Greatest admiral of all time

[kayanat]

The most influential person in US Naval History? Who do you think was the most influential person in the History of the US Navy and Why? John Paul Jones, Chester Nitiz and others may be listed, but why do you think they hold a special place in Navy History?

[lwd]

That would probably be better off in a thread of it's own.

[RF]

Maybe, but if you are looking at the ''greatest'' you have to consider their long term influence on naval matters, whether you are looking at one navy or indeed all navies. This I think is one of the reasons why Nelson is way out in front.

[lwd]

Maybe, but if you are looking at the ''greatest'' you have to consider their long term influence on naval matters, whether you are looking at one navy or indeed all navies. This I think is one of the reasons why Nelson is way out in front.

But if the question of who was most influential in US naval history my answer would be Thomas Jefferson who is clearly not a admiral and not even a naval officer. In British naval history while Nelson is way up there so is Churchil among others.

[RF]

If you are looking at US naval history what about John Paul Jones - who pre-dates Thomas Jefferson, going back to the original war of independence?

As for the Royal Navy, King Henry VIII? Not that he was always right, as the Mary Rose demonstrated back in 1545.

[Bgile]

If you are talking influence, how about A T Mahan?

[dfrighini]

Interesting question and a difficult question to answer, it must be remembered that different admirals had different problems and different technology, so direct comparisons can be hard. However I will try to answer this question the best I can.

I agree with Karl, Heihachirö Tögö is my favorite, however sadly he seems a little forgotten, only getting 2% of the vote. I think given the differences in technology he proved himself both a great tactical and strategic admiral, his handling of his fleet at both Tsushima and Yellow Sea was classical, he cross the T and send in his torpedo boats, routing the Russians and destroying their fleet. He always kept strategic objectives in mind, had he not been mindful of these the campaign could have worked out very differently.

I have got some other favourites, however none of these are a complete as Heihachirö Tögö. I like both Hipper and Sheer, they were clever, however they failed to understand until post Jutland that battleships had already had their day, and that u-boats (and air power) were now king of the hill. regarding Germany this story surprising is also true regarding World War 2. Don't get me wrong, I love battleships, however Germany would have been better of not have large scale fleets and concentrating on u-boats during both wars, this is a lesson they have learned twice, and both times it was to late. had Germany used the metal and men used to construct fleets on u-boats the Battle for the Atlantic in both wars could have been very different. Had Germany got 350+ u-boats in 1939 the allies might have lost the war.

I also respect Admiral Bruce Fraser, like all true RN admirals he knows to respect his enemies, in particular his comments having sunk the Scharnhorst. Certainly Fraser was a good planner, the trap for the Scharnhorst was well laid, but luck also played into his hands, as Scharnhorst certainly could have escaped had she been better captained and almost did. Fraser had almost given up hope of catching the Scharnhorst and was about to turn his fleet back towards the convey when Scharnhorst's speed drops (either through shell or engine trouble). So history was written by the narrowest of margins. However did sinking the Scharnhorst really make a big difference? I don't think so, Both DOY and Scharnhorst are dinosaurs belonging to a different era, they had both had their day before they were even built. When Heihachirö Tögö was fighting in the Yellow Sea battleships were the aircraft carries of WW2. So really the closest WW2 admiral I can compare Heihachirö Tögö is perhaps Isoroku Yamamoto or Chester Nimitz.

PS: Why is Christopher Columbus on this list, was he an admiral?

[RF]

I like both Hipper and Sheer, they were clever, however they failed to understand until post Jutland that battleships had already had their day, and that u-boats (and air power) were now king of the hill. regarding Germany this story surprising is also true regarding World War 2. Don't get me wrong, I love battleships, however Germany would have been better of not have large scale fleets and concentrating on u-boats during both wars, this is a lesson they have learned twice, and both times it was to late. had Germany used the metal and men used to construct fleets on u-boats the Battle for the Atlantic in both wars could have been very different. Had Germany got 350+ u-boats in 1939 the allies might have lost the war.

Hipper and Scheer were good tacticians, I agree. Yes they were slow to appreciate the decline of the battleship and the significance of air power as an attacking as opposed to purely reconnaissance weapon - but so to was Raeder.

I'm not so sure about your comments on Germany abandoning having a large surface fleet. Germany's problem was its strategic position. In maritime terms Germany was bottled up in an almost inland sea, the Baltic, with only a short coastline on the North Sea. Provided there was a means of being able to break out and operate in strength in the Atlantic then a large fleet is justified. The question of U-boats is a good one BUT it constitutes reliance on just one weapon, and to build to 350 subs takes time and the Allies will see that problem coming - and therefore have time to develop countermeasures.
Given that the British had consented to Germany building to 35% of the tonnage of the British Fleet in 1934, Germany could have used an alternative Z Plan to build to the agreed limits by say 1941, particulary if greater significance to a naval air arm had been done. There would have been no initial British contermeasures as they had agreed on the German expansion. Yes, U-boats were a major weapon. Coupled with substantial surface forces backed by naval air power a balanced fleet, properly handled, would have been decisive.

[RF]

I agree with Karl, Heihachirö Tögö is my favorite, however sadly he seems a little forgotten, only getting 2% of the vote. I think given the differences in technology he proved himself both a great tactical and strategic admiral, his handling of his fleet at both Tsushima and Yellow Sea was classical, he cross the T and send in his torpedo boats, routing the Russians and destroying their fleet. He always kept strategic objectives in mind, had he not been mindful of these the campaign could have worked out very differently.

Right, lets ask a question here. How far was Togo's victory at Tsushima down to the fact that he was on home territory while the Russian Baltic Fleet had sailed halfway round the world and was hardly in tip top condition?

Could Togo have taken his fleet round the world into the Baltic and fought the Russians there, with no logistical or other support from countries bordering on the Baltic? And win?

[dfrighini]

I agree with Karl, Heihachirö Tögö is my favorite, however sadly he seems a little forgotten, only getting 2% of the vote. I think given the differences in technology he proved himself both a great tactical and strategic admiral, his handling of his fleet at both Tsushima and Yellow Sea was classical, he cross the T and send in his torpedo boats, routing the Russians and destroying their fleet. He always kept strategic objectives in mind, had he not been mindful of these the campaign could have worked out very differently.

Right, lets ask a question here. How far was Togo's victory at Tsushima down to the fact that he was on home territory while the Russian Baltic Fleet had sailed halfway round the world and was hardly in tip top condition?

Could Togo have taken his fleet round the world into the Baltic and fought the Russians there, with no logistical or other support from countries bordering on the Baltic? And win?

You make an interesting point here, certainly the condition of the Russian Baltic Fleet play a major part in the Russian's defeat. I suppose it comes down to Togo striking whilst the iron is hot, I don't think he waited before attacking the Russian Fleet (correct me if I'm wrong) and ambushed them as they arrived in local waters. Agreed that local knowledge is also another important factor, however I feel the Russians also has some local knowledge as Russian waters and borders are not far away from this area, and whilst it is the Russian Baltic Fleet (in poor condition) the Russian command staff on the other hand should have some knowledge of the waters, especially around Port Arthur.

[dfrighini]

I like both Hipper and Sheer, they were clever, however they failed to understand until post Jutland that battleships had already had their day, and that u-boats (and air power) were now king of the hill. regarding Germany this story surprising is also true regarding World War 2. Don't get me wrong, I love battleships, however Germany would have been better of not have large scale fleets and concentrating on u-boats during both wars, this is a lesson they have learned twice, and both times it was to late. had Germany used the metal and men used to construct fleets on u-boats the Battle for the Atlantic in both wars could have been very different. Had Germany got 350+ u-boats in 1939 the allies might have lost the war.

Hipper and Scheer were good tacticians, I agree. Yes they were slow to appreciate the decline of the battleship and the significance of air power as an attacking as opposed to purely reconnaissance weapon - but so to was Raeder.

I'm not so sure about your comments on Germany abandoning having a large surface fleet. Germany's problem was its strategic position. In maritime terms Germany was bottled up in an almost inland sea, the Baltic, with only a short coastline on the North Sea. Provided there was a means of being able to break out and operate in strength in the Atlantic then a large fleet is justified. The question of U-boats is a good one BUT it constitutes reliance on just one weapon, and to build to 350 subs takes time and the Allies will see that problem coming - and therefore have time to develop countermeasures.
Given that the British had consented to Germany building to 35% of the tonnage of the British Fleet in 1934, Germany could have used an alternative Z Plan to build to the agreed limits by say 1941, particulary if greater significance to a naval air arm had been done. There would have been no initial British contermeasures as they had agreed on the German expansion. Yes, U-boats were a major weapon. Coupled with substantial surface forces backed by naval air power a balanced fleet, properly handled, would have been decisive.

Admittedly my comments on this subject are simply speculation and based somewhat on hindsight, which makes things easy to judge in a subjective manner. Perhaps one of the major differences between Britain and Germany in both World Wars is an issue of supply, Britain has allies all around the world, ports where her capital ships can refuel and repair where Germany had none and had to use supply ship. In my mind they was always the weak point in Germany's North Atlantic, this effectively contributed to the lose of a number of German capital ships, including the Bismarck (France was not a good place for Kreigsmarine ships because of the RAF).
The reason I made these comments is it appears Germany only gave priority to the u-boat arm latter in the war, i.e. 1942 era. To late by this point as America had already joined the war and the pace in construction of merchant tonnage increased considerably. Although its easy to say, had the Germans had sufficient numbers of u-boat early in the war things could have been different. However contradicting what I have just said i believe the German surface units played a major/important role in the Norway campaign. I agree with your statements about a balance fleet, always an important factor.

The allies believed (yet again correct me if I'm wrong) that because the u-boat's had been defeated during the First World War by the introduction of the convey system that this would happen again during any future war. very few people prior to the war saw the real danger of the u-boat's. A similar attitude to the German's who likewise might have failed to realize their true potential, despite their efforts during the First World War.

[RF]

Coming back to Togo, he knew the Russian weakness was that the Russians were on their way to Vladivostock, where they would be rested and replenished, and hence become a much more effective force. Togo had to attack before the Russians reached Vladivostok, and had the advantage of being between the Russian Fleet and Vladivostok.

With regards to U-boats the main difference concerning convoys between the two world wars was that in the second Donitz pioneered the use of co-ordinated mass attacks by subs, the so-called ''wolf pack'' tactics. In 1939 this was still an untried theory - the need for a very large force of U-boats only became apparent in 1940/41, by which time the British were already adopting countermeasures.

[dfrighini]

Coming back to Togo, he knew the Russian weakness was that the Russians were on their way to Vladivostock, where they would be rested and replenished, and hence become a much more effective force. Togo had to attack before the Russians reached Vladivostok, and had the advantage of being between the Russian Fleet and Vladivostok.

With regards to U-boats the main difference concerning convoys between the two world wars was that in the second Donitz pioneered the use of co-ordinated mass attacks by subs, the so-called ''wolf pack'' tactics. In 1939 this was still an untried theory - the need for a very large force of U-boats only became apparent in 1940/41, by which time the British were already adopting countermeasures.

Perhaps Deonitz was a little ahead of his time, great thinker are often not listened to. I believe he developed his still unproven theory as early as World War One when he was a u-boat commander or when confined to imprisonment after WW1.

[RF]

In WW1 Donitz was a watch officer in a U-boat in the Med. He got his idea of ''wolf pack'' from surface attacks on ships at night, realising that a concentration of ships in convoy could be destroyed by a concentration of attacking subs.

[dfrighini]

In WW1 Donitz was a watch officer in a U-boat in the Med. He got his idea of ''wolf pack'' from surface attacks on ships at night, realising that a concentration of ships in convoy could be destroyed by a concentration of attacking subs.

I thought he was a junior u-boat commander in the First World War and sunk one ship (UB-68) with his own boat in 1918 before he was captured. I presume you are talking about his time on U-39 beforehand. Thanks for the information. )))