Hiroshima and Olimpic

[Vic Dale]

It was known by Truman, Stalin and Churchill that the war could not continue. There would be no need to re-enact the carnage of the Islands, since Japan was completely isolated and with no chance of relief. Invasion had been ruled out as unneccessary long before August, so the notion of saving American lives falls flat.

Saving Japanese lives by dropping the bomb? Well it's an interesting take, but it is for sure that such an idea never crossed the conference table and was not even considered in private discussion.

The Japanese made approaches for peace as early as February and before the fall of Okinawa it was clear that Japan would be completely isolated, by June the privations caused by the blockade were being severely felt by the population of Japan and on the 20th Hirohito summoned a confrence and pressed the matter of surrender on his government. It is one thing not to be able to listen in to private confrences, but the infrastructure of a nation will be known, especially one so dependent on trade as japan. She had too few resources of her own, so it would be just a matter of time and that was well known.

[lwd]

It was known by Truman, Stalin and Churchill that the war could not continue.

They knew the Japanese had no chance of winning. No one knew how much longer the war would go on. Based on what had been seen up to say August of 45 there was no reasons to suspect that the war couldn't go on for months lacking decisive action on the part of the allies. The two possible decisive actions were 1) invade 2 ) drop the bomb.

There would be no need to re-enact the carnage of the Islands, since Japan was completely isolated and with no chance of relief. Invasion had been ruled out as unneccessary long before August, so the notion of saving American lives falls flat.

The vast bulk of the documentary evidence shows other wise. Olympic was clearly on schedule prior to the bombs being dropped. If you look at most of the numerous threads on this topic on other WWII web pages you will find plenty of references. I've never seen one that supports your position. For instance the following quote from: http://home.kc.rr.com/casualties/ is applicable:

...MacArthur replied on 9 August that the buildup might be a "deception"! (it was not) and noted that there were indications (which actually were part of a deception) that Japanese airpower was no longer a threat. He reminded Marshall that the factors weighing against the alternative sites in the Home Islands had not changed and said: "In my opinion, there should not be the slightest thought of changing the OLYMPIC operation.

Hardly indicates that it has been ruled out now does it.

Saving Japanese lives by dropping the bomb? Well it's an interesting take, but it is for sure that such an idea never crossed the conference table and was not even considered in private discussion.

"It is for sure" ... amazing that you can say that. There are a number of indicators that decreasing the losses to Japanese civilians were a concern. Again the US dropped leaflets ahead of some of the bombing raids on Japanese cities warning the civilians to flee as a raid was coming.

The Japanese made approaches for peace as early as February and before the fall of Okinawa it was clear that Japan would be completely isolated, by June the privations caused by the blockade were being severely felt by the population of Japan and on the 20th Hirohito summoned a confrence and pressed the matter of surrender on his government. It is one thing not to be able to listen in to private confrences, but the infrastructure of a nation will be known, especially one so dependent on trade as japan. She had too few resources of her own, so it would be just a matter of time and that was well known.

From: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... s/wolk.pdf

At a cabinet meeting on 9 August, after word of the Nagasaki strike, Gen Korechika Anami, Japanese minister
of war, remarked that “we must fight the war through to the end no matter how great the odds against us!” Senior leaders of the Japanese army and navy argued for a continuation of the war and sought to thwart Emperor Hirohito’s efforts to surrender to the Allies.

[Bgile]

In the history of "Easy" Co., right after the German surrender there is a passage about preparing to ship out for the Pacific. This was no joke, and preparations were being made.

[Vic Dale]

It is hardly surprising that the generals stuck out those dogs were likely to get hung, but the weight of opinion was against them.

It is one thing to recognise the possibility of heavy civilian casualties and quite another to offer to bomb them to save their lives.

[RF]

It is one thing to recognise the possibility of heavy civilian casualties and quite another to offer to bomb them to save their lives.

With hindsight.

[lwd]

On the other hand it's very reasonable to expect that ending the war sooner is likely to save lives on both sided in the long run. If you are talking numbers lost I believe you'll find that some of the conventional raids killed more people than were lost at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. If not they were close. The longer the war went on the more people people would die.

[Vic Dale]

It is one thing to recognise the possibility of heavy civilian casualties and quite another to offer to bomb them to save their lives.

With hindsight.

There is no hindsight involved here at all. Had anyone suggested such a ridiculous idea at the time they would have been laughed out of court - by the hawks AND the doves.

War develops a logic and seemingly a mind of it's own. Every decision was taken in a completely cold-blooded manner, so the civilian deaths were deliberate. Towards the end of the war, bomber command was simply looking for targets, regardless of the strategic value. Targets were selected more for their potential to burn, than strategic value. Bomber command could not improve the lives of British citizens so it continued to do what it was good at, destruction of German cities. War production in Germany actually rose, despite the massed bombing raids on Germany and only towards the end when Germany was running out of steam generally, did it make as much impact as might have been thought.

The big problem for Harris, was losses. Attacking heavily defended factories in the heart of the Ruhr for example was very costly in men and machines, and such targets were quite obvious for their geographic location. It was considerd a disaster and likely to sap morale of the bomber crews if losses greater than 5% were seen as becoming consistent, so flying by night and bombing German cities seems to have been the softer option. It also made good headlines for a British public who were suffering the privations of their 3rd, 4th or 5th year of war - wiping out a ball-bearing works did not have quite the ring of destruction of a city and the latter target would probably incur less casualties among aircrews. Bomber command played on hatred of the enemy, which basically means working to the lowest common denominator.

Bomber command was said to have fixed it's sights on civilian morale, bombing workers accommodation in the hope that it would undermine confidence in Hitler. Yet this lesson had already been learned during the Blitz - bombing civilians does not break morale, it actually strengthens it. Support for the royal family and Churchill took a turn for the better once Buckingham palace was bombed. It has even been suggested that bombing Dresden was a deliberate act intended to strengthen German morale in the face of the Russian onslught. This is prossibly based on hindsight regarding the results and it's effect on morale.

So the view that bombing could have been thought likely to destroy Japanese morale, has to be evaluated against the experience gained during the Blitz and elsewhere, where morale and support for the government increased in the face of intense bombing, in inverse proportion to hatred of the enemy - in Britain AND Germany.

[RF]

If you are talking numbers lost I believe you'll find that some of the conventional raids killed more people than were lost at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. If not they were close. The longer the war went on the more people people would die.

This is correct. The incendiary raids on Tokyo during March 1945 killed far more than those who perished in the two atom bomb detonations together, including those who died from radiation effects many years later.

[RF]

It is one thing to recognise the possibility of heavy civilian casualties and quite another to offer to bomb them to save their lives.

With hindsight.

There is no hindsight involved here at all. Had anyone suggested such a ridiculous idea at the time they would have been laughed out of court - by the hawks AND the doves.

War develops a logic and seemingly a mind of it's own. Every decision was taken in a completely cold-blooded manner, so the civilian deaths were deliberate. Towards the end of the war, bomber command was simply looking for targets, regardless of the strategic value. Targets were selected more for their potential to burn, than strategic value. Bomber command could not improve the lives of British citizens so it continued to do what it was good at, destruction of German cities. War production in Germany actually rose, despite the massed bombing raids on Germany and only towards the end when Germany was running out of steam generally, did it make as much impact as might have been thought.

But this whole post is based on hindsight.

The idea behind bombing was to shorten the war, destroy the enemy capacity to wage war and thus save the lives of your own people, both civilian and military. Civilian deaths from bombing were a by-product of that bombing, not necessarily its main aim. As for Bomber Command, yes it can improve the lives of British and other Allied civilians by shortening the war, by disrupting the enemy economy. And yes war production in Germany did rise 1941-1944, because its original peacetime production levels were low, because the overall production processes were a bureaucratic shambles under the Nazis until Speer organised things properly. What you did not say was that German war production under bombing did not increase by as much as it would certainly have done without that bombing, it roughly quadrupled output rather than the seven or eight fold it otherwise would.

A lot has been said about the effects of bombing on civilian morale. Generally yes it shores up morale. But not always. Evidence has come to light in Britain that the usual propaganda spin put out about morale was not 100% accurate.

[Vic Dale]

Why then would Churchill suggest that the demands on the Japanese government be moderated to get their agreement quicker? Whinney and dear old Uncle Joe were both asking that this be done, so why did Truman hold out? He never openly disagreed with this suggestion and since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs caused fewer casualties than a normal bombing raid, how could it be thought to be possible to hasten the end of the war if normal bombing raids did more damage?

The decision to capitulate was Hirohito's and it came out of the blue, so how could that have been calculated for? He can't have felt the pressure of the masses, so it doesn't add up that the bomb was dropped to save lives. It was dropped, that is all we can say and the rapid capitulation has been tacked on belatedly to justify this act to the masses in the USA, as the total cost in terms of fallout became known.

The bomb itself caused fewer casualties than the nightly raids, so it would not matter a damn what was dropped, It is public revulsion at the radiation burns which has caused successive US administrations to justify it's use.

[lwd]

... He never openly disagreed with this suggestion and since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs caused fewer casualties than a normal bombing raid, how could it be thought to be possible to hasten the end of the war if normal bombing raids did more damage?

fewer casualties does not mean less damage. That you would even suggest the above will lead many who are still undecide to place you in the "dweller under the bridge catagory".

The decision to capitulate was Hirohito's and it came out of the blue, so how could that have been calculated for?....

Others could have made the decision. But in any case it was hoped that someone in authority would see surrender as a better option than complete distruction. Not hard to put that in ones calculations.

He can't have felt the pressure of the masses, so it doesn't add up that the bomb was dropped to save lives.

Why not and why? Even if your debatable assumption is true it doesn't support your conclusions.

It was dropped, that is all we can say and the rapid capitulation has been tacked on belatedly to justify this act to the masses in the USA, as the total cost in terms of fallout became known.

What "total cost"? The desire was clearly to get Japan to surrender and the bomb was clearly viewed as an alternative to invasion for forcing that decision. Saying otherwise is ignoring the vast bulk of evidence.

The bomb itself caused fewer casualties than the nightly raids, so it would not matter a damn what was dropped,...

Again your assumption does not support your conclusion.

It is public revulsion at the radiation burns which has caused successive US administrations to justify it's use.

A classic case of opinion stated as fact. Also one the weight of evidence suggest is wrong.

[Karl Heidenreich]

About radiation:

You guys know that radiation accounts to only 2% of the total casualties of the bombs. The other 98% were for burns, the blasts or because the were knocked from flying debris or from the secondary fires.

I understand the rabid commies, or Greenpeace activitists or the common anti USA guy use Hiroshima and Nagasaki as an argument to blame of genocide the US and such. But the balance is quite clear:

1. Japan would NOT surrender on allied terms by it´s own choice. And remember that THEY attacked Pearl, invaded Philipines, killed hundred of thousands and treated POW like dogs.
2. The only way to make Japan surrender was to force it to surrender.
3. WAY 1: Invasion
4. WAY 2: Atomic bomb

If anyone believe in a blockade to force them,Japanese, then he must be a disciple of Collin Powel´s Academy of Lousy Strategists: blockades account for 0 surrenderings during modern warfare since Napoleon´s days. Not even Northern blockade of Southern ports at the Civil War was enough to bring Lee to surrender (invasion did it, as a matter of fact).

The choice is obvious: 200,000 enemy fatal casualties + 0 allied vs. 5Mega enemy fatal casualties + 250K allied fatal casualties and a couple of years of war. And Stalin behind it´s shock armies waiting to overun destroyed Germany and to march triumphantly at Paris.

Best regards

[Bgile]

The thing is, there were only two bombs and it was going to take some time to build more. The idea was to convince the Japanese that if they didn't surrender we would send many more bombers, each carrying one of these bombs, and blow up ALL their cities and then start working on other targets. That couldn't be accomplished with conventional attack.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Bgile,

General Groves promised Truman that during August he could deliver a couple more bombs and at the end of September he can have three more. The military didn´t want them used against cities but to make a stockpile and use them to open the road for the troops during Olimpic. This is interesting because proves that many believed the bombs alone would not convinced the Japanese to surrender but they will have to invade anyway. And using the bombs as tactical devices would make the job easier.
What´s interesting is to know how many bombs the US had at the end of September 1945? And how many when the soviet blockade to Berlin started.

Best regards.

[Bgile]

Karl,

It's also interesting because it shows the military didn't appreciate the radiation danger then. I believe In the summer especially you would have a problem with alpha particles until it rained.