German tanks

[Karl Heidenreich]

Byron:

As for the ultimate value of Dupuy's research goes, I think it speaks for itself and is echoed by other highly respected academics and analysts. For Van Creveld, an Israeli, to concur with Dupuy's analysis speaks volumes to me. As for Dupuy's critics, well, critics always accumulate around any argument or thesis. I have yet to see, however, any criticism of that goes any real distance toward discrediting Dupuy's work .

And are consistent with other works that were not addressing that topic such as Glantz and Willbeck. I will still have to finish the thesis of US armor doctrine but some elements of it also confirm these facts.

[lwd]

A couple of point on Dupuy. He was actually looking at the casualty inflicting potential of a cerain size of unit (divisions? been a while since I read his works) normalized to a per person figure. This does not mean that the average German soldier was worth 1.5 US or British soldiers. I also don't remember if he took the time factor into account. When the US enter the war for instance all of it's troops were essentially green (a very light sprinkling of mostly officers and older noncoms had WWI experiance). They also had a number of doctrinal and organizational problems and the standard peace time officer problem. Over time they improved dramatically. The German army on the other hand declined in the latter war years.

..... My own point of view is that Dupuy is arguing that the German SYSTEM produced a fighting force 1.5x more effective; he is not arguing that the average German was 1.5x the man or 1.5x the warrior.

I think you got that exactly right. Note that the numbers might change if you chose larger or smaller units. I do wonder what would happen if he added time as a variable as well. Would the German advantage start dissapearing as you got into late 44 and 45 for instance.

As for the ultimate value of Dupuy's research goes, I think it speaks for itself and is echoed by other highly respected academics and analysts. For Van Creveld, an Israeli, to concur with Dupuy's analysis speaks volumes to me. As for Dupuy's critics, well, critics always accumulate around any argument or thesis. I have yet to see, however, any criticism of that goes any real distance toward discrediting Dupuy's work.

I agree to at least some extent but part of the problem is Dubuy wasn't writing for the casual reader. He was pretty precise in what he was doing and why. Professionals usually take this into account and don't try to extrapolate his results. Most of the valid critisims I've seen speak more to the problem of interpretting his work beyond it's scope. So the critsims aren't really of Dupuy's work. I haven't read his works in quite a while but I do remember when I did that there were several points I had questions on but I also felt that I needed to study the material in more detail before calling it to question. Looks like it's time to buy another copy and reread it.

[Karl Heidenreich]

I am glad that now lwd and everybody else is happy and this topic is clear.

[dunmunro]

Victories against long odds:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... tents.html

[hunter]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ARMY MAJOR Christopher Willbeck:

As he states (Jentz) in his introduction, these "original after action reports (German) are very valuable in obtaining a true picture of the tactics. As written, they wouild have had to meet the tough test of peer aceptance. Because they were written shortly after the events ocurred, they also have the advantage of being recorded before memory became clouded by time. Most of German reports appear to have been written with the motive of initiating improvements to the Tigers or changing tactics."

Am I mistaken but I am the only one bringing forth evidence to the discussion only to meet the opinions that are complety subjective and not comming from any evidence at all?

Regards,

It is a common misconception that Schneider (for it is his figures Wilbeck uses) used official documents to compile TIC I & 2.
It seems Schneider used mainly third hand self-serving accounts by veterans.
Perhaps one example is the best way to show how this leads him to make vastly inflated 'kill' claims when there is not the slightest scrap of evidence to confirm it.
　
　
　
If you research Otto Carius you find multiple mentions of his being responsible for 51 Soviet tank kills on 22 July 1944.
Carius says he knocked out 17 IS 11 and 5 T-34 in one action and then moved on with 6 Tigers and destroyed a further 28 IS-11

You can even find pictures the recreate the events.


http://www.militaryartgallery.com/HTML_ ... s_roar.htm
　
The Tigers Roar
Malinava, Latvia, July 22nd 1944
by
David Pentland
1st Lieutenant Otto Carius commanding 2nd Company of the 502nd heavy tank Battalion, with eight Tigers, advanced towards the village of Malinava (a northern suburb of Dunaburg), to halt the Russian advance. Following a reconnaissance Lieutenant Otto Carius explained his plan to take the village. He decided to attack using only two tanks because there was only one narrow road leading to the village. Six Tigers therefore remained in the reserve while Lt Carius and Lt. Albert Kerschers (one of the most decorated commanders of sPzAbt 502) tanks moved towards the village. Speed was the essence and afterwards, Otto Carius recalls that the entire battle did not last more than 20 minutes. in this short time, Carius and Kerscher knocked out 17 of the new JS-1 Stalin and 5 T-34 tanks. Following this he deployed 6 of his tanks in an ambush against the remainder of the Soviet tank battalion advancing toward him, unaware of their lead companies demise. Surprise was complete and a further 28 tanks were destroyed along with their supporting trucks and vehicles, the complete battalion had been wiped out for no loss.



　
　
Six Tiger I tanks including Albert Kersher and Lt. Otto Carius, of 2nd Company Heavy tank Battalion 502, prepare to take up ambush positions for the soon to arrive Soviet tank brigade. In the ensuing encounter, the Tigers destroyed the entire column of 28 Josef Stalin IIs.


The entry in TIC 1

　
　
first 6 T-34 were knocked out. Then Carius and another Tiger got 17 IS-2 and 5 T-34. Later the same day Carius and 5 other Tigers knocked out 28 more tanks.



Schneider's account appears to be based on the account Carius gives in his book 'Tigers In The Mud' (pages 146-151 hardback) in the chapter called 'The Ambush'.
Now I am sure some here will start claiming the word of Carius can not be doubted and that Schneider (TIC1) based his books on meticulous research in German Reports and we can be assured it is all 100% checked and proven to be true. . In this instance we can actualy check if it is true.
At the back of the Carius book 'Tigers In The Mud ' can be found the report (Document 6) written by the commander of sPzAbt 502. Written on 20 August 1944 the entry for 22/7/44 lists a total of 23 Soviet tanks claimed by the Unit. 17 T-34 and 6 IS-2.

The AAR shows conclusively that Schneider did NOT use the period documentation and that contrary to his listing of 55 tanks claimed that day only 23 were claimed.

The AAR lists 17 T-34 and 6 IS II whilst Carius claims 17 IS II and 5 T-34 for the first action and 28 IS-II for the second.

Schneider is not a credible source here and as Wilbeck's book is based entirely on the numbers in TIC1 & 2 he is as suspect as Schneider.
　
It is clear the German kill claim system was chaotic and numbers appear to be made up on the spot and then increased later. In short they are useless as an accurate count of knocked out tanks.
The system was so bad that the official policy was to apply a 50% discount (Zetterling, 'Kursk 1943', page 126. ISBN 0714650528. pub. 2000) to all kill claims.

Here we can see it in action in mid 1943

from "Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1945, Band 2" by Fritz Hahn.

　

　
　
The Germans believed half their own crew claims were bogus and using the Carius example above we can see the doubts were well founded.
Anyone doing the most basic research (i.e checking the claims rather than worshipping them) can easily find the truth.

[Karl Heidenreich]

If we applied a 50% correction to the kill ratios that are officially accepted still the Tigers of the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 had instead of a 13.08 ratio then a 6.54, or the 13./Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland will have a 8.335 instead of a 16.67 (which is a case that the same Willbeck mention starting his thesis). In the worst case of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508 then the ratio is still 1 on 1, but never a reversal of the ratios. It's the same that I have always argued in the case of the German Aces: we can cut Hartman not by two but by three and we have 120 kills and give Bong twice as much (80), and still the German ace outscores it's rival. I can live with that more than confortably.

Regards,

[alecsandros]

@hunter

Hello and welcome to the forum;

I am currently working on a analysis of Tiger deployment and operations on various fronts.

To this end, I have read quite carefully Schneider's books, amongst others. The bibliography he lists is comprised of primary documents and also secondary sources. There are no tertiary sources that I know of.
Willbeck cites also an extensive bibliography, so attributing his work exclusively to Scheider's books is not fair, IMO.

When reading it, one must be very carefull because the details [given in his book] are scarce, and one must pay attention to the circumstances described. The most important aspect, IMO, is to take notice of the other forces involved in Tiger assaults. In many cases, the Tigers attacked along with panzer-grenadier units and at the end of the description of the battle, the author mentions the TOTAL number of tanks knocked-out during the engagement, both by Tigers and infantry/mobile AT guns. A good example comes from the battle of Tetourba (sp?) in NOrth Africa 1943. Over 130 Allied tanks destroyed from a total of about 180 available. 6-8 Tigers participated in the attack, which was lead by the Afrika Corps and helped by Stuka dive bombers. Naturaly, some of the 130 tanks were knocked-out by Tiger tanks, but how many is endlessly debatable.

In other instances, Tigers attacked along with Panthers/Pz-IVs. Again, a total number of adversary tanks is given at the end of the operations, but it is pure madness to try to find out which ones were knocked out by Tigers and which by Panthers.

Another important aspect is to differentiate between "knocked-out" and "destroyed" tanks. Schneider totals them up, because one "knocked-out" tank practicaly means 1 less tank on the battlefield; however, many of them were recuperated and repaired, so were not total losses. BUT for the mentioned battle, the tank was incapacitated, and that is what matters in the short-term.

About the 50% discount in kills:

First of, a good deal of judgment is required to apply it. Applying it throughout is not productive. For instance, the losses at Viller-Bocage are verifiable from British sources, and they match quite well German tankers claims. There are also cases in which the battlefield was photographed from the air, and the carcasses of tanks can be counted individualy. I've seen exaples both of the western front and eastern front in which this method was very close to proving the claims of the tanker crews. Naturaly, there will be exceptions: an abandoned enemy tank for instance, can be "knocked-out" during battle, allthough it no longer poses a real threat; the "kill" is later reported and added to the totals. Also, one enemy tank can come under fire from 2 friendly tanks, and both will claim a "kill".

Second of, a difference should be made between Tiger-equiped and non-Tiger equiped tank formations. The former were, in the vast majority of cases, elite crews lead by elite commanders, while the latter were many times, especially in the final stages of the war, poorly trained 18-years-old tankers rushed into combat. The respectability and thrust-worthiness of the Tiger veterans demanded a much higher battle-awareness and consequently they had to deliver better reports of the actions in which they took part. Status was particularly important in SS-divisions, and the if the credibility of a batallion/company commander was stained with repeated bogus-reports he wouldn't last long in a command position. With this in mind, and returning to Schneider, he explicitly mentions all the recipients of valor medals (usualy Knight Cross for tankers). Naturaly, mistakes could occur, but usualy the medals were awarded only if the importance of the actions (and not of the claims) taken by X or Y were particularly important on the battlefield.

Third of, on average 50% of the losses suffered by the Tigers are self-destructions. That is, for lack of fuel/spare parts, the tanks were blown up by their own crews or abandoned. Consequently, the number of Tigers lost to enemy actions is about 1/2 out of the total lost Tigers.
That leads us to a superior raport betweeen Tigers lost and enemys knocked-out during combat operations.

Fourth of, the 50% discount was applied to the total kill claims, coming from all weapons - AT guns/tanks/bombers/etc. This was a problem for the top-bureaucracy, and stemed from the aggregation of information at different levels of the military organization. This means the 50% was not applied on individual battalion claims, but higher-up, when general reports were being written (concerning the theatre of operation). Consider 20 tanks kncoked-out (not burned) by Tigers. The next day, a squadron of Hs-129's flies over and "attacks" them. The next day, a pz-grenadier regiment "captures" all enemy tanks. Total soviet tanks incapacitated: 60. So, it's natural that in the upper hierarchy things were clouted and you can see why they needed to apply "discounts" now and then.

There are other aspects to consider, but I'll be posting my analysis soon and maybe we'll comment later on.

Cheers,
Alex

[lwd]

If we applied a 50% correction to the kill ratios that are officially accepted still the Tigers of the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 had instead of a 13.08 ratio then a 6.54,

Just what's being counted here? I've seen one source that says they lost 88 Tigers but http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml#502 lists about 100 lost. It also states at one point the claimed kills were:

Abt. claims destruction of 156 tanks and assault guns and 175 AT guns since 24 June

So are the kills that went into the ratio above tanks? or tanks and assault guns? or tanks, assault guns, trucks, and AT guns?

... In the worst case of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508 then the ratio is still 1 on 1, but never a reversal of the ratios.

Are you sure about that? Just what is counted and how. I did find this interesting quote in relation to the 501st by the way at: http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml#501

12 August 1944 A single T-34/85 ambushes the Abt. and totally destroys 3 Tiger IIs due to turret ammunition fires

It's the same that I have always argued in the case of the German Aces: we can cut Hartman not by two but by three and we have 120 kills and give Bong twice as much (80), and still the German ace outscores it's rival. I can live with that more than confortably.

That may indeed be true but the tendency is for people to then draw unwarrented conclusions from such facts. For instance do you think the German's would have had a much worse KV ratio if the heavy tank abteilung had been equipped with M-36's?

Regards,[/quote]

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

I cannot believe that an oversimplistic comment like mine was disected for the purpose of yours of trying to be a feature character in a discussion that do not belong to you at all! I always knew that you like to figure and show your wisdom but this is not the way!

Hunter made a point, a made a comment and Alex did a good answer. There was nothing to disect or no one except for you! Reading your answer I just find is empty, just argumentative, because you are contesting nothing. Do as Hunter and do some research and come forward and made your own topic.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Hunter:

Anyone doing the most basic research (i.e checking the claims rather than worshipping them) can easily find the truth.

Well. In order to address this properly in a basic research I am going to use the following sources:

David Glantz and Jonathan House book on Kursk, which is by far one of the most extensive research on the Zitadelle phase of this particular action. Also Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg - Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44 - Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten for what was the overall action, including the confusing Soviet offensive. Both these authors and books give the totals of German tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged.

For the Soviet side we have, in addition to Glantz and House "Kursk", Grigoriy Krivosheev's Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the twentieth century.

Battle of Kursk (Zitadelle Phase)

German tanks destroyed: 323 tanks
Soviet tanks destroyed: 1,956 tanks

Kill Ratio: 6.06 to 1 in favor of German armor.


Battle of Kursk (Overall)


German tanks destroyed: 720 tanks and assault guns
Soviet tanks destroyed: 6,064 tanks and assault guns

Kill Ratio: 8.42 to 1 in favor of German armor.

On the Prochokova Battlefield

German tanks: 6 destroyed and 89 damaged
Soviet tanks: 334 destroyed and 420 damaged

(Destroyed) Kill Ratio: 14.83
(Destroyed and damaged) Kill Ratio: 7.94 to 1

So, this in essence, confirms the schwere Panzer Abteilung kill ratios, even when the totality of German tanks involved were not "just" Tigers I but also Pz III, Pz IV, Panthers and Elefants as well as assault guns.

Best regards,

[lwd]

...
So, this in essence, confirms the schwere Panzer Abteilung kill ratios, even when the totality of German tanks involved were not "just" Tigers I but also Pz III, Pz IV, Panthers and Elefants as well as assault guns.

It may suggest it, it certainly doesn't confirm it. There are many things that kill tanks besides other tanks much less heavy tanks. The numbers above speak to a superior kill ration of German forces as a whole. Just what the kill rations of particular types of vehicles were is still rather up in the air. Furthermore kill ratios in specfic battles don't confirm them as a whole. If you look for instance at:
http://books.google.com/books?id=1OeCJF ... &q&f=false
You will find evidence for several battles where Sherman's and even US TD's had superior kill ratios. Does this mean that it confirms that in general they had supperior kill ratios?

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

It may suggest it, it certainly doesn't confirm it.

This argument only suggests that if it's fits your definitions and agenda then you can use it as a confirmation. Using an example (OT) you and some other misinformed people thinks that the US Iowa firing (but not hitting) Nowaki CONFIRMS that it has superior fire control capabilities. In reality that incident only BARELY SUGGESTS that's the case. In what we are discussing, with a lot more information, from several sources, we can at least confirm that the tendency is that German Armor, in general, and the schwere Abteilung in specific, had impressive kill ratios in their favor.

I hope this settles it.

[lwd]

I'll admit I did fall for one of your strawmen. I don't think anyone here has suggested that the German heavy tank units had bad kill ratios. What's not clear is just what they were or what that implies about the tanks. To demostrate the lack of proof of your Kursk posting let's accept the number of tanks killed on both sides. However mines also killed tanks during Kursk did they not? Since the Germans lost fewer tanks that by your logic would imply that the German mines had a higher kill ration than the Soviet ones.

As for the Iowas firing vs the Nowaki. It does indeed prove that they had a very good fire control system. You are correct in that it doesn't prove that it was supperior to the British or German ones. It is worth noteing that they never even tried to fire at such ranges from what I've seen however. Doctrine clearly played a part here. As for not hitting the Nowaki there is evidence that she took some spinter damage and of course Bismarck didn't manage to sink any of the much closer British DD's did she?

[alecsandros]

To demostrate the lack of proof of your Kursk posting let's accept the number of tanks killed on both sides.

6 Tigers were completely lost during all phases of Kursk. 3 of them were lost during Operation Citadelle (German assaults). 3 more were written off while in mentenance.

The total number of Tigers used during all the phases of Kursk was between 100-150, depending on the source. About half the Tigers were sent to maintenance at least once during the battle of Kursk, but differentiating between manteinance due to enemy action, preventive mainteinace and due to breakdowns is very hard, if not impossible to do.

The total "kill" claims by their crews was over 600-700 enemy tanks and over 900 AT guns, out of which about 40-50% during Operation Citadelle, when Tigers were on the offensive, so few other AT weapons were present to "help" them.

Sources: Jentz, Schneider

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Doctrine clearly played a part here. As for not hitting the Nowaki there is evidence that she took some spinter damage and of course Bismarck didn't manage to sink any of the much closer British DD's did she?

Of course this is OT but cannot be left unchallenged: when the destroyer action took place the Bismarck cannot steer because of the rudder damage, so no firing solution worth to hit the great number of destroyers attaching her. Which is not the case with Nowaki and Iowa: there several BBs fully operational were firing against one destroyer: no hits whatsoever.

Now: on the origins of the destroyed tanks at Kursk, besides the points that Alex already made, the same aplies both ways, so the ratio stands. If some Tigers were lost to mines then the ratio works against them, not in their favor. Learn statistics man!