Karl Heidenreich wrote:In previous threads it has been determined that the attrition of panzer units on the field of battle during the Normandy Campaign was due in a great part to alllied air power. Many of those Mk IV, Panther and Tiger tanks destroyed and photographed for the amusement of some were hit and destroyed from airborne adversaries
This is simply untrue. Tanks destroyed by Aircraft numbered around 15% of the total . By comparison over 40% of German tank losses were caused by Allied AP shot.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:mkenny:This is simply untrue. Tanks destroyed by Aircraft numbered around 15% of the total . By comparison over 40% of German tank losses were caused by Allied AP shot.
I think something is missing:
15% +40% = 55%
Ask in another thread and I will answer you. It is impolite to to hijack the thread.
Dave Saxton wrote:Hitler failed to catch the vision of how the Me-262 should best be used. He saw at as a Blitz Bomber that would make the invasion beaches untenable in the upcoming invasions. Hitler forbade its production as a fighter or a defensive weapon, so the program languished into 1944, and the Mustangs wore the Jagdwaffe down to impotence through early 1944. Ironically had the 262 been employed as a fighter as Galland, Milch, and Kneymeyer, had envisioned it could have done more to stop the Invasion than it ever could have as a blitz bomber. An absolute requirement for the Invasion was complete Allied air superiority, and without it the Invasion and its successful follow through could not go forward.
By D-day the production of 262s was still barely 60 a month. The 262 went into combat operations as both an ineffective blitz bomber and a very effective interceptor over the fatherland the same week as Overlord. The Gloster Meteor also commenced combat operations that week.
boredatwork wrote:Are you sure about your production numbers? As far as I know the first 29 production 262s weren't delivered UNTIL June 1944.
I see frequent references to Hitler's Fuhrer-Befehl as the reason there weren't swarms of Me 262s sooner - however I see no evidence that is the case. The modifications to make the jet into a fighter bomber were relatively trivial and would have had minimal impact upon production.
What did impact production was the non-availability of a reliable powerplant.
The bulk of 23 pre-production airframes were completed in January of 1944 but had to wait until April for their engines.
The Jumo 004B wasn't frozen for production until June 1944. Hitler's order did nothing to delay the engine - he needed it urgently for his bomber version as well as the Arado 234 afterall.
Even after June engine availability was the primary production bottleneck, not airframes - June - 29; July - 59; August - 20 due to lack of engines; September 90. This was further compounded by the short life span of the engines which meant a substantial proportion of the trickle was being used as replacements, rather than for new built aircraft.
Given the first production engines (and still very unreliable ones at that) weren't available until June I fail to see how a massive force of Me262s could have been available in time to make an impact on D-Day regardless of how they were emplyed.
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