Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Non-naval discussions about the Second World War. Military leaders, campaigns, weapons, etc.
mkenny
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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:28 am

Here a table with Luftwaffe ground forcess included and to April 1945

Feldheer Casualties 1 Sep 39-20 Apr 45 (Organizationabteilung d. Gen.Stb. d. Heer, 26 Apr 45, NARA T78, R414, F3189)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
.............................KIA ......................WIA......................... MIA................................... Total
Ostheer ................1,005,413 ............3,992,062 ..................1,369,174 ...........................6,366,649
Geb.AOK 20............ 16,395 .................60,515.........................6,852................................. 83,762
OB Süd-West..... ......48,750 ................174,734 ....................215,525...............................439,009
OB Süd-Ost .............22,370 ..................70,064....................... 24,620 .............................117,054
OB West ................109,046..................382,776 ....................772,460....................... ...1,264,282
Other .....................9,248 ...................28,826.........................6,120............................... 44,194
Total ....................1,211,222 ..............4,708,977 .................2,394,751................... ........8,314,950

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:30 am

From the same essay(Glantz):
On the 50th anniversary of the Normandy invasion of 1944, a U.S. news magazine
featured a cover photo of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was labeled as the man
who defeated Hitler. If any one man deserved that label, it was not Eisenhower but
Zhukov, Vasilevsky, or possibly Stalin himself. More generally, the Red Army and the
Soviet citizenry of many nationalities bore the lion’s share of the struggle against
Germany from 1941 to 1945. Only China, which suffered almost continuous Japanese
attack from 1931 onward, matched the level of Soviet suffering and effort. In military
terms, moreover, the Chinese participation in the war was almost insignificant in
comparison with the Soviet war, which constantly engaged absorbed more than half of all
German forces.
From June through December 1941, only Britain shared with the Soviet Union the
trials of war against the Germans. Over 3 million German troops fought in the East, while
900,000 struggled elsewhere, attended to occupied Europe, or rested in the homeland.
From December 1941 through November 1942, while over nine million troops on both
sides struggled in the East, the only significant ground action in the Western Theater took
place in North Africa, where relatively small British forces engaged Rommel’s Afrika
Corps and its Italian allies.
In October and November 1942, the British celebrated victory over the Germans
at El Alamein, defeating four German divisions and a somewhat larger Italian force, and
inflicting 60,000 axis losses. The same month, at Stalingrad, the Soviets defeated and
encircled German Sixth Army, damaged Fourth Panzer Army, and smashed Rumanian
104
Third and Fourth Armies, eradicating over 50 divisions and over 300,000 men from the
Axis order of battle. By May 1943 the Allies pursued Rommel’s Afrika Corps across
northern Africa and into Tunisia, where after heavy fighting, the German and Italian force
of 250,000 surrendered. Meanwhile, in the East, another German army (the Second) was
severely mauled, and Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies were utterly destroyed,
exceeding Axis losses in Tunisia.
While over 3.5 million German and Soviet troops struggled at Kursk and 8.5
million later fought on a 1,500-mile front from the Leningrad region to the Black Sea coast,
in July 1943 Allied forces invaded Sicily, and drove 60,000 Germans from the island. In
August the Allies landed on the Italian peninsula. By October, when 2.5 million men of
the Wehrmacht faced 6.6 million Soviets, the frontlines had stabilized in Italy south of
Rome as the Germans deployed a much smaller, although significant, number of troops to
halt the Allied advance.
By 1 October 1943, 2,565,000 men (63%) of the Wehrmacht's 4,090,000-man
force struggled in the East, together with the bulk of the 300,000 Waffen SS troops. On 1
June 1944, 239 (62%) of the German Army's 386 division equivalents fought in the East.
With operations in Italy at a stalemate, until June 1944, in fact, the Wehrmacht still
considered the west as a semi-reserve. In August 1944, after the opening of the second
front, while 2.1 million Germans fought in the East, 1 million opposed Allied operations
in France.
Casualty figures underscore this reality. From September 1939 to September
1942, the bulk of the German Army's 922,000 dead, missing, and disabled (14% of the
total force) could be credited to combat in the East. Between 1 September 1942 and 20
November 1943 this grim count rose to 2,077,000 (30% of the total force), again
primarily in the East. From June through November 1944, after the opening of the second
front, the German Army suffered another 1,457,000 irrevocable losses. Of this number,
903,000 (62%) were lost in the East. Finally, after losing 120,000 men to the Allies in the
Battle of the Bulge, from 1 January to 30 April 1945 the Germans suffered another 2
million losses, two-thirds at Soviet hands. Today, the stark inscription, “died in the
East,” that is carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German cemeteries
bear mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the
Wehrmacht perished.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:32 am

mkenny:

Please answer the questions posted since some days ago, first. Don`t ignore them. You are making of a fool ignoring everything that is being thrown at you.

Luftwaffe? We are talking land warfare here.

What are you going to do next: list the Bismarck casualty list?
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:33 am

Karl Heidenreich wrote: Feb-May 1945? No, he is saying 1939 - 1945. Please read or you are in a nervous breakdown mode already?
I did read it. Here is what you said:
Karl Heidenreich wrote:By war’s end, out of the 13.5 million men Hitler’s Wehrmacht fielded in the
war, 10.8 million had perished or fallen captive in the East
Thus he does say 10.8 in the East (1941-45)and not 1939-45.

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:35 am

Let´s check this figures and concepts, mkenny:

During the war and since war’s end, the Soviets have bitterly complained since the
war about the absence of a real “second front” before June 1944, and that issue remains a
source of suspicion even in post Cold War Russia. Yet, Allied reasons for deferring a
second front until 1944 were valid, and Allied contributions to victories were significant.
As the American debacle at the Kasserine Pass in December 1942 and Canadian
performance at Dieppe in 1943 indicated, Allied armies were not ready to operate in
France in 1943, even had a sufficient number of landing craft been available for the
invasion, which they were not. Even in 1944 Allied success at Normandy was a close
thing and depended, in part, on major German misperceptions and mistakes. Once in
France, after the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in August, the 2 million Allied
troops in France inflicted grievous losses on the 1 million defending Germans, 100,000 at
Falaise, and a total of 400,000 by December 1944. In the subsequent battle of the Bulge
(16 December 1944-31 January 1945), the Germans lost another 120,000 men. These
losses in the West, combined with the over 1.2 million lost in the East during the same
period, broke the back of the Wehrmacht and set the context for the final destruction of
Germany in 1945.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:37 am

mkenny:
Thus he does say 10.8 in the East (1941-45)and not 1939-45.
You once said, when admiting that you were wrong with Monty in this same thread, that no one is perfect. In the rush of writing I commited the mistake there of writing 1939 instead of 1941. So what? Not even quarter of a million could be added to that by then.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:38 am

Answers please, or you are admiting you have no answers for those questions, which everybody knows by now at the forum.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:39 am

Karl Heidenreich wrote:
Luftwaffe? We are talking land warfare here.
Please read carefully the description
and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
Karl Heidenreich wrote:What are you going to do next: list the Bismarck casualty list?
How about total Navy casualties Sept 1939 to November 1944:

91,470

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:44 am

The bibliography of the Glantz paper is large, but is worth mentioning here, just in order to disperse the comedy-like comment: "Glantz has got the numbers completely wrong."

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
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(1941-1945 gg.): Statisticheskii sbornik No. 1 (22 iiunia 1941 g.) [The combat and
numerical composition of the USSR’s Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War
(1941-1945): Statistical collection No. 1 (22 June 1941)]. Moscow: Institute of
Military History, 1994.
Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, Chast’ 1 (iiun’-dekabr’ 1941 goda) [The combat
composition of the Soviet Army, Part 1 (June-December 1941)]. Moscow:
Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, 1963.
Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, Chast’ 2 (Ianvar’-dekabr’ 1942 goda) [The combat
composition of the Soviet Army, Part 2 (January-December 1941)]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1966.
Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, Chast’ 3 (Ianvar’-dekabr’ 1943 goda) [The combat
composition of the Soviet Army, Part 3 (January-December 1943)]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1972.
Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, Chast’ 4 (Ianvar’-dekabr’ 1944 goda) [The combat
composition of the Soviet Army, Part 4 (January-December 1944)]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1988.
“Dokumenty nemetskogo komandovaniia po voprosam podgotovki voiny” [Documents
of the German command on the matter of preparing for war] and “Dokumenty
nemetskogo komandovaniia po voprosam vedeniia voiny” [Documents of the
German command on the matter of the conduct of the war] in Sbornik voennoistoricheskikh
materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 18 [Collection of
military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War, issue 18]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1960. Classified secret.
“State Defense Committee Decree of 11 September 1941.” Central Party Archives of the
Institute of Marxism and Leninism, TsPA UML. F. 644, op. 1, d. 9.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “General’nyi shtab v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny:
Dokumenty i materialy 1941 god” [The General Staff in the Great Patriotic War:
Documents and materials from 1941] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia,
23 12 (1) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 23, no. 12 (1)].
Moscow: “TERRA,” 1997.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “General’nyi shtab v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny:
Dokumenty i materialy 1942 god” [The General Staff in the Great Patriotic War:
Documents and materials from 1942] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia,
23 12 (2) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 23, no. 12 (2)].
Moscow: “TERRA,” 1999.
111
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “General’nyi shtab v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny:
Dokumenty i materialy 1943 god” [The General Staff in the Great Patriotic War:
Documents and materials from 1943] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia,
23 12 (3) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 23, no. 12 (3)].
Moscow: “TERRA,” 1999.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “Stavka VGK: Dokumenty i materialy 1941 god” [The Stavka
VGK: Documents and materials of 1941] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia
Otechestvennaia, 16 5 (1) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 16,
no. 5 (1)]. Moscow: “TERRA,” 1996.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “Stavka VGK: Dokumenty i materialy 1942” [The Stavka VGK:
Documents and materials of 1942] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia, 16
5 (2) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 16, no. 5 (2)].
Moscow: “TERRA,” 1996.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “Stavka Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniia: Dokumenty i
materialy 1943 god” [The Stavka VGK: Documents and materials of 1943] in
Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia, 16 5 (3) [The Russian archives: The
Great Patriotic War, vol. 16, no. 5 (3)]. Moscow: “TERRA,” 1999.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. “Stavka VGK: Dokumenty i materialy 1944-1945” [The Stavka
VGK: Documents and materials of 1944] in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia
Otechestvennaia, 16 5 (4) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic War, vol. 16,
no. 5 (4)]. Moscow: “TERRA,” 1999.
112
SECONDARY SOURCES
Burdick, Charles, and Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942.
Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1983.
Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, KS: The
University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed. Lawrence, KS: The
University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Glantz, David M. Barbarossa: Hitler’s Invasion of Russia in 1941. Charleston, SC:
Tempus, 2001.
Glantz, David M. Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945), volume I:
The Summer-Fall Campaign (22 June-4 December 1941). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished,
1999.
Glantz, David M. Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945), volume II:
The Winter Campaign (5 December 1941-April 1942). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished,
1999.
Glantz, David M. Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945), volume
III: The Summer Campaign (12 May–18 November 1942). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished,
1999.
Glantz, David M. Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945), volume
IV: The Winter Campaign (19 November 1942-21 March 1943). Carlisle, PA:
Self-published, 1999.
Glantz, David M. Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945), volume V,
parts 1 and 2: The Summer-Fall Campaign (1 July-31 December 1943). Carlisle,
PA: Self-published, 2000.
Glantz, David m. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December
1942-August 1943. London: Frank Cass, 1991.
Glantz, David M. ed. The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June-August
1941. London: Frank Cass, 1993.
Glantz, David M. Kharkov 1942: The Anatomy of a Military Disaster. London: Ian
Allen, 1998.
Glantz, David M. The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. London: Frank
Cass, 1992.
Glantz, David M. The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1945: 900 Days of Terror. London:
Brown Partworks, 2001.
Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Frank
Cass, 1989.
Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Intelligence in War. London: Frank Cass, 1990.
113
Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London:
Frank Cass, 1991.
Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War. Lawrence, KS:
The University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Glantz, David M. Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation
Mars. Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Grechko, A. A., ed. Istoriia Vtoroi Mirovoi voiny 1939-1945 v dvenadtsati tomakh [A
history of the Second World War 1939-1945 in twelve volumes]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1973-1982.
Grechko, A. A., ed. Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia v bos’mi tomakh [Soviet
military encyclopedia in eight volumes]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980.
Gurkin, V. V. “Liudskie poteri Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh sil v 1941-1945: Novye
aspekty” [Personnel losses of the Soviet Armed forces 1941-1945: New aspects].
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal] 2 (March-April 1999):
2-13.
Ogarkov, N. V. ed. Sovetskaia voennaia entiklopediia, v bos’mi tomakh [Soviet
military encyclopedia in 8 volumes]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-89.
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Army G-2, 1954). Unpublished National Archives manuscript in German
(unpublished translation by Joseph Welch).
Krivosheev, G. F., ed. Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voinakh,
boevykh deistviiakh i boevykh konfliktakh, Statisticheskoe issledovanie [The secret
classification has been removed: The losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars,
combat operations, and military conflicts, A Statistical study]. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1993.
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Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1985. Unpublished
Center for Military History Project 26-P.
Maslov, Aleksander. Captured Soviet General: The Fate of Soviet Generals Captured by
the Germans, 1941-1945. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
Maslov, Aleksander. Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle,
1941-1945. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
Nachal’nyi period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny [The initial period of the Great Patriotic
War]. Moscow: Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, 1989.
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shesti tomakh, Tom tretii [A History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union 1941-1945 in six volumes, vol. 3]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961.
Pospelov, P. N., ed. Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945
v shesti tomakh [A history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-
1945 in six volumes]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960-1965.
114
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in 8 volumes]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1997-1999.
Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War 1941-1945. New York: Praeger Publishers,
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vos’moi [A history of the Second World War in twelve volumes, volume eight].
Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977.
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Moscow: Aviar, 1992.
Zhukov, G. Reminiscences and Recollections, Volume 1. Moscow: Progress, 1974.
Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington, D.
C.: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army, 1968.
Ziemke, Earl F., and Bauer, Magna E. Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East.
Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army,
1987.
Zolotarev, V. A., ed. Velikaia Otechestvannaia voina 1941-1945: Voenno-istoricheskie
ocherki v chetyrekh tomakh [The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Militaryhistorical
essays in four volumes]. Moscow: “Nauka,” 1998-1999.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:46 am

mkenny:
How about total Navy casualties Sept 1939 to November 1944:

91,470
What about them? Not relevant in this discussion as all the garbage you are bringing to soffocate your predicament.

My answers? Let me remind you: "Where do I said that the Germans fought to death?

Arrogance, arrogance, arrogance...

I think I can rest my case now.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:52 am

German figures

Feldheer Casualties 1 Sep 39-20 Apr 45 (Organizationabteilung d. Gen.Stb. d. Heer, 26 Apr 45, NARA T78, R414, F3189)
Losses in the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe Ground Troops
.............................KIA ......................WIA......................... MIA................................... Total
Ostheer ................1,005,413 ............3,992,062 ..................1,369,174 ...........................6,366,649

Glantz, it is claimed, says the East total was 10.8 million. 4.8 million adrift even without the bogus counting of the wounded as permanent losses.
To be fair to Glantz we only have a passing mention and not a referenced total.
I have to admit pulling the legs off a helpless spider is not as satisfying as I imagined it would be. It is sad to see someone trying to defend such a hopeless case.
I implore you to walk away.

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Thu Feb 18, 2010 1:56 am

We can do a summary now, after the evidence posted from an expert source, not a pàthetic amateur:

The Germans fought in two fronts from June 6th, 1944 to May 8th, 1945. Their most important front was in the East were they fought the bulk of their enemies: the Red Army. To that front they commited the greatest amount of resources.

In the West the Germans were also overwhelmed by numerical superior allies: about 4 - 5,2 million allies against roughfly 2 million Germans. In the West the Germans also fought against an enemy that quickly gained control of the skies.

The Germans greatest toll of casualties was, however, in the East, not in the West.

It has been until the last decade the precise studies has taken place in order to analyse what really happened in the Eastern Front, which includes the operations toward the end of the war. These new studies modify (or correct) previous mistakes.

Warmest regards,
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 2:21 am

Some interesting info on Glantz and his reliance on German secondary sources and the factual errors that ensue.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... +in+Glantz

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8604&hilit

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by mkenny » Thu Feb 18, 2010 3:48 am

Karl Heidenreich wrote:By war’s end, out of the 13.5 million men Hitler’s Wehrmacht fielded in the
war, 10.8 million had perished or fallen captive in the East
Strangely one of your other highly rated sources (Krivosheev) contradicts this with a total of 6,923,700 German casualties in the East.
This can be seen on page 278 of his book.
Which figure do you think is the most accurate-given the 4 million difference?
Krivosheev also lists 1,725,800 Axis Allied casualties bringing the Axis total to 8,649,550.
It is still c.2 million short of Glantz.

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Re: Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

Post by boredatwork » Thu Feb 18, 2010 7:22 am

To toss in my 2 cents... as I am boredathome tonight...


1. I think the internet would be a much happier place if people actually read what other people are saying before arguing againt it.
2. I was lost after page 25 and the name calling started but as I understand it 5 pages have been spent arguing 2 points - Germany was outnumbered in the west & substantial numbers of German troops surrendered in a not wounded or dead condition.
3. I don't remember Karl specifically using the phrase "fight to the death" nor do I remember Mkenny "admiting that [he was] wrong with Monty in this same thread" - as I recall it he acknowledged that Monty failed at Arnhem and was not perfect - both points which no one, including him, had disputed.
4. I bought and read a used copy of Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'Este after about page ~13 of this thread and thought the insight into the Normandy Campaign, particularly Montgomery's role was very interesting.
5. Again I point out the irony, in a thread about "revisionist tendencies," that if 'pro-axis' and 'pro-allied' arguments are advanced the pro-axis argument it automatically taken as the 'truth' by some and any attempt to present the opposite is obviously evidence of 'revisionism.' IMO RF 'won' this thread on p1, post 12 - "Hardly a proposition for intelligent debate....."

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