in an intercept position south of the Denmark Strait). So, it was possible that other enemy ships were coming after him...
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

paul.mercer wrote: In my humble (and not very expert opinion) Lutyens acted correctly in making for Brest and it was a very unlucky (from his point of view and very lucky from ours!) that he took a torpedo hit in the rudders,otherwise he would almost certainly have made it.
Hard to say,
HE was very unlucky on May 26th, indeed,
But let's remember he was very lucky on May 24th and 25th...

My impression is he gambled his way towards Brest... and lost...
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

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paul.mercer wrote:Gentlemen,
In my humble (and not very expert opinion) Lutyens acted correctly in making for Brest and it was a very unlucky (from his point of view and very lucky from ours!) that he took a torpedo hit in the rudders,otherwise he would almost certainly have made it.
I agree completely with this.

But it is a separate issue from continuing the engagement with POW. The full extent of damage to Bismarck was only apparent to the senior officers after firing had ceased and therefore would not have been part of the decision to disengage.
Even with substantial further damage - in my view unlikely - the option for the Biscay ports remains.
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by alecsandros »

RF wrote: Even with substantial further damage - in my view unlikely - the option for the Biscay ports remains.
The option remains, but what about the quality of the decision taken ? Why was it better , with the info available on that morning, to go to Brest ?
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Re: May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Dave Saxton wrote: "Thus it was Raeder, not Hitler, that was concerned about the commerce raiding mission aspects. Hitler actually regretted that Luetjens did not fight it out with POW. Hitler viewed it as a missed opportunity."
Hi Dave,
this Hitler position (with all hindsight available to him...) looks very much like the position of a dictator, knowing nothing of naval warfare, who wants to show to the "poor" (expert....) Raeder that he would have had a better solution than him and Lutjens together.....
Of course , with hindsight, he was right: knowing the actual outcome of Rheinubung, even turning against Holland's light escort, being sunk by their torpedoes and sinking one single small destroyer :shock: , would have been better that what actually happened to the German flagship.....

I'm sure Hitler would have criticized any decision that was leading to Bismack loss in any case.

Hitler was pushing the navy (and Raeder) to take decisive actions against the British vital commerce but was not willing to take the necessary risks, Raeder just implemented the decision and the Rheinubung operative orders were very clear and sensible: not to engage battleships (if not for sinking convoys).

RF wrote: "Remember this is the same Hitler that had wanted Lotjens recalled when first told that Rheinubung was under way."
Hi RF,
absolutely correct ! The problem is that he had no clue what naval war meant in terms of risks to be taken in order to get the results he was requiring.

Paul Mercer wrote: "In my humble ..... opinion Lutyens acted correctly in making for Brest
Hi Paul,
I do agree with you, given his orders and the scope of the mission, without hindsight.

Alecsandros wrote: " my opinion is that he made a wrong decision on the info available to him. Setting to Brest meant a 4-day journey - giving the Home Fleet ample time to concentrate heavy forces along his escape route. Going back to Norway would have meant a 2.5 days journey - risky and with the added problem of aborting his raiding mission - but it gave the enemy half the time to destroy him. "
Hi Alec,
you are right of course from tactical viewpoint.
The only problem, was that Hitler and Raeder expected results against the British commerce from the Rheinubung.

To come back home, just after sinking Hood, would have been glorious, but without crippling damage sustained, I'm sure Lutjens would have been criticized for not fulfilling the priority scope of the mission.
In this sense, sinking PoW, and sustaining other serious damage (very likely IMO, both would PoW have not disengaged at all at 6:01:30 and even would a retreating, desperate, PoW have decided to turn back and fight to death once followed and hit), would have been a "better opportunity" for him to abort his mission and to try to come back home without the risk to be criticized.

As he was not yet aware of the severity of the damage already sustained at 6:03 and his division gunnery had been disrupted by the torpedo alert and turns, I think he was right continuing his mission without loosing time behind a retreating enemy under smoke.

I agree with you that, in an hypothetical scenario, with no torpedo alarm, BS had good chances to hit PoW after 6:03, in the very first minutes (14 / 15 km distance) of the chase (I'm not sure it was easy to slow her down, however, due to the geometry), but, due to the fake alert, there was not much probability to slow down PoW even with a long stern chase (starting from around 18 km distance)....


Bye, Alberto
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