Who was the best Kriegsmarine surface ship commander?

[RF]

Coming back to the original question I am somewhat surprised that no-one has suggested Theodor Krancke, perhaps the most successful single heavy ship captain, whose cruise on Admiral Scheer is widely regarded as a maritime raiding classic. He did everything just right, reaching as far as the Arabian Sea and getting back home again.

[Terje Langoy]

Yo're right about Cilliax.. It was at least one of the twins. But I would have to say that the Channel Dash was amongt the most genious operations, and that's why he had my vote. Simple and genious. He was a man who didn't reject the idea to sneak by, right under the nose of the British. Just like Gunther Prien. A cautious commander like Lutjens would never do that simply because he'd already have convinced himself it would never work. But if the operation had failed, where would that put Cilliax? It's not much that separates a genious commander from a failure. As for Theodor Krancke, and the Admiral Scheer, he don't necessarily strike me as an remarkable commander in other terms than to receive good result in a warfare where he would be superior anyway. It's not a token of great leadership to persist when you're engaging merchants and AMC's aboard an armoured cruiser carrying six 11-inches!

I was looking more for surprising and innovative elements of tactic and strategies when I accessed the question. Cilliax simply took the route that, to the British, was anything but an obvious choice. A commander showing that he was willing to "gamble" in order of achieving results. When you raise the stakes and risk more, the more guts it takes of you as a commander. That's how I see it...

[RF]

As for Theodor Krancke, and the Admiral Scheer, he don't necessarily strike me as an remarkable commander in other terms than to receive good result in a warfare where he would be superior anyway. It's not a token of great leadership to persist when you're engaging merchants and AMC's aboard an armoured cruiser carrying six 11-inches!

I was looking more for surprising and innovative elements of tactic and strategies when I accessed the question.

My suggestion of Krancke was not from the standpoint of engaging merchant ships or AMC's - if that were the criteria then Operation Berlin looks distinctively unimpressive.
My thinking was more in terms of keeping a substantial warship in hostile waters thousands of miles from home for up to five months and in getting back again without being caught and engaged. Indeed I believe that the Scheer on its return journey was the last German ship to successfully pass the Denmark Strait undetected.

[RF]

I was looking more for surprising and innovative elements of tactic and strategies when I accessed the question. Cilliax simply took the route that, to the British, was anything but an obvious choice. A commander showing that he was willing to "gamble" in order of achieving results. When you raise the stakes and risk more, the more guts it takes of you as a commander. That's how I see it...

This was a route decided upon by Hitler, not Raeder let alone Ciliax. It appears from Garret's book that Ciliax was not too much a success as a captain of Scharnhorst, and my impression was that he embraced the idea of the Channel Dash from the standpoint of his own security and career advancement, and failed to recognise it for the strategic retreat that it actually represented. I could of course be wrong about Ciliax, but I assume that the KM ratings who nicknamed him the ''black czar'' did so for good reason.

[Terje Langoy]

Wow, this thread is indeed an old one, Robert..! I must admit that I'm not of the same opinion now as I was back then, looking only at the physical results of Scheer's sortie as in the ships, hereunder type of ships, that had been sunk. Now that I have done a bit more reading, study and reflecting I tend to agree with you on Theodore Krancke. Yes, he did manage to avoid what both of the Graf Spee's didn't. Perhaps it was the most successful execution of Raeder's strategy on the high seas done by a regular warship.

I'm quite aware now that the Channel dash, like Jutland, was a tactical victory but strategical defeat. I also see this as a pretty solid blow to the authority of Admiral Raeder since Hitler's "superiority" in what should be Raeder's domain totally wrecked his future plans for the twins. Both of them with modifications I view as intended to improve their capabilities as raiders. It could have been interesting to find out exactly what motives Hitler had for calling them back at a time when they were close to ready for re-entering the Atlantic.

Finally, in accordance with the origin of the thread, my vote for the best KM surface ship commander would, at the current moment, go to Kurt Caesar Hoffmann aboard the Scharnhorst. He appears a very capable commander both socially and tactically.

[RF]

I can go along with you regarding Hoffmann, but there is one reservation already alluded to by Vic Dale in the thread about whether Lutjens or Marschall would have been the better Rheinubung Fleet Commander - namely that he was possibly too gung-ho for his own good on Operation Berlin, where he did propose to Lutjens that Scharnhorst engage a battleship with 15 inch guns to draw her away from a convoy, and was slapped down. We shal never know whether it would have worked, but the risks were substantial, and if Scharnhorst's engine rooms were hit.....

Krancke was careful in his convoy attack to stay out of range of Jervis Bays popguns - as a result most of that convoy escaped and if Krancke had a pair of K classe cruisers with him the merchantmen in that convoy would have been massacered.... Those two cruisers could then have gone to France while Scheer plunged further afield.... leaving the problems for the British.
It does highlight that not using the K classe in conjunction with the big ships was a failing on the Germans part, surprising considering what German light cruisers outside home waters achieved in 1914....

[Bgile]

I can go along with you regarding Hoffmann, but there is one reservation already alluded to by Vic Dale in the thread about whether Lutjens or Marschall would have been the better Rheinubung Fleet Commander - namely that he was possibly too gung-ho for his own good on Operation Berlin, where he did propose to Lutjens that Scharnhorst engage a battleship with 15 inch guns to draw her away from a convoy, and was slapped down. We shal never know whether it would have worked, but the risks were substantial, and if Scharnhorst's engine rooms were hit.....

Krancke was careful in his convoy attack to stay out of range of Jervis Bays popguns - as a result most of that convoy escaped and if Krancke had a pair of K classe cruisers with him the merchantmen in that convoy would have been massacered.... Those two cruisers could then have gone to France while Scheer plunged further afield.... leaving the problems for the British.
It does highlight that not using the K classe in conjunction with the big ships was a failing on the Germans part, surprising considering what German light cruisers outside home waters achieved in 1914....

I was under the impression that German CLs had so many defects they were useless as open ocean raiders. Is that not correct?

[Terje Langoy]

I can go along with you regarding Hoffmann, but there is one reservation already alluded to by Vic Dale in the thread about whether Lutjens or Marschall would have been the better Rheinubung Fleet Commander - namely that he was possibly too gung-ho for his own good on Operation Berlin, where he did propose to Lutjens that Scharnhorst engage a battleship with 15 inch guns to draw her away from a convoy, and was slapped down. We shal never know whether it would have worked, but the risks were substantial, and if Scharnhorst's engine rooms were hit...

Currently wide open at the desk before me is Whitley's book "German Capital Ships of World War Two" and hereunder his excellent account of the encounter in question above. Here's a general summary of the events:


- At 0618 on 8th February, the radar aboard the Gneisenau had picked up a contact to starboard, quickly followed by another contact, at a range of 17 200 m. Visual sighting was however not obtained for another two hours, when the foretop lookouts reported mastheads, evidently a convoy. The flagship continued to close on the contacts until the foretop reported "a thick mast, possibly a warship" with the immediate effect that current heading of the flagship was altered, putting the convoy astern. At 0859 Admiral Lütjens signalled the Scharnhorst with details of the sighting, stating his intentions to attack from the south while Scharnhorst simultaneously attacked from the north at about 1030. Two minutes later, the flagship lost visual contact with the convoy.

- Meanwhile, the Scharnhorst had worked up speed to 20 knots and altered course for the reported position of the convoy, sighting a ship at 0947, bearing 350 deg. range 28 500 m. About a minute later several mastheads rose above the horizon but it was quickly established that a warship was present, identified as the Ramillies. The British ship sighted the Scharnhorst, increased speed to 15 knots and closed up action stations. Hoffmann now initiated a ploy of his own initiative, intending to close in on the enemy until recognized as German and then reversing the course and so draw the Ramillies away from the Gneisenau attacking from the south. That the Scharnhorst had been spotted was evident by the smoke rising from Ramillies' funnel as she worked up speed. At 1004 the ploy failed as Admiral Lütjens received the battlehip report from the Scharnhorst and ordered Hoffmann to break off the action. Scharnhorst withdrew as ordered, losing sight of the Ramillies about 40 minutes after the first sighting.

- Lütjens was extremely angry with Hoffmann for exercising his initiative in this manner. Operational orders stated that "course was to be reversed as soon as a capital unit was sighted" and Lütjens considered Hoffmann's actions neither corresponded to his own intentions nor the operational orders. Hoffmann argued to his defence that such a statement was contained nowhere in the orders, there merely being the usual statement to the effect that "battle with an equal enemy was to be avoided" and that Lütjens interpretations was far too restrictive for them to succeed in their task.


It appears to me that Hoffmann never intended to actually engage the Ramillies, merely flash his own ship to the enemy and then make a"run to the north" hoping that the Ramillies would play along. His plan seems to have worked, as evidenced by the Ramillies making smoke and so forth working up speed. Considering the range of which the two ships detected each other, roughly 28 000 m, I'm compelled to say neither of the ships could have been of any particular threat to each other. So, despite an apparently minimal risk and a plan that seemed to work just fine, the flagship failed to exploit this golden opportunity offered by Hoffmann's actions. But on the other hand, this could of course be due to Lütjens signal to the Scharnhorst at 0859, where he provided an ETA for the attack (1030) in which the Scharnhorst already was on the move 42 minutes ahead of schedule. So forth, it is a possibility that the Gneisenau not even was in a position to exploit the opportunity offered by the Scharnhorst and thus Hoffmann winded up with flashing his ship and announcing their presence for the enemy, alerting not only the Ramillies but the British Admiralty of their current whereabouts, and this without achieving any mission objectives being able to justify the attack. Perhaps can we produce arguments both ways here but bottom line is that the plan of Hoffmann, it's simple intention, was more than valid. With proper coordination and resolute determination between the two German ships as well as the Fleet Commander, it could perhaps have paid off big time.

But for the sake of the merchant sailors in convoy HX-106, let's be glad it didn't.

[Bgile]

Well said, Terje. It makes sense. Hoffman's plan was good, but he wasn't the fleet commander and uncoordinated action would understandably upset the latter.

[RF]

Without Hoffman's ploy being put fully into effect there is no real answer as to the degree of risk Scharnhorst was put. Bear in mind the convoy had other escorts such as destroyers and also of how close Scharnhorst would have to approach to draw the British battleship away.

[Bgile]

Without Hoffman's ploy being put fully into effect there is no real answer as to the degree of risk Scharnhorst was put. Bear in mind the convoy had other escorts such as destroyers and also of how close Scharnhorst would have to approach to draw the British battleship away.

It seems to have appeared to Hoffman that he had succeeded.

[Terje Langoy]

Bearing in mind the historical references I think we can safely assume the Scharnhorst never was in any grave danger. However, in a hypothetical sequel to this action the outcome could perhaps be of a different nature. I dare not speculate too much though I supect the superior speed of the Scharnhorst should give her an advantage nonetheless. Most of all, I consider Gneisenau as the pending factor here. How long would Scharnhorst have to put up a show before rumours of another suspicious ship would make further decisions hard to make aboard the Ramillies? Hoffmann's ploy could not be executed by the Scharnhorst alone, it required an offensive from the Gneisenau too.

A detail I consider to be of upmost importance is Lütjens contact report and his following orders, signalled to the Scharnhorst at 0859. Hoffmann later argued to his defence that the Flagship had reported the convoy some eight miles south of its true position, hence the early detection at 0947. (43 minutes before the attack was supposed to commence) From here, merely a minute would pass before the Scharnhorst at 0948 sighted and identified the Ramillies which soon after also detected the Scharnhorst, though at the time only as a "suspicious ship" (Ramillies would later report the contact as the Hipper, presumably based on recent intelligence of the Hipper leaving Brest) Anyway, after sighting Scharnhorst the Ramillies began to work up speed in order to close in and investigate. Thus the increase of smoke from Ramillies' funnel would surely give Hoffmann verification that he had gained Ramillies attention. It would also give him little choice but to either withdraw and report to Lütjens that the planned attack now was compromized or he could take actions at once and hopefully Lütjens would play along. It seems to me he simply tried to respond to an unfortunant error in a report received 49 minutes earlier.

[Terje Langoy]

Krancke was careful in his convoy attack to stay out of range of Jervis Bays popguns - as a result most of that convoy escaped and if Krancke had a pair of K classe cruisers with him the merchantmen in that convoy would have been massacered.... Those two cruisers could then have gone to France while Scheer plunged further afield.... leaving the problems for the British.
It does highlight that not using the K classe in conjunction with the big ships was a failing on the Germans part, surprising considering what German light cruisers outside home waters achieved in 1914....

I’ve had a brief glance into K/S’ book on the German CL’s in World War Two and made a general summary of the various careers. It goes as following:

At the outbreak of war, four of the six CL’s were utilized as mine layers to reinforce the Siegfried Line by mining the German bight from the Dutch coast to Kattegat. (Emden was damaged 4 September when a Tommie crash-landed between the quay and her foredeck while berthing - Karlsruhe went out of service in May 1938 for structural modifications and did not return to service before November 1939) By December, Emden and Karlsruhe were deployed in training duties while Königsberg underwent a refit in the shipyard. The other three CL’s acted as escort screen for destroyers returning back to port after mine operations off the British eastern coast, which had been a successful task up until 13 December. At this day Leipzig and Nürnberg were both torpedoed by the submarine HMS Salmon (Köln escaped the attack) and though the hit aboard the Nürnberg had been severe enough to put her out of action until May 1940 it had been a fatal blow to the Leipzig. Orders came that “neither her top speed nor full battle-readiness needed to be restored” and she was to be reassigned as a training unit for naval gunnery and torpedo schools when she left the shipyard in December 1940. During Weserübung in April 1940, four CL’s (Emden & K-class) were deployed to Norway whereupon two of them subsequently were lost. Emden then acted as a communications- and liaison centre in Oslo until the situation in Norway had been consolidated and she returned to Gotenhafen in August. Köln returned back in April and were refitted from June 1940 until March 1941 (in this period she had a wooden Helipad mounted at the roof of her B-turret - she would be one of the first warships to conduct trials with an onboard helicopter, the FI282 Kolibri. After Nürnberg left the shipyard in May 1940, she operated in Norway as troopship escort in June 1940 (Operation Dora) and then returned to the Baltic in the end of July, as battleship escort. (Gneisenau)

Early in 1941, the OKM issued an instruction reclassifying the four remaining CL’s as training ships “with no further operational deployment from 7 February 1941”

The two cruisers Köln and Nürnberg were redeployed in the North Group of the newly composed German Baltic Fleet, after the initiation of Barbarossa. In September the group set sail towards the Gulf of Finland in case any Russian warships should leave Kronstadt to intern in Sweden. However, no such thing occurred and the operation was finally called off in October. Köln then returned to port for further refits and would not set sail again until July 1942, as she was to relieve the CA Lützow in Norway. Nürnberg had reverted to her role as a training ship before she too set sail towards Norway to relieve the CA Admiral Scheer in October 1942. During the first half of 1941 the Leipzig had numerous minor refits until she in June acted as escort for the CA Lützow (Operation Sommerreise) following her as far as Norway. She returned back home and would, together with Emden, be part of the South Group of the German Baltic Fleet. They would carry out shore bombardment in support of the German landings on the Estonian island of Ösel. By November Leipzig would return to her role as training ship, as would Emden. Both were either in refit or training duties throughout 1942.

…So, if we can agree the window of opportunity for the CL raider probably would have to be dated fall of 1940, then the list of operational CL’s doesn’t exactly resemble a fleet. The Fiasco of 13 December 1939 plus Weserübung certainly took its toll and with the OKM directive of February 1941 in mind as well, I think the list of probable candidates has already been reduced to merely the Köln and the Nürnberg. (I exclude the Emden as she, in my view, was unsuited for such operations) These CL’s were most active thus they’re as a good a choice as any. I like to believe Nürnberg might be able to manage but I suspect the Köln would be worse off. One of her sisters, the Karlsruhe, suffered severe structural damages in a Force 12 Hurricane back in March 1936 whereas the entire ship had threatened to completely fall apart. Allegedly, the K-class cruisers had a weak construction and poor stability which offers no good in an operation on the High Seas. So, we’re left with the Nürnberg only. Whether she could have contributed to Scheer's sortie is another discussion.

[Bgile]

A very good summary. Unfortunately it will be lost in a discussion of ship commanders and hard to find within a month or so.

[RF]

Looking at this summary I am wondering whether the KM really got the best out of its light cruisers, indeed of whether with a better design more reliable ships could have been available. Originally intended as longer range ships (equipped with diesel engines) it is rather ignominous that they should be relegated to the role of training ships.

It also leaves open the thought that many of these ships commanders, given other roles, might have been able to achieve something that would rank for discussion under the title of this thread.