Operation Sea Lion

[paul.mercer]

Gentlemen,
In your expert opinions, did Operation Sea Lion ever have a chance of succeeding or would the Channel weather and the RN have sunk it long before it reached English shores?

[lwd]

If the Germans wanted to successfully invade Britain they would have been better off waiting for the next iceage than launching Sea Lion.

[alecsandros]

If the Germans wanted to successfully invade Britain they would have been better off waiting for the next iceage than launching Sea Lion.

I don't know about that.
There was no clear strategic direction to occupy Britain. the fuhrer was much more obsessed with the Russians, and the focus was thus in the east.

A good question would be: could Germany successfully invade Britain if they would realy have wanted to ?

My 2 cents would be on teh "yes" answer.
1940 Dunkerque would have been a graveyard for 330000 elite British and French troops. Luftwaffe would have focused entirely on Britain, reducing its airfields and radars to shambles. And the 35000 strong force of paratroopers (many of whom fought in Crete) would have secured a wide bridgehead on English soil.
With RAF destroyed, the Roya Navy had no chance of intervening during the landings, as they would have been under attack by waves of He111 and Ju87/88.

Of course it could have worked differently in reality; maybe the Germans would have made mistakes; maybe. But a strong chance existed, had their resources been focused on Britain.

[lwd]

If the German's try to take out Dunkirk it's a real question as to what happens. Certainly some of the British will get out in any case. What sort of losses the Germans take in the process is hard to determine as are the further impacts of such an attempt.

In any case the LW tried to take out the RAF and failed.

Even if they had succeeded they could hardly have prevented the RN from enterveing in the landings.

As for paratroopers how much lift did the Germans have at that time? Especially after the losses in Holland and Norway? Then there's the fact that paratroopers don't hold out well for any extended period of time. Consider that the Germans at one point were going to leave them out of Sea Lion all together and eventually ended up assigning them pretty minor roles which would still have been dificult for them to achieve.

Sea Lion was a fiasco waiting to happen and the Heer and the KM were busy making sure that if it happened the finger wouldn't be pointed at them.

[alecsandros]

If the German's try to take out Dunkirk it's a real question as to what happens. Certainly some of the British will get out in any case. What sort of losses the Germans take in the process is hard to determine as are the further impacts of such an attempt.

There were 7 panzer divisions waiting to storm Dunkerque. They were not ordered to attack but were ordered instead to "consolidate their position". Only LW hammered the Allied forces. The British expeditionary corps had very few remaining AT weapons, it was in dissaray after a frenzied withdrawal, and it's very doubtfull it could have stopped the german tanks.
Liddell Hart puts this into perspective by linking it to Hitler's hope of a "saxon alliance" between Germany and GB. Dunkerque would have been an act of benevolence to this end.

In any case the LW tried to take out the RAF and failed.

As we've discussed earlier, it failed because it sustained losses AND a vast amount of planes was needed for the invasions of Balkans, NOrth Africa and Russia. Had LW concentrated exclusively on British soil, and with a better strategy, I very much doubt the same end result for BoB would have appeared.

Even if they had succeeded they could hardly have prevented the RN from enterveing in the landings.

I stronly disagree. Ships without air cover are simply an invitation to massacre by the enemy bombers and torpedo bombers, when in large numbers.

Anyway, the main point is that the Germans never realy tried to put together the Sea Lion. A good quote here:

This ultimately placed responsibility for Sea Lion's success squarely on the shoulders of Raeder and Göring, neither of whom had the slightest enthusiasm for the venture and, in fact, did little to hide their opposition to it.[7] Nor did Directive 16 provide for a combined operational headquarters under which all three service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) could work together under a single umbrella organisation to plan, coordinate and execute such a complex undertaking (similar to the Allies' creation of SHAEF for the later Normandy landings).[8]

Upon hearing of Hitler's intentions, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, through his Foreign Minister Count Ciano, quickly offered up to ten divisions and thirty squadrons of Italian aircraft for the proposed invasion.[9] Hitler initially declined any such aid but eventually allowed a small contingent of Italian fighters and bombers, the Italian Air Corps (Corpo Aereo Italiano or CAI), to assist in the Luftwaffe's aerial campaign over Britain in October/November 1940.[10]

"Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff, to put pressure on the British Government to come to terms.[50] In fact in November 1939 the German Naval staff produced a study (on the possibility of an invasion of Britain) and concluded that it required two preconditions, air and naval superiority, neither of which Germany ever had.[51]"

From here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion

About the chances of success:

In the wargame conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974, which assumed the Luftwaffe had not yet won air supremacy, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England by using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial assault. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (e.g. the GHQ Line), a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time, the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow, cutting off supplies and blocking further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery, the invasion force was forced to surrender.[55]

Who knows what would have happened with LW in control of the skies and not Expeditionary Corps to help.. ?

[lwd]

If the German's try to take out Dunkirk it's a real question as to what happens. Certainly some of the British will get out in any case. What sort of losses the Germans take in the process is hard to determine as are the further impacts of such an attempt.

There were 7 panzer divisions waiting to storm Dunkerque.

Were there really? And what was the availability rate of said division? Weren't these also needed to finish off the French? Use them against Dunkirk and the French are unlikly to surrender on the same schedule.

... The British expeditionary corps had very few remaining AT weapons, it was in dissaray after a frenzied withdrawal, and it's very doubtfull it could have stopped the german tanks.

The BEF may have been a bit lite on AT weapons but even Tigers didn't hold up well to DD guns and the British had a fair number of those that could have played a part.

In any case the LW tried to take out the RAF and failed.

As we've discussed earlier, it failed because it sustained losses AND a vast amount of planes was needed for the invasions of Balkans, NOrth Africa and Russia. Had LW concentrated exclusively on British soil, and with a better strategy, I very much doubt the same end result for BoB would have appeared.

The majority of the LW was concentrated against Britain. According to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftwaffe_ ... 80%931945) the LW had 3,157 servicable aircraft in August of 1940. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain has them commiting 2,550 to the BoB. Given that the first number included over 500 non combat aircraft it's kind of hard to imagine them being able to concentrate much more against Britain. Nor were there forces committed to North Africa, Russia, or the Balkans at this time.

Even if they had succeeded they could hardly have prevented the RN from enterveing in the landings.

I stronly disagree. Ships without air cover are simply an invitation to massacre by the enemy bombers and torpedo bombers, when in large numbers. [/quote]
Historically at this point in time the LW wasn't all that good at attcking combat ships operating at sea with reasonable amounts of AA ammo. Nor did it have any significant capabilty of attacking ships at night. The torpedo capability was also rather lacking, I'm pretty sure they didn't have any well trained torpedo attack squadrons at this time nor did they have a decent arial torpedo.

Anyway, the main point is that the Germans never realy tried to put together the Sea Lion.

That's because at least in part due to the fact that they had very little to push with. Two (maybe) heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and a few destroyers are hardly up to challenging the RN home fleet. There was also a huge intelligence failure which is the only reason anyone thought they were close to winning the BOB.

About the chances of success:

In the wargame conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974, which assumed the Luftwaffe had not yet won air supremacy, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England by using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial assault. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (e.g. the GHQ Line), a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time, the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow, cutting off supplies and blocking further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery, the invasion force was forced to surrender.[55]

Who knows what would have happened with LW in control of the skies and not Expeditionary Corps to help.. ?

One has to be careful reading the assumptions of that game. It was set up so the army types could playout a German invasion. While it's stated the LW hadn't won air supremacy the assumptions that allowed the land invasion are hard to support without it. As for the mine fields the Germans lacked the mines and mine layers to establish the fields that they historically planned and it appearse to discount a very significant RN sweeping capability at that time.

When one looks at the details such as:
1) The LW was never close to establishing air supremacy and couldn't even hold air superiority if the RAF wished to contest it.
2) If they had gotten close the RAF had a plan in place to pull back the British fighters so that they could intervene if an invasion came to pass.
3) The RN light forces (all that was initially proposed for use vs the invasion force) composed of light cruisers, many DD's, and 100's of smaller vessels would find it self opposed by a hand full of German DD's and misscelanous light forces.
4) In the event of an invasion the LW was over tasked. It was suppose to keep out the RN, provide close air support, interdict British movement further inland, supply CAP over the invasion beaches, and over the invasion fleet.
5) Like wise a fair number of the auxilary craft of the KM. Mine sweeper/layers in particular would have been required to be laying mines, sweeping mines, and escorting the invasion barges all pretty much at the same time.

[alecsandros]

You are proposing and explaining a war game scenario. I don't contest that the events you've imagined may have happened, supposedly, if Germany actualy tried to invade the British islands.

However, my impression, as I said earlier, and as other people, more knoledgeable on the subject tham I am, had, is that a focused attack on the islands would have brought victory for the germans...
The arguments, or counter-arguments if you wish, would be:
- the 7 panzer divisions that surrounded the Dunkerque pocket had at least 1000 tanks available. In 1940 a german "armored divisions" consisted of 2 armored brigades, each fielding ~ 120-150 tanks. The paper strength then woult have been at least 7 x 2 x 120 = 1680. You can substract a number that you see appropriate for total losses, incapacitated tanks and tanks in mentenace at the time.
- the destroyers that rescued so many men only started ariving in numbers starting with the 3rd and 4th day of the rescue operation. Remember it was 1940, and naval gunfire was very hard to direct without air spotters, which would be hard pressed by LW.
So an assault by 1000 tanks against a dissarayed army with very few AT guns does not seem to go other than annihilation/capture of all of the allied troops. Not to mention the german infantry divisions in the area.

- LW concentrated on the BoB for only 2 months (10 jul - 14 Sept 1940). They had their chance of taking out the RAF when they started bombing the airfileds, radar posts and airplane mentenance facilities. Goering decided to change the plan, and LW suffered increasingly heavier losses. BUT remember that it was Hitler himself who called of the mass attacks on Sept 15th, after which only sporadic attacks were made.Even if you'd like to include Sept and Oct 1940 in the count, you'd have 3,5 months of aerial battles, which, compared to the scale of the war and the length of the strategic offensives, is not to much. Certainly LW was not "crippled" after those 3,5 months, and a lengthier air offensive may have had a different outcome (or not, depends what elements you're focusing on).
In late 1940, German focus began to shift to the east, with the first campaigns in the Balkans, and then in Rusia.

- because the priority of the invasion of Britain was low, there wasn't any real resource allocation towards building (or at least designing) sufficient modern landing crafts for tanks, vehicles, personell.
- the UBoats could have sealed the Channell on both ends
- With the Expeditionary Corps captured, there were no experienced soldiers and officers in the islands. The Germans, on the contrary, would have fielded very experieced troops.
- Air dominance and tank-to-plane cooperation and coordination would have made a huge impact on the batle, just as in France
- The very good network of railways and roads would have helped the Germans travel very fast and capture key poins quickly, just like in France.

[lwd]

...- the 7 panzer divisions that surrounded the Dunkerque pocket had at least 1000 tanks available.

Well according to http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/ar ... 43178.html there could hardly be 7 panzer divisions surrounding Dunkerque as the German's only had 7 for the invasion of France. Indeed if you look at the map here: http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/blitz/dunkirk40.htm It shows Army Group B as the one in front of Dunkerque but if you lookat: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_b ... my_Group_B or http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... s-III.html you will find that Army Group B had no panzer divisions. Furthermore from what I've read the availability rate of all German motorized equipment at that point was quite low. Then if you want to assault Dunkirque you've got to pull some panzer division(s) out of line and attack through marginal terrain against dug in troops with naval fire support. Then you have to turn these around to proceed with the invasion of France.

- the destroyers that rescued so many men only started ariving in numbers starting with the 3rd and 4th day of the rescue operation. Remember it was 1940, and naval gunfire was very hard to direct without air spotters, which would be hard pressed by LW.

Not if you can see your targets. Note what happened in Sicily.

- LW concentrated on the BoB for only 2 months (10 jul - 14 Sept 1940). They had their chance of taking out the RAF when they started bombing the airfileds, radar posts and airplane mentenance facilities. Goering decided to change the plan, and LW suffered increasingly heavier losses. BUT remember that it was Hitler himself who called of the mass attacks on Sept 15th, after which only sporadic attacks were made.Even if you'd like to include Sept and Oct 1940 in the count, you'd have 3,5 months of aerial battles, which, compared to the scale of the war and the length of the strategic offensives, is not to much. Certainly LW was not "crippled" after those 3,5 months, and a lengthier air offensive may have had a different outcome (or not, depends what elements you're focusing on).
...

If you look at fighter strength over the period you will see that the Germans started with a signficant edge and lost it in the first few weeks of the campaign and never regained it. The British were putting fighters into service too fast for the LW to counter. As you get into October the number of flying days decreases as well and the weather becomes unsuitable for a cross channel invasion, especially one in river barges until spring. By mid September it is clear (in hind sight) that the LW had already lost the BOB. The reason that it was not clear at the time is that the Germans vastly understimated both how strong the RAF was at the start and how fast they were buidling replacements and the British vastly overestimated how fast the LW was building replacements. Thus both sides at the time thought the Germans were much closer to victory than they were. Furthermore it's rather inaccurate to say that Goering or Hitler "changed" the plan. The plan was devised by the LW command and they recomended going to the next stage.

- because the priority of the invasion of Britain was low, there wasn't any real resource allocation towards building (or at least designing) sufficient modern landing crafts for tanks, vehicles, personell.

And when exactly should they have started producing these and what should they have given up to have them?

- the UBoats could have sealed the Channell on both ends

Hardly. The channel wasn't exactly a good place for Uboats to operate and the Germans didn't really have all that many. Indeed if you look at the chart at: http://www.uboat.net/ops/combat_strength.html you will note that they seldom had more than 20 Uboats at sea during 1940. Other pages at that site indicate that the Germans started the war with 57 seaworthy Uboats 18 were built in 1939 but most of those were likely already included in the total 50 were built in 1940 but of course not all would be in available in September or October and 30 had been lost through 3 September 1940.

- With the Expeditionary Corps captured, there were no experienced soldiers and officers in the islands.

Not so. The British army was significantly more than the 13 divisions sent to France and forces from other Commonwealth countries already had forces in Great Britain.

- Air dominance and tank-to-plane cooperation and coordination would have made a huge impact on the batle, just as in France

Except the LW couldn't dominate the skies of Britain and the Germans couldn't move many tanks their either. While the British would have had a huge edge in both artillery and armor.

- The very good network of railways and roads would have helped the Germans travel very fast and capture key poins quickly, just like in France.

Unlikely. For one thing the British had a decent indepth defence by September and it just kept getting stronger. Then there's that problem of getting supplies from the continent to the forces in Britain.

[alecsandros]

The Dunkierk pocket was surrounded by Army groups A and B.
"Two massive German armies flanked them: General Fedor von Bock's Army Group B was to the east, and General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A to the west. (Both these officers were later promoted to Field Marshal.)

Group A: "During the German invasion of the Low Countries and France Army Group A was under the command of General Gerd von Rundstedt, and was responsible for the break-out through the Ardennes. It was composed of 45½ divisions, including the 7 panzer division of Panzer Group Kleist."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Group_A
Group B: Army Group B had approximately 300,000 men involved in these operations which occurred in May 1940.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Group_B

The mobility of the panzer divisions was quite formidable, and the tanks could easily have passed onto Dunkierk. Guderian explicitly quotes the lack of initiative from the Fuhrer on sending tanks to Dunkirk as one of the reasons they lost the war. Hitler himself, in his political testament, made reference to the way he left the Expeditionary Corps escape, so I think you're missing some key facts here.

- Again, there was NO naval gunfire support available in the first days! And the DDs present in the following days were scrambling to pick up troops, and wre not at all in the position to bombard the shore, for lack of observation and unfavorable position (in the harbor waiting for troops to scramble everywhere)

- the "fighter edge" during BoB that you metion was lost by RAF in the second phase, when the airfields came onto attack. Liddell Hart explicitly mentions this. It was Goering strategic mistake to focus on London.

- the 20 Uboats that you mention are oceanic ships. For coastal operations other, smaller U-boats could be used. I don't know how many ? But I would expect at least 20-30 further smaller ones.

- The Expeditionary Corps was the only experienced force in the British infantry. Fighting with unseasoned troops would have been quite bad against the Germans. As for the fortifications - don't forget that the French also put many hopes in their Maginot line...

- Not to mention German paratroopers... The possibility of capturing entire harbors by them... And then loading troops onto usual cargo ships (German, French), and then unloading them in the harbor... Or the possibility of Uboats loading additional troops to strenghten the paratroopers... Or the vast amounts of troops available to the Wehrmacht in 1940... And the possibiilty of paratrooping "normal" troops onto the islands... (In Oct 1940, Germany probably had around 400 operational Ju-52s)...

So, again, a lack of preparation and planning in the historical context does not mean at all that, had Britain had been a "primary target" (like the USSR), the Germans wouldn't have conquered it. Quite the contrary...

[alecsandros]

A small follow-up:
The first 2 weeks of the invasion would be critical. If the German forces would manage to capture the naval bases and airfields from the southern half of England, and to mantain their supply lines opened throughout this time, the invasion would be successfull. British resistance would continue northwards, mainly in Scotland.

With the naval bases captured, the presence of the Royal Navy in the Channel would be difficult to mantain, for lack of long-range ships. Moreover, the GErmans would undoubtedly start mounting heavy naval guns on both sides of the Channel, making warship presence highly dangerous. Uboat and massed bomber attacks would make the job of the Royal Navy even harder. Even lacking torpedo planes, LW managed to sink a good number of British ships in 1940/41: a good number of destroyers during DUnkirk, Crete, etc. The best weapons for this were the Ju87 and Ju88s dive bombers.

[lwd]

When I tried to reply to all of this post I took so long the board logged me off and I lost a rather long reply so I'll keep this one shorter, which means either multiple replies and/or not looking up the referances I did earlier.

The Dunkierk pocket was surrounded by Army groups A and B.

Quite right. I was looking at the inital thrusts and not the positions when the Dunkirque pocket was isolated.

.... Guderian explicitly quotes the lack of initiative from the Fuhrer on sending tanks to Dunkirk as one of the reasons they lost the war.

Guderian has also been accused in a number of places of playing to his post war audiance. From references I've found the intial halt/slow down of the panzer groups was not due to Hitler hesitating to take on Dunkerque but rather military necessity. The Germans had an evolving tactical situation they needed to decide how to deal with at the same time they needed to resupply their units in particular their armored and motorized ones as well as get those with minor repairs or damage back into service.

- Again, there was NO naval gunfire support available in the first days! And the DDs present in the following days were scrambling to pick up troops, and wre not at all in the position to bombard the shore, for lack of observation and unfavorable position (in the harbor waiting for troops to scramble everywhere)

If you change things for one side you can change them for the other. The RN could have had DDs there in a matter of hours and if said DDs (or even light cruisers) were there for fire support they wouldn't have been in the harbor getting in the way of the evacuation. Furthermore the panzers weren't likely to get there in the first few days either.

- the "fighter edge" during BoB that you metion was lost by RAF in the second phase, when the airfields came onto attack. Liddell Hart explicitly mentions this. It was Goering strategic mistake to focus on London.

Again if you look at operational fighters you will find that the LW had a signifcant edge when the BoB started but they rapidly lost it and never recovered it. Indeed the fighter strength of the RAF more or less stabalised by the end of August and replacements pretty much kept up with losses. That was not the case with the LW. There's been a very clear graph of this posted on line in the past I'll see if I can find it later.

- the 20 Uboats that you mention are oceanic ships. For coastal operations other, smaller U-boats could be used. I don't know how many ? But I would expect at least 20-30 further smaller ones.

They include the Type II boats which are the coastal ones. Check that site for more details.

- The Expeditionary Corps was the only experienced force in the British infantry.

That is simply incorrect. It may have been the largest grouping of experianced British infantry but it was far from all of it

As for the fortifications - don't forget that the French also put many hopes in their Maginot line...

The problem with the Maginot line was that it had an open flank. The British stop lines didn't. Nor would the Germans have been able to bring anywhere near the force against them that was brought against France.

- Not to mention German paratroopers... The possibility of capturing entire harbors by them...

What possiblities? The British were expecting paratrooper attacks and attacks on the harbors. Paratroopers have little in the way of heavy weapons or the ability for sustained combat. Market Garden illustrated that quite well. Furthermore the harbors that the Germans would likely have attacked were prepaired for destruction.

And then loading troops onto usual cargo ships (German, French), and then unloading them in the harbor...

What cargo ships? If the invasion is to be in conjunction with the paratroop drop the cargo ships are already full of invasion forces. If not by the time they get to the harbors if the Germans manage to take any they are likely to be lost again and/or mined and/or covered by British guns.

Or the possibility of Uboats loading additional troops to strenghten the paratroopers...

So you are going to risk the Uboats you've stated you need to keep the RN out of the channel to deliver penny packets of troops on to locations that are either likely to be defended or several days walk from where they are needed?

Or the vast amounts of troops available to the Wehrmacht in 1940...

How are they going to get this "vast amounts of troops" to Britain?

And the possibiilty of paratrooping "normal" troops onto the islands... (In Oct 1940, Germany probably had around 400 operational Ju-52s)...

Let's see you mentioned 30,000 paratroopers I believe but the only source I found on line suggested it was several thousand less and that only a few thousand of those (around 6,000 from what I recall) were trained paratroopers at that time. Then say the Germans do have 400 Ju-52s (the number seems about right but I've not seen any documentation one way or anther on it) that's enough to lift what ~5,000 paratroopers at a time. In Holland they lost about half the Ju-52s in one such operation given British preperations one would expect losses to be at least as heavy. That means that the Germans will be lucky to lift 10,000 total troops and there will be many casualties among those especially the untrained ones.

So, again, a lack of preparation and planning in the historical context does not mean at all that, had Britain had been a "primary target" (like the USSR), the Germans wouldn't have conquered it. Quite the contrary...

Just what do you think Germany can do to make the invasion of Britain possible in 1940? If they don't take France first then they need a navy that can challenge the British Home Fleet and indeed prevail over it. They simply don't have the time or the resources for this or if they do it leaves them very vulnerable to a French attack. If they take France first as they did historically they still need a stronger fleet and a stronger LW can they build this and still have a Heer which can take France? I doubt it but let's see what you propose.

[lwd]

A small follow-up:
The first 2 weeks of the invasion would be critical.

I usually see this stated as the first 10 days.

If the German forces would manage to capture the naval bases and airfields from the southern half of England,

What naval bases? and even if they capture them how likely are they to be intact or not interdictable? In this regard it's worth noteing how long it took the allies to get some of the French harbors back into operation and they had vastly more resources and trained personel than the Germans would.

With the naval bases captured, the presence of the Royal Navy in the Channel would be difficult to mantain, for lack of long-range ships.

???? Scapa Flow is what a days sail from the channel. Not many RN vessels had endurances of less than a day. There's also harbors considerably closer by the wya.

Moreover, the GErmans would undoubtedly start mounting heavy naval guns on both sides of the Channel,

The Germans are going to be in a very marginal situation supply wise and now you are proposing that they move heavy guns and ammo over that will likely take weeks to emplace?

Uboat and massed bomber attacks would make the job of the Royal Navy even harder.

If the Uboats are operating in the channel they are going to be taking severe losses. The LW bombers operating against the RN won't be supporting the Heer and will also be taking losses.

Even lacking torpedo planes, LW managed to sink a good number of British ships in 1940/41: a good number of destroyers during DUnkirk, Crete, etc. The best weapons for this were the Ju87 and Ju88s dive bombers.

But most of those ships were operating under sever limitations when they were sunk or damaged. The ones at Dunkirk were often stopped or moving slowly as well as overcrowded in many cases. Off Crete losses were very minor except when again the destroyers were overloaded or were sent into action with minimal or no AA ammo or were stopped for some reason. Off Norway, Crete, and around the British Isles the LW didn't exibit a great deal of ability in taking out warships traveling at speed, with adequate AA ammo during 1940. They will have even greater problems when RAF fighters show up.

[alecsandros]

Well, you seem very excited about this little wargame scenario :)

I don't know if it's worth it - to discuss so much about a possible invasion which was never a serious endeavor for either side.
But for the sake of the argument, and enjoying your imaginative answers, here goes:

1) Could Dunkirk have been taken and the EC captured?
As always, you'll see that many "new" historians will try to build books and reputation by attacking previous "great historians". I find this quite unpleasant.
Of course pretexts for stopping a full tank-assault against poorly prepared lines of defense (very much lacking AT weapons) were necessary. The troops needed an explanation for not pursuing the enemy "till the end". If you would take the time and think about the real picture on the shores on Dunkirk in may 1940, you'll find that there were extremely few chances of an allied counterattack (that's why the panzer divisions were ordere to stop and consolidate). And even when it became clear that the EC was fleeing across the channell, the tanks wer not ordered in at all.
I don't think it's good to dismiss evidence such as HItler's testament and Guderian's and Melenthin's memoirs. You should have a look at them before deciding "they played to their audiences"

2) Again, realisticaly, the DDs and CAs and CLs could not support with gunfire! Take some time and think about this! They couldn't be coordinated, and could only fire ~ 10-12 km inland! The Dunkirk pocket was FAR larger! WHO would do the spotting ? How would they evade hiting their own troops ? HOw would they load the troops in the harbor if they would stay to fire against the Germans ?

3) There were about 40 Type IIs in existence in summer 1940. About 33% were in mentenance.

4) The losses of Ju52 in Netherlands were due to the unsuitable ground over which they landed, and not enemy activity. Check the losses over Crete, and you'll see them MUCH smaller, allthough the defence was on paper stronger.

5) The BCE was the ONLY experienced corps in the British military. This is for the last time I'm writing this. Please check it up ?

6) You are probably comparing Sea Lion with D-Day landings. This is not the case. Far fewer resources wre needed for the first than for the second.

7) Scapa Flow is far to the NORTH. A voyage to the SOUTH would require ships with ranges in excess of 2000km. The travel would be extremely dangerous, with German bombers operating from British airfields. It would be pretty much the battle of the Atlantic, only that the air supremacy would be German, and not allied. Do you know what air supramacy did in the battle of the Atlantic... ?

8) It's naive to imagine that the British could put up better defences than the Maginot line for the entire lenght of Hadrian's wall in a few weeks or even months.
Who would man the defences ? With what equipemnt ? (Do you know the imapct of the loss of equipment at DUnkirk... ?)

9) Small confined areas of sea are very easily protectd by land batteries. IF you add dive bombers and uboats... On a 40km wide stretch of water... It's not hard to undrestand the outcome. Or is it?

[alecsandros]

Estimates for the carrying capacity of German transport planes:

http://www.fjr2.be/Pagina%2025%20-%20Ai ... %E4ger.htm

1 Ju52 = 17 lightly equipped men OR 10 fully-equipped paratroopers, with additional cargo for the divisional equipment (guns, mortars, heavy machineguns, food, ammo, etc)

It was estimated that it took about 800 transport planes to carry a fully-equipped German division in 1940.

Given the small space to travel (Calais - the area around London), each Ju52 could easily have done 2 sorties/day. [let's asume drops by evening/night, as there would still be heavy concentration of AA in south-eastern Britain]

This means that in the first day of the air assault, 1 fully equipped division (~8000 - 10.000 men) could be paratrooped in 1 night.

Provided the first division could have set up a reasonable perimeter, in the second day the Ju52 could have carried gliders... I think they had about 300-400 gliders available in summer 1940, but I could be wrong.
Let's take 200... They coudl carry heavier equipment... and another fully-equipped division... And after that, each day, teh Ju52s could paratroop another full division, provided the weather stayed good.

In 4 days, there would be 4 fully-equipped divisions in south-eastern Britain, with, maybe, 35.000 troops. As you mentioned, not all of them could have been paratroopers, but maybe half ? The other half would have been anyway selected of an elite corps, as the difficulty of their mission would have been extreme.
I doubt there woudl be more than 4 divisions paratrooped, as it would have been to difficult for 400-600 cargo planes (many of which would be in mentenance after 4 days of heavy action)to supply such a large force.

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Now, if those 4 divisions can manage to secure at least one major harbor, and a few good airfields, the British are in a great bucket of sh**. And who could stop them ? And how... ? With what guns ... ? What tanks ? What troops ? The equipment was lost at Dunkirk, and the elite of the British military would have been lost there to...

[lwd]

Well, you seem very excited about this little wargame scenario :)

Excited is not how I would put it. I've seen this argued in depth a number of times and I just don't see any way Germany can get it to work.

1) Could Dunkirk have been taken and the EC captured?
As always, you'll see that many "new" historians will try to build books and reputation by attacking previous "great historians". I find this quite unpleasant.
Of course pretexts for stopping a full tank-assault against poorly prepared lines of defense (very much lacking AT weapons) were necessary. The troops needed an explanation for not pursuing the enemy "till the end".

The problem with this is that it's not what happened. The initial halt orders were given by local commanders and later confirmend by the senior command.

If you would take the time and think about the real picture on the shores on Dunkirk in may 1940, you'll find that there were extremely few chances of an allied counterattack (that's why the panzer divisions were ordere to stop and consolidate).

But not much prior to this the British had counter attacked with some success. The Germans had to keep this in mind.

And even when it became clear that the EC was fleeing across the channell, the tanks wer not ordered in at all.

Part of that was Goering promising that the LW would take care of it. The Heer was also probably greatful for the rest to resupply and repair and prepair for their operations deeper into France. The ones that forced France to surrender.

I don't think it's good to dismiss evidence such as HItler's testament

Hitler is hardly well known for his veracity.

and Guderian's and Melenthin's memoirs. You should have a look at them before deciding "they played to their audiences"

Individuals who have studdied them in great detail have made such comments about Guderian's. I don't think I said anything about Mlenthin's. However in general a number of themes emerges from many of the post war memoirs of the German generals. "Hitler lost us the war" is one of them. See for instance:
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/op ... ynamo.html

One of the most controversial aspects of the fighting around Dunkirk was the Hitler’s “halt order”, issued on 24 May 1941. After the war the surviving German generals did their best to shift the blame for this order on to Hitler. Even Rundstedt, on whose advice the order had been issued, would later claim that it had been Hitler’s idea, and that the intention had been to spare the British a humiliating defeat.

http://www.panzerworld.net/dunkirk
Also talks to the condition of the German panzers.
And this one goes into both sides of the question in some detail:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5902 ... f-war.html
And starting on page 33 the following is rather interesting reading:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49667585/Camp ... ion-Dynamo

2) Again, realisticaly, the DDs and CAs and CLs could not support with gunfire! Take some time and think about this! They couldn't be coordinated, and could only fire ~ 10-12 km inland! The Dunkirk pocket was FAR larger! WHO would do the spotting ? How would they evade hiting their own troops ? HOw would they load the troops in the harbor if they would stay to fire against the Germans ?

??? I have given it considerable thought. Note that I mentioned the seaward flanks. If one looks at the map on page 44 of: http://www.scribd.com/doc/49667585/Camp ... ion-Dynamo it's apparent that by 28 may 10-12 km inland covers around 1/3 of the pocket a percentage that will only increase over time. Indeed most of the pockeet would be covered by 31 May. These were directily observable and well within range of ships off Dunkirque. I also mentioned that those providing fire support wouldn't be acting as troop transports at the time. It would make sense for them to for instance fire off most of their heavy ammo in fire support then load troops return to Britain drop the troops and reload and repeat. As for spotting the British had been using naval gunfire support for some time. I'm not sure how it was orgainzed at this point but it did indeed happen. See for instance: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_gunfire_support

during the Battle of France the British discovered effective anti-tank artillery in the form of the four-inch (102 mm) guns from destroyers tied up at the quays of Boulogne.

And at Torch according to http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/a ... lgeria.htm

Naval support would be coordinated through the Royal Navy

Which implies a certain amount of capability in that regard.

3) There were about 40 Type IIs in existence in summer 1940. About 33% were in mentenance.

That's typical of all Uboats. I.e. only about 1/3 were on patrol at any one time. Another 1/3 was usually in maintenance. The rest in transit or with their crews on leave or such.

4) The losses of Ju52 in Netherlands were due to the unsuitable ground over which they landed, and not enemy activity. Check the losses over Crete, and you'll see them MUCH smaller, allthough the defence was on paper stronger.

Well let's see. There is indeed some interesting information to be gained from Crete. First of all there was no RAF presence at all. In spite of this an attack vs a hasty and uncoordinated defence cost the German paratroopers almost half their force. Furthermore it took 500 Ju-52's two sorties to deliver a bit over 8,000 men. http://www.2worldwar2.com/fallschirmjager.htm list the German losses as 170 transport air craft os about 1/3 in 2 sorties. This still doesn't bode well for the effort you propose.

5) The BCE was the ONLY experienced corps in the British military. This is for the last time I'm writing this. Please check it up ?

This is the first time you've written it. But again let's take a look II Corp had 2 green divisions when it was sent over to France in 1940 and seems to have handled itself pretty well. Which brings up t he question of why discus corps? Divisions were the operational units. Then there's the question of what you mean by experianced. Certainly the 7th armored division for instance that was fighting in North Africa would be considered experianced. The same would seem to apply to the 10th armored. Looking at infantry divisions there was the 49th and then there was the 70th/7th/6th. If you go to smaller units a number of others will exist across the Commonwealth.

6) You are probably comparing Sea Lion with D-Day landings. This is not the case. Far fewer resources wre needed for the first than for the second.

Far fewer indeed but still far more than the Germans had or could reasonably have.

7) Scapa Flow is far to the NORTH. A voyage to the SOUTH would require ships with ranges in excess of 2000km.

Google maps shows the distance to be less than 700 miles from Scapa Flow to the English Channel. At 25 knots that's just over a days journey. The otherway around it's about 50% further. Then of course there are naval bases not to mention comercial harbors much closer.[/quote]

The travel would be extremely dangerous, with German bombers operating from British airfields.

How are German planes going to be operating out of British airfields? In any case you are still assuming that the LW is much better in the antishipping role than it was during this period.

It would be pretty much the battle of the Atlantic, only that the air supremacy would be German, and not allied. Do you know what air supramacy did in the battle of the Atlantic... ?

Except there is no way the Germans can gain air supremacy at least early enough in the invasion for it to have any effect. After several days it might be possible but that would see the KM and the German cargo fleet destroyed and any invasion forces pretty throughly chopped up.

8) It's naive to imagine that the British could put up better defences than the Maginot line for the entire lenght of Hadrian's wall in a few weeks or even months.
Who would man the defences ? With what equipemnt ? (Do you know the imapct of the loss of equipment at DUnkirk... ?)

They don't have to be better than the Maginot line. Indeed they can be consideralby worse because the Germans can't bring anywhere near as much force to bear. In particular they will be very deficient in armor and artillery given their lack of transport. The stop lines wouldn't be Harians wall they would be in the far south of England by the way. As for equipment the British weren't in bad shape by August between imports and domestic production and of course the arrival of Commonwealth forces.

9) Small confined areas of sea are very easily protectd by land batteries. IF you add dive bombers and uboats... On a 40km wide stretch of water... It's not hard to undrestand the outcome. Or is it?

No it's not especially when the forces are as disparate as they would be. The invasion fleet and the KM would be pretty throughly trashed in this endeavor. Look what happend in Norway against a totally unprepared country.