Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

From the birth of the Dreadnought to the period immediately after the end of World War I.
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RF
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by RF »

Hood was in a bad way before it was blown up.... maybe it was a lucky shot, but with British battlecruisers it had happened before, at Jutland.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by RF »

paul.mercer wrote: Tue Mar 02, 2021 9:46 am
RF wrote: Mon Mar 01, 2021 10:15 am Basically Paul it seems you are arguing for a super ''Graf Spee'' for a River Plate type confrontation? A Scharnhorst/Gneisenau type vessel?
Thanks again RF,
Yes, you are correct something on the lines of a very fast 'pocket battleship' but with at least 3 or possibly 4 turrets each with two 11" guns the whole lot weighing in at around at between 20- 25000 tons, although I not sure if it would be possible to keep it to around that weight, but having a ship of that size would surely be a lot cheaper to build, man and run than some of the giant battle cruisers that were envisaged by the RN in the 1920's and would be more than sufficient to keep enemy cruisers at bay. It would be a lot smaller ship than the 'Twins which I believe eventually topped out at well over 30,000 tons.
Without wishing to re-open the 'River Plate' scenario I feel that having 6 guns in only two triple turrets was a mistake although I suppose it saved weight. In hindsight and as a personal opinion, I have always thought that AGS should have won that battle, but I suppose we will never know the real circumstances behind Capt Langsdorffes decision.
You may recall that the KM did a design for the Dutch Navy just before WW2 started (in Europe that is) for three battlecruisers with 11 inch calibre guns set in the arrangement of the Scharnhorsts. These battlecruisers were designed in mind to deter Japanese assault on the Dutch East Indies, by being able to destroy packs of IJN heavy cruisers. These battlecruisers were designed to be very fast, to outrun IJN battleships, but had armour protection much lighter than Scharnhorst and not much in the way of secondary or AA armament. I believe tonnage was about 25,000 tons. I think they would have been vulnerable to carrier plane attack as the Dutch had no carriers planned.

The role of AGS as a commerce raider is ideal for the ''pocket battleship'' particulary if the scenario Langsdorf believed he was entering into was the case, namely an enemy force of one light cruiser and two destroyers that he thought was screening a convoy. The problem with the ''pocket battleship'' was that it was an early 1930's concept and its diesel engines, while giving economy of fuel consumption, mean't that its speed was inferior to British cruisers. So in a confrontation with three cruisers who deliberately flank attack the AGS to force a split in fire the cruisers dictate the range and can shadow, this was Langsdorf's undoing, as shown by his indecision, his exposure to fire, rapid manoeuvering that upset the 11 inch gunnery, inadequate fire control and protection for the 5.9 inch guns. Failure to sink Exeter and retreat to Montevideo mean't defeat in a battle that on paper, as Captain Dove would observe, AGS could have won. Equally had Exeter been more fortunate with its gunnery at the start of the battle, where an 8 inch shell came close to penetrating inside the engine rooms, the AGS could have been immobilised and then sunk with torpedoes.
What I have never understood is why Raeder didn't in 1934/35 push for an improved version of the ''pocket battleship'' instead of building the Hipper class cruisers or even the Scharnhorsts. By improved version I mean bigger/better diesel engines, put the 5.9 inch into twin or triple turrets instead of exposed single mounts etc. Such vessels would be excellent commerce raiders, especially if they hunted in pairs and even better if supported by a small aircraft carrier. Larger and more powerful diesel engines could then used in a force of ''Atlantic'' destroyers which could act as escorts and back up for the improved ''pocket battleships'' - then you have a task force that could anihilate lightly escorted convoys, escorts as well as merchant ships. The problem of the ''super ship'' syndrome is that it is one ship only - presenting the one big target. I see this sort of concept as rather like having a game of chess in which you have your queen as the all powerful piece and nothing else, while the opponent has the full force of pawns, bishops and knights which combine to overwhelm that queen.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by gcogger »

RF wrote: Tue Mar 02, 2021 6:15 pm Hood was in a bad way before it was blown up.... maybe it was a lucky shot, but with British battlecruisers it had happened before, at Jutland.
In a bad way? IIRC, there was a fire amongst some of the smaller calibre ready ammunition (above the main deck, I believe?), the smoke from which was causing fire control issues. Not a major problem, just temporarily inconvenient. I'm not aware of anything else of significance, but I'm willing to be corrected.
The battlecruisers at Jutland were a very different situation. Partly because the armour was much thinner than Hood's, but mostly because of appalling ammunition handling practices - an issue of procedure rather than design. Neither is likely relevant to what happened to Hood.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

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gcogger wrote: Tue Mar 02, 2021 8:11 pm
RF wrote: Tue Mar 02, 2021 6:15 pm Hood was in a bad way before it was blown up.... maybe it was a lucky shot, but with British battlecruisers it had happened before, at Jutland.
In a bad way? IIRC, there was a fire amongst some of the smaller calibre ready ammunition (above the main deck, I believe?), the smoke from which was causing fire control issues. Not a major problem, just temporarily inconvenient. I'm not aware of anything else of significance, but I'm willing to be corrected.

There were two hits from Prinz Eugen which had started two separate fires which were observed from a spotter plane I believe was operating out of Iceland (referred to in the subsequent Hood sinking enquiry) plus the hit you mention from Bismarck's third salvo, then the fourth salvo a shell took off Hood's spotting top taking out the gunnery officer (this was observed by one of the Hood survivors who witnessed body parts including a torso in officer uniform descending down). This would have left Hood's guns firing in local, not centralised control. The fifth salvo was the final blow, but prior to that there was a marked deterioration in Hood's shooting at Prinz Eugen, which initially found the cruisers range but then started falling further and further astern of the cruiser, prior to Hollands' order to switch fire to Bismarck.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by paul.mercer »

gentlemen,
Many thanks for your detailed replies although the bit about the torso falling was a bit graphic, but this is something that happens but is rarely talked about! I do wonder that if AGS had had 6 X 11" in three twin turrets whether this might have given her a better chance of taking on the three RN cruisers who were flanking her? It is a long time since I read about the battle, but I seem to recall that it was mainly the 8" shells from Exeter that were really hurting her which makes me think that once Exeter was out of the fight AGS should have been able to dispose of the two 6" cruisers without too much trouble or having to worry about their shells doing much damage.
Re the idea for a larger version of the AGS ships, I suppose they would have had the same problems if they encountered a convoy escorted by a battleship, but if the RN had decided to build more to that design instead of concentrating on heavily large armed battlecruisers in the 1920's then it would have provided an excellent way to escort their convoys.
One can only wonder!
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by gcogger »

RF wrote: Wed Mar 03, 2021 9:50 amThere were two hits from Prinz Eugen which had started two separate fires which were observed from a spotter plane I believe was operating out of Iceland (referred to in the subsequent Hood sinking enquiry) plus the hit you mention from Bismarck's third salvo, then the fourth salvo a shell took off Hood's spotting top taking out the gunnery officer (this was observed by one of the Hood survivors who witnessed body parts including a torso in officer uniform descending down). This would have left Hood's guns firing in local, not centralised control. The fifth salvo was the final blow, but prior to that there was a marked deterioration in Hood's shooting at Prinz Eugen, which initially found the cruisers range but then started falling further and further astern of the cruiser, prior to Hollands' order to switch fire to Bismarck.
Thanks, I'd forgotten about the hit to the spotting top. I guess that when large shells are flying around, there's not much you can do to prevent hits like that (other than be lucky!).
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by Byron Angel »

Re the accuracy of Hood’s opening gunnery, the relatively early model of RDF Type 284 she carried - when employed for FC ranging purposes (as opposed to surface search) - was only considered “effective” at 16-18,000 yards.

B
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Wed Mar 03, 2021 5:25 pm Re the accuracy of Hood’s opening gunnery, the relatively early model of RDF Type 284 she carried - when employed for FC ranging purposes (as opposed to surface search) - was only considered “effective” at 16-18,000 yards.

B
This is an except of HMS Hood's Type 284 radar trials using KGV as a target:
Tests were carried out ranging on King George V with the following results:
Outward Run. 11,000 yards … saturation of target; 14,000 yards … 10 times the
signal; 16,000 yards … 6 to 8 times the signal; 27,000 yards … VA times the
signal; 27,300 yards … the signal was lost. The echo was very spasmodic from
25,000 yards, but the plot of the run taken from RDF ranges and bearings was a
very good one. Inward run. King George V came in on an unknown bearing and
was picked up at 24,700 yards; it was thought that it would have been possible
to pick up the target earlier but for the fact that she came in on the same bearing
as land echoes. The destroyers escorting King George V were picked up at
16,300 yards. (RA Burt)
The above is very similar to KGV's experiences with Type 284 against Bismarck. Suffolk was able to use her Type 284 to range on PE and/or Bismarck well past 22K yds.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi Dunmunro,
I guess it then boils down to which RN document one chooses to subscribe to. I did not, as you know, make up the cited range numbers (which dated from 1942). A transcription of the original RN text was post on KB about six(?) months ago IIRC.

Byron
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Wed Mar 03, 2021 8:50 pm Hi Dunmunro,
I guess it then boils down to which RN document one chooses to subscribe to. I did not, as you know, make up the cited range numbers (which dated from 1942). A transcription of the original RN text was post on KB about six(?) months ago IIRC.

Byron
I don't recall all the particulars, except to note that ranges will vary depending on where the Type 284 is mounted and what the target is. A light cruiser ranging on another light cruiser might well experience average reliable effective ranges of ~16k yds. However we have enough data points from operational use of the Type 284 during the Bismarck episode to be fairly confident that Hood's Type 284 could reliably range to ~24 yds.

I can't seem to recall or find a prior specific discussion on this but there was a thread on the Type 284 a year or so ago. Type 284 ranges were variable depending on antennae height and size. IIRC, some cruisers used a smaller antennae.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi dunmunro,

Here is the original post plus some add'l materiel accumulated.
A terrific amount of development was undertaken to refine Type 284 from its initial evaluation (KGV, Nov 1940 according to Kingsley) to its performance aboard Duke of York in 1943.

Byron

CB 4112 (4) (1942)
HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF R.D.F. FOR GUNNERY PURPOSES
TYPE 284
Admiralty Gunnery Branch, SW1 – Dated 19th July 1942.

RANGING CAPABILITIES
4. The results tabulated below show the average maximum usable ranges reported by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, from experience gained in the first five ships fitted with Type 284.

Target - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Average Maximum Usable Range
Land Echoes - - - - - - - - - - - 50,000 yards
Battleship - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18,000 “
Large Cruiser - - - - - - - - - - - 15,000 “
Small Cruiser - - - - - - - - - - - 12,000 “
Destroyer - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8,000 “
Submarine on Surface - - - - - 5,000 “

Greater ranges can at times be obtained: for instance, ranges of an “Aurora” class cruiser have been taken at 28,000 yards when the Director Trainer could see the target and was keeping the aerials accurately trained, but the echoes in these cases are weak and fluctuating and cannot be relied upon in practice.

These ranges are somewhat less than were expected from the results obtained in the first sea trial referred to in Paragraph 1, and the possibilities of improving on them are still under investigation.

Note – C.B. 4112 was the wartime document reference for “Handbook on the Use of Radar for Gunnery Purposes”. C.B. 4112 (4) was the 1942 edition; C.B. 4112 (8) was the 1945 edition.

xxxxxxxxxx

B.R. 2435 – TECHNICAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS - 1939-1945
C.B. 3213 – Technical Staff Monographs 1939-1945 - Radar
RADAR
1954

In June 1940 trials were carried out on a low angle fire-control set, Type 284, which also worked on a wave length of 50 cm. The aerial array of this set consisted of two 24-dipole broadside arrays, one for reception and one for transmission, each fitted with a 21-foot long parabolic cylindrical mirror (the length of the mirror corresponded to the length of the visual range finder also fitted on the director control tower). Type 284 could range on a battleship at about 20,000 yards to an accuracy of +/- 120 yards.

The first 50 cm radar range finders were fitted at the end of 1940 and these produced a very marked improvement in the accuracy of surface fire.

- - -

By the middle of 1941, a 10 cm set, Type 271, had been fitted in most battleships and cruisers for surface warning. This set was found to outrange Type 284 on surface targets and so a remote display fed from Type 271 was fitted in the transmitting station. The range from this equipment could be plotted on the fire-control table and, by this means, a solution could often be obtained at maximum gun range, which was not possible with Type 284. Since the use of Type 271 for fire-control prevented its use for surface warning, the range from Type 284 was normally used when available.

- - -

Up till 1941, in the fitting of the 50 cm sets provision had been made to bring the director to the bearing for maximum signal by means of a remote indicator system, but this was really inadequate for fire-control purposes. At this stage, because the 10 cm sets were as yet unable to give adequate ranges against aircraft, the 50 cm sets were converted for beam-switching, in bearing only; it was not considered practicable to convert these sets to give angle of elevation as well owing to the size of the aerials they would require.

When fitted with beam-switching, Type 284 gave a bearing accuracy of from +/-3 to +/- 5 minutes of arc against surface targets <snip> . Type 284 proved a great success in blind fire against surface targets <snip> .

- - -

RADAR TRAINING SIGHT
To facilitate training in blind fire, Types 284 and 285 were equipped with a remote indicator unit; with the Type 285 this unit was invariably fitted in the H.A. director, but with Type 284 it was usually fitted in the TS. Owing to the bulk of this remote indicator unit it was often impossible to find a position for it in the director convenient for the trainer; for this reason, development of a Radar Training Sight to replace the original remote indicator unit was undertaken.

The Radar training sight, besides being of much smaller size, had the added advantage that the trainer could view an image of the radar display in one eyepiece, with normal vision in the other (the radar image could be quickly switched in or out of the field of vision by means of a simple lever mechanism.

- - -

SURFACE GUNNERY
Before the advent of radar, “bearing” was the only indication required and this was passed by Evershed transmission from the Captain’s (visual) sight on the bridge to the Director Control Tower (DCT).

When warning radar was fitted, together with the GHS set Type 284, the existing system of indication was retained but in a modified form. The modification was that bearing could now be transmitted by Evershed to the DCT, either from the Captain’s sight on the bridge of from the Type 284 office, and the Warning Radar Office was linked by telephone of voicepipe to the DCT and the GS office. With this arrangement, when visibility was poor, it wqs possible to pass the approximate bearing of an echo detected by the warning radar both to the DCT and to the gunnery radar operator. The latter would then guide the director in a sweep about the indicated true bearing by means of his Evershed system. Once the echo had been detected by the Type 284 the operator attempted to guide the director to keep its line of sight on the target, by keepin the echo at maximum amplitude.

In 1942 Type 284 was modified to improve its bearing accuracy, and it became possible to train to within about ¼ degree of the target. In addition and extra indicator, known as the Training Tube, which facilitated training by radar, was fitted either in the DCT, or, preferably, in the TS. When the Training Tube was fitted in the TS the DCT had to be guided remotely as before. These two modifications made accurate blind fire possible.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by RF »

paul.mercer wrote: Wed Mar 03, 2021 10:30 am ....... that once Exeter was out of the fight AGS should have been able to dispose of the two 6" cruisers without too much trouble or having to worry about their shells doing much damage.
The key point here is that the two cruisers were superior in speed and operated like destroyers, as Langsdorf described to Captain Dove, and while AGS had the firepower to sink them on paper, it wasn't accurate enough and also the rate of fire was slow. Another critical factor was the failure of the 5.9 inch guns, which could have been decisive - Scharnhorst used hers to sink Acasta and Ardent rather than 11 inch, sledgehammers trying to catch a fast moving ''nut'' even though Acasta did put a torpedo into Scharnhorst.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

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RF wrote: Thu Mar 04, 2021 10:16 am
paul.mercer wrote: Wed Mar 03, 2021 10:30 am ....... that once Exeter was out of the fight AGS should have been able to dispose of the two 6" cruisers without too much trouble or having to worry about their shells doing much damage.
The key point here is that the two cruisers were superior in speed and operated like destroyers, as Langsdorf described to Captain Dove, and while AGS had the firepower to sink them on paper, it wasn't accurate enough and also the rate of fire was slow. Another critical factor was the failure of the 5.9 inch guns, which could have been decisive - Scharnhorst used hers to sink Acasta and Ardent rather than 11 inch, sledgehammers trying to catch a fast moving ''nut'' even though Acasta did put a torpedo into Scharnhorst.

Yep.

I suppose the other thing is that they didn't necessarily have to sink her. She was thousands of miles away from port and any damage that say compromised seaworthiness would effectively mission kill her (which turned out to be the case?)?


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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

Post by RF »

I think the answer to that is the second Battle of the River Plate, the battle that never happened as the AGS was scuttled instead. With Cumberland then present the advantage swings to the RN.

It was Langsdorf's decision to go to Montevideo that was the fatal error. He didn't have to do that. As Harwood had no radar he could have used the nightime to try and lose contact with Ajax/Achilles though the cruisers had a speed advantage. Otherwise the only other chance of escape was to leave Montevideo before Cumberland arrived from the Falklands - and then we could see whether AGS could despatch Ajax/Achilles.
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Re: Royal Navy Super Battleships and Battlecruisers

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RF wrote: Fri Mar 05, 2021 9:59 am I think the answer to that is the second Battle of the River Plate, the battle that never happened as the AGS was scuttled instead. With Cumberland then present the advantage swings to the RN.

It was Langsdorf's decision to go to Montevideo that was the fatal error. He didn't have to do that. As Harwood had no radar he could have used the nightime to try and lose contact with Ajax/Achilles though the cruisers had a speed advantage. Otherwise the only other chance of escape was to leave Montevideo before Cumberland arrived from the Falklands - and then we could see whether AGS could despatch Ajax/Achilles.

I've read more than once online that she had received damage to her diesel and water purification systems that had the effect of completely nobbling her chances of ever getting anywhere near home.

If that was the case he had run out of options. He either did as historical or fought out a battle that even if he won, wouldn't save his ship.



I suppose the issue is that the premise that she could 'outrun anything she couldn't outfight etc' was flawed if you happened to be 5000 miles from home.



AGS's fate was far from a certainty, but the odds of sailing back into Kiel were probably against her given her location and what she was up against. It was certainly no 'Troubridge' moment - Harwood did have a speed advantage and a plan. I don't think Troubridge had either.
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