1.-to early for the night march (to much light aviable yet), not the right time to close daytime action
2.-Freedom of Agency needs to be regained
3.-Return to the german bay needs to be kept open
he expressed the hopes that:
1.-Surprise of the enemy due to new tactical situation
2.-Easier disengagement from the enemy van
3.-help for the crew of SMS WIESBADEN
Yes, I have seen those reasonings before in various books. However, I always was a bit doubtful about them.
* Saving the Wiesbaden: Why would you risk a fleet to save a probably already sinking light cruiser?
* Too early for night. OK, so we take another beating from a superior enemy before night?
* Return to German Bight. Sure, but the maneuver performed would actually risk that very escape route.
* Surprise the enemy, yes he probably did that - and himself.
* Easier disengagement - why, he had just disengaged.
That is why I thought the theory you described interesting. It fits better that any of the reasons actually put forward by Scheer. IMHO it seems likely Scheer either:
1) Didn't have a clue and messed up. Understandable given the bad visibility and bad intel on the enemy.
2) Thought he had a clue, did the audacious move described above and messed up.
I must say I lean towards 1, because if he had had a good plan, he would probably had said so instead of the above, which to me always sounded a bit mushy.