Karl Heidenreich wrote:Nope. The Soviets used massive quantities of artillery and ammo and pretty much preprogrammed barrages. That was there post war doctrine as well. US and British artillery was vastly more flexible and more effective on a tube by tube basis.
That´s interesting, really. Where can I find some literature on that? After all this discussion my interest on the Eastern Front has re started.
I'll see what I can find but it's been quite a while sense I read up on most of this.
Has anyone here even suggested that?
I was not refering to you, in specific, but to a general tendency, which is this thread is about. You read or hear it a lot. If my memory does not betray me when the movie "A Bridge Too Far" a female narrator refers to D Day in those terms. Or the general approach of American History on that behalf, which is only logical.
It is an oft stated thing. The problem is I can find very few people who actually believe it. Of course it could be that most of the people I talk to or correspond with are much better informed about such things than average but it could also be akin to the comments about the poor quality of American beers.
I would have put it after Stalingrad.
Stalingrad is where the Germans lost the war, you are correct.
After Stalingrad it is clear that the Germans were going to loose. However they lost earlier than that. The high water mark coming weeks or months previously.
In Kursk they made their final strategic offensive and since then the russians got the initiative.
One could make a case for the Battle of the Bulge being a strategic offensive.
.... Ike, I must reckon, not being a strategic genius was a superb Supreme Commander... only to deal with De Gaulle and Monty made him earn his salary.
Don't forget Patton, Churchill, and Roosevelt. Fortunatly the latter was inclined to back up his commanders.
Since many of their "crack units" were deployed on both fronts or even all three at one time or anther this is a rather meaningless statement.
Don´t think so, Lee. The units, their combat performance, muster and deployment over time are important. That´s why I´m asking for the relative strenghts of them by year.
The point is most of the units ended up spending some time on both fronts from what I've read.
Not saying they did but the rational above is badly flawed.
It is not, Lee. If you have six million to be taken prisioners then it´s OK. But if you claim six million and there were only 1.5 million, or 2 or 3 million, it could never happened that Ike took six million prisioners when Germany surrendered. But if you tell me that the allies took 6 million, overall, during the totality of the conflict, from 1939 to 1945, then that´s another complete different thing.
That's in part because you aren't looking at the dynamics of the situation. IE the Germans were trying to maintain their force in the West at a particular level so as troops were lost they were replaced. Furthermore troops in Germany were often not considered to be on either front so once the allies crossed into Germany itself the numbers get a bit trickier.