Pollen was someone that saw a way to make money. He was constantly putting pressure on the Admiralty so they buy his system. The pressure went from going to the House of Commons to threaten the Admiralty of selling his system to other countries. The prices charged for his system were desproportioned high. Moreover, more than once in the long time from his first contact around 1905 to around 1913 when he was discharged as an Admiralty contractor, he assured to have designs in working order when really they were on he drawing board yet. I think that such a comercial policy nowadays would not be tolerated even by a non-military customer.
That said and with the hindsight benefit, the various Pollen designs were too complex for the technology of the day. For example he proposed a method of finding the enemy course and speed (see the thread about Radar Fire Control for the signicance of this) from a plot of the movements of the target, made automatically on a paper by a mechanical device using bearing and range info transmitted from the rangefinder.
On the other hand Dreyer´s system was more simple, albeit it required more human intervention, and about all, was far cheaper (about 6000 pounds for a complete ship installation versus 2000 pounds for the same) and came from within the service, which assured complete secrecy.
Hood´s table was old-fashioned in 1941, no doubt. But this was not Dreyer´s fault but Admiralty´s not upgrading her in time. For her time Dreyer´s system was certainly smart.
Thanks for your kind words about the Argentine dreadnoughts. They should be a remainder that Argentina was in those times a rising power, which managed to acquire two of the latest weapon at sea, in a time when only 10 countries in the world had such armament. Then a number of bad governments put the country in a poor state, to the point that today we have almost no air force.
Regards to all