Hiroshima and Olimpic
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Since the Hiroshima bomb didn't cause the Japanese to surrender, a demo bomb wouldn't have either. Wouldn't we just have wasted a bomb?
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi lwd! Thanks for the response.
1. You are correct that there were other relevant concerns and I didn't mean to say that there weren't. I intended a narrower context for my statement " The only relevant concern is whether the long term U.S. political position would have been stronger by creating a factual record that precludes later questioning about morality". I was referring to what the relevant concerns were as to the Japanese only (in other words the hell with them but we still have to do what is best die us). I did not intend this to be a statement of what should be Truman's sole concern.
2. You are right about the number of Japanese casualties from the March firebombing of Tokyo. However in the week July 30-August 5, the AAF was actually dropping leaflets to warn the civil population out of targeted cities. This concern about minimizing them neutralizes the contention that the current conventional operations were designed to inflicted more in 1-2 weeks than the atomic bombs did. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i3a07p.htm See also page 440 subtitle "The Final Blows" of General MacArthur's Rerport of Operations. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 1/ch14.htm
3. You asked what would be a significant number (or as I propose an insignificant number) of casualties that would occur from the actual ongoing operations during a week's waiting period. I propose determining the actual number of casualties from a week of such operations in August 1945 and deciding whether it was significant or insignificant.
(a) Paragraph 41 of Admiral Nimitz Final Report on those operations said there were 50 US-UK naval casualties in the entire month of August 1945.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... 45Aug.html
(b) The table on page 110 of the Army Casualty Reports says that total Army and AAF battle deaths in August 1945 were 391, non battle deaths were 194, total was 585.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref ... html#death
(c) Marine Corps deaths are not included but the above numbers suggest less than 100.
Dividing the month onto four weeks, In a week's waiting time there would have been about 110 battle casualties from existing operations against Japan. If the air operations against Japan were suspended, what would the number have been from unavoidable ground operations to mop up pockets in places such as Borneo and the Philippines, perhaps 20?
4. You are right that training for amphibious landings and other things necessary for the invasion was dangerous. But armies engage in highly dangerous training maneuvers during peacetime. Look at the number of military training accidents during our recent years at peace. See also the number of casualties from accidents in August 1945 reported in the table above.
1. You are correct that there were other relevant concerns and I didn't mean to say that there weren't. I intended a narrower context for my statement " The only relevant concern is whether the long term U.S. political position would have been stronger by creating a factual record that precludes later questioning about morality". I was referring to what the relevant concerns were as to the Japanese only (in other words the hell with them but we still have to do what is best die us). I did not intend this to be a statement of what should be Truman's sole concern.
2. You are right about the number of Japanese casualties from the March firebombing of Tokyo. However in the week July 30-August 5, the AAF was actually dropping leaflets to warn the civil population out of targeted cities. This concern about minimizing them neutralizes the contention that the current conventional operations were designed to inflicted more in 1-2 weeks than the atomic bombs did. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i3a07p.htm See also page 440 subtitle "The Final Blows" of General MacArthur's Rerport of Operations. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 1/ch14.htm
3. You asked what would be a significant number (or as I propose an insignificant number) of casualties that would occur from the actual ongoing operations during a week's waiting period. I propose determining the actual number of casualties from a week of such operations in August 1945 and deciding whether it was significant or insignificant.
(a) Paragraph 41 of Admiral Nimitz Final Report on those operations said there were 50 US-UK naval casualties in the entire month of August 1945.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... 45Aug.html
(b) The table on page 110 of the Army Casualty Reports says that total Army and AAF battle deaths in August 1945 were 391, non battle deaths were 194, total was 585.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref ... html#death
(c) Marine Corps deaths are not included but the above numbers suggest less than 100.
Dividing the month onto four weeks, In a week's waiting time there would have been about 110 battle casualties from existing operations against Japan. If the air operations against Japan were suspended, what would the number have been from unavoidable ground operations to mop up pockets in places such as Borneo and the Philippines, perhaps 20?
4. You are right that training for amphibious landings and other things necessary for the invasion was dangerous. But armies engage in highly dangerous training maneuvers during peacetime. Look at the number of military training accidents during our recent years at peace. See also the number of casualties from accidents in August 1945 reported in the table above.
Last edited by tnemelckram on Sun Mar 01, 2009 5:17 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
My answer is no. For two reasons: First this uses the benefit of hindsight. Second, setting hindsight behind, I am proposing following up with the historic two bombs which did induce the surrender.Bgile wrote:Since the Hiroshima bomb didn't cause the Japanese to surrender, a demo bomb wouldn't have either. Wouldn't we just have wasted a bomb?
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Nothing would preclude questions about morality. In this case for instance say we did drop the demo and then 2 more real bombs. The argument in that world could be that the additional casualties from the additional two weeks plus the additional losses due to starvation and disease among the Japanese population could have been avoided if we hadn't dropped the demo bomb. Many might argue that one would bomb would have been enough (lacking the knowledge of what happened when this strategy was followed).tnemelckram wrote:Hi lwd! Thanks for the response.
1. .... I intended a narrower context for my statement " The only relevant concern is whether the long term U.S. political position would have been stronger by creating a factual record that precludes later questioning about morality". ...
I have not contended that the convention opereations were designed to inflict that many casualties. However I contend that they could have especially if you include the additional affects of starvation and disease....However in the week July 30-August 5, the AAF was actually dropping leaflets to warn the civil population out of targeted cities. This concern about minimizing them neutralizes the contention that the current conventional operations were designed to inflicted more in 1-2 weeks than the atomic bombs did.
How about Chinese losses? And Australian? and for that matter Soviet? And it isn't just battle casualties. There are disease and accident casualties that are dependent on whether or not the war is over. This also ignores the possibility of a successful attack by the Japanese. A single kamikaze or even conventional bomber or sub for instance that gets lucky could cause multiples of this with just the one attack. Then there were the indications that the Japanese were starting to execute POWs in greater numbers.... In a week's waiting time there would have been about 110 battle casualties from existing operations against Japan.
But as I've stated suspending air ops sends the wrong signal. It would IMO almost guarantee that there was no surrender immediately after the third bomb. This means the war goes on even longer.If the air operations against Japan were suspended, what would the number have been from unavoidable ground operations to mop up pockets in places such as Borneo and the Philippines, perhaps 20?
Indeed but no one was going to be conducting major amphibious exercises in the aftermath of a Japanese surrender. They would be conducting them in the absence of the same.4. You are right that training for amphibious landings and other things necessary for the invasion was dangerous. But armies engage in highly dangerous training maneuvers during peacetime. ...
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi lwd!
Good debate with you capably advocating the other side. First of all I made a mistake by using August 1943 instead of August 1945 to arrive at Army and AAF August 1945 Pacific Theater casualties. Here are the correct August 1945 figures from the same Pacific Theater table:
Killed in action...... 260
Died of wounds..... 37
Declared dead....... 1
Total battle deaths 298
Accident aircraft....... 124
Accident not aircraft.. 178
disease.................. 111
Other.................... 78
Total Non-battle deaths 491
So my revised total battle deaths per week from existing operations in August 1945 is 112.
US and UK Navy Battle Deaths 50
Army and AAF Battle Deaths 298
Estimated USMC Battle Deaths 100
Total August 1945 Battle Deaths 448
448/4 weeks = 112 per week.
Note that there were 491 non battle deaths instead of the 194 that I previously and erroneously stated, which bolsters your point about the inherent dangers of non-battle military operations. But see point 4 below.
1.
My point is that moral issues are a springboard for a stronger long term position on issues such as proliferation. It takes away the argument that actual past use justifies development by other countries. Such complications from letting the genie out of the bottle was foreseen and the issue was raised:
Among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project were many who did not agree.
To them, the "wave of horror and repulsion" that might follow the sudden use of an atomic
bomb would more than outweigh its military advantages. "It may be very difficult," they
declared, "to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and
suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand
times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons
abolished by international agreement." The procedure these scientists recommended
was, first, to demonstrate the new weapon "before the eyes of representatives of all the
United Nations on the desert or a barren island," and then to issue "a preliminary ultimatum"
to Japan. If this ultimatum was rejected, and "if sanction of the United Nations (and of
public opinion at home) were obtained," then and only then, said the scientists, should the
United States consider using the bomb. "This may sound fantastic," they said, "but in nuclear
weapons we have something entirely new in order of magnitude of destructive power, and
if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage their possession gives us, we must use
new and imaginative methods." (emphasis added)
Command Decisions Army Center For Military History (1960) at 498 http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_23.htm
This neatly encapsulates my view. This source gives a reasoned explanation of the decision to disregard it, so opening it should enhance the discussion. Here's an example of how one aspect of the explanation can be pierced. It relates something that hasn't come up here yet - a "warning or demonstration" could be followed with a dud. It's interesting that the quote is in the disjunctive or because the only way a dud would matter is if there was a warning and then a failed demonstration. With no warning, the Japanese would not know that a dud had occurred. I have already ruled out pre-announcing a demonstration because of the obvious danger to the air crew, but the risk of a dud is another good reason not to warn. Overriding all is warning or no warning, a dud on an actual target would not be any different.
2.
I have already said that the welfare of the enemy was a secondary consideration to our best interests. But there are three additional reasons why this doesn't hold water.
(a) The blame must land on the Japanese government for its decision to continue the war.
(b) The existing loose blockade was designed to allow passage of enough food and medicine
but was going to be tightened. From the same source at page 500:
Other means of achieving this objective had been considered and, in early June, had
not yet been entirely discarded. One of these called for the occupation of a string of
bases around Japan to increase the intensity of air bombardment. Combined with a tight
naval blockade, such a course would, many believed, produce the same results as an
invasion and at far less cost in lives.
General MacArthur relates Japanese fears that the demands of the Occupation could
cause problems with the food supply.
Immediately following the Emperor's surrender proclamation, officials of the Agriculture-
Commerce Ministry and the Chief of the Tokyo Economics board estimated that Japan's
food supplies would be entirely dislocated because of expected heavy food requisitions
by Occupation forces. Yomiuri-Hochi warned that the food requirements of the "tens
of thousands" of Occupation troops would have a "great effect upon our present and
future livelihood."
Reports Of General MacArthur, Army Center For Military History (1966) at 22.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... ch1.htm#b6
(c) Both alternatives would lead to an indeterminable number of deaths so weighing one
against the other is precluded but both are still terrible by nature and cancel each other out.
3.
own troops and had been a most troublesome ally to boot. No problem.
(b) Australian - The Commonwealth nations warranted the same consideration as our own. I'd say you would probably have to add 3 casualties, at most 5, to the US-UK figures.
(c) Russian - Allies warrant the same consideration. They didn't start their Manchurian invasion until August 8. A Russian decision about waiting 1-2 weeks was for the Russians and since it's outside our control the losses are outside our blame-scope.
4.
5.
(b) Anything is possible but the best available indicator of actual cost is the actual losses from the actual ongoing operations.
(c) I'm surprised that the 800 deaths from the sinking of the Indianapolis on July 29, 1945 haven't been mentioned. There are many reasons why it should not affect my likely casualty figures, or their import. First, Japanese submarines were a remarkably ineffective weapon and this was their only dramatic success. Second, the lesson had been learned and the further precautions would be intended and thus expected to reduce future casualties from the same cause. Third, it was a one-off event caused by unique circumstances (among them failure to take existing precautions and the nature of the mission) which were unlikely to be repeated. Fourth, even if you move all 800 casualties into August, the result is about 300 per week, which I suspect is still far less than people entering in to this subject believe.
(d) Let's not lose sight of the fact that the soldiers always say that they are grateful that the bomb spared them the expected horrors of the invasion. I've never heard anyone express the same view with respect to weekly losses from current operations.
6.
Good debate with you capably advocating the other side. First of all I made a mistake by using August 1943 instead of August 1945 to arrive at Army and AAF August 1945 Pacific Theater casualties. Here are the correct August 1945 figures from the same Pacific Theater table:
Killed in action...... 260
Died of wounds..... 37
Declared dead....... 1
Total battle deaths 298
Accident aircraft....... 124
Accident not aircraft.. 178
disease.................. 111
Other.................... 78
Total Non-battle deaths 491
So my revised total battle deaths per week from existing operations in August 1945 is 112.
US and UK Navy Battle Deaths 50
Army and AAF Battle Deaths 298
Estimated USMC Battle Deaths 100
Total August 1945 Battle Deaths 448
448/4 weeks = 112 per week.
Note that there were 491 non battle deaths instead of the 194 that I previously and erroneously stated, which bolsters your point about the inherent dangers of non-battle military operations. But see point 4 below.
1.
I think we can agree that they were not precluded and even further that the moral issues (using a narrow definition that confines it to pure morality alone) were adequately considered and resolved. The issues were raised, resolved with reservation, and those involved always express regrets when they explain how, in the balance, they made the right decision. That's enough to preclude me from saying that they were immoral men or that the decision was immoral.Nothing would preclude questions about morality.
My point is that moral issues are a springboard for a stronger long term position on issues such as proliferation. It takes away the argument that actual past use justifies development by other countries. Such complications from letting the genie out of the bottle was foreseen and the issue was raised:
Among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project were many who did not agree.
To them, the "wave of horror and repulsion" that might follow the sudden use of an atomic
bomb would more than outweigh its military advantages. "It may be very difficult," they
declared, "to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and
suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand
times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons
abolished by international agreement." The procedure these scientists recommended
was, first, to demonstrate the new weapon "before the eyes of representatives of all the
United Nations on the desert or a barren island," and then to issue "a preliminary ultimatum"
to Japan. If this ultimatum was rejected, and "if sanction of the United Nations (and of
public opinion at home) were obtained," then and only then, said the scientists, should the
United States consider using the bomb. "This may sound fantastic," they said, "but in nuclear
weapons we have something entirely new in order of magnitude of destructive power, and
if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage their possession gives us, we must use
new and imaginative methods." (emphasis added)
Command Decisions Army Center For Military History (1960) at 498 http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_23.htm
This neatly encapsulates my view. This source gives a reasoned explanation of the decision to disregard it, so opening it should enhance the discussion. Here's an example of how one aspect of the explanation can be pierced. It relates something that hasn't come up here yet - a "warning or demonstration" could be followed with a dud. It's interesting that the quote is in the disjunctive or because the only way a dud would matter is if there was a warning and then a failed demonstration. With no warning, the Japanese would not know that a dud had occurred. I have already ruled out pre-announcing a demonstration because of the obvious danger to the air crew, but the risk of a dud is another good reason not to warn. Overriding all is warning or no warning, a dud on an actual target would not be any different.
2.
The argument . . . could be that . . . the additional losses due to starvation and disease among the Japanese population could have been avoided if we hadn't dropped the demo bomb.
I have already said that the welfare of the enemy was a secondary consideration to our best interests. But there are three additional reasons why this doesn't hold water.
(a) The blame must land on the Japanese government for its decision to continue the war.
(b) The existing loose blockade was designed to allow passage of enough food and medicine
but was going to be tightened. From the same source at page 500:
Other means of achieving this objective had been considered and, in early June, had
not yet been entirely discarded. One of these called for the occupation of a string of
bases around Japan to increase the intensity of air bombardment. Combined with a tight
naval blockade, such a course would, many believed, produce the same results as an
invasion and at far less cost in lives.
General MacArthur relates Japanese fears that the demands of the Occupation could
cause problems with the food supply.
Immediately following the Emperor's surrender proclamation, officials of the Agriculture-
Commerce Ministry and the Chief of the Tokyo Economics board estimated that Japan's
food supplies would be entirely dislocated because of expected heavy food requisitions
by Occupation forces. Yomiuri-Hochi warned that the food requirements of the "tens
of thousands" of Occupation troops would have a "great effect upon our present and
future livelihood."
Reports Of General MacArthur, Army Center For Military History (1966) at 22.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... ch1.htm#b6
(c) Both alternatives would lead to an indeterminable number of deaths so weighing one
against the other is precluded but both are still terrible by nature and cancel each other out.
3.
(a) Chinese - The Nationalists had fought the war with little regard for the lives of theirHow about Chinese losses? And Australian? and for that matter Soviet?
own troops and had been a most troublesome ally to boot. No problem.
(b) Australian - The Commonwealth nations warranted the same consideration as our own. I'd say you would probably have to add 3 casualties, at most 5, to the US-UK figures.
(c) Russian - Allies warrant the same consideration. They didn't start their Manchurian invasion until August 8. A Russian decision about waiting 1-2 weeks was for the Russians and since it's outside our control the losses are outside our blame-scope.
4.
The 491 Army-AAF August 1945 disease and accidental casualties should not be included because the same tables show that such casualties were not "dependent on whether or not the war is over". After the war was over, non battle deaths were 531 in September 1945 and 470 in October 1945 while the corresponding number of battle deaths were 19 and 10. This suggests that only battle deaths from existing operations would be reduced as a result of ending the war; thus a weekly number of 115 (now including 3 Australians) is the best measure of how many lives a 1-2 week delay would cost. Further, disease deaths should be excluded or dramatically discounted because (1) the causative event already occurred; (2) the etiology cannot be directly traced to continued war; and/or (3) prevention and treatment had improved a thousandfold since the Civil War.And it isn't just battle casualties. There are disease and accident casualties that are dependent on whether or not the war is over.
5.
(a) I'm not ignoring this at all. My position is grounded in Clausewitz' maxim (paraphrased) "War is another means that nations use to obtain political results". I'm saying that based on what was known at the time, there was no reason not to try a demonstration bomb, because it would have led to a better political result regardless of whether it induced a surrender. Wars are often continued despite the certainty, let alone the risk, of further enemy successes, because the best possible political results have not yet been obtained. World War II was continued to pursue the possibility of the best political result - unconditional surrender - when the practical equivalent was already in hand via the same terms as World War I.This also ignores the possibility of a successful attack by the Japanese. A single kamikaze or even conventional bomber or sub for instance that gets lucky could cause multiples of this with just the one attack.
(b) Anything is possible but the best available indicator of actual cost is the actual losses from the actual ongoing operations.
(c) I'm surprised that the 800 deaths from the sinking of the Indianapolis on July 29, 1945 haven't been mentioned. There are many reasons why it should not affect my likely casualty figures, or their import. First, Japanese submarines were a remarkably ineffective weapon and this was their only dramatic success. Second, the lesson had been learned and the further precautions would be intended and thus expected to reduce future casualties from the same cause. Third, it was a one-off event caused by unique circumstances (among them failure to take existing precautions and the nature of the mission) which were unlikely to be repeated. Fourth, even if you move all 800 casualties into August, the result is about 300 per week, which I suspect is still far less than people entering in to this subject believe.
(d) Let's not lose sight of the fact that the soldiers always say that they are grateful that the bomb spared them the expected horrors of the invasion. I've never heard anyone express the same view with respect to weekly losses from current operations.
6.
The only sure way to stop this is by having someone physically present. That requires an invasion, but that would not occur for three months. It is not necessary to delay this date by 1-2 weeks as well. Moreover, increased murders out of frustration or anger over the actual use of bomb would have been consistent with the then-current understanding of the Japanese psyche, and there's also the risk that the bombs would kill POWS (I believe this actually happened).Then there were the indications that the Japanese were starting to execute POWs in greater numbers.
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Adding to point 5 above, Command Decisions (which is an official Army publication) never mentions the casualties from ongoing operations in August 1945 as a reason to use the bomb as soon as possible. Instead it says this at 516-517:
And here's Eisenhower's statement of the Clausewitz principle in a letter to General Marshall dated April 7, 1945, quoted on page 486 of Command Decisions:
The sentence in italics is my point. I only added the rest of the paragraph about the Russians to preserve the context, not to make some point about ulterior motives related to the Russians.The close sequence of events between 6 and 10 August, combined with the fact that the bomb was dropped almost three months before the scheduled invasion of Kyushu and while the Japanese were trying desperately to get out of the war, has suggested to some that the bombing of Hiroshima had a deeper purpose than the desire to end the war quickly. This purpose, it is claimed, was nothing less than a desire to forestall Soviet intervention in the Far Eastern war. Else why this necessity for speed? Certainly nothing in the military situation seemed to call for such hasty action. But if the purpose was to fore- stall Soviet intervention, then there was every reason for speed.
And here's Eisenhower's statement of the Clausewitz principle in a letter to General Marshall dated April 7, 1945, quoted on page 486 of Command Decisions:
I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
A number of problems with that:tnemelckram wrote:...My point is that moral issues are a springboard for a stronger long term position on issues such as proliferation.
1) Proliferation in todays sense was not even a concept at the time. Thus this arguement suggest that if they could see what would happen in the future they could have made a better decision.
2) The affects of dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have helped get some countries to agree to the non proliferation treaties.
3) Dropping a demo bomb would still have resulted in the use of bombs on at least one probably 2 and possibly more Japanese cities.
4) There is a distinct possiblity that the use of a demo bomb would have resulted in the Soviets being less cautious (say during the Cuban missile crisis) and that the first use of atomic weapons could then have been an exchange between Nato and the Warsaw pact.
If you are argueing morality that's a rather difficult postion to justify....
(a) Chinese - The Nationalists had fought the war with little regard for the lives of their
own troops and had been a most troublesome ally to boot. No problem.
I'm not sure those on the Yorktown or Hammann or a number of other US ships would agree with you. And that's just from subs....(c) I'm surprised that the 800 deaths from the sinking of the Indianapolis on July 29, 1945 haven't been mentioned. There are many reasons why it should not affect my likely casualty figures, or their import. First, Japanese submarines were a remarkably ineffective weapon and this was their only dramatic success.
But there were quite a few such "unique" events. That's the nature of war.Third, it was a one-off event caused by unique circumstances (among them failure to take existing precautions and the nature of the mission) which were unlikely to be repeated.
That's because the casualties from the invasion were expected to be orders of magnitude worse both in total numbers and in percentages.(d) Let's not lose sight of the fact that the soldiers always say that they are grateful that the bomb spared them the expected horrors of the invasion. I've never heard anyone express the same view with respect to weekly losses from current operations.
It's reasonable to expect them not to execute POWs after the surrender. Indeed I've read a number of accounts which suggest that even a week or two would have seen the exection of quite a few more POWs.6.The only sure way to stop this is by having someone physically present. ...Then there were the indications that the Japanese were starting to execute POWs in greater numbers.
My take on this is one has to look at not only averages but how much variation there was and the risk that those number could be higher. Taking all these into account I think the best decsion was made and that anything else is argueing on the margins.
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi lwd!
A couple of things in response to your last post.
1. In response to my statement that it was justifiable to disregard how a 1-2 week delay for a demo bomb would affect the interests of our difficult Chinese ally, you said that "if I a am arguing morality that's a hard position to justify". I am not arguing morality. I am arguing proper conduct of statecraft. Morality is subsidiary to that - you always want to be able to claim that the best possible moral basis as part of the justification for any action that furthers national policy. Here's a few thoughts that might clarify or explain this.
(a) My political views are mostly on the liberal side, but when it comes to warfare I do not follow the usual liberal line. I think that war is an unavoidable part of human nature and that it is hopeless daydreaming to think that this can be changed "if we could all just talk and get along". I do not think that all war is inherently evil; instead I think there is such a thing as a "just war" in accordance with the principles of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, and the current body of international law governing the initiation and conduct of war that collects their thoughts. In most wars one side is able to claim that it is fighting a "just war". Most often that will be the one that is attacked, but can also be a nation that has been grievously harmed by an act of another state short of war that the acting state fails or refuses to rectify.*
(b) I think that the usual liberal view that makes morality the sine qua non is a dog that doesn't hunt in this grave area. Instead, morality is subsidiary to the primary question of what is in the best interests of the state.
(c) The same is true about military considerations such as losses. They don't trump all and are secondary.
(d) My view of the place of morality is somewhat cynical. Clausewitz is right. Morality is just one of the tools a state uses when it has to use war to reach its political goals.
(e) The same is true about the willingness to accept military losses. It's just another tool.
(f) Because of the demands that war places on its people, a nation must make the best possible use of all of its tools to achieve the best possible political result.
(g) For the same reason, it must also be a long term result because you don't want to have to fight another war to clean up the first result.
(h) As tools and secondary considerations, military concerns and morality must be approached in the same cold manner as any decision to use a tool, and balanced just as coldly.
(i) Within those two classes of issues, there will be sub-issues requiring the same cold approach and balance. The morality of the effect of the decision on the Chinese is such a sub-issue. But it is trumped by the principle that you are seeking the best possible long term political result for the American people, not the Chinese. For example, after promising Chaing Kai-shek that landing craft would be used in Operation Buccaneer, Roosevelt threw Chaing off the train when he decided that U.S. interest were best served by defeating the Nazis first and instead using the craft for Overlord.
(j) These rules apply equally to all forms of government. Democracy, monarchy, dictatorship, capitalism and communism all justify themselves with the claim that they achieve the best long term political results for the governed. That claim constrains their decisions in war.
2.
Using the above, I think that this was a sub-issue that first had to be balanced against other military considerations. The statement that the risk "could" be higher says nothing about the quantity of that risk because the statement is just as true about remote risks as it is about great risks. The risk can be quantified as great or remote by looking at factors such as the actual degree of risk suggested by intelligence in the next 1-2 weeks, how much it would be reduced by counter measures, what operations were planned, and actual current losses from the same operations. Then it has to be balanced against moral considerations.
3.
This sentence is a good and clear summary of your view that cuts right to your point. Rephrasing it in my terms with an explanation might define our issue.
A reasonable decision was made, but not best, because the decision failed to determine the margins of the arguments and thus take all factors into account.
By definition, a decision chooses one point of view while discarding others. To make the best decision, you have to take into account all of the factors that support of each option. Considering all factors takes you to the margins of the argument because there are no more factors and the set is complete (think of how a Venn Diagram defines a complete set by using the line of a circle as the margin). You must go to the margin to take into account all of the factors being argued and make the best decision. That's what I'm trying to do.
_____________________________________
* On this last basis my liberal a$$ supported Afghanistan because the Taliban refused to do anything about their "guest" Osama Bin Ladin.
A couple of things in response to your last post.
1. In response to my statement that it was justifiable to disregard how a 1-2 week delay for a demo bomb would affect the interests of our difficult Chinese ally, you said that "if I a am arguing morality that's a hard position to justify". I am not arguing morality. I am arguing proper conduct of statecraft. Morality is subsidiary to that - you always want to be able to claim that the best possible moral basis as part of the justification for any action that furthers national policy. Here's a few thoughts that might clarify or explain this.
(a) My political views are mostly on the liberal side, but when it comes to warfare I do not follow the usual liberal line. I think that war is an unavoidable part of human nature and that it is hopeless daydreaming to think that this can be changed "if we could all just talk and get along". I do not think that all war is inherently evil; instead I think there is such a thing as a "just war" in accordance with the principles of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, and the current body of international law governing the initiation and conduct of war that collects their thoughts. In most wars one side is able to claim that it is fighting a "just war". Most often that will be the one that is attacked, but can also be a nation that has been grievously harmed by an act of another state short of war that the acting state fails or refuses to rectify.*
(b) I think that the usual liberal view that makes morality the sine qua non is a dog that doesn't hunt in this grave area. Instead, morality is subsidiary to the primary question of what is in the best interests of the state.
(c) The same is true about military considerations such as losses. They don't trump all and are secondary.
(d) My view of the place of morality is somewhat cynical. Clausewitz is right. Morality is just one of the tools a state uses when it has to use war to reach its political goals.
(e) The same is true about the willingness to accept military losses. It's just another tool.
(f) Because of the demands that war places on its people, a nation must make the best possible use of all of its tools to achieve the best possible political result.
(g) For the same reason, it must also be a long term result because you don't want to have to fight another war to clean up the first result.
(h) As tools and secondary considerations, military concerns and morality must be approached in the same cold manner as any decision to use a tool, and balanced just as coldly.
(i) Within those two classes of issues, there will be sub-issues requiring the same cold approach and balance. The morality of the effect of the decision on the Chinese is such a sub-issue. But it is trumped by the principle that you are seeking the best possible long term political result for the American people, not the Chinese. For example, after promising Chaing Kai-shek that landing craft would be used in Operation Buccaneer, Roosevelt threw Chaing off the train when he decided that U.S. interest were best served by defeating the Nazis first and instead using the craft for Overlord.
(j) These rules apply equally to all forms of government. Democracy, monarchy, dictatorship, capitalism and communism all justify themselves with the claim that they achieve the best long term political results for the governed. That claim constrains their decisions in war.
2.
My take on this is one has to look at not only averages but how much variation there was and the risk that those number could be higher.
Using the above, I think that this was a sub-issue that first had to be balanced against other military considerations. The statement that the risk "could" be higher says nothing about the quantity of that risk because the statement is just as true about remote risks as it is about great risks. The risk can be quantified as great or remote by looking at factors such as the actual degree of risk suggested by intelligence in the next 1-2 weeks, how much it would be reduced by counter measures, what operations were planned, and actual current losses from the same operations. Then it has to be balanced against moral considerations.
3.
Taking all these into account I think the best decision was made and that anything else is arguing on the margins.
This sentence is a good and clear summary of your view that cuts right to your point. Rephrasing it in my terms with an explanation might define our issue.
A reasonable decision was made, but not best, because the decision failed to determine the margins of the arguments and thus take all factors into account.
By definition, a decision chooses one point of view while discarding others. To make the best decision, you have to take into account all of the factors that support of each option. Considering all factors takes you to the margins of the argument because there are no more factors and the set is complete (think of how a Venn Diagram defines a complete set by using the line of a circle as the margin). You must go to the margin to take into account all of the factors being argued and make the best decision. That's what I'm trying to do.
_____________________________________
* On this last basis my liberal a$$ supported Afghanistan because the Taliban refused to do anything about their "guest" Osama Bin Ladin.
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Let's zero in on this as it is probably the source of most of our disagreements right now
I maintain it was the best possible at the time and that there are good reasons for it still being considere the best at this time. The margins are in many cases irrelevant and one simply cannot even know all the factors at the time or even after for that matter.tnemelckram wrote: A reasonable decision was made, but not best, because the decision failed to determine the margins of the arguments and thus take all factors into account.
Again this is impossible to do and if you try you end up doing nothing. To make the best decision practicle you look at the most important factors and see how that decision affects them. In this case they (the US administration) pretty clearly did this and came up with the right decision. Furthermore if you look back on it today for every point that can be made for them choosing a different solution another point at least equally compelling can be made for them not doing so. The conclusion is pretty clear...To make the best decision, you have to take into account all of the factors that support of each option. ....
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi Lwd!
I haven't posted in a while because I wanted to give the topic some rest and reflection. I was concerned that my above March 2 post about political philosophy was overkill. It appears that you didn't think so given your thoughful response on March 3, which appears to be the result of your consideration to my entire post.
It's obvious that you fully understand what I am saying and have solid counter arguments. Weare both doing a good job of sticking to what was known at the time in weighing the quality of the decision to use the first bomb on a chosen target (instead of using it for a demonstration) but approach it in different ways.
Your approach incorporates some degree of looking back from the historical result while my approach looks forward from immediately before the decision was made. Interestingly, you have not made any improper use of hindsight in your approach. That's because looking into the matters shows that all of the factors that you argue in support of the best decision having been made were known to Truman and his advisors before it was made, as well as that the likely outcome would be the historical result.
Following from that, I agree that in the balance, the historical result has turned out good for our country, with the key factor being that the Cold War was "fought" by rational opponents and ended on terms favorable to us. A demonstration bomb would not have prevented the Cold War. Even if the Japanese remained skeptical, the Russians wouldn't have been, and would have obtained the bomb regardless. Plus I figure that we would probably have had to follow the demonstration with a second bomb in anger, thereby removing all doubts.
The biggest negative has been the encouragement of proliferation, which was a known risk at the time and is still troublesome. However, a state that aquires atomic weapons also acquires responsibilities and other complications to the national interest, and to the personal interests of the leaders. These are powerful enough to effectively preclude first use or distribution to others.
This applies even to the extreme case of North Korea. What is important to the leadership is their continued ability to run the country as their own private feudal preserve. Balanced against that, they don't care a whit about exporting ideology, seizing territory or causing anything other than minor trouble to get some attention. Their first use would assure their destruction, as would use by any others becasue it would be assumed that NOrth Korea was the source. Plus you have the fact that any dictator (indeed any rational nation) would be reluctant to dilute the power of possession by sharing them with others, and wary of the risk that the weapons could fall into the hands of their own enemies. FIrst use might be tempting if they were cornered and about to fall, but this can be addressed by providing them with a more attractive alternative way out that appeals to their self-interest (such as an equally comfortable exile and protection from prosecution).
As to Iran, I think that they are rational and driven by the traditional considerations of national interest precluding first use or distribution.
So while I don't agree with your approach, I can live with the results. Maybe that's a good way to close this interesting debate.
The most interesting thing I learned from you was the practical difficulties of making an effective demonstration. How can you make the intended audience fully aware of what it is and what it can do, while at the same time limiting the number of casualties so the rest6 of the world believes that it was a demonstration?
There's a few things that I hope were new to you and that you appreciate.
First, that there would have been very few casualties from continuing operations to concern the U.S. during the week or so given to the Japanese to contemplate the demonstration. In fact, one of the sources I cited above says that the risk to the bombers was so insignificant that officers began joyriding on missions, requiring MacArthur's HQ to order them to stop it. This oft-cited factor does not carry as much weight as is popularly believed.
Second, that arguments in favor of a demonstration are not made with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, a demonstration was a serious alternative and all of the factors now advanced pro and con were known then and considered.
Third, that arguments in favor of a demonstration can be made in a context that is not anti-US or derogatory of the people who made this difficult decision. People are wrong when they present the historical decision as inherently evil, or evil given the available demonstration alternative, or evil because it was based on certain political or national interest considerations. The decision was not evil in those ways or in any other way. Good v. evil is not the issue. The nation's political and other interests were the core of the decision and had to be coldly weighed. The issue is whether based on what was known at the time a demonstration bomb would have better served the national interest.
I haven't posted in a while because I wanted to give the topic some rest and reflection. I was concerned that my above March 2 post about political philosophy was overkill. It appears that you didn't think so given your thoughful response on March 3, which appears to be the result of your consideration to my entire post.
It's obvious that you fully understand what I am saying and have solid counter arguments. Weare both doing a good job of sticking to what was known at the time in weighing the quality of the decision to use the first bomb on a chosen target (instead of using it for a demonstration) but approach it in different ways.
Your approach incorporates some degree of looking back from the historical result while my approach looks forward from immediately before the decision was made. Interestingly, you have not made any improper use of hindsight in your approach. That's because looking into the matters shows that all of the factors that you argue in support of the best decision having been made were known to Truman and his advisors before it was made, as well as that the likely outcome would be the historical result.
Following from that, I agree that in the balance, the historical result has turned out good for our country, with the key factor being that the Cold War was "fought" by rational opponents and ended on terms favorable to us. A demonstration bomb would not have prevented the Cold War. Even if the Japanese remained skeptical, the Russians wouldn't have been, and would have obtained the bomb regardless. Plus I figure that we would probably have had to follow the demonstration with a second bomb in anger, thereby removing all doubts.
The biggest negative has been the encouragement of proliferation, which was a known risk at the time and is still troublesome. However, a state that aquires atomic weapons also acquires responsibilities and other complications to the national interest, and to the personal interests of the leaders. These are powerful enough to effectively preclude first use or distribution to others.
This applies even to the extreme case of North Korea. What is important to the leadership is their continued ability to run the country as their own private feudal preserve. Balanced against that, they don't care a whit about exporting ideology, seizing territory or causing anything other than minor trouble to get some attention. Their first use would assure their destruction, as would use by any others becasue it would be assumed that NOrth Korea was the source. Plus you have the fact that any dictator (indeed any rational nation) would be reluctant to dilute the power of possession by sharing them with others, and wary of the risk that the weapons could fall into the hands of their own enemies. FIrst use might be tempting if they were cornered and about to fall, but this can be addressed by providing them with a more attractive alternative way out that appeals to their self-interest (such as an equally comfortable exile and protection from prosecution).
As to Iran, I think that they are rational and driven by the traditional considerations of national interest precluding first use or distribution.
So while I don't agree with your approach, I can live with the results. Maybe that's a good way to close this interesting debate.
The most interesting thing I learned from you was the practical difficulties of making an effective demonstration. How can you make the intended audience fully aware of what it is and what it can do, while at the same time limiting the number of casualties so the rest6 of the world believes that it was a demonstration?
There's a few things that I hope were new to you and that you appreciate.
First, that there would have been very few casualties from continuing operations to concern the U.S. during the week or so given to the Japanese to contemplate the demonstration. In fact, one of the sources I cited above says that the risk to the bombers was so insignificant that officers began joyriding on missions, requiring MacArthur's HQ to order them to stop it. This oft-cited factor does not carry as much weight as is popularly believed.
Second, that arguments in favor of a demonstration are not made with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, a demonstration was a serious alternative and all of the factors now advanced pro and con were known then and considered.
Third, that arguments in favor of a demonstration can be made in a context that is not anti-US or derogatory of the people who made this difficult decision. People are wrong when they present the historical decision as inherently evil, or evil given the available demonstration alternative, or evil because it was based on certain political or national interest considerations. The decision was not evil in those ways or in any other way. Good v. evil is not the issue. The nation's political and other interests were the core of the decision and had to be coldly weighed. The issue is whether based on what was known at the time a demonstration bomb would have better served the national interest.
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
A line of argument that assumes rationality in all governments and leaders is flawed when confronted by dictators who are fruitcakes. Particulary when most wars start by accident.....
So far none of the fruitcakes have obtained nuclear weapons, so this consideration has not been put to the real test.
So far none of the fruitcakes have obtained nuclear weapons, so this consideration has not been put to the real test.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
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tnemelckram
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Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi RF!
First, a fruitcake could not slog his way to the top without being exposed. Doing so requires a rational, ruthless and calculating man, even in the smallest country.
Second, you can't have it both ways if you use ruthlessness is an indicator of fruitiness.
Stalin - 40 million killed? Didn't use the weapons. Ditto Mao.
Third, so far India and Pakistan have withstood the test of emotion leading to fruitiness. Pakistan has remained rational in its nuclear policy despite the pulls of Muslim fundamentalism. Both countries have remained steady even though they are neighbors who hate each other and trade provocations from time to time.
I disagree.So far none of the fruitcakes have obtained nuclear weapons, so this consideration has not been put to the real test.
First, a fruitcake could not slog his way to the top without being exposed. Doing so requires a rational, ruthless and calculating man, even in the smallest country.
Second, you can't have it both ways if you use ruthlessness is an indicator of fruitiness.
Stalin - 40 million killed? Didn't use the weapons. Ditto Mao.
Third, so far India and Pakistan have withstood the test of emotion leading to fruitiness. Pakistan has remained rational in its nuclear policy despite the pulls of Muslim fundamentalism. Both countries have remained steady even though they are neighbors who hate each other and trade provocations from time to time.
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
The Israelis think Iran will provide the bomb to Hamas and Hisbulla (sp?). If true, that will be the first case. They may feel that whatever happens to Iran, it is Allah's will that Israel be destroyed and they will use the bomb if they can.
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
I don't believe that I have ever classified Stalin or Mao as fruitcakes, in any case both had nuclear weapons so by definition that should be clear from the sentence you quoted.tnemelckram wrote:Hi RF!
I disagree.So far none of the fruitcakes have obtained nuclear weapons, so this consideration has not been put to the real test.
First, a fruitcake could not slog his way to the top without being exposed. Doing so requires a rational, ruthless and calculating man, even in the smallest country.
Second, you can't have it both ways if you use ruthlessness is an indicator of fruitiness.
Stalin - 40 million killed? Didn't use the weapons. Ditto Mao.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
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tnemelckram
- Member
- Posts: 101
- Joined: Fri Dec 05, 2008 4:45 am
Re: Hiroshima and Olimpic
Hi Bgile and RF!
I
That's just as likely as an American President saying whatever happens to the US, it's manifest destiny to spread democracy and free markets all over the world. Just isn't going to happen. Plus it would cheapen the value of their membership in the exclusive club. The Iranians are rational.They may feel that whatever happens to Iran, it is Allah's will that Israel be destroyed and they will use the bomb if they can.
Iran won't because those groups might decide to use the bomb to influence Iranian policy as well. The real risk is some individual loon like A.Q. Khan from Pakistan giving a bomb to terrorists. The biggest risks of individual action come from Russia and Pakistan.The Israelis think Iran will provide the bomb to Hamas and Hisbulla (sp?). If true, that will be the first case.
I
ANybody that did what they did must be mighty committed to their program - even more committed than some fear Iran is to Islamic Fundamentalism.don't believe that I have ever classified Stalin or Mao as fruitcakes, in any case both had nuclear weapons so by definition that should be clear from the sentence you quoted.