Which you didn't even care to quote, just mention to show that you also have something as a document support. A mediocre work at least, not like Glantz, Dupuy or Willbeck's. A review which can be completely read at:
Mythos revisited: American Historians and German Fighting Power in WWII
by Thomas E. Nutter
In 1994 Keith E. Bonn published his tendentiously titled work, When the Odds Were Even.(100) Bonn is a 1978 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and at the time his book was published, was serving as an infantry officer at Fort Lewis, Washington. When the Odds Were Even grew out of Bonn's doctoral dissertation in history at the University of Chicago. While it would appear from Bonn's Acknowledgments that he had access to original German documents in both the U.S. National Archives and the Bundesmilitargeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Freiburg, Germany, in fact he relies upon primarily American sources to tell the German side of the story. His Acknowledgment also reveals that he interviewed only American veterans in the preparation of his work.(101)
In his Introduction, Bonn sets the tone for When the Odds Were Even , and indeed for the entire genre of which it is a part. In the process of decrying the "selective" use of history, Bonn states that
[O]ne of the most recent and unquestionably most alarming trends in the historiography of World War II in the ETO [European Theatre of Operations] is the use of the events of this era by certain military reformers to justify recommendations that the contemporary U.S. Army should discard its own uniquely evolved institutions and doctrines and instead simply imitate the Wehrmacht.(102)
Particularly offensive to Bonn in this regard are works which "inaccurately represent the facts bearing on the respective combat accomplishments of the American and German armies" or compare those accomplishments unfairly.(103)
Bonn must at least be credited with admitting that the Unites States Army enjoyed certain critical advantages over the Wehrmacht in the ETO, namely (i) tactical air superiority, if not supremacy; (ii) a gradually improving logistical situation; and (iii) a relatively favorable manpower situation, advantages which "colored the outcome of very campaign, every battle, and every engagement in which they (the Americans) participated".(104) Because of these significant disparities, a "truly fair and accurate comparison" of the two armies is difficult to construct. Bonn finds his ideal field for comparison, however, in the Vosges campaign of the Fall-Winter, 1944/1945. Having reached this conclusion, however, Bonn immediately moves to debunk it. In the early portion of the campaign, for example, the Germans not only enjoyed the benefits of prepared positions in terrain naturally suited to defense, but also disposed of veteran troops who, though "sometimes outnumbered…still had their full complement of mortars and machine guns", weapons the author describes as the most important under the circumstances.(105) On the other hand, the American units involved are described as either totally green or burned out from campaigning in Italy. In spite of these disadvantages, the "mixed bag of American units" succeeded in prevailing over their opponents in the first phase of the battle, as well as its succeeding phases.
Bonn begins his work with a brief discussion of the then existing historical literature touching on his subject, with regard to much of which he is very skeptical. Bonn is highly critical of Martin van Creveld, whom he describes as "notorious". After condescendingly referring to Creveld's "admirers" as "well-intentioned but uninformed", he decries the latter's work as historically inaccurate and "the worst kind of revisionist history". Bonn claims that Creveld's work is shot through with historical inaccuracies about the U.S. Army. To illustrate this, he claims that Creveld represents that U.S. combat divisions used such things as pigs, bees, monkeys, centipedes, and belligerent dogs for their unit insignia, and that these "whimsical" designs embarrassed American troops and adversely affected their morale.(106) In fact, the passage in Creveld's work to which Bonn alludes reads as follows:
Like their German counterparts, American units were known by either roman or Arabic numbers. Most also had nicknames, though the enormous variety of whimsical designs---belligerent dogs, ducks, centipedes, spiders, bees, bulls, birds, monkeys, wolves, bears, horses, pigs and cats, among others---that accompanied American units into combat suggests that these meant little to the troops. Except for Meril's Marauders, an outfit operating against the Japanese, I know of no case in which an American formation was known after its commander.(107)
At least two things are evident from the foregoing passage. First, Creveld does not refer to U.S. combat divisions, as Bonn claims, but to "units", a fact which is evident from not only the paragraph in question, but from the surrounding context as well. Such "units" could include something as small as an armored company or platoon, or a fighter or bomber squadron, or even an individual aircraft. Second, at least one of the animals referred to by Creveld---"birds"---was in fact used as a divisional symbol by at least two
U.S. combat formations---the 45th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division---and at least as far as is known, the soldiers in those formations were not "embarrassed" by those symbols. Moreover, one need only consult any one of a number of works on the Eighth Air Force to determine that many of its units bore symbols such as belligerent dogs, bees and hornets, ruptured ducks, bulls and the like.
Bonn's flawed methodology in approaching his topic is apparent very early in the book. For example, he asserts that the personnel strength of German units (which he claims are not available from German sources) may be gleaned from American sources. This can be done, according to Bonn, by "meticulously screening available U.S. intelligence reports" and comparing these to the estimates provided by German veterans of the Vosges campaign in the manuscripts they wrote for the U.S. Army in the immediate postwar era. The numbers thus yielded are then cross-referenced with German tables of organization and equipment to give "accurate hard quantities or numbers". There are at least two serious drawbacks to this method. First, as Niklas Zetterling has shown, while numbers of personnel and weapons may not be available from the records of a large German formation (such as Heeresgruppe G), those numbers are often available, either directly or by "patching together" from subordinate formations such as divisions or army corps.(108) Second, no one with anything more than a passing familiarity with the German army would suggest that cross-checking against a German table of organization and equipment in 1944 would be a meaningful exercise. The fact of the matter is that such tables were fanciful characterizations of what the OKW and OKH would have liked for their formations to look like. For example, on 1 August 1944 Panzer Divisions underwent a complete reorganization, into the so-called "Type 44 Panzer Division". A Panzer Division included one Panzer regiment of two battalions; the first battalion included four companies of 17-22 Panther tanks each, while the second battalion possessed four companies of 17-22 Mk IV tanks each.(109) 21.Panzer-Division engaged the Allies during the Normandy fighting. On 8 August 1944 its Panzer-Regiment 22 fielded a total of 20 combat ready Mk IV tanks, over sixty fewer than its maximum authorized strength. More interesting still is the makeup of 21.Panzer-Division on the eve of the Normandy campaign, at which time it was organized as a "Type 43 Panzer Division". According to this organizational structure, it should have had two Panzer battalions, the first consisting of four companies of 22 Mk IVs each, and the second comprising four companies of 22 Panthers each. In fact, on 1 June 1944 the first battalion of Panzer-Regiment 22 had four companies of 17 Mk IVs each, while the Regiment's second battalion broke down as follows: 5 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 9 French Somua; 6 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 13 French Somua, 2 British Hotchkiss; 7 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 13 French Somua; 8 Kompanie, 6 Mk IV (short barrel).(112) These discrepancies between the nominal strength of the 21.Panzer-Division and its actual makeup are typical of the distinctions between ideal and reality which characterized all formations in the German army at this stage of the war.
It goes on and on and the complete reading can be found in the link posted above. Still, the Germans had a much better, the best, army of WWII, acknowledge so by the same officers of the army that fought it.