Falkland war

Naval discussions covering the latter half of the 20th Century.
Francis Marliere
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Falkland war

Post by Francis Marliere »

Gentlemen,

I have an interest in the 1982 Falkland war and have a couple of questions.

Argentina had 3 Fletcher class destroyers (Rosales, Almirante Storni, Almirante Domecq Garcia) which were paid off in 1982 and 1983. I wonder if this vessels were still operational during the war because they did not take part in operations.

I do not understand the logic behind the decision to send the submarine Santa Fe in South Georgia. As far as I understand things, his mission was to bring some reinforcement and supply. IMHO, it makes more sense to send surface ships, either a dedicated transport such as Bahia Pareiso or a couple of destroyers or frigates, which could quickly reach South Georgia, unload then leave the area before the British ships arrive. Did I miss something ?

The Royal Navy had several ships in reserve at the beginning of the war. HMS Intrepid was made operationnal and sent south but some other ships that may have been very helpfull (HMS Bulwark, HMS Tiger, HMS Blake, ...) were not. I wonder wether it was for 'good' reasons (it would be too difficult or/and too long to put the ship back in commission) or for 'bad' (political or budgetary) reasons. Any thoughs ?


Thanks for any help,

Francis Marliere
Steve Crandell
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Re: Falkland war

Post by Steve Crandell »

I believe it would have taken too much time to bring ships out of reserve, provide them with crew, and train them to the level of competency needed to operate in a war zone.
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RF
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Re: Falkland war

Post by RF »

Francis Marliere wrote:
I have an interest in the 1982 Falkland war and have a couple of questions.

Argentina had 3 Fletcher class destroyers (Rosales, Almirante Storni, Almirante Domecq Garcia) which were paid off in 1982 and 1983. I wonder if this vessels were still operational during the war because they did not take part in operations.
I'm not sure that these ships were fully operational at the time. As with the carrier Vienticento de Mayo the Argentine navy may have also preferred not to risk losing these ships and kept them in home waters. Belgrano was regarded as more expendable.
I do not understand the logic behind the decision to send the submarine Santa Fe in South Georgia. As far as I understand things, his mission was to bring some reinforcement and supply. IMHO, it makes more sense to send surface ships, either a dedicated transport such as Bahia Pareiso or a couple of destroyers or frigates, which could quickly reach South Georgia, unload then leave the area before the British ships arrive. Did I miss something ?
Basically the same answer - less risk. Bear in mind that Souith Georgia was further away from the Argentine mainland and that surface ships would have no air cover in the vicinity of South Georgia.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
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RF
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Re: Falkland war

Post by RF »

Steve Crandell wrote:I believe it would have taken too much time to bring ships out of reserve, provide them with crew, and train them to the level of competency needed to operate in a war zone.
In which case there is a clear lack of proper pre-planning for the invasion of the Falklands, together with a mis-reading of the British reaction.
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RF
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Re: Falkland war

Post by RF »

Francis Marliere wrote:
The Royal Navy had several ships in reserve at the beginning of the war. HMS Intrepid was made operationnal and sent south but some other ships that may have been very helpfull (HMS Bulwark, HMS Tiger, HMS Blake, ...) were not. I wonder wether it was for 'good' reasons (it would be too difficult or/and too long to put the ship back in commission) or for 'bad' (political or budgetary) reasons. Any thoughs ?
Britain had NATO commitments elsewhere and there was a desire to not leave the Russians with the impression that Britain was over stretched. Don't forget that at the time the Cold War was still on.
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Francis Marliere
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Re: Falkland war

Post by Francis Marliere »

Gentlemen,

thanks for your answers.

However, I still fail to understand why the ARA send Santa Fe. The submarine was too old to fight and too slow to reach South Georgia before the RN. From my armchair admiral's point of view, it makes more sense to send surface ships that can unload and leave SG before the enemy is there. Santa Fe left port on 9 (some sources say 17 April) ; if the reinforcement is loaded on a Sumner class destroyer, this ships can reach South Georgia on 13 April, unload on 14 and leave before HMS Conqueror begins his patrol in the area. Even a fast transport could have made the job. I wonder if Argentina has one avilable at the time (Bahia Paraiso returned to port a bit late, either 14 or 18 avril from different sources, Bahia Buen Suceso and Almirante Irizar were busy bringing reinforcement and supply to the Falklands).

I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate ?

Bestn

Francis Marliere
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RF
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Re: Falkland war

Post by RF »

Francis Marliere wrote:
However, I still fail to understand why the ARA send Santa Fe. The submarine was too old to fight and too slow to reach South Georgia before the RN. From my armchair admiral's point of view, it makes more sense to send surface ships that can unload and leave SG before the enemy is there. Santa Fe left port on 9 (some sources say 17 April) ; if the reinforcement is loaded on a Sumner class destroyer, this ships can reach South Georgia on 13 April, unload on 14 and leave before HMS Conqueror begins his patrol in the area. Even a fast transport could have made the job. I wonder if Argentina has one avilable at the time (Bahia Paraiso returned to port a bit late, either 14 or 18 avril from different sources, Bahia Buen Suceso and Almirante Irizar were busy bringing reinforcement and supply to the Falklands).
This is argued post war with a hindsight that at the time the Argentines would not have. Santa Fe may be slow, but as a least valuable vessel it is the expendable candidate that can be used. Also take into account that the Argentines may not have expected South Georgia to be retaken first because to do so the British naval task force had to divide in the face of likely air attack.
I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate ?
This will be a matter of location and logistics. The Soviets would be aware of the approximate state of the ships but not the precise timings of getting them into full duty. Sending them into the bottom half of the South Atlantic takes them out of other possible operations completely. Don't forget that the Falklands are almost a third of the Earth's surface away from Britain, they are very distant waters even from the central Atlantic.
Leaving Bulwark where it was without formal reactivation was probably the best and most economic option.
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paul.mercer
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Re: Falkland war

Post by paul.mercer »

Gentlemen,
Re HMS Tiger, herewith something I got off Google.
In 1978 Tiger was placed in reserve, subsequently being placed on the disposal list in 1979. Both Tiger and her sister-ship Blake were listed as part of the Standby Squadron, and moored inactive at HMNB Chatham.
When the Falklands War broke out in early April 1982, both ships were rapidly surveyed and it was determined both were in very good material shape, so much so that both were drydocked (Tiger in Portsmouth and Blake at Chatham) and recommissioning work was begun.
During reconstruction and in the following years, material cannibalised from Lion was used to patch both Tiger and Blake. Tiger reportedly had so much material from Lion that her crew nicknamed her "HMS Liger".
Whilst there was speculation that their 6-inch guns would be useful for shore bombardment, the real reason for their potential deployment was the size of their flight decks, (the 3rd largest in the Royal Navy at that time after the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible), and the potential to use them as mobile forward operating and refuelling bases for Task Force Harriers. (Blake had already operated RAF Harriers briefly for proving trials in 1971, and Harriers had refuelled on Tiger). Their benefit would be more as platforms to extend the range and endurance of the Harriers and as a refuelling stop on the way back to the carriers, rather than as somewhere to operate offensive missions from, or as somewhere to place a pair of Sea Harriers as an extended-range CAP (Combat Air Patrol) ahead of the two carriers (and reducing their own exposure to air strikes), but the need to take off vertically rather than the use of a ski-jump severely reduced the Harriers' endurance and weapons carrying capability, and in late May 1982 after the loss of the destroyer Sheffield and the Argentian cruiser General Belgrano the refits were stopped.
There were also doubts about the two ships' self-defence capabilities, (the 6-inch and 3-inch armament had never been reliable) and this coupled with the large complement (and potential loss of life were one of the cruisers to be lost), caused much anxiety in the Admiralty. That, along with where to find 1,800 capable and qualified crew in a hurry at a time when the Royal Navy was already downsizing, sealed the two ships fate. The UK simply could not afford its own Belgrano disaster, either materially or politically.
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Re: Falkland war

Post by Francis Marliere »

Gentlemen,

thanks for your answers. However, I have other questions if you don't mind.

During the landing at San Carlos, the battery of Rapiers was among the first things to be unloaded. The SAM were in position on midday on 21st May, but unfortunately were not operationnal untill the 25th. Do you know why ?

The british were fully aware that the Sea Harrier, due to their short range, would spend most of their flying time in transit between the carriers and the area of operations, and very little (10 to 30 mn) on CAP protecting the beachhead. It's the reason why Atlantic Conveyor and Stromness were loaded with thousands of aluminium plates intended for the building of an auxiliary airbase where Sea Harriers and choppers would be able to land, refuel and take-off. This auxiliary base became operational on 4th June. I wonder why such a priority task took so long to perform.

In "Amphibious Assault Falklands", à book written by Michael Clapp, the man who commanded the amphibious group, the author explains why he made the choice to land at San Carlos. Basically, the beaches were large enough, far enough from Stanley to be safe from a counter attack but close enough for a British assault, and well defended from the swell, submarines, Exocet and conventional air attacks.
Unfortunately, the books don't tell why other places that also look fine as a landing place, such as Mare Harbour and East Cove, were not chosen. From an armchair admiral's perspective, these places were far enough from Stanley and offered good defense against Exocet, submarines, and swell. They also had two advantages over San Carlos : they were closer to the carrier and hence reduced the transit time of the Sea Harrier, and the were a bit more far away for the FAA planes.
So, why San Carlos ? I guess there must be something I don't know such as size and / or gradient of the beaches, depth of water, etc. Any thoughs ?

Last thing, I wonder how did warship made long range communications when not fitted with SATCOM (ARA ships and some British ones such as Intrepid). Could their communication be intercepted and their location determined like in WWII ?

Thanks for any help,

Francis Marliere
HMSVF
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Re: Falkland war

Post by HMSVF »

Francis Marliere wrote: Thu Jun 11, 2015 10:10 am Gentlemen,

thanks for your answers.

However, I still fail to understand why the ARA send Santa Fe. The submarine was too old to fight and too slow to reach South Georgia before the RN. From my armchair admiral's point of view, it makes more sense to send surface ships that can unload and leave SG before the enemy is there. Santa Fe left port on 9 (some sources say 17 April) ; if the reinforcement is loaded on a Sumner class destroyer, this ships can reach South Georgia on 13 April, unload on 14 and leave before HMS Conqueror begins his patrol in the area. Even a fast transport could have made the job. I wonder if Argentina has one avilable at the time (Bahia Paraiso returned to port a bit late, either 14 or 18 avril from different sources, Bahia Buen Suceso and Almirante Irizar were busy bringing reinforcement and supply to the Falklands).

I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate ?

Bestn

Francis Marliere

I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate


Bulwark was knackered. She was surveyed I believe and it became rapidly clear that she was beyond reactivation - certainly within a useful time frame. Tiger and Blake (Blake was at Chatham as part of the Standby Squadron) were also surveyed, however again the work required to get them up and running couldn't have been undertaken in time and also they were manpower demanding at a time when the RN wasn't exactly flush. Tiger and Blake took 900 odd or so people to man them. It would be interesting to know whether the ammunition for the 6 inch and 3 inch guns was even available.
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Re: Falkland war

Post by HMSVF »

Francis Marliere wrote: Thu Jun 11, 2015 10:10 am Gentlemen,

thanks for your answers.

However, I still fail to understand why the ARA send Santa Fe. The submarine was too old to fight and too slow to reach South Georgia before the RN. From my armchair admiral's point of view, it makes more sense to send surface ships that can unload and leave SG before the enemy is there. Santa Fe left port on 9 (some sources say 17 April) ; if the reinforcement is loaded on a Sumner class destroyer, this ships can reach South Georgia on 13 April, unload on 14 and leave before HMS Conqueror begins his patrol in the area. Even a fast transport could have made the job. I wonder if Argentina has one avilable at the time (Bahia Paraiso returned to port a bit late, either 14 or 18 avril from different sources, Bahia Buen Suceso and Almirante Irizar were busy bringing reinforcement and supply to the Falklands).

I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate ?

Bestn

Francis Marliere
I also fail to see how can NATO commitments explain why HMS Bulwark (and other warships) were not reactivated. Could you please elaborate



Bulwark was knackered. She was surveyed I believe and it became rapidly clear that she was beyond reactivation - certainly within a useful time frame. Tiger and Blake (Blake was at Chatham as part of the Standby Squadron) were also surveyed, however again the work required to get them up and running couldn't have been undertaken in time and also they were manpower demanding at a time when the RN wasn't exactly flush. Tiger and Blake took 900 odd or so people to man them. It would be interesting to know whether the ammunition for the 6 inch and 3 inch guns was even available.
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Re: Falkland war

Post by JAG »

RF wrote: Wed Jun 10, 2015 8:27 am
Francis Marliere wrote:
I have an interest in the 1982 Falkland war and have a couple of questions.

Argentina had 3 Fletcher class destroyers (Rosales, Almirante Storni, Almirante Domecq Garcia) which were paid off in 1982 and 1983. I wonder if this vessels were still operational during the war because they did not take part in operations.
I'm not sure that these ships were fully operational at the time. As with the carrier Vienticento de Mayo the Argentine navy may have also preferred not to risk losing these ships and kept them in home waters. Belgrano was regarded as more expendable.
I do not understand the logic behind the decision to send the submarine Santa Fe in South Georgia. As far as I understand things, his mission was to bring some reinforcement and supply. IMHO, it makes more sense to send surface ships, either a dedicated transport such as Bahia Pareiso or a couple of destroyers or frigates, which could quickly reach South Georgia, unload then leave the area before the British ships arrive. Did I miss something ?
Basically the same answer - less risk. Bear in mind that Souith Georgia was further away from the Argentine mainland and that surface ships would have no air cover in the vicinity of South Georgia.
Well, you have to remember something, the Falklands was a secondary aspect of the larger Chile-Argentina conflict, and I know how that sounds to the English-speakers.

In 1978 Argentina refused to honor the arbiter award that granted the Beagle Channel and the three islands to the south to Chile, and, full of pride after stealing the 1978 World Cup they tried to bully Chile into giving them up anyways, Chile refused and both fleets mobilized coming within hours of an engagement but, in the end, they backed down.

Of course they hated the embarrassement and launched on a MASSIVE acquisition campaign that would see their navy completely re-equipped and the other two services considerably strenghtened in order to settle the Chilean matter once and for all.

Of course, that takes quite a bit of time, and since the economy was taking a turn for the worse in part as a consequence of their out of control military spending (tank factory, aircraft factory, new shipyard, submarine yard) they needed some quick win to keep the people happy until they could deal with Chile and show them just how great a bunch of heroes they were...

And that is how the Falklands war happened, the UK had already offered to give up the islands under a lease in exchange for the argentine destroyer, corvette and submarine contracts so, the Junta judge them weak and decided to take them over expecting little resistance and US support, after all, they were doing the US dirt work in Central America with their death squads killing people there just as they had done in Argentina.

I believe poor Saddam made the same mistake... They also hoped and discussed the possibility that the Chileans might yield once they saw the British do the same...

So, no provisions to fortify the islands had been made, they garrisoned the islands with conscripts from the warm areas of the country since the troops better suited to cold climates were still deployed along the Andes facing Chile, same for their marines, only one batallion went to the Falklands, all the others were at the Chilean border.

Since they were in the middle of a wide fleet replacement they had many of their best officers abroad, training in Germany, learning to use the new hardware and of course that left little time and resources to keep what they had in working order, which is something they have always struggled with anyway. No sense in maintaining some old WW2 crate on their way to the breakers, right?

Therefore, the argies went to war with a barely working navy, undermanned, and facing an unexpected enemy when they were getting ready and psyched about taking on the Chilean Navy.

When the Belgrano went down it could do barely 18kts instead of 32 (when the Chilean Brooklyns went to the breakers they did 31kts, we maintain our shit) and was not in general quarters, all hatches open in a war zone, and its 2 ASW escorts were too close to the old and noisy CL to the point they were effectively deaf, so Conqueror could and did track it for a long time and then sent it to the bottom once authorized to do so. Easy pickings.

The sinking caused admiral Anaya to declare that the navy would no longer risk their combat units since they could not risk weakening its strength vis a vis Chile, thus ending the navy's participation in the war.

They didnt take the UK seriously, that war was not meant to happen, it was conceived as a diplomatic coup that, thankfully, backfired horribly and prevented and actual large scale war from happening in Southamerica.

Argentina actually won by losing...
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marcelo_malara
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Re: Falkland war

Post by marcelo_malara »

Some things on the Belgrano sinking.

Her machinery was so noisy that the Conqueror tracked her to 70.000 yards with passive sonar.

Despite of this, the Belgrano group used passive instead of active sonar for submarine detection, with so noisy machinery going to active would not have worsened the lack of stealth, and indeed could have detected the Conqueror at 1400 yards in her final run.

Both escorts were to starboard of the Belgrano at the time of the attack, which came from port side. Could never found the reason for this.

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SUT
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Re: Falkland war

Post by SUT »

Actually, the three destroyers escorting Belgrano were in a very basd mechanical and technical condition. Even their better personnel had already been sent to Germany to become the first crews of the brand new Meko 360 frigates which were on completion, being ordered after the failure of the threatening on Chile in 1978. The memoirs of the Captain of the Cruiser, Captian Bonzo, actually gives numbers, and goes destroyer by destroyer, stating that none of them went over 22 knots. As Jag was saying, they were on A condition, with all their hatches open, and in Belgrano just a single lighted boiler room and a single generator room providing power. They has their crew down for the night with just a single peace time watch awake. No mystery that when the torpedoes hit the cruiser, they released some depth charges and ran away at best possible speed.
paul.mercer
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Re: Falkland war

Post by paul.mercer »

Gentlemen,
It seems like gross negligence by the Captain to me.
If the destroyers had picked up Conqueror at 1400 yards it seems that at only 22 knots they couldn't have caught her anyway, I wonder if, at 1400 yds distance Conqueror would have already fired her torpedoes and made off anyway?
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