Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

[Karl Heidenreich]

Genda:

Byron & Karl, here is a very good article about the economic factors and lend-lease. From Pipes website.

http://www.feldgrau.com/econo.html

Thanks!

[alecsandros]

Byron,

From what I have been reading today it is interesting to note that, by the winter 1944 and early 1945 the soviets were no longer in position to lose any more men. What they had in excess for the initial campaign in 1941 until summer 1944, that is human resources in excess, was not the case for the last stages of the campaign against Hitler. That is why they tried to compensate with producing attrition through artillery and tactical air superiority simply because they have no more men to lose.

It is very interesting indeed.
What is even more interesting, IMO, is that the shortage in men was mainly due to Stalin's genocides 1932-1940 and NKVD's extermination of millions of troops and civilians suspected of having "pacified" with the enemy, 1941-1944.

[Byron Angel]

Byron & Karl, here is a very good article about the economic factors and lend-lease. From Pipes website.

http://www.feldgrau.com/econo.html

Thanks, MG. It is indeed an interesting article. Its mention of the fact that Lend-Lease basically fed the Soviet armed forces for the duration ofthe war years makes it one of the few articles to even touch upon the vast amounts of material aid supplied by Lend-Lease beyond the weapons, aircraft, and vehicles typically mentioned.


Byron

[Byron Angel]

Here is some quick APPROXIMATED data on Lend-Lease material other than weapons sent by the US between July 41 and May 45. This does not take into account materials provided by Canada and Great Britain (about half as much again?) -

3,315,000 tons - metals

1,089,000 tons - chemicals and explosives

1,707,000 tons - petroleum products

4,200,000 tons - food

1,179,000 tons - machinery

- - -

A very good reference source on the contribution of Lend-Lease to the Soviet war effort is "The Soviet economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945" By Walter Scott Dunn. A limited view version can be found on book.google.com. Even the limited view is worth reading through. Some interesting items mentioned therein -

> Soviet production of aluminum had, in practical terms, been wiped out by the German advances of 1941 and 1942, only beginning a recovery in mid-1944.

> Soviet production of trucks had fallen to only about 3,000 vehicles per month by 1942, as most automotive factories had been converted to the production of light tanks. Stalin demanded 20,000 to 25,000 trucks per month from the allies to meet Soviet war needs. Lend-Lease supplied 79,000 truck in 1942 alone.

> Soviet ammunition expenditure was able to be doubled from 1.5 million tons in 1942 to 3 million tons in 1943 (thanks to massive Lend-Lease supply of explosives and propellant IMHO).


It is also worth noting that all this material was supplied during a time when the USA was feverishly building up its own armed forces and had placed its own civilian population under food rationing.


Byron

[lwd]

...
..... It is indeed a "tricky topic", as you say. I unfortunately lost my Lend-Lease research data in a hard drive crash, but, in brief, the key was not in the number of tanks or guns or trucks or aircraft provided by Lend-Lease....

The timing on these may have been important however. I've read somewhere that a significant number of tanks involved in the defence of Moscow were from British (as opposed to American) Lend Lease. IE they arrived just in time. For the most part the trucks and rail stock were probably more signifcant.

... the majority of the explosives consumed by the Red Army. ...

Wasn't aware that it was the majority but not only were a lot of explosives sent a lot of precursers were as well.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

The timing on these may have been important however. I've read somewhere that a significant number of tanks involved in the defence of Moscow were from British (as opposed to American) Lend Lease. IE they arrived just in time. For the most part the trucks and rail stock were probably more signifcant.

I heard that the soviets called the Lee type tank as the "coffin for five brothers".

[lwd]

lwd:

The timing on these may have been important however. I've read somewhere that a significant number of tanks involved in the defence of Moscow were from British (as opposed to American) Lend Lease. IE they arrived just in time. For the most part the trucks and rail stock were probably more signifcant.

I heard that the soviets called the Lee type tank as the "coffin for five brothers".

I've also heard that similar names were used for most tanks with the possible exception of the IS tanks. IE if a tank had a crew of x men then it was referred to as a "coffin for x brothers". I have seen some casualty figures for various nationalities that indicate the number of KIA/tank lost and the Soviets appear to have had a much higher ration than other combatants. It's not at all clear to me why or indeed if this was spurious.

[VeenenbergR]

So 2 facts deserve real attention and analysis:

1): was it the lend lease help that enabled the Soviets just in time to stand and hold crucial objectives and later enabled them to throw the Germans back.
Just looking at this help it helped the Soviets enormously to give their units the necesssary mobility and to focus upon production of aircraft, guns and tanks.
2): was it even with this massive support the manpower in a critical situation at the beginning of 1945.
It is a well known fact that the Soviets pressed many women in service in the latter stages of the war.

So was Hitler then right to hope he could turn the tide with a last massive mobilization of the last manpower of the Reich: the boys and older men

I really get the impression that the Soviets just in time managed to hold the lines near Moscow and leningrad and just got enoughhelp to enable them to attack the Germans near Stalingrad.

Was the Eastfront then a near thing??????///

[lwd]

From what I've read (and I'm no expert in this area so take this for what it's worth), I suspect that LL (and for the most part British LL) may have helped in the Battle of Moscow. I don't see the Germans taking Moscow in any case but the city probably would have suffered more and the Soviets lost more. It progressivly became more important after that particularly in the Soviet offensives where it allowed them a tempo of operations they wouldn't have had otherwise.

By the end of the war the Soviets were having significant personel shortages. Furthermore they had a looming famine if the war wasn't concluded in time to get a decent harvest in and distributed in 45. Again without LL I don't see the Germans winning but the end might come as a negotiated settlement with the lines probably outside the USSR but likely with the Red Army short of Berlin. Of it might settle down into some sort of festering stalemate. Of course there's still the Western front to consider in this scenario.

[VeenenbergR]

Gentleman:

From mkenny's published table 104 from Krivosheev:

6.237.000 Germans and their SS-volunteers (minus 215.000 Vlassovites) = 6.022.000 Germans were KIA (3 million), got MIA (1 million), died of wounds/disseases (0,4 million) or were POW's (2,6 million) only on the East Front.

To these another batch of POW's must be added: handed over by the Western Allies to the Soviets after may 1945.

Now: of these 2,6 million POW's + batch handed over some 1,480.000 died in Soviet custody (= estimation of Rüdiger Overmars)

IF Rüdiger Overmars is right 5,3 million German soldiers died on all causes on all theatres, but if totalling Krivosheev his numbers for the East Front alone the number is: 3 million + 0,4 million + 1 million + 1,48 million (because later these turned to be dead as well) = 5,88 million of military deaths.
That number even surpases the sometimes found too high number of Overmars and then even the dead for all other theatres of war still has to be added to this number.

The number of Krivosheev are therefore unrealistic and unacceptable high.

As we know AT MOST 2,5 million Germans were KIA on the Eastern Front (and that is including civilians pressed into service in 1945: some 250.000); 0,4 million may be killed by disseases/ wounds beacuse of the Eastern Front and 1,48 million are the estimated killed in soviet custody, making the sum 2,5 + 0.4 + 1,48 = 4,38 million for the Eastern Front and the reminder of 0,92 million for all the other fronts. This division is an acceptable division.

Krivosheev is not wrong with some 100.000 men but for the Eastern Front alone some 1,5 million too high!!! I find it strange that Krivosheev and Overmars don't solve this puzzle together on German grand totals.

[Karl Heidenreich]

VeenenbergR:

The number of Krivosheev are therefore unrealistic and unacceptable high.

The numbers he gave for casualties of both, Germans and Russians, at the Battle of Kursk seemed a way over what can be accepted. I tend to agree with you and, incredibly, with mkenny.

Take a look:

http://translate.google.com/translate?h ... google.com

[Byron Angel]

Was the Eastfront then a near thing??????///

..... I am, of course, plunging into uncharted speculative waters here:

From the historical point of view, with Lend-Lease in place, I don't see late war Soviet manpower problems as a dramatic game-changing issue. The USSR's real superiority over Germany was not so much in manpower as it was in materiel. Its materiel advantages (armor, artillery, airpower) were IMO simply insurmountable.

If the Soviet war effort had not been supported by Lend-Lease, I question whether the USSR could have defeated Germany. My likeliest scenario would be a stalemate somewhere short of the Volga. I could even visualize a potential Soviet defeat, although that would have depended upon what strategy the western allies chose. The western allies might (cynically) have opted to support the Soviets only to the extent of "keeping them in the game" to tie up German forces in the east, while denying them sufficient aid to build a truly powerful offensive threat. Had they done this, the postwar situation in central Europe might have taken a dramatically different aspect - or - Stalin, seeing through the western ploy, might felt pressured to attempt to make peace with Hitler involving large and attractive concessions of Soviet territory.


Byron

[hammy]

In an aside to the Lend-lease aid theme , I understand that many of the ships heading West across the Pacific were U S ones re-registered as Soviet ones and flying that flag , and sailed without escorts as "Neutrals" for Japan was not at war with Russia until the war's end in 1945 .
The Japanese , wary of taking on the Soviet Empire as well as their other enemies , supposedly turned a blind eye to this , and did not intervene , although Hitler must have been doing his nut .

This aspect of the war at sea seems to have been airbrushed out of most of the histories now .

I read somewhere that Russian troops called tins of Spam , "American bullets" , and Elsewhere of German officer's frustration at finding large numbers of U S built trucks about the battlefields .
Another overlooked route was up from the Indian ocean through (British-controlled) Persia , and into southern Russia that way .

The Russians dont seem to have liked a lot of what Britain sent them early on , particularly the tanks , and for some reason the Hawker Hurricanes , which is odd seeing that they had a generally "Good War" elsewhere . German sources also dismiss them as Worthless aerial opponents in Russian hands too .
They got on famously with the Aircobra and Kingcobra though .

[VeenenbergR]

Byron Angel and Karl.

Thanks for the very interesting links you both send!!! Lend lease was much underrated until now.
The Soviets paid with their lives and always boasted that they did the job (but the lend lease made it possible to do the job well!!)

Karl: soviet statistics are quite real (f.e. Kursk) and they at least admit losses in the order of 178.000 (against 58.000 of the Germans).
Glantz mentioned Soviet losses between 178.000 and 240.000 and German lossses between 58.000 (30 divisions = average of 2000 per division over 10-12 days) to 78.000.

In Normandy losses in the period of July and August 1944 were about equal I think, with the Germans also deploying some 30 divisions.......

In the Ardennes losses were 100.000 over 1 month, also over 30 divisions.....

Rob

[alecsandros]

Karl: soviet statistics are quite real (f.e. Kursk) and they at least admit losses in the order of 178.000 (against 58.000 of the Germans).

It depends on the author, I guess. I read about Kursk many years ago, in a soviet military history book, and it presented:
Kursk - German killed - ~ 900.000; captured: ~ 200.000. Total: 1,1 millions
Kursk -soviets killed ~ 500.000.
The figures were highly contested since the 60s and especialy 70s by western historians, up to the current position, that you and the others have presented...

Maybe (hopefully) the russian military historiography got better after the USSR broke down...