I would also agree and think this is a reasonable interpretation put forward by Byron. I´m not sure if I agree on position finding, that procedure differed a bit from those outlined above, it was coupled navigation but anyway there should be a fair margin of error built in in this method, too.
The main problem is communication. How do You properly transfer not only a single position but position and direction of multiple ships at once in a way understandable for the receiver? At one point during the battle 18.26, Scheer suggested to his flag officers to seperate the HSF into two forces; Hipper and the 1st SG together with the 3rd Division should deal with the british units in the East while he and the 2nd & 1st Div continues to the northwest.
According to Ruge, this promising plan was briefly discussed with Scheer's staff, and then abandoned in the face of communications difficulties expected in such a move.
Altough the 1914 summer maneuver pioneered such a move and as Keith Yates pointed out, individual initiative was highly regarded and expected in the IGN, allowing the independent action of subforces. This meant that, with minimal instructions, Scheer could count on Hipper and Behncke to fight their squadrons without instructions coming from FleetFlag. Wireless communications within the HSF had been effective for the entire battle. Scheer could have briefly and quickly informed his subordinates of his intentions. But the problem was how to fare after deployment?
In a way, the fleets remind me on dinosaurs: Heavily armed and even more armoured but equipped only with rudimentary senses for situaltional awareness. The line style battle lacks flexibility and in conditions of detoriating visibility a large battleline was of little asset as Jellicoe correctly pointed out.
After the battle, the HSF was reorganized along tactically more flexible units centered around homogenious subunits (NASSAU´s, HELGOLANDs with fleet flag BADEN attached, then the KÖNIG´s with BAYERN attached and finally the five KAISER´s instead of the mixed Divisions of eight battleships each). This was tested successfully during operation Albion in 1917.
The WIESBADEN incident never caught my believe. There is one precedent to this, that is the loss of SMS BLÜCHER abandoned between the lines and finally sunk by the BCF during Doggerbank. In the immidiatpresentation following the battle Hipper explained why he left BLÜCHER and this was not only agreed upon by Pohl but also by Scheer. So what could change his mind within a year? BLÜCHER was an ACR, WIESBADEN a single CL, worth risking the fleet for it?