Posted: Sun Sep 17, 2006 10:04 am
I have not read Olivier's book. can you recommend it? I have Steinberg's but I have not yet the opportunity to start with it. I have read Hurd's and, in my opinion, it is not worth. It does not provide anything you cannot find in other places is too one sided nad lacks perspective to say the least.
More interesting are Sondhaus "Preparing for Weltpolitik", Weir "Building the Kaiser Navy" and the little known Brezet "Le Plan Tirpitz" (in French). The last two are more focused on industrial, technical and purely naval matters (I mean less politics and grand strategy). Brezet's book is the only one I know that details the design process of the capital ships of the HSF. BTW, it breaks several myths, as the one that says that the 380mm battery of the Bayern's was a consecuence of QE's. Brezet shows how this move was decided before the Germans knew about the QE.
Now, I agree with you that the effectiveness of the HSF was impaired by geopraphical factors and that the USN was successful in developing without much threat from Britain due to the inability of the britons to put a real menace. But to me the paralellism in the REASONS why having a strong fleet between Germany and the US still remains.
I will challenge the idea that a Baltic strategy would not make Britain react. Considering that the Russians were building dreadnoughts and a powerful fleet, there was still the possibility of Britain considering the German Navy buildup as a threat.
I do not agree also with the statement that the HSF will be useless in a war with France. First, the French Navy enjoyed almost absolute freedom of movement during the Franco-Prussian war, if it accomplished nothing is more a case of ineptitude and lack of direction, but the opportinity was there. So the Germans needed a fleet to answer to this. Second, the world in 1914 was very different than in 1870. Specially, Germany was very different. I need to repeat here tha at that time Germany was NOT a pure landpower in the sense that a BIG part of its wealth came from overseas. The amount of damage that undisputed supremacy of a French fleet could made was much much bigger than in 1870.
It is undisputable that the way that Tirpitz directed the creation of the HSF was harmful for Germany. The question then is if there were ways to achieve the goal without provoking the British?
I do not believe a strategy of sending the battlefleet overseas would have worked. German bases in Africa and Asia proved too easily to seize. Morte important still, this strategy would need fundamental changes in the design of the warships of the HSF. These were optimized for North Atlantic Operations, making them able to operate on distant stations would require bigger and more expensive ships.
I can agree that Germany in the late XIX Century was in an impasse: second or third worl economy (depending on how you measure it), with a big and growing overseas trade, landlocked by geography and with powerful enemies (lets put aside for the moment the fact that this could have been avoided). The logic for developing a strong fleet was quite natural. I said that implementation failed because:
1. Tirpitz caused unnecessary (or excessive) rivalry with Britain
2. Ship design and quantities was hampered by funding (more than elsewhere I mean)
3. Germany developed "luxury" ships in the form of battlecruisers
4. The conduct of operations in 1914-1916 was inept. Even in Jutland one can argue there was a missed opportunity for the HSF. I should concede that after Jutland and the start of the submarine war, the HSF was doomed however
It is interesting to note that Germasn Naval expenditure was relatively small, not only compared to Britain and the USA but even with France and Russia (at least on certain years). In 1910 as an example, the total Naval Expenditure of the major powers was: Britain 40.4 MM GBP, France 15.0 MM, Russia 9.7 MM, Germany 20.8 MM, Italy 8.3 MM. The main issue of the HSF was, therefore, financial. Imperial Germany wass unable to provide the funds required for a true challenge to the RN!
I do believe than even TOTAL military expenditure in Germany, contrary to legend, was not greater than Britain's, so it was not only a question of priority of the Army.
The fact is that the tax system in Imperial Germany (the whole nature of the state in fact) was inadequate for a modern, growing, industrialized country.
I would say therefore that Imperial Germany had the motivations, the technique and the wealth to challenge the RN, even with the drawback of Geography. It failed because, ironically, it did not bet strongly enough!
Rafael
More interesting are Sondhaus "Preparing for Weltpolitik", Weir "Building the Kaiser Navy" and the little known Brezet "Le Plan Tirpitz" (in French). The last two are more focused on industrial, technical and purely naval matters (I mean less politics and grand strategy). Brezet's book is the only one I know that details the design process of the capital ships of the HSF. BTW, it breaks several myths, as the one that says that the 380mm battery of the Bayern's was a consecuence of QE's. Brezet shows how this move was decided before the Germans knew about the QE.
Now, I agree with you that the effectiveness of the HSF was impaired by geopraphical factors and that the USN was successful in developing without much threat from Britain due to the inability of the britons to put a real menace. But to me the paralellism in the REASONS why having a strong fleet between Germany and the US still remains.
I will challenge the idea that a Baltic strategy would not make Britain react. Considering that the Russians were building dreadnoughts and a powerful fleet, there was still the possibility of Britain considering the German Navy buildup as a threat.
I do not agree also with the statement that the HSF will be useless in a war with France. First, the French Navy enjoyed almost absolute freedom of movement during the Franco-Prussian war, if it accomplished nothing is more a case of ineptitude and lack of direction, but the opportinity was there. So the Germans needed a fleet to answer to this. Second, the world in 1914 was very different than in 1870. Specially, Germany was very different. I need to repeat here tha at that time Germany was NOT a pure landpower in the sense that a BIG part of its wealth came from overseas. The amount of damage that undisputed supremacy of a French fleet could made was much much bigger than in 1870.
It is undisputable that the way that Tirpitz directed the creation of the HSF was harmful for Germany. The question then is if there were ways to achieve the goal without provoking the British?
I do not believe a strategy of sending the battlefleet overseas would have worked. German bases in Africa and Asia proved too easily to seize. Morte important still, this strategy would need fundamental changes in the design of the warships of the HSF. These were optimized for North Atlantic Operations, making them able to operate on distant stations would require bigger and more expensive ships.
I can agree that Germany in the late XIX Century was in an impasse: second or third worl economy (depending on how you measure it), with a big and growing overseas trade, landlocked by geography and with powerful enemies (lets put aside for the moment the fact that this could have been avoided). The logic for developing a strong fleet was quite natural. I said that implementation failed because:
1. Tirpitz caused unnecessary (or excessive) rivalry with Britain
2. Ship design and quantities was hampered by funding (more than elsewhere I mean)
3. Germany developed "luxury" ships in the form of battlecruisers
4. The conduct of operations in 1914-1916 was inept. Even in Jutland one can argue there was a missed opportunity for the HSF. I should concede that after Jutland and the start of the submarine war, the HSF was doomed however
It is interesting to note that Germasn Naval expenditure was relatively small, not only compared to Britain and the USA but even with France and Russia (at least on certain years). In 1910 as an example, the total Naval Expenditure of the major powers was: Britain 40.4 MM GBP, France 15.0 MM, Russia 9.7 MM, Germany 20.8 MM, Italy 8.3 MM. The main issue of the HSF was, therefore, financial. Imperial Germany wass unable to provide the funds required for a true challenge to the RN!
I do believe than even TOTAL military expenditure in Germany, contrary to legend, was not greater than Britain's, so it was not only a question of priority of the Army.
The fact is that the tax system in Imperial Germany (the whole nature of the state in fact) was inadequate for a modern, growing, industrialized country.
I would say therefore that Imperial Germany had the motivations, the technique and the wealth to challenge the RN, even with the drawback of Geography. It failed because, ironically, it did not bet strongly enough!
Rafael