Operation Sea Lion

[alecsandros]

Lwd, you're a little off...

Between what I write and what you understand, it seems to be a gap... because you read and post in a hurry...

Example:
"Merchants were hardly "plentifull". If they had been then barges wouldn't have been chosen as the transport for most of the German troops"

A merchant can NOT disembark equipment/troops on a beach! You need specialised landing crafts for that. That's why I stressed the importance of capturing a harbor.

"Because it's over 30 km just to Dover. If you look at the distances to the invasion beaches you will find they are well out of range. Then there's the problem even when they are in range of targeting enemy vessels and not hitting friendly ones."

The point of the coastal guns is NOT to bombard enemy shores, but to hit enemy SHIPS. Given the way most of the naval battles were fought in WW2 (ranges of at least 5km or more), the German gunners needed to be severely incompetent "to hit their own ships".

By the way:

"Furthermore the actual weather data isn't as important as the historical. The Germans wouldn't have had the actual data before hand they would have had to look at the historical trends and they suggest that after mid October the weather becomes increasingly risky as it did indeed near the end of October."

Exactly how incompetent do you think meteorologists were ? Of course they did not "have the actual data before hand", but they were certainly in the ballpark with some estimates!

-------

"Those number seem a bit off. In August they have slightly ~1,250 bombers, and 1,000+ fighters but the BoB resulted in a deficit of over 500 planes (depending on source up to nearly 800) and serviceablity rates would have been even worse given the high optempo required. Your numbers suggested of 1,200 bombers and 1,400 interceptors are thus rather problematic. Not sure what's included in your transport catagory."

The numbers you posted are for only 3 Luftfotts (2,3, and 5)! They had 2 more at the time (1 and 4)!

------
About the RAF: "Older history books assert this period was the most dangerous of all. In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the period from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.[174]"

Again, Dowding had to take 68 pilots from Royal Navy carriers in late Sept, for lack of fighter pilots.

Thus, the number of produced planes is irrelevant, as there were not enough pilots to man them.

------------

He-111 could also be used as transports and even as paratroop transports.

--------------

"The German paratroopers force, the Fallschirmjager, was established in January 1936, with the enthusiast Student as its commander. It began as a single battalion of paratroopers and kept growing rapidly, becoming a division in 1938 and later a Corps, including paratroopers, glider troops, and elite infantry. It was a large and independent elite force of selected and very highly trained volunteers. They developed new tactics and techniques which improved their performance, such as the parachute-opening cord tied to the aircraft, which made parachuting safer and enabled them to jump from lower altitude and reduce exposure to enemy fire. The Fallschirmjager force belonged to the German Air Force. The concept was that they will be used to achieve what air bombardment can not, mainly capturing strategic positions behind enemy lines instead of destroying them.

Their transport aircraft were the common Junkers 52, which carried 17 paratroopers, and the DFS 230 glider, which carried over a ton of heavier weapons and equipment, or troops, and could be towed by an empty Junkers 52 and released over the landing zone. "
http://www.2worldwar2.com/fallschirmjager.htm

AND

The official German maintenance handbook for the Ju-52 lists no fewer than 37 different uses and loadings, of which the following are examples:

1. Troop transport -- carries 15 to 20 fully-equipped men
2. Freight transport -- maximum pay-load, 5,260 lbs
3. Ambulance aircraft -- accomodation for 12 stretchers
4. Parachute troop carrier -- 12 fully-equipped men
5. Glider tug -- can normally tow one Go-242 with 23 men or 3 small gliders carrying 10 to 12 men each
6. Flying classroom -- especially for training in night flying

http://www.fjr2.be/Pagina%2025%20-%20Ai ... %E4ger.htm

--------------

The Germans hadn't demonstrated the ability to launch such "massed air attacks" particularly at night.

The battle for Crete should be at least interesting, if not clear proof, in these aspects. We've already discussed that only a fraction of the bombers available in the BoB managed to sink 5DDs, 3 cruisers, and to damage other large ships. And that in only 2-3 days!

At night... I already said that a strong RN force could and would do severe damage to the merchants (I strongly doubt they could get to the landing crafts). BUT after that, they would not have the time to get back to bases beyond the range of HE111 and JU88s... And they would be plastered with bombs.

[alecsandros]

Anyway,
I feel we've written to long for such a dry endeavour: neither Germany nor Britain expected a real invasion...
And the more I look into it, the stranger it seems:

- The Dunkirk escape (btw, Lutfwaffe started the attacks 7 days after the withdrawal began)
- Luftwaffe did not use all 5 Luftflotten during BoB, but only 3, out of which 1 severely understrength.
- Plans for real landing crafts were not developed;
- Rudolph Hess... and many other "curious things"...

[lwd]

Lwd, you're a little off...

Not really.

Between what I write and what you understand, it seems to be a gap... because you read and post in a hurry...

Let's see:

Example:
"Merchants were hardly "plentifull". If they had been then barges wouldn't have been chosen as the transport for most of the German troops"

A merchant can NOT disembark equipment/troops on a beach! You need specialised landing crafts for that. That's why I stressed the importance of capturing a harbor.

I'm very throughly aware of that but there is little probability of capturing an intact harbor especially if you have to clear any the area to push enemy artillery out of range, and if you send your ship and it's not intact then it is at significant risk until it can use the harbor. If you don't send it though your force may not be able to hold long enough that it has a harbor to land in when it gets there.

"Because it's over 30 km just to Dover. If you look at the distances to the invasion beaches you will find they are well out of range. Then there's the problem even when they are in range of targeting enemy vessels and not hitting friendly ones."

The point of the coastal guns is NOT to bombard enemy shores, but to hit enemy SHIPS. Given the way most of the naval battles were fought in WW2 (ranges of at least 5km or more), the German gunners needed to be severely incompetent "to hit their own ships".

5km is hardly typical for night actions especially with light forces. The IJN loosing a battleship admiral to 40mm fire rather underlines this point.

By the way:

"Furthermore the actual weather data isn't as important as the historical. The Germans wouldn't have had the actual data before hand they would have had to look at the historical trends and they suggest that after mid October the weather becomes increasingly risky as it did indeed near the end of October."

Exactly how incompetent do you think meteorologists were ? Of course they did not "have the actual data before hand", but they were certainly in the ballpark with some estimates!

Where did I say they were incompetent? It certainly wasn't the science it was even a few years later say in 1944 and even then it was tricky. The Germans didn't have access to good enough data sources to make good estimates days in advance during periods when the weather was unstable such as October. Especially if the invasion fleet is very subject to storms or even strong winds and will have to take several days unloading.

"Those number seem a bit off. In August they have slightly ~1,250 bombers, and 1,000+ fighters but the BoB resulted in a deficit of over 500 planes (depending on source up to nearly 800) and serviceablity rates would have been even worse given the high optempo required. Your numbers suggested of 1,200 bombers and 1,400 interceptors are thus rather problematic. Not sure what's included in your transport catagory."
The numbers you posted are for only 3 Luftfotts (2,3, and 5)! They had 2 more at the time (1 and 4)!

Are they? I don't think it said so in the sources I was reading. That may have been implied but I'd like to know why you think so.

About the RAF: "Older history books assert this period was the most dangerous of all. In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the period from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.[174]"

This is only looking at half the picture and then for a period of a couple of weeks. Note the point about older history books being dangerous and then they go on to a book published in 1961. By the way what's the source of this?

Again, Dowding had to take 68 pilots from Royal Navy carriers in late Sept, for lack of fighter pilots.

So? Again the British at the time thought they were in worse shape than they were because they overestimated the LW replacement rates. You also have failed to address the fact that the British had a backup plan even if things did get worse.

Thus, the number of produced planes is irrelevant, as there were not enough pilots to man them.

But there were. Here are the numbers for the chart I mentioned (I think it was previously in one of the sources above). I'm not sure if the numbers are from the first of the month, the middle, or the end but the trend is clear. This numbers are for single seat fighters and as I'm reading values from a graph not very exact.
......LW.....RAF
July 950.....900
Aug 900....1050
Sep 800....1020
Oct 800.....950
Nov 800.....950
The British strength never drops below the July strength and the German one never raises above the July strength. Based on these numbers the RAF is certainly not loosing and there really doesn't look like there's a serious pilot shortage.

..."Their transport aircraft were the common Junkers 52, which carried 17 paratroopers, and the DFS 230 glider, which carried over a ton of heavier weapons and equipment, or troops, and could be towed by an empty Junkers 52 and released over the landing zone. "
http://www.2worldwar2.com/fallschirmjager.htm

AND

The official German maintenance handbook for the Ju-52 lists no fewer than 37 different uses and loadings, of which the following are examples:
...
4. Parachute troop carrier -- 12 fully-equipped men

Well you said 10 earlier. I'm willing to believe 12 the 17 wasn't "fully-equipped" that's pretty clear.

The Germans hadn't demonstrated the ability to launch such "massed air attacks" particularly at night.

The battle for Crete should be at least interesting, if not clear proof, in these aspects. We've already discussed that only a fraction of the bombers available in the BoB managed to sink 5DDs, 3 cruisers, and to damage other large ships. And that in only 2-3 days!

Indeed we have. Look what happened to the German surface reinforcements when they were caught at night by British Destroyers in spite of rather valiant efforts by the Italians. Furthermore we have seen that most of the British losses werer incurred when they were either low on AA ammo or had a full load of evacuees. Furthermore those losses were not over 2-3 days they were over the period from 21 May through 1 June although they were also somewhat larger than you mention. The details are at: http://www.navymuseum.mil.nz/history/ti ... -crete.htm and here's a listing from that site:

Cruisers Ships Sunk
Gloucester: 22 May, 725 Dead
Fiji: 22 May, 5 Dead, 271 Missing, 24 Wounded
Calcutta: 1 June, 9 Dead, 108 Missing, 40 Wounded
Destroyers Ships Sunk
Kashmir: 23 May, 82 Missing, 14 Wounded
Kelly: 23 May, 3 Dead, 127 Missing, 17 Wounded
Juno: 21 May, 12 Dead, 116 Missing, 21 Wounded
Imperial: 29 May
Hereward: 29 May, 5 Dead, 165 Missing
Greyhound: 22 May, 1 Dead, 83 Missing, 23 Wounded
Diamond: 27 April, 155 Missing,1 Wounded
Wrynek: 27 April, 108 Missing, 5 Wounded
Landing CraftSunk
A 15:26 April, 15 Dead
A 19: 25 April
Battleships Damaged
Warspite: 22 May, 19 Dead, 24 Missing, 69 Wounded
Valiant: 22 May
Barham: 26 May, 7 Dead, 6 Wounded
Carrier ShipsDamaged
Formidable: 26 May, 12 Dead, 10 Wounded
Cruiser Ships Damaged
Orion:26 May, 1 Dead, 5 Missing, 24 Wounded
29 May, 115 Dead, 76 Wounded
Ajax:28 April, 5 Dead, 19 Wounded
28 May, 6 Dead, 19 Wounded
Perth (RAN): 24 May
29 May, 4 Dead, 3 Wounded
Dido:29 May, 27 Dead, 10 Wounded
Naiad: 22 May, 7 Dead, 31 Wounded
Coventry: 17 May, 2 Dead, 7 Wounded
Carlisle: 22 May, 14 Dead, 25 Wounded
Destroyer Ships Damaged
Kingston: 21 May, 1 Dead, 2 Wounded
Kipling: 23 May, 5 Dead, 1 Wounded
Kelvin: 29 May, 2 Dead, 4 Wounded
Jervis: 30 May, 4 Wounded
Jaguar: 26 May, 2 Wounded
Nubian: 26 May, 15 Dead, 6 Wounded
Havock: 23 May, 15 Dead, 10 Wounded
Griffin: 24 May, 1 Wounded
Decoy: 29 May, 1 Dead, 8 Wounded
Assault Ships Damaged
Glenearn: 25 April, 4 Wounded
Glenroy: 26 May, 1 Wounded

The first two cruisers were essentially out of AA ammo. The DDs sunk after the 23 were in most if not all cases not fully operational due to the presence of large numbers of evacuees. In any case the LW and for that matter Italians were more skilled at this point and operating in the abscence of RAF interference. Even so the RN would likely be more than willing to accept such losses again if it meant the total destruction of several German divisions and the preservation of the United Kingdom.

At night... I already said that a strong RN force could and would do severe damage to the merchants (I strongly doubt they could get to the landing crafts).

Why don't you think they could get to the barges? Note they were not landing craft.

BUT after that, they would not have the time to get back to bases beyond the range of HE111 and JU88s... And they would be plastered with bombs.

Back to bases out of range of the German bombers probably not. But back to bases out of range of German fighters and covered by the RAF almost certainly. Or they could withdraw to sea in if they even needed to come back again.

[alecsandros]

Wikipedia sums up our conflicting data:

"The effect of the German attacks on airfields is not straightforward. Stephen Bungay's research tells us that Dowding, in a letter to Hugh Trenchard[165] accompanying Park's report on the period 8 August – 10 September 1940, states that the Luftwaffe "achieved very little" in the last week of August and the first week of September.[166] The only Sector Station to be shut down operationally was Biggin Hill, and it was non-operational for just two hours. Dowding admitted 11 Group's efficiency was impaired but, despite serious damage to some airfields, only two out of 13 heavily attacked airfields were down for more than a few hours. The German refocus on London was not critical.[166]

Air Vice Marshal Peter Dye, head of the RAF Museum, discussed the logistics of the battle in 2000[167] and 2010,[168] dealing specifically with the single-seat fighters. Dye contends that not only was British aircraft production replacing aircraft, but replacement pilots were keeping pace with losses. The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased. From July, 1 200 were available. In 1 August, 1 400 were available. Just over that number were in the field by September. In October the figure was nearly 1,600. By 1 November 1800 were available. Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe.[167][168] Although the RAF's reserves of single seat fighters fell during July, the wastage was made up for by an efficient Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO), which by December had repaired and put back into service some 4,955 aircraft,[169] and by aircraft held at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.[170]

Richard Overy endorses Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and 467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.[171] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10 percent. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".[172]

American historian James Corum points out that it was unlikely that the Luftwaffe was ever able to destroy the RAF. If British losses became severe, the RAF could simply withdraw northward and regroup. It could then deploy when and if the Germans launched an invasion. Corum doubts that the Luftwaffe could have defeated the RAF in the limited time available before the weather window closed in October. Corum also argues that the Sea Lion would have failed because of the weaknesses of German sea power.[173]

Older history books assert this period was the most dangerous of all. In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the period from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.[174]"

I would add my info from Liddell Hart's "History of the Second world war" (1971), from which I often quoted above.

[alecsandros]

Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940.

Luftflotte 1 (Poland)
Luftflotte 2 (The Netherlands and Belgium)
Luftflotte 3 (France)
Luftflotte 4 (Austria and Czech Republic)
Luftflotte 5 (Norway and Denmark)



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Air ... rld_War_II

[lwd]

A reference that some may find illuminating. Check out the article on Logistics and the Battle of Britain at:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles ... B5185E.pdf
It's got the graph I was refering to as well as a number of others that illustrate the problem quite nicely.

Also recieved this in a PM concerning the other Luftflotte:

... about Luftflotte 1 and 4 not being part of the battle. AFAIK, they had almost all their combat units taken and allocated to Luftflottes 2, 3 and 5. Of the Bf 109 units, only II and III JG77 didn't serve on the channel front at all in July, Aug and September.

[alecsandros]

It probably didn't copy well. I can't access the table...

It's a good thought the one about reallocation of Luftflotten planes. Maybe you can post more details ?

[lwd]

The url didn't copy correctly. Let's see if this works:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles ... B5185E.pdf
It's a pdf of The Royal Airforce Power Review Volume 3 Number 4 Winter 2000
The article in question starts on page 15. There's also an article on the Stuka on page 39 that may be relevant but I haven't examined yet.
As for the allocation of the combat units to the various Luftflotte that's all that was in his message. Hop is usually pretty accurate in such things but note that he qualified the above with AFAIK. I'm not sure where he got this and he may not be either. It might be available somewhere over on the axis history forum or perhaps a dedicated LW forum.

[alecsandros]

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk%2Fresearch%2Fdocuments%2FBracknell%2520No%25201%2520-%2520Battle%2520of%2520Britain.pdf&ei=VT2mTvbJGuSM4gSj3LAC&usg=AFQjCNGcmhc6NggDLQSswlyF6vfYunoBnw&sig2=5jvfsnAenLRUGzlw75wLKQ

It's a summary of a conference held in 1990, that re-assessed the BoB. Many interesting elements...

[lwd]

Now it's my turn ... for some reason your link isn't opening. I suspect something got truncated.

[alecsandros]

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/do ... ritain.pdf

[lwd]

Thanks, as you say very interesting.

[Mostlyharmless]

I hope that the discussion has just about established that the Germans had no chance of successfully invading Britain in Summer 1940 or indeed later. Even if the BEF been destroyed at Dunkirk, it is still very unlikely that an invasion might have succeeded.

Fans of alternate history such as myself have struggled to imagine how Germany might have invaded but have generally concluded that history needs to change before 1940. A particularly bad example of the genre is at http://alternatehistory.com/discussion/ ... p?t=167056. Alternatively, we could have the Germans racing across the Channel on hydrofoil transports http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ ... index.html .

[RF]

I hope that the discussion has just about established that the Germans had no chance of successfully invading Britain in Summer 1940 or indeed later. Even if the BEF been destroyed at Dunkirk, it is still very unlikely that an invasion might have succeeded.

My verdict is that it would be unlikely - but not impossible.

If the RAF had been destroyed in a Battle of Britain before early/mid August 1940 and if all three of Germanys' armed forces had worked closely together then Sea Lion would be a viable proposition. The key is destruction of the RN - this could only be done by the Luftwaffe in the Channel. And to draw the RN into the Channel you would need to launch the invasion itself....

With different and more savvy German commanders Sea Lion could have succeeded..... without changing history prior to 1940.

[Dave Saxton]

It may have possible but it would be more probable and more practical to force Britain out of the war by winning the Battle of the Atlantic than by occupying the British Isles. Whether this was probable or not may be debatable, but the German high command didn't really put forth much effort or resources toward this alternative either.