Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Mon Jul 25, 2022 7:16 pm

Hello All,

First off, we must remember there was no "automatic plotting" in those days and those recording information probably would find it difficult to imagine their records being scrutinised so closely over a century later.

Looking at the Groos' diagram showing the British en echelon on a line of bearing on Lion's starboard quarter so each ship is leaving her smoke in between her next astern and the enemy, it is difficult to see how Lion can sheer out to starboard without crossing Princess Royal's bows. This plan shows the whole BCS turning c.30 degrees to starboard simultaneously some time significantly after 16:00. Groos' presence at the battle and the detail in his representation of British courses and formation may give an impression of accuracy which is not always valid. It would be interesting if McCartney had plotted the actual wreck sites against Groos' estimated locations as well as Harper's.

Harper only plots Lion's course and does not show the identified deviation. His post war contretemps with Beatty and allegations of plot manipulation are well known but in none of his writings does he identify anything amiss with Lion's course around 16:00. Obviously he didn't get hold of the Gunnery Log. Maybe not accounting for this significant deviation is why he retrospectively gets Indefatigable's position wrong, extrapolating backwards from a later Lion position.

Ascribing "motives" to unrecorded variations in courses:

while the BCF (Beatty) have plenty of reasons to not show the true states of his line.

Is a little contentious IMHO wmh829386. I have no doubt Paschen faithfully recorded what he saw and your excellent research of the Lion Gunnery Log independently confirms this. But he then goes on to make a meal out of it.

the fact is not mentioned in our opponent’s accounts and is only alluded to inaccurately as a turning away of the whole line

These are plainly allegations of some sort of deception without allowing that they may originate in simple errors. Chatfield's ship was under a hail of fire, and he and others may have been more interested in the potential magazine explosion brewing amidships, giving orders for damage control etc and let their attention drift from the course being maintained. Not mention Indefatigable blowing up. A 5 degree helm order when travelling at near 28 knots would be quite extreme, I suspect, but then I have no personal experience of battleship ship handling. The Naval Manual suggests 15 degrees gives the tightest tactical circle, but this and higher values create enormous drag.

Lion recorded a range cut of 23,000 yds,

Altogether, Lion had opened the range by three miles.

4.12.00, when Lion had once again brought Lutzow back on a R91 target bearing,

I suspect an increase of 6,000yds in 12 minutes from the enemy means a rate 500yds a minute (average)

We have already established the long range limitations of B & S rangefinders. This value may be hugely in error.

Paschen, having made his point about the enemy flagship being driven from line by Lutzow's fire, acknowledges Lion later resumed her position. He immediately after says:

The opponents worked with strong course changes and were difficult to see in the smoke. The range [ target Princess Royal] quickly changed from 151hm to 130 hm, then quickly out to 190 and then back to 150hm.

Staff Skagerrak p 60

So, as suspected from her gunnery log she was altering course too.

wmh829386 you say:

I do not understand how could she [Tiger] shoot that badly at such ranges. (Or how massively inaccurate her ranges are)

According to Campbell one of her turrets resumed shooting after being hit but was found later to be 19 degrees out of alignment with the director. The benefits of remote direction, spotting and range-finding depend on correlated and continued accurate alignment of these remotely located systems.
That range change of 1800 yds in two minutes shows some measurements were highly inaccurate.

All the best

wadinga

HMSVF · Post by **HMSVF** » Mon Jul 25, 2022 10:24 pm

These are plainly allegations of some sort of deception without allowing that they may originate in simple errors. Chatfield's ship was under a hail of fire, and he and others may have been more interested in the potential magazine explosion brewing amidships, giving orders for damage control etc and let their attention drift from the course being maintained. Not mention Indefatigable blowing up. A 5 degree helm order when travelling at near 28 knots would be quite extreme, I suspect, but then I have no personal experience of battleship ship handling. The Naval Manual suggests 15 degrees gives the tightest tactical circle, but this and higher values create enormous drag

Human factors (I know I have banged on about this before in the past!).

I personally think that its completely understandable that errors are present. You have individuals under very high pressures and stress, with information coming in left, right and centre. Professionalism and training can counter a lot of this but at the end of the day men are not computers nor automatons . If the individual ships of the BCF had "black boxes" or GPS then obviously things would be lot easier.

Innes Mccartney published a fantastic book on the archeology of Jutland which answered a fair few questions and provided information that either wasn't known or refuted what eye witness's claimed to have seen. The witness's I don't think for one minute were lying its just that they were suffering sensory overload at the time and their recollections were as such perception and interpretation. I certainly wont criticize Harper over his work ,I think he did an astonishing job in achieving what he did. That HMS Indefatigable wasn't where she was supposed to be ? Well... It took 105 years to work out the actual series of her loss. Prior to her discovery and survey we had a photograph and eyewitness testimony which to be honest was a little contradictory.

BW

HMSVF

wmh829386 · Post by **wmh829386** » Wed Jul 27, 2022 2:57 am

wadinga wrote: ↑Mon Jul 25, 2022 7:16 pm Hello All,

Ascribing "motives" to unrecorded variations in courses:

while the BCF (Beatty) have plenty of reasons to not show the true states of his line.
Is a little contentious IMHO wmh829386. I have no doubt Paschen faithfully recorded what he saw and your excellent research of the Lion Gunnery Log independently confirms this. But he then goes on to make a meal out of it.

the fact is not mentioned in our opponent’s accounts and is only alluded to inaccurately as a turning away of the whole line

These are plainly allegations of some sort of deception without allowing that they may originate in simple errors. Chatfield's ship was under a hail of fire, and he and others may have been more interested in the potential magazine explosion brewing amidships, giving orders for damage control etc and let their attention drift from the course being maintained. Not mention Indefatigable blowing up. A 5 degree helm order when travelling at near 28 knots would be quite extreme, I suspect, but then I have no personal experience of battleship ship handling. The Naval Manual suggests 15 degrees gives the tightest tactical circle, but this and higher values create enormous drag.

I doubt the Navigator failed to plot a 30 degree course change. Remember that they were relying on these plot for dead-reckoning. However, I understand that, depending on the intervals of the Navigator's course plot, he may just take an estimate of the average course. What I am trying to say is not that the plots were manipulated but that no one from the BCF questions Beatty's handling of his line despite some obvious failings.

BCF was manoeuvring without signal. Hence Lion's swing to starboard were followed by various degree by the rest of the line. The problem is really not about the swing to starboard by Lion, rather it is the state of BCF's line.

1. Princess Royal and New Zealand were both unable to reach the port quarter of the ship Infront required by the line of bearing order.

2. The line of bearing order and the fact that BCF have drawn ahead of the 1SG means that the rear of the BCF's line were much closer to the 1SG compared to the range between Lion and Lutzow.

3. It is under this context, Lion swings to the Starboard. It was an opportunity to reform BCF's line, slow to close the distance with 5BS or simply hold the engagement at longer range after Indefatigable blew up.
However Lion turned to port to "regain her position" which lead the line to close the range at a ragged state again. Because it's all done without signal, it is difficult to know Beatty's or Chatfield's intention.

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Wed Jul 27, 2022 5:12 am

wmh829386 wrote: ↑Mon Jul 25, 2022 5:16 am My impression is that Beatty's line were far more ragged than most plot would suggest. (It will be difficult for the Germans to plot the British accurately while the BCF (Beatty) have plenty of reasons to not show the true states of his line.

>>>>> I had just about completed a lengthy response to this very email of yours last night, was called away for a moment and returned to find that my cat had deleted it. Color me extremely annoyed ....

- - -

Lion almost certainly swing to starboard at 4:00, which were clearly shown on her gunnery records. The resulting loss of speed and position certainly took some time to recover.

>>>>> Yes, it was a long time before Lion recovered and here is what bothers me about the episode. Lion recorded four course alterations to starboard prior to 4.00: the first at 3.49; the second at 3.50.5; a third at 3.52.5; a fourth at 3.55. Based upon alteration in target bearing (a rough measure to be sure), Lion appears to have been slowly altering course away to starboard at a rate of slightly less than one point per minute (a very leisurely turn rate by any measure) between 3.49 and 3.56. Thereafter, from 3:56 until 4:00, she had steadied on a heading of 114deg.

Lion was IMO hit upon "Q" turret between 3:59-4:00. Lion's gunnery log records a fifth course alteration to starboard ordered at 4:00. Chatfield writes ("Navy and Defence") that this course change was intended to be another minor 5deg alteration away to starboard. Let's accept that and also that the helm order was indeed simply misunderstood. Let's further accept that this 5deg of helm turn apparently turned Lion about 30deg between 4:00 and 4:02 before correction.

At this point, however, I am trying to understand why Lion, after the 4:00 hit on "Q" turret (at 16,500 yds range) continued to open the range by three miles over the next 12 minutes to an estimated 23,000 yds - well beyond any ship's engagement range) before finally rounding to. My operating theory is that this radical opening of the range was the result of Lion having been hit by Lutzow a further three times in rapid succession between 4:01 and 4:03 after the hit on "Q" turret.

- - -

Princess Royal almost certainly did not form the line of bearing that could completely clear the smoke from Lion, furthermore, the smoke interference got worse after Lion's swing to starboard, which means that she was sailing behind Lion's smoke until that time.

From her gunnery records she must have partly followed Lion's turn, as her gunnery record from the official despatch reads "Red 130" at 4:01:20 compared to "Red 115" at 3:55:5.

>>>>> See what Campbell had to say re the positional relationship between Princess Royal and Lion immediately after the run away ("Jutland", p.42)

- - -

I have not much information about Queen Mary, but she was certainly closer to the 1SG and seems to have less smoke interference.

>>>>> I have only fragmentary material from Gary Staff's book re Queen Mary in the early part of the action (around 4:00) - that she was engaged with Seydlitz for a short time at about 14,500-15,000 yds.

- - -

Tiger's record show a gun range of 10,500 yards at 4.00.1/2
I can only interpret that as a combination of poor gunnery AND the line of bearing putting the rear of Beatty's line close to 1SG.
I do not understand how could she shoot that badly at such ranges. (Or how massively inaccurate her ranges are)

>>>>> Do not think too poorly of Tiger. She was only able to open fire at 3:51, with only her "A" and "B" turrets at first able to bear; she was hindered by bad smoke interference from destroyers of 9th Flotilla steaming abreast of her 1,000 yards on her engaged side. Furthermore, she was hit by Moltke an estimated nine times between 3:47 and 4:00, with both "Q" and "X" turrets temporarily disabled at 3:54. A tough day at work for Tiger.

- - -

New Zealand seems to be on the Starboard quarter (wrong side for the line of bearing) from Tiger. Her range at 4:00 is 12,500 yds. It decrease to 10,800 yds at 4.02. Perhaps she is trying get to the correct line of bearing by taking advantage of the starboard turn triggered by Lion. Again much of the thing said about Tiger's gunner can apply on her, however she is an older ship without director and poor RF and control positions.

Little can be know about indefatigable, but according to Brooks, Von der Tann recorded a minimum range of 13,450 yds around 4.02 which mean she is either agin on the wrong side for the line of bearing too, or that New Zealand is shooting massively short.

The "line" Beatty is anything but straight at that point.

>>>>> It's late. I'll catch up on New Zealand and Indefatigable tomorrow. As mentioned, I have the translated account of the sinking of Indefatigable written by Von De Tann's gunnery officer Cdr Mahrholz - very informative.

B

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Wed Jul 27, 2022 1:12 pm

Hi wmh829386 ,

I see you are prepared to acknowledge that if the 30 degree course change were of short enough duration it might not be recorded on the plot,

I doubt the Navigator failed to plot a 30 degree course change. Remember that they were relying on these plot for dead-reckoning. However, I understand that, depending on the intervals of the Navigator's course plot, he may just take an estimate of the average course.

As HMSVF has pointed out there are human factors at work here. The excitement and fear causing sensory blocking of some information as distractions and then reaction setting in. Quoting Lieut William Chalmers on Lion's bridge (Jutland Death in the Grey Wastes):

On the bridge we were blissfully ignorant of the fact that two large shells had landed in the ship........ we heard the ominous hum of a shell fragment and caught a glimpse of polished steel as it flashed past the bridge. One of these went clean through the plotting room and dislodged the clock.

As for the state of Beatty's line, well the series of turns to starboard were to bring the enemy from close on the port bow to somewhere on the port side opening a arcs. I have already mentioned the strange order using a true bearing to spread the BCF en echelon before the turns to starboard. This would unfortunately mean Lion and the faster ships slowing down to let the trailing ships on the outside of the turns maintain enough surplus speed to steam a greater circumference and yet maintain relative position. But the True bearing would become obsolete at the first base course turn to starboard.

Beatty had already gained some ground to the south after first contact because Hipper unaccountably continued northward for some minutes instead of immediately heading for the trap with Scheer. Beatty kept his speed up because he did not want 1st AG to escape again (like Dogger Bank) and extending his lead to the south would eventually allow him to chop across, cut Hipper off from his base and nail him against the left pincer of the 5th BS. Beatty obviously believed the erroneous appreciation that the HSF was still in port.

Princess Royal and New Zealand were both unable to reach the port quarter of the ship Infront required by the line of bearing order.

Groos, should also have suffered Paschen's indignation for not not showing Lion making a detour, only the remaining ships jinking to starboard sometime later after Indefatigable's demise. I am very skeptical about Groos' neat depiction of the BCF en echelon on Lion's starboard quarter. Campbell reproduces it without comment. In a fast moving battle conforming with the leading ship's movements is far more practical than rigid control through flag signals. I am sure you are correct about the formation being ragged, but this gives individual commanders some freedom of action.

Hi Byron,

continued to open the range by three miles over the next 12 minutes to an estimated 23,000 yds

Aside from some rangefinder cuts operating at well beyond their limits (early estimates were also a mile or more in excess of reality) is there any independent evidence of this major deviation?

This, I think contradicts this assertion. Commander Alan McKenzie-Grieve in HMS Birmingham on Lion's starboard bow (Grey Wastes):

The enemy's shooting at the Lion became extremely accurate and she sheered a little to starboard , the effect of fall of shot being very noticeable. Just as she came back again she was very heavily hit and I saw a large plate, which I took to be the top of a turret, blown into the air.

My emphasis

If the flagship had really reeled out of line for three miles to the west, I think he would have noticed it. He was close enough to see "boltholes" through his binoculars, although he was prone to exaggeration as he says the plate went "400 to 500ft" into the air. The roof plate landed on the deck close to the turret.

He goes on:

It seemed to have no effect on the ship, except that her midship turret was out of action.

It was undoubtedly a blunder to have the L class destroyers struggling around the outside of the big turn to starboard, but we must remember everybody was paranoid, on both sides, about submarines. Some undersea menace, crawling at a mere 5-6 knots on battery, might be so incredibly lucky enough to be in the right position to get a shot at the big ships as they thundered past at 26+ knots, especially since they could accidentally be targeting their own in the chaos glimpsed through the periscope, should have been a discounted threat. But we only know this in retrospect. Beatty makes mention of HMS Lydiard and HMS Landrail in his despatch as "preserving the battlecruisers from submarine attack" after they "saw" a periscope. Is that really just a retrospective excuse for a tactical blunder?

All the best

wadinga

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Wed Jul 27, 2022 8:48 pm

wm wrote -

New Zealand seems to be on the Starboard quarter (wrong side for the line of bearing) from Tiger. Her range at 4:00 is 12,500 yds. It decrease to 10,800 yds at 4.02. Perhaps she is trying get to the correct line of bearing by taking advantage of the starboard turn triggered by Lion. Again much of the thing said about Tiger's gunner can apply on her, however she is an older ship without director and poor RF and control positions.

Little can be know about indefatigable, but according to Brooks, Von der Tann recorded a minimum range of 13,450 yds around 4.02 which mean she is either agin on the wrong side for the line of bearing too, or that New Zealand is shooting massively short.

>>>>> Catching up on New Zealand and Indefatigable, as promised -

Mahrholz Account (Von der Tann) at Battle of Jutland

In the afternoon of the 31st of May 1916, I handed over the watch at 4 in the afternoon ["8 Glas" is a german expression for 8 half hours, so I assume 4 hours in the afternoon are meant]. Nothing had happened during our advance, so I couldn't report anything about the enemy. Our armored cruisers were following the small cruisers of the 2nd recon division, which were grouped in a half-circle. To port, only smoke was visible from "Elbing" and "Pillau". "Frankfurt", "Wiesbaden", and "Regensburg" were just in sight ahead and to starboard. Five airships were ordered for recon in the sectors N to W, and, since they took off at 12:30, were still behind us. The weather was quiet, but hazy, in particular towards the N and the E. I went to my cabin for a short rest, and picked up a book. As soon as I started to read, the order for combat-readiness clang through the ship. In a jiffy I was on the bridge - also because the cabins in "von der Tann" were located in the forecastle. The first alarm signals from the combat posts were arriving the fire control station. I checked the telephone, and contacted the watch [???. "E.Uhr"??], the auxiliary outlook, and the 3rd artillery officer in the aft fire control station. Also, I had to have the impact (fall of shot)watches ["Aufschlagsmeldeuhren"???] checked. Then I inquired about the situation, but little I got to know. The small cruisers reported visual contact with light enemy forces, but from previous experiences it could be expected that battlecruisers were following. With full speed, the armored cruisers steamed to the reported position, and soon we could see our light forces engaging the still hidden enemy. The enemies’ muzzle fire and their shell splashes were visible. The picture cleared further: Besides the fighting cruisers, 6 smoke clouds appeared in south-westerly direction and obviously, were approaching quickly. From the top, they were identified as battle cruisers. We realized that we were not dealing with small cruisers anymore, but with an opponent who is on par. It dawned upon some of us, that this is the beginning of a battle, but nobody was expecting the entire English fleet. But this time was different, as our whole fleet was following in only 50 sm distance. This created a unifying feeling of strength and power, and everybody on board looked forward to the clash with great excitement. Suspense mounted, as many eyes looked through binoculars and periscopes for details. Soon we could identify the ships even from the lower levels as battlecruisers, and that they were approaching us in two columns. We were on a NW course, and the English admiral steered towards the South to cut off our line of retreat. Admiral Hipper followed this movement, as the opportunity arose to draw the enemy to our closing main force in the south. So for now we and our opponents sailed on diverging courses, and we spotted another squadron in the distance. As it turned out later, this was the 5th battle squadron, comprising four ships of the most powerful “Queen Elizabeth” battle ship class with an armament of 38 cm. The enemy outweighed our forces by a factor of larger than two, but nonetheless everybody on board was dying to get closer. An immense tension was in the air and within everybody, aching for relief, and the delay for opening fire even increased that tension. I already had instructed the post at the [Richtungsweisersehrohr], and aimed my battery at the enemy. With 15-fold magnification, my oculars allowed me to clearly identify the ships. “Spread fire from left”, the signal petty officer shouted through the observation slit, while I slowly counted down the enemies’ line. Our five ships opposed six ships, and thus, according to regulations, we as the tailing ship had to engage the last two ships of the enemy. Since the secondary artillery was still out of range, I had to consider splitting my main artillery, two turrets fore, two aft. But this would mean two splashes with each salvo only, which I wanted to avoid. So I decided to keep my battery together and annihilate one ship after the other, and with grim determination I was getting prepared. But still there was time to watch the enemy through the oculars. Like prehistoric behemoths, these mighty ships plowed slowly through the water. Clearly I could follow the motions on the ships – the hoisting of the signals and the according turns and movements of the heavy turrets, the lifting of the barrels. We knew this threatening sight from excersies, only this time the gun muzzle would not be as harmless.

We constantly took ranges, and the officer in charge reported with glee that the different instruments aligned within 100 meters of deviation only. Although I thought that this would benefit the initial salvos, I still advised an 8 hm spread because at these large distances the [tageseinfluss]
Byron comment - I believe that “tageseinfluss” = meteorological conditions of the day, i.e., barometric pressure and wind conditions in that upper part of the atmosphere through which the ballistic trajectory must pass but which could not be measured from the surface.

may not be neglected. The [a.u.] was sent to the [aussatztelegraphen], the [seitenverschiebung] was calculated with great calm, and orders were given to the artillery. At any time we were ready to open fire, and we all had the impression to participate in a practice shooting. Our long and steady approach, without any turns, facilitated all calculations and estimations. A multitude of measured distances provided a reliable initial range, and commands were delivered in a calm and clear manner. The entire approach was pure joy to the artillerist. The guns were loaded with armor piercing shells, and not too friendly greetings to the British were engraved with chalk. Then, at a range of 162 hm, the eagerly awaited order ["f.d.], open fire!" was given. Instantaneously, the first salvo thundered towards the enemy. Also on the other side, we could see their muzzle fire, and yellowish to brownish smoke clouds building up above their ships. I looked very sharply, so not to miss our splashes nor any movement of the enemy. Although I did not know at that time, our first target of which only the type could be identified, was the battle cruiser "Indefatigable". The centre of our sixteenth - division was exactly at its mid funnel. Like in the shooting exercise, I focused on the fore part of the opponent because it is the bow and the bridge where course changes manifest themselves earliest. Also, the target may get in-between the splashes from laterally missing projectiles and thus may a [Längenbeobachtung] is possible. This is why the bow should always be in the focus of the artillery officer. Simultaneously with the ringing of the [Aufschlagsmeldeuhren], four giant water columns arose. The [Schieber] was chosen correctly, the range of splashes at the aft superstructure was impeccable. “8 back, 4 more left, one salvo!” was my first correction. During the time of flight, the [“A.U”] made a measure which coincided exactly with the value from the observation. With such an accurate measure I was expecting a bracket [Gabel? = Fork]. And indeed, again four water columns arose, which for a short time concealed the central part of the target. All four could be clearly traced down to the water surface, so they were short. “4 increase [vor?], one salvo”, and again after a short time of flight, a salvo reached the enemy. Two were short, one was over, and the fourth was not seen. Possibly it was a hit since the reporter on duty assured me that the salvo comprised four shots. I hesitated to record a hit since the effect of armor piercing shells can only be seen when the destruction is large enough to propagate from the inside towards the outside. Instead, I strictly kept to clearly observable hits, even though the young officer on the top mars noted down hits. “Straddled, good fast” was the order after the splashes, and now we shot salvos at short intervals. We also took salvos [in die Luft?].
Byron comment - “in die Luft”, under the prevailing order for rapid fire, a salvo was being fired before its immediate predecessor had landed.

The opponent fired back at a slower rate, and clearly we identified their muzzle fires. Whoever was not occupied at that moment, was able to track their fall of shot according to the clock. But the enemy’s shooting was poor due to his slow rate of salvos. Possibly he was hampered by lower visibility – at these hazy weather conditions our light paint paid off.

Byron comment - Mahrholz is here (IMO) speculating that the apparent slow salvo rate of Indefatigable was possibly a consequence of difficult visibility. It is also possible that the rapid and accurate fire of von Der Tann during this period was interfering with Indefatigable’s spotting. Another possibility, circumstantially suggested by surviving gunnery logs of the BCF battle-cruisers is that the BCF ships were ranging by double-salvoes, which could also have created the impression of a slow rate of fire. Be that as it may, Mahrholz’s description of New Zealand’s (Indefatigable’s next astern) fire does not mention bad visibility affecting her fire..

According to the observation of the light cruisers, the enemy’s shots were all significantly over, such that at times the vessels behind us were endangered. A confusion of our hits with the enemy’s muzzle fire could be ruled out since the latter was followed by yellowish to brownish smoke. In contrast, our hits were characterized by a bright glow only in case the armored piercing shells did not penetrate into the target before exploding.

By now the shooting from “von der Tann” was very effective, and from time to time the enemy was completely hidden behind the splashes. “Indefatigable” seemed to cease fire and tried to get out of the firing line by zigzagging, but our good optics could detect any of its movements immediately. When the enemy veered off, I increased the range by 1 hm, and decreased accordingly when he veered in. I moved the [Schieber] slightly towards the direction of the enemy’s bow moves. During the flight of the salvo the new calibration for the [Anzeiger] was ordered, and immediately I got reported the [Gang] and [Schieber] for the new location of the enemy. At most times the [Schieber] coincided with the [freihändig abgegriffen - manually determined??] value, and since the position constantly changed [Standortänderung??] we did not drag on the [Gang]. The artillery communication officer worked splendidly, the [Aufsatztelegraph] had the correct new [E.U.] after each turn of the enemy. There was no way out, our battery stayed in the target and the quick succession of salvos was barely interrupted. I got impatient and ordered a personal command which I developed during exercises, and which was not written in any gunnery instruction: “Faster!” This implied for the man at the E.-watch to go for the maximum possible fire rate without awaiting the gun signal for readiness, and the salvos went out in an incredible rush. The deadly blow struck the enemy 14 minutes after opening fire. I looked through the bearing glass [Richtungsweisersehrohr] and saw the arrival of a salvo, followed by a gigantic explosion in the aft turret. A bright sheet of flame shot out of the turret roof and expanded along the entire aft section. Debris whirled through the air, possibly fragments of the turret’s roof. The next salvo hit the ship forward, and finished it off. A monstrous black cloud of smoke rose into the air to twice the height of the top mast and masked the enemy completely - apparently we have hit an oil tank. We shot another salvo into the cloud, but most likely it missed since our opponent has already slipped below the waves. The observing officer ensured me that the enemy has been sunk, but I still was skeptical since I knew how easily one can be mistaken at these distances, and how tempting it is to visualize one’s wish. Only after the smoke was gone, was I also convinced of the sinking and reported accordingly to the captain. Down in our ship, the message of our enemies’ defeat spread quickly and I heard many ‘Hooray’s’ in the headphones.

The action against “Indefatigable” was executed like a practice shooting, and “von der Tann” was not hit even once. The ensuing battle with “New Zealand” was much more challenging and showed the great advantage of making the first hits in an artillery duel. Unhindered by German fire, “New Zealand” was able to get the range and bearing on “von der Tann”, and it is astounding that we were not hit earlier by her. Almost 6 minutes after the destruction of “Indefatigable”, the first shell hit “von der Tann” and penetrated the armored belt below water line close to section 1. The shell exploded during the impact and threw chunks of armor inside. This powerful blow at the ship’s end made the hull vibrate like a tuning fork, 5 to 6 times the ship’s end’s swayed back and forth, and the bending of the ship damaged the radio wires between the masts. We also got some minor flooding, but the fight continued. Visibility degraded, the initially clear horizon got hazy, and the range opened.

Byron comment - Mahrholz is here (IMO) at first referring to the period during which Von der Tann was engaging Indefatigable and New Zealand was ranging upon Von der Tann while not under fire by any German ships

speculating that the apparent slow salvo rate of Indefatigable was possibly a consequence of difficult visibility. It is also possible that the rapid and accurate fire of von Der Tann during this period was interfering with Indefatigable’s spotting. Another possibility, circumstantially suggested by surviving gunnery logs of the BCF battle-cruisers is that the BCF ships were ranging by double-salvoes, which could also have created the impression of a slow rate of fire. Be that as it may, Mahrholz’s description of New Zealand’s (Indefatigable’s next astern) fire does not mention bad visibility affecting her fire.

I'm still hunting for some additional material regarding New Zealand, but I think it is a paper document buried in my files rather than a file on my HDD.

Byron

wmh829386 · Post by **wmh829386** » Fri Jul 29, 2022 5:45 am

Thanks Bryon for the excellent resources. It will take some time for me to digest.

However one thing is clear, Mahrholz was able to observe to course change of indefatigable, make new estimate of range rate (E.U.), and then have the range finder readings to confirm it. He had such confidence with the range as to order rapid independent fire.

It seems that he did not realise the 5BS have started shooting at Von der Tann soon after he switched to New Zealand.

Hi Wadinga

In a fast moving battle conforming with the leading ship's movements is far more practical than rigid control through flag signals. I am sure you are correct about the formation being ragged, but this gives individual commanders some freedom of action.

You are missing the point. The issue is how the line was led. By pushing down to under 15,000 yds from Lutzow, he offered two bad choices for the Captains behind him.
1. Stay at the engaged quarter of ship Infront to clear their smoke, but get unnecessarily close (and more often than not in a gunnery disadvantage)
2. Stay at the disengaged quarter and suffer smoke interference, but staying at longer range and be a more difficult target.

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Fri Jul 29, 2022 10:36 pm

[

wadinga wrote: ↑Wed Jul 27, 2022 1:12 pm As HMSVF has pointed out there are human factors at work here. The excitement and fear causing sensory blocking of some information as distractions and then reaction setting in. Quoting Lieut William Chalmers on Lion's bridge (Jutland Death in the Grey Wastes):

On the bridge we were blissfully ignorant of the fact that two large shells had landed in the ship........ we heard the ominous hum of a shell fragment and caught a glimpse of polished steel as it flashed past the bridge. One of these went clean through the plotting room and dislodged the clock.

>>>>> In Chalmers’ own book “The Life and Letters of David Beatty – Admiral of the Fleet” (p.231), he repeated the very same passage – “On the bridge, we were blissfully ignorant of the fact that two large shells had exploded in the ship; the rush of wind and other noises caused by the high speed at which we were travelling, together with the roar of our own guns as they fired, four at a time, completely drowned the noise of bursting shell”.

That said, the two earliest hits upon Lion were not of great consequence:

Hit 1 (3:51 hrs) – Passed through 1in side plating between forecastle and upper decks near the fore funnel, caromed off the upper deck and ultimately passed overboard on the lee side without exploding.

Hit 2 (3:52 hrs) – Struck the base of the middle funnel, passing through the funnel casing and exploding on the forecastle deck. A fire was started and B and D boiler rooms were filled with smoke and fumes.

Hit 3 (4:00 hrs) upon “Q” turret was a different matter altogether. Although the hit was not heard it was personally reported to the bridge by a surviving marine sergeant from “Q” turret. When so notified, Chalmers was able to view the remains of “Q” turret from the bridge wing. Chalmers was also aware that Liion was under heavy and accurate fire from the numerous close salvo splashes surrounding the ship. It is quite reasonable to suppose that damage of any real consequence to the ship were promptly reported as a matter of regular procedure.

- - -

As for the state of Beatty's line, well the series of turns to starboard were to bring the enemy from close on the port bow to somewhere on the port side opening A arcs.
>>>>> Clearing of A arcs was indeed the initial motivation, because more of the British ships than just Lion were obliged to open fire with forward turrets due to the acute target angle produced by Beatty’s headlong rush to engage. However, after having cleared her own A arcs, Lion immediately found herself under heavy and accurate fire and, according to Chatfield’s report, further turns to starboard were executed to open the range. Lion’s gunnery report shows a total of four such course alterations (3:49, 3:50.5, 3:52.5 and 3:55) ordered prior to the miscarried fifth consecutive starboard course alteration at 4:00. No course alteration back to port was ordered until 4:09.

- - -

I have already mentioned the strange order using a true bearing to spread the BCF en echelon before the turns to starboard. This would unfortunately mean Lion and the faster ships slowing down to let the trailing ships on the outside of the turns maintain enough surplus speed to steam a greater circumference and yet maintain relative position. But the True bearing would become obsolete at the first base course turn to starboard.
Some comments here –

> Use of compass (true) bearings relative to the flagship was a common means of ordering formation of a line-of-bearing formation. This was important when dealing with smoke interference due to a breeze from a particular point of the compass. So long as any course alteration was conducted as a simultaneous turn together, the participating ships could maintain their relative positions without alterations in formation speed or eccentric courses.

> Beatty ordered the BCF to take up a NE line-of-bearing formation at 3:46. But, if Lion’s signal record is to be trusted, he appears not to have slowed to permit his ships to complete their deployment.
Note –
3:34 – SO BCF > 2nd BCS: “Prolong the line by taking station astern.”
3:35 – SO BCF > General : “Admiral intends to proceed at 24 knots.”
3:36 – SO BCF > SOs of Squadrons: “Present course and speed: E 25 knots.”
3:45 – SO BCF > Battlecruisers: “Form on a line of bearing NW.”
There is no evidence that Lion reduced speed. Had there been any intent to do so, it would (IMO) have been signaled. As it was, the gunnery action commenced only two minutes after the line-of-bearing signal was made and the deployment was never fully completed. Reading through the early BCF signal traffic, I come away with a distinct sense of disorder and haste.

- - -

Beatty had already gained some ground to the south after first contact because Hipper unaccountably continued northward for some minutes instead of immediately heading for the trap with Scheer.
There is nothing unaccountable here. Hipper continued northward for a short period to cover the withdrawal of 2SGwhich at the time was well ahead of 1SG to the NW. When 2SG safely rejoined, Hipper reversed course and proceeded to the SE at a very modest 18-21 knots. He knew Scheer was coming up from the SE, sp the distance gained to the south by the BCF was more or less moot.

- - -

Beatty kept his speed up because he did not want 1st AG to escape again (like Dogger Bank) and extending his lead to the south would eventually allow him to chop across, cut Hipper off from his base and nail him against the left pincer of the 5th BS. Beatty obviously believed the erroneous appreciation that the HSF was still in port.
I must say that I view this a bit differently. At Dogger Bank, Beatty let his “fox and hounds” personality get the better of him, separated himself from his supports by driving ahead at 28 knots and, functionally isolated Lion versus a local German superiority, getting Lion badly shot up in the process.
At Jutland, he displayed that he had at least learned the value of keeping his ships well together, under control and more or less mutually supporting. But he had still not mastered the finer art of tactically maneuvering multiple sub-commands.

- - -

Aside from some rangefinder cuts operating at well beyond their limits (early estimates were also a mile or more in excess of reality) is there any independent evidence of this major deviation?
Leaving aside the estimated range of 23,000 yds recorded at 4:12, the 4:12.5 gunnery log notation – “Enemy had not fired for some minutes” – was a clear suggestion that Lion’s retreat had either run it beyond German gun range or German vision. The German 30.5cm L50 @ 13.5deg Jutland elevation could range to 20,450 yards

- - -

This, I think contradicts this assertion. Commander Alan McKenzie-Grieve in HMS Birmingham on Lion's starboard bow (Grey Wastes):
The enemy's shooting at the Lion became extremely accurate and she sheered a little to starboard , the effect of fall of shot being very noticeable. Just as she came back again she was very heavily hit and I saw a large plate, which I took to be the top of a turret, blown into the air.
My emphasis.

If the flagship had really reeled out of line for three miles to the west, I think he would have noticed it. He was close enough to see "boltholes" through his binoculars, although he was prone to exaggeration as he says the plate went "400 to 500ft" into the air. The roof plate landed on the deck close to the turret.

He goes on:
It seemed to have no effect on the ship, except that her midship turret was out of action.
Commander McKenzie-Grieve’s account almost without question alludes to the 4:00 hit upon Lion’s “Q” turret, which was also the time of Lion’s last course alteration to starboard. The 23,000 yard range estimate was timed at 4:12 in Lion’s gunnery record.

- - -

It was undoubtedly a blunder to have the L class destroyers struggling around the outside of the big turn to starboard, but we must remember everybody was paranoid, on both sides, about submarines. Some undersea menace, crawling at a mere 5-6 knots on battery, might be so incredibly lucky enough to be in the right position to get a shot at the big ships as they thundered past at 26+ knots, especially since they could accidentally be targeting their own in the chaos glimpsed through the periscope, should have been a discounted threat. But we only know this in retrospect. Beatty makes mention of HMS Lydiard and HMS Landrail in his despatch as "preserving the battlecruisers from submarine attack" after they "saw" a periscope. Is that really just a retrospective excuse for a tactical blunder?
Beatty’s report of the Battle of Jutland is IMO an artful exercise in self-exculpatory dissimulation. Nowhere is this more evident than in his account of 9th Flotilla’s activities in the Run to the South.

Lydiard, Liberty Landrail and Laurel were all “L” Class destroyers of 9th Flotilla loaned to the BCF from Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force. 9th Flotilla served as the anti-submarine screen for 2BCS during the cruise from Rosyth to Jutland. When the BCF deployed, 2BCS instructed 9th Flotilla to take position abreast New Zealand in column at 1,000 yards on her engaged side. Shortly thereafter, 9th Flotilla was signaled by SO BCF to take station ahead of Lion. These “L” Class DDs were barely capable of 29 knots and several of them spent most of the Run to the South struggling down the engaged side of the BCF fouling the ranges of the battlecruisers with clouds of funnel smoke as they crept by. See the report of HMS Lydiard in the Jutland Despatches for full details and positional diagrams.

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Mon Aug 01, 2022 12:52 pm

Hi All,
Thanks to Byron for the extensive Mahrholz account.

My point in referencing Chalmers' account was to highlight that the plotting room was penetrated by shell splinters, so accurate recording of Lion's course might have been disrupted.

Chatfield is quoted in Grey Wastes as saying he was informed by bridge personnel (not Chalmers) of the Q turret hit and was giving orders for magazine flooding even before the Marine Sergeant arrived.

If Beatty was altering to maintain or increase range is that a criticism? Hipper did much the same at times.

I perhaps expressed myself badly by describing the line of bearing as NE true, when I should have said absolute. The direction is only valid for the course you are on at that moment. The wind was a light breeze only 4-6 knots. In a sailing ship battle with the ships moving at about that speed too, keeping clear of the smoke clouds was difficult. As we know from the Denmark Straits film, when travelling at 28 knots funnel and gunsmoke are quickly left astern. Beatty was quite possibly failing to adopt a formation which would keep the "next astern" clear of his smoke. He had failings.

There is nothing unaccountable here.

Well I don't think I'm alone in thinking so. According to Staff (Skagerrak) the Krieg zur See official history found it perplexing as well.

Only this remained certain: the newly sighted force [1st & 2nd BCS], including six Dreadnoughts, steered north, and it was decided to choose this as a combat course. Indeed a battle on a northern course , away from the German main body, in no way agreed with the German operational plan, but, nevertheless Admiral Hipper determined to use this direction for battle. This course would also bring him closer to the 2nd AG.........

Even the ingenious excuse "closer to the the 2nd SG" is clearly an afterthought as Groos chart shows the 2nd SG turning SE only at the same time as Hipper. If he wanted them gathered up safely under his protection he should have ordered them to turn immediately towards him when the enemy were identified, whilst he continued NW. Once steadied on a SE course he had to slow to 18 knots to allow 2nd AG a chance to catch up precisely because he had not turned them early and closed on them. Beatty is not the only commander at Jutland capable of an "artful exercise in self-exculpatory dissimulation".

Beatty did indeed initially charge headlong at the enemy, but having been evaded after the Scarborough raid, had his force distracted by the Lizard's discarded tail at Dogger Bank, and been too far north to get at him after the assault on Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth after months of newspaper criticism he was perhaps excessively over-motivated. As for "functionally isolated" at Dogger Bank HMS Princess Royal and HMS Tiger surely kept up well enough, but German fire was concentrated on the leading ship, whether it was close to others or not. Perhaps he should have sent somebody else ahead as a shell-sponge but that was hardly his style.

was a clear suggestion that Lion’s retreat had either run it beyond German gun range or German vision.

I'm not sure the former was physically possible in the short period of time available and apparently unnoticed, (well unremarked) by the British cruisers to starboard. Vision wise, quite possibly. The British were further south than the Germans, firing over their port quarter and a temporary period of 30 degrees to starboard, end-on to the Geramns, would as noted make X turret the only weapon bearing and leave smoke astern fouling the range. So Paschen switched to a target he could see, HMS Princess Royal.

Staff reports the shortest range Mahrholtz fired at HMS Indefatigable was 123hm or 13,450 yds.

All the best

wadinga

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Tue Aug 02, 2022 5:05 am

wadinga wrote: ↑Mon Aug 01, 2022 12:52 pm My point in referencing Chalmers' account was to highlight that the plotting room was penetrated by shell splinters, so accurate recording of Lion's course might have been disrupted.

Chatfield is quoted in Grey Wastes as saying he was informed by bridge personnel (not Chalmers) of the Q turret hit and was giving orders for magazine flooding even before the Marine Sergeant arrived.

>>>>> I'm quoting from Chalmers' biography of Beatty, "The Life and Letters of David Beatty - Admiral of the Fleet" (p.230-231) -
"An impression of this stage of the battle from the British point of view can be obtained from the narrative of an eyewitness (footnote 3) on the Lion's bridge, written a few days after the battle:

By four o'clock the range had come down to 14,000 yards, and we were at close grips with the enemy. His fire was phenomenally accurate, and we were being hit frequently.
<snip>
At about this time a bloodstained sergeant of Marines appeared on the Admiral's bridge. He was hatless, his clothes were burnt, and he seemed to be somewhat dazed: on seeing me he approached and asked if I were the captain. While directing him to the compass platform above my head, curiosity got the better of me, and I asked him what was the matter: in a tired voice he replied, "Q turret has gone, sir. All the crew are killed, and we have flooded the magazines.
I looked over the bridge. No further confirmation was necessary: the armoured roof of Q turret had been folded back like an opened sardine tin, thick yellow smoke was rolling up in clouds from the gaping hole, and the guns were cocked up in the air awkwardly. It was evident that Q turret would take no further part in the battle. Strange that all this should have happened within a few yards of where Beatty was standing, and that none of us on the bridge should have heard the detonation.

The afore-mentioned footnote number 3 indicates said eyewitness to have been "The biographer", which I interpret as being Chalmers himself. I see no reason why both Chalmers and Chatfield were not both informed by the Marine. The Sergeant of Marines who encountered Chalmers was seeking "the captain", which would in fact have been Chatfield and Chalmers indicates that he did in fact direct the Marine to find the captain on the compass platform above.

- - - - -

If Beatty was altering to maintain or increase range is that a criticism? Hipper did much the same at times.

>>>>> I have criticized Beatty of several points, but do not recall having taken him to task for opening the range. The first course alteration (3:49) was an absolute necessity in order for his ships to open A arcs. The next four alterations away to starboard (3:50.5, 3:52.5, 3:55 and 4:00) IMO can be understood from the perspective that the BCF was taking heavy and disproportionate damage from 1SG. Campbell ("Jutland". p.41), not counting any hits suffered by the two lost battle cruisers (Indefatigable and Queen Mary) estimates that the BCF suffered 15 hits between 3:47 and 4:00 versus four inflicted upon 1SG. Firepower-wise, the immediate consequences for the BCF were three 13.5-inch turrets knocked out or disabled and the main FC of Princess Royal disabled; by comparison, 1SG had suffered one turret knocked out. By 1603/03 (once again according to Campbell), Indefatigable had blown up.

- - - - -

There is nothing unaccountable here. Well I don't think I'm alone in thinking so. According to Staff (Skagerrak) the Krieg zur See official history found it perplexing as well: Only this remained certain: the newly sighted force [1st & 2nd BCS], including six Dreadnoughts, steered north, and it was decided to choose this as a combat course. Indeed a battle on a northern course , away from the German main body, in no way agreed with the German operational plan, but, nevertheless Admiral Hipper determined to use this direction for battle. This course would also bring him closer to the 2nd AG.........

{b}>>>>> Here is the relevant passage from "Krieg zur See" (Volume V) (per USN Office of Naval Intelligence Monthly Information Bulletin (February 1926) Supplement Number 4 - Translation of chapters 7 through 14 inclusive of "The German Official Account of the Sea Battle off the Skagerrak" by Cdr Otto Groos IGN (annotated by Cdr H H Frost) -

".... the British were sighted earlier than the Germans, though some time elapsed before the German forces could observe further details as to course, speed and formation of the enemy which was in sight. It could only be roughly determined that their force, among which appeared to be six large warships, was steering a northerly course, and this fact was decisive in the selection of the battle course.. Not being inclined to avoid this opportunity for battle, as contemplated in the original operations plan, Admiral Hipper decoded top accept battle on this unfavorable course, even though in so doing he would be drawn away from his own fleet. He therefore held his course, following Scouting Division II, and ordered fire distribution from the right, read at any moment to make signal to open fire. At 4:29 no change in course on the part of the enemy could be discerned. [Frost - It should be especially noted that Hipper did not sight the Fifth Battle Squadron at this time. <snip> Many critics of Beatty have argued that he should have brought the Fifth Battle Squadron into action simultaneously with the battle cruisers. But had Hipper sighted 10 British ships it is certain that he would have turned to the southward toward Scheer and avoided action. It therefore was fortunate for the British that Hipper saw only six enemy capital ships.]

Meanwhile Admiral Beatty had been enabled to confirm the bearing of the enemy forces, and finding that in trying to accomplish his purpose of cutting them off from their base he had advanced too far to the northward., changed course back to east and sounded "Clear ship for action." At 4:33 he ordered the Second Light Cruiser Squadron to take station ahead with the Ninth and Thirteenth Flotillas, while the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron swung in behind the First on course ESE to form line of battle. At the same time the Fifth Battle Squadron , which was then bearing WNW, distant eight miles, was ordered by signal to advance to the eastward at full speed. Visibility was good, the sun at their backs and the wind WNW. If Admiral Hipper held his course the British battle cruisers would stand between him and his base. Whether the enemy was supported or not, Admiral Beatty's mission was to bring ships of the same class to battle and to maintain contact with these so long as he was not obviously inferior in numbers. In this case, however, he had a measurable superiority, his position appearing so favorable both tactically and strategically that he could not be in doubt as to the correctness of his decision.

On the German side the movement of the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron observed at 4:33 aroused the somewhat mistaken impression that the enemy was changing from column formation to deploy on battle line to the southward; therefore Admiral Hipper swung off to starboard and went on course southeast. This new movement of the enemy was followed all the more willingly, since on this course was offered the possibility of drawing the enemy forces on his own man body. At the same time he reduced speed from 23 to 18 knots in order to give the three vessels from Scouting Division II opportunity to close up. <snip> Admiral Hipper ordered the light cruisers to assemble on Scouting Division I. These vessels thereupon put about,... .[/b]

- - - - -

Even the ingenious excuse "closer to the 2nd SG" is clearly an afterthought as Groos chart shows the 2nd SG turning SE only at the same time as Hipper. If he wanted them gathered up safely under his protection he should have ordered them to turn immediately towards him when the enemy were identified, whilst he continued NW. Once steadied on a SE course he had to slow to 18 knots to allow 2nd AG a chance to catch up precisely because he had not turned them early and closed on them. Beatty is not the only commander at Jutland capable of an "artful exercise in self-exculpatory dissimulation".

So long as Hipper intended to fight on a northerly course, SG2 was kept ahead as a scouting element ahead. According to the maps which accompany the a/m translation, the distance between SG1 and SG2 between 3:00 and 3:30 GMT was about 5-6 miles. At 3:48, SG2 was on course SE about 5 miles behind 1SG; its nearest enemy threat was 5BS, abeam of 1SG on an approximately ENE course at about 17,000 yards. 5BS fired upon 1SG, which evaded away to the E to get out of range.

As far as issues of artful dissimulation go -
> Beatty persisted in claiming that the wind was out of the SE when it was actually out of the WNW. Why? How else could he justify the order for the BCF to deploy on a NW line of bearing to keep the ships "clear of smoke"?
> Beatty claimed that the line of bearing formation was formed in two minutes between issuance of the maneuver order and opening of fire. Not possible according to the laws of physics in this galaxy with Lion making 25 kts and 2BCS making only 26/27 kts; plot it out yourself.
> Beatty wrote in his official report re the opening exchange of fire: "Both (forces) appeared to straddle the target early." Really? Between 3:47 and 4:00, the five German ships of 1SG scored 4x as many hits as the six ships of the BCF (not counting any German hits on Queen Mary or Indefatigable).
> Beatty wrote "At 4:08pm the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. No mention is made of the fact that, at 6:07, Lutzow had ceased fire after Lion had run beyond the 21,000 yard range of Lutzow's guns.
> Then the great submarine fairy tale to justify the screw-up with 9th Flotilla running down the engaged side of the BCF for the better part of 45 minutes.
> Finally the "fierce and resolute" fighting "between the battle cruisers" in the period 4:15-4"43, which in actuality was the fierce and resolute fighting between 5BS and 1SG. The contributions made by the BCF in this period paled in comparison to that of 5BS ... which Beatty barely mentions.

The man should have been in advertising.

Beatty did indeed initially charge headlong at the enemy, but having been evaded after the Scarborough raid, had his force distracted by the Lizard's discarded tail at Dogger Bank, and been too far north to get at him after the assault on Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth after months of newspaper criticism he was perhaps excessively over-motivated. As for "functionally isolated" at Dogger Bank HMS Princess Royal and HMS Tiger surely kept up well enough, but German fire was concentrated on the leading ship, whether it was close to others or not. Perhaps he should have sent somebody else ahead as a shell-sponge but that was hardly his style.

I will give Beatty a pass for Scarborough, Lowestoft and Yarmouth. Responsibility for Dogger Bank, however, fully belongs to Beatty. The only ship able to keep up with Lion was the brand new Tiger - just commissioned, fresh out of the dockyard, but not worked up. Princess Royal was only just returned from the American station with a foul bottom and had not yet gone in for refit before being called upon for the Dogger Bank operation. In the battle, she could do no better than to keep up with New Zealand; Lion and Tiger left her behind quite soon in the battle. Beatty's impetuosity and lack of tactical acumen put Lion in a position where she was deluged by a two-ship German concentration that landed 17 hits upon her and crippled her. Damage was so extensive that not only was Lion left dead in the water, but her wireless was out and her signal halyards were so shredded that she was unable to hoist a properly intelligible signal. AS usual, Beatty found a scapegoat in admiral Moore for the dual sins of failing to correctly guess the intent of a highly ambiguous signal hoist and, more importantly, failing to read Beatty's mind.

- - - - -

was a clear suggestion that Lion’s retreat had either run it beyond German gun range or German vision.
I'm not sure the former was physically possible in the short period of time available and apparently unnoticed, (well unremarked) by the British cruisers to starboard. Vision wise, quite possibly. The British were further south than the Germans, firing over their port quarter and a temporary period of 30 degrees to starboard, end-on to the Geramns, would as noted make X turret the only weapon bearing and leave smoke astern fouling the range. So Paschen switched to a target he could see, HMS Princess Royal.

Addressed above per Campbel

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Tue Aug 02, 2022 2:40 pm

Hi Byron,

Here is Chatfield (Navy and Defence) quoted in Grey Wastes:

I heard a resounding "Clank!" behind me. Turning round from the compass which I was watching carefully to ensure the Chief Quartermaster below in the Conning Tower was steering that steady course which is so important for gunnery, I saw a large flame spring up from Q turret. Those on the bridge who had been looking aft told me the armoured roof of Q turret had gone up in the air and fallen on the upper deck. Realising the magazine might be in danger, I told the Conning Tower to order Q magazine to be flooded immediately. My order, however, had been forestalled by Major Harvey RMLI, the turret commander. It was lucky he had done so, for every second counts in such an emergency and as is well known he gave the order with his last words. A little later my attention was drawn to a figure who had just come up on the bridge ladder. His face was black from fire, his hair singed, his clothes burnt. Saluting in strict formality, he reported "Q turret knocked out Sir!"

So we have established that Chatfield knew of the event before before Chalmers or the marine arrived, had taken action and that his attention was somewhat diverted from monitoring the ship's course.

There is no contention of the superiority of German gunnery over the BCF during the Run to the South. My concern is that some, Paschen for instance, might believe that a major deviation by Beatty's flagship has been "erased" from the record based on IMHO no evidence at all.

I am at a loss to explain the differences between Krieg zur See wording presented by Staff (Skagerrak) and the wording you have above. Is the source actually H H Frost since his annotations are inserted into the text?

I note:

and this fact was decisive in the selection of the battle course.. Not being inclined to avoid this opportunity for battle,

Is it possible those two dots indicate Commander Frost excised the direct observation that Hipper's actions were at odds with the plan? It is clear Frost is an unapologetic cheerleader for Hipper "Hats off to Hipper!" and might be judicious in the evidence he presents.

There are other strange anomalies: Staff

However around 16:29 an enemy course alteration could be recognised

Frost?

At 4:29 no change in course on the part of the enemy could be discerned.

These are directly contradictory.

Staff makes a meal out of this wind direction business. A light breeze is only 4-6 knots. if you were driving in your car and stuck your head out of the window at 25 miles an hour you would be hard pushed to identify the direction and speed of such an ambient wind. Log entries for such phenomena aboard ship are usually based on observation of wave pattern and height rather that stopping the vessel and observing a wind vane and anemometer, definitely impractical in this case. German disappointment at the lack of hits by their torpedoes in the action are expressed by saying the sea was generally so calm the bubble tracks were particularly obvious. We are also reminded that a becalmed sailing ship was sighted during the action.

I cannot see much problem with forming a line of bearing in a relatively short time, ships apply, in this specific case, some port helm and gradually open out from the wake of the next ahead. On opening fire Hipper was on the BCF's port bow and en echelon to port would help with smoke. Lion's smoke would be south of the next astern, and so on. What is not feasible is to maintain an en echelon formation to port during a major turn to starboard, which is why Groos has rationalised this to a simultaneous turn to give en echelon on the starboard quarter during the run to the south. Whether this actually happened might be detectable from the gunnery records.

Beatty would not be the first commander to believe (at the time) he was doing as much damage as the enemy.

No mention is made of the fact that, at 6:07, Lutzow had ceased fire after Lion had run beyond the 21,000 yard range of Lutzow's guns.

There is no evidence to support this fact, I presume at 16:07 other than a British rangefinder estimate which had been reading excessively high for some time.. No one reports Lion moving out so far. Lutzow switched targets because she could not see Lion.

Many other Captains and more senior officers reported seeing periscopes and being attacked by submarines during the battle. The concern about submarine operations was general and certainly no fairy tale. If you have access to any of the L class reports do they allege submarine attack? I believe Landrail reported a torpedo coming in from the port side which subsequently passed close to Princess Royal.

I believe Blucher scored the first hit on Lion at Dogger Bank, so three ships at times were concentrating on the leading British vessel. There is not much opportunity for tactical acumen when your enemy is running away at a speed faster than some of your ships can attain. All you can do is hope that you can reduce his speed somewhat. Beatty was not alone in imagining non-existent enemy forces. He imagined a German submarine, Hipper, in his official report, imagined a nearby British battleship force which forestalled his desire to turn and save Blucher when he saw Lion disabled. Quoted in Staff Battle on the Seven Seas.

"Fierce and resolute" does not mean successful or tactically astute. Losing two capital ships and over two thousand men and still remaining in action when there is an opportunity to disengage is both. At Dogger Bank Beatty should have hoisted "not under control", and left Moore to his own devices. However based on the ability of the enemy to extend his distance from all of the remaining British ships in the chase, save the Inaccurate HMS Tiger it is hard to see a different result even if Moore had kept up the charge.

I hope you and others are finding this a stimulating and enjoyable discussion. I hope others will join in. That is surely why the forum exists.

All the best

wadinga

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Tue Aug 02, 2022 11:40 pm

wadinga wrote: ↑Tue Aug 02, 2022 2:40 pm Here is Chatfield (Navy and Defence) quoted in Grey Wastes:

I heard a resounding "Clank!" behind me. Turning round from the compass which I was watching carefully to ensure the Chief Quartermaster below in the Conning Tower was steering that steady course which is so important for gunnery, I saw a large flame spring up from Q turret. Those on the bridge who had been looking aft told me the armoured roof of Q turret had gone up in the air and fallen on the upper deck. Realising the magazine might be in danger, I told the Conning Tower to order Q magazine to be flooded immediately. My order, however, had been forestalled by Major Harvey RMLI, the turret commander. It was lucky he had done so, for every second counts in such an emergency and as is well known he gave the order with his last words. A little later my attention was drawn to a figure who had just come up on the bridge ladder. His face was black from fire, his hair singed, his clothes burnt. Saluting in strict formality, he reported "Q turret knocked out Sir!"
So we have established that Chatfield knew of the event before before Chalmers or the marine arrived, had taken action and that his attention was somewhat diverted from monitoring the ship's course.

>>>>> I have an original copy of Chatfield's "Navy and Defence". I'm not trying to sound compulsively contrary or cantankerous, but I would say that all we really have is Chatfield's ex post facto account of events. True? Doctored? "Mis-recollected"? It is impossible to know for certain.

Chatfield writes: "It was not long after the disaster to the "Indefatigable", that I heard a resounding clank behind me. Turning round from the compass which I was watching carefully to ensure that the Chief Quartermaster below in the conning tower was steering that steady course which is so important for gunnery, I saw a large flame spring up from "Q" turret (some hundred feet abaft the bridge). Those on the bridge who had been looking aft told me the armored roof of "Q" turret had gone up in th4 air and had fallen on the upper deck."
> How did Chatfield hear the "resounding clank" when others on the bridge seem to have missed it?
> According to the best accounts, the hit on "Q" turret occurred at 4:00; Campbell times the explosion of "Indefatigable" at 6:02/6:03.
> Chatfield refers to "watching carefully to ensure that the Chief Quartermaster below in the conning tower was steering that steady course which is so important for gunnery", and later states that he ordered CQM Strutt to execute the fateful "miscarried" 5deg course alteration to starboard only after having interviewed the Marine sergeant from "Q" turret was this not the same moment when he had just ordered a 5deg course alteration?

If "Q" turret was hit after the loss of Indefatigable and Chatfield only instructed Strutt to alter course to starboard AFTER interviewing the Marine sergeant, the time-line is out of kilter. FWIW.

- - - - -

There is no contention of the superiority of German gunnery over the BCF during the Run to the South. My concern is that some, Paschen for instance, might believe that a major deviation by Beatty's flagship has been "erased" from the record based on IMHO no evidence at all.

>>>>> I did not get that at all from Paschen. My impression is that he gave an honest account of what he believed he saw and experienced. Campbell certainly did not dispute it, apart from theorizing that Paschen may have mistaken Lion for Princess Royal in the smoke at some point - perfectly possible. OTOH, Campbell seems to accept that Lutzow temporarily ceased fire around 6:07 after her target ran out of gun range (about 21,000 yards). Wheels within wheels.

- - - - -

I am at a loss to explain the differences between Krieg zur See wording presented by Staff (Skagerrak) and the wording you have above. Is the source actually H H Frost since his annotations are inserted into the text?

I'm working from the 1926 in-house English language translation published by the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence. According to the document preface, the translation was done by Cdr W P Beehler, USN (ret). It goes on to say: "The translation has been examined and revised by Lieut. Commander H. H. Frost, who has prepared a series of explanatory notes which are inserted in the text in brackets." The passage that I transcribed in my previous post contains only one such parenthetical Frost comment showing as "[Frost - followed by text]". I have a RN translation of the same work, but have been too lazy to ferret it out from the present chaos of my files.

- - - - -

I note: and this fact was decisive in the selection of the battle course.. Not being inclined to avoid this opportunity for battle,
Is it possible those two dots indicate Commander Frost excised the direct observation that Hipper's actions were at odds with the plan? It is clear Frost is an unapologetic cheerleader for Hipper "Hats off to Hipper!" and might be judicious in the evidence he presents.

Frost not involved here. The two following sentences read: "Not being inclined to avoid this opportunity for battle, as contemplated in the original operations plan, Admiral Hipper decided to accept battle on this unfavorable course, even though in so doing he would be drawn away from his own fleet. He therefore held his course, following Scouting Division II, and ordering fire distribution from the right, read(y) at any moment to make signal to open fire.

- - - - -

There are other strange anomalies:
Staff - However around 16:29 an enemy course alteration could be recognized.
Frost?
At 4:29 no change in course on the part of the enemy could be discerned.
These are directly contradictory.

Please advise which of Staff's books you referencing (also page reference(s) please).[/quote]

- - - - -

Staff makes a meal out of this wind direction business. A light breeze is only 4-6 knots. if you were driving in your car and stuck your head out of the window at 25 miles an hour you would be hard pushed to identify the direction and speed of such an ambient wind. Log entries for such phenomena aboard ship are usually based on observation of wave pattern and height rather that stopping the vessel and observing a wind vane and anemometer, definitely impractical in this case. obvious. We are also reminded that a becalmed sailing ship was sighted during the action.

>>>>> You are describing the Beaufort Scale - a reliable friend of mariners around the world for close to two centuries and counting. Direction of the wave front indicates approximate true wind direction; wave height and characteristics provide an estimate of wind strength in twelve categories from dead calm to hurricane. Not perfectly exact, but more than sufficient for government work. Note that many of the track charts one sees in connection with Jutland indicate wind direction on the compass rose for the time period in question.

It is worthy of note that funnel smoke, once ejected from the stack/funnel, possesses no intrinsic horizontal velocity. It typically drifts in the direction of the true wind at about 2/3rds its velocity. The period of time it remains a nuisance varies with the volume of smoke versus time and the velocity of the breeze. Gun smoke is violently ejected in the direction of discharge then ultimately hangs in limbo, carried along by the breeze. The 302deg line-of bearing formation, had it been successfully carried out, would have been adequate with the breeze out of the SE; but with the breeze out of the WNW, the funnel an gun smoke was simply pushed ahead and to the engaged side of Beatty's ships. That having been said, the smoke of the destroyers paralleling the BCF on its engaged side perhaps represented the chief problem (IIRC the only ship which did NOT complain about smoke interference was Lion).

IIRC, German torpedoes of that period had a reputation for leaving pronounced tell-tale tracks.

There are many stories about the Danish sailing ship that found herself between Beatty and Hipper in the early part of the action. Some described it as having first been seen under full sail, some described it as becalmed, others described it as heaved to (it is perfectly possible to heave to a square-rigger with her sails set (another of my periods of interest); see John Harland's excellent "Seamanship in the Age of Sail")

- - - - -

I cannot see much problem with forming a line of bearing in a relatively short time, ships apply, in this specific case, some port helm and gradually open out from the wake of the next ahead.

>>>>> As earlier suggested, plot it out and see what you get. Following Campbell's track chart, which shows Lion, Princess Royal and Queen Mary splaying to starboard, Tiger straight ahead and 2BS splaying to port, the best I can get is about 5 minutes and an average advance for Tiger of about 3,500 yards to get all six ships at proper 500 yard intervals from one another on the 302 deg line of bearing without use of large amounts of helm. And that assumes that New Zealand and Indefatigable have worked back up to 26 kts after their immediately prior 16 point turn to form up with 1BCS in line ahead. The deployment order for the line of bearing formation was signaled at 3:45 according to the signal log appendix in the Jutland Despatches. Fire was opened at 3:48. A check the open fire times of all six ships points to something not being right (NZ opened fire at 3:51 IIRC).

- - - - -

On opening fire Hipper was on the BCF's port bow and en echelon to port would help with smoke. Lion's smoke would be south of the next astern, and so on.

>>>>> Princess Royal (2nd in line) pointedly complained about funnel and gun smoke interference from Lion. So ..... either Princess Royal was badly out of position or there was a problem with the 302 degree line of bearing formation (i.e., a breeze out of the WNW would have drifted smoke to the BCF's engaged side). To add insult to injury, we know that most of the BCF ships were forced to turn to starboard in order to clear their main battery A arcs. This did not help their fire control efforts. By comparison, 1SG was well situated bearing-wise to receive the approaching BCF within its own A arcs.

- - - - -

What is not feasible is to maintain an en echelon formation to port during a major turn to starboard, which is why Groos has rationalised this to a simultaneous turn to give en echelon on the starboard quarter during the run to the south. Whether this actually happened might be detectable from the gunnery records.

>>>>> The answer is IMO to be found in the signal log appendix:
3:45 - SO BCF > Battle Cruisers: "Form on a line of bearing N.W." (flags)
3:45 - SO BCF > General: "Alter course together to E.S.E." (flags) ..... (my emphasis)
4:40 - SO BCF > General: "Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard."

After 3:45 until 4:40 all BCF maneuvers were apparently conducted without signals of any sort, presumably on a Tryon-esque "follow-the-leader" basis (what I believe Brooks refers to as "J Pendant"). Beatty's early instructions to the BCF was that captains were expected to follow his lead and, in the absence of signals to exercise correct judgment with respect to anticipating his intentions.

- - - - -

No mention is made of the fact that, at 6:07, Lutzow had ceased fire after Lion had run beyond the 21,000 yard range of Lutzow's guns.
There is no evidence to support this fact, I presume at 16:07 other than a British rangefinder estimate which had been reading excessively high for some time.. No one reports Lion moving out so far. Lutzow switched targets because she could not see Lion.

See Campbell (again) - page 42: By 1600 the range had already increased to about 16,500 yards between the two leading ships, and in the next ten minutes rose to about 21,000 yards. <snip> The Lutzow scored three hits on the Lion between 1601 and 1603, and her claim of six hits between 1548 and 1607 when she temporarily ceased firing, is thus correct.

- - - - -

Many other Captains and more senior officers reported seeing periscopes and being attacked by submarines during the battle. The concern about submarine operations was general and certainly no fairy tale. If you have access to any of the L class reports do they allege submarine attack? I believe Landrail reported a torpedo coming in from the port side which subsequently passed close to Princess Royal.

>>>>> Well over a hundred torpedoes were fired by both sides during the fleet action at the Battle of Jutland. None of them were fired by submarines. I have not delved into this issue statistically, but I would wager that the torpedoes seen (or imagined) by the Admiral Beatty and the BCF were all fired by 1SG (or possibly German light cruisers). Offhand I cannot recall any German destroyer torpedo attacks delivered against the BCF.

- - - - -

I believe Blucher scored the first hit on Lion at Dogger Bank, so three ships at times were concentrating on the leading British vessel. There is not much opportunity for tactical acumen when your enemy is running away at a speed faster than some of your ships can attain. All you can do is hope that you can reduce his speed somewhat. Beatty was not alone in imagining non-existent enemy forces. He imagined a German submarine, Hipper, in his official report, imagined a nearby British battleship force which forestalled his desire to turn and save Blucher when he saw Lion disabled. Quoted in Staff Battle on the Seven Seas.

B>>>>> I disagree with much of what you argue. But that is another topic for another day.

- - - - -

"Fierce and resolute" does not mean successful or tactically astute. Losing two capital ships and over two thousand men and still remaining in action when there is an opportunity to disengage is both.

>>>>> Fair comment as far as the men and officers of BCF go. I just feel badly that they had to serve under Beatty

- - - - -

I hope you and others are finding this a stimulating and enjoyable discussion. I hope others will join in. That is surely why the forum exists.

Talk about "stimulating" - I wonder what Antonio and Alberto are doing.

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Fri Aug 05, 2022 5:34 pm

Hi Byron,

I enjoy reading your posts and take much value from the points you make. You and others often open my eyes to factors I had not considered and I am truly appreciative.

Reading the Chalmers quote again it seems to me he was on a lower platform than Chatfield. The Marine Sergeant reaches him first and in his dazed state asks if he, Chalmers, is the Captain, and having explained once, he then moves up to reach Chatfield and makes his report again. How long does the injured sergeant take to get from his post to Chatfield? Has HMS Indefatigable blown up in the meantime? These 5-7 minutes were an incredibly stressful time on Lion's bridge.Trying to determine what happened, in which order, down to a minute by minute basis to determine when a misheard order was given, and subsequently corrected, when nothing was time-stamped at the time, is going to be contentious. (We have established this before

)

There was a 25-28 knot wind blowing through the compass platform from directly ahead, and the forward turrets were blasting away. Why some individuals might have noticed a noise and others not is indeterminable. For me, onomatopoeia "Clank!" indicates it was not the soft roar of cordite deflagration but the landing of several tons of armour on the deck which Chatfield noticed.

As far as I can see Campbell reproduces Groos' depiction of the BCF in en echelon formation at this time. What he does say on p48 in my edition is

At that time [16:15] the Lion was going far over, and had been continuously going over for at least the previous six minutes, her gun range reaching a maximum of c23,000 yds, while the Princess Royal , after a pause of five minutes, reopened at the correct range.

So for 16:11 onwards the actual range was lot less than 23,000 yds.

The Lutzow scored three hits on the Lion between 1601 and 1603, and her claim of six hits between 1548 and 1607 when she temporarily ceased firing, is thus correct.

If Lion really increased the range by making a radical turn and continuing it until the range had increased by 3 miles, Lutzow must have done very well to hang onto her target. I don't see Campbell saying Lutzow ceased firing at Lion because she moved out of range. She might just be invisible behind her own smoke having turned (briefly) 30 degrees. Princess Royal became a more attractive target.

Gary Staff ( who I am sad to discover passed away some time ago) wrote two books covering the battlecruiser action. The excerpts I reproduced above come from Skaggerak pub Pen & Sword p46. Although he refences Der Krieg zur See band 5 he does not describe whose translation into English and it is even possible he has been forgetful in parenthesising his own inserted comments (unlike HH Frost). The "strange anomaly" sentence closes the paragraph. It is clear two different translators depending on the freedom of their approach may express things differently, but this is directly contradictory.

We all know, now, that there no submarines from either side involved in the action, but decisions made at the time cannot be informed, or judged by this hindsight. Campbell says, p46

, At about 16:11 supposed periscopes were reported to port and starboard of the British battlecruisers, as well as a torpedo track from either side.

Campbell notes torpedoes were fired from both British and German battlecruisers from underwater tubes at high deviations from original launch orientation and extreme ranges of 11,000 yds plus. Where these went or whether any reached the other line is unknown. In retrospect the L class struggling up the engaged side were a nuisance, but there was destroyer action in which they could have taken part, but presumably missed, having been ordered to clear the range. Additionally as a screen, if a German attack had been forthcoming, they would have been ideally placed. As it was it was British destroyers from the head of the line which initiated the attack. On p50 he notes ten torpedoes being fired at the British battlecruisers by German torpedo boats at c9,000yds at 16:33-35, however Beatty's counter march at 16:40 nullified these long range efforts.

If the maintain LOB 302 degrees signal was not rescinded, maybe the Groos rendition is what actually happened when Beatty's ships turned SE. There was nothing to be done about smoke drifting downrange, the wind, such as it was, was blowing towards the Germans. Each ship was leaving its smoke behind at 26 knots. A revised LOB on Lion's port quarter on the new heading would have helped.

By comparison, 1SG was well situated bearing-wise to receive the approaching BCF within its own A arcs.

Indeed for the first few minutes the BCS effectively had their T crossed, but then they were always going to turn and attempt to cut Hipper off from his base. As I have observed previously, Beatty had been under immense pressure to catch and defeat Hipper since the War started, that meant getting into gun range as quickly as possible, with rushed and sometimes unwise dispositions. I believe Chatfield actually ordered open fire since Beatty was elsewhere doing Admiral things (reporting to Jellicoe?), as the range closed.

As Bill Jurens noted elsewhere Antonio Bonomi and Alberto Virtuani have published a 144 page paperback "dossier" Le Navi de Battaglia Bismarck e Tirpitz 2022 advertised as:

This new DOSSIER, the work of Antonio Bonomi and Alberto Virtuani, signatures already known to our readers for their previous work on the units of the Kriegsmarine, reconstructs in an absolutely exhaustive way and according to the most up-to-date information, the construction characteristics, the armament, the equipment, the camouflage schemes, the organization on board and the operational history of the major units of the German Navy in the Second World War, become legendary for their respective events. The work, of course, is accompanied by a very rich iconographic apparatus that, in addition to many rare images, also includes numerous technical drawings, schemes and color profiles specially made for publication.

via Storia Militare and available in Italian only. It would be interesting to hear what they have committed to record.

All the best

wadinga

Byron Angel · Post by **Byron Angel** » Fri Aug 05, 2022 9:59 pm

wadinga wrote: ↑Fri Aug 05, 2022 5:34 pm Reading the Chalmers quote again it seems to me he was on a lower platform than Chatfield. The Marine Sergeant reaches him first and in his dazed state asks if he, Chalmers, is the Captain, and having explained once, he then moves up to reach Chatfield and makes his report again. How long does the injured sergeant take to get from his post to Chatfield? Has HMS Indefatigable blown up in the meantime? These 5-7 minutes were an incredibly stressful time on Lion's bridge.Trying to determine what happened, in which order, down to a minute by minute basis to determine when a misheard order was given, and subsequently corrected, when nothing was time-stamped at the time, is going to be contentious. (We have established this before )

>>>>> I prefer not to make any firm judgments on this point; as mentioned, it may be as simple a matter as a lapse of memory. And your comment about a time lapse between the actual hit upon "Q" turret, recovery of sensibilities and the arrival the Marine sergeant major upon the bridge (one source stating that he was despatched by the wounded Harvey).All of that could easily have represented a fair amount of elapsed time. The bothersome passage in Chatfield''s account, however is this ("Navy and Defence, p.142) - "It was not long after the disaster to the "Indefatigable" that I heard a resounding clank behind me." Still - very possibly a simple matter of mis-recollection.

- - - - -

There was a 25-28 knot wind blowing through the compass platform from directly ahead, and the forward turrets were blasting away. Why some individuals might have noticed a noise and others not is indeterminable. For me, onomatopoeia "Clank!" indicates it was not the soft roar of cordite deflagration but the landing of several tons of armour on the deck which Chatfield noticed.

>>>>> I do not disagree. As a matter of fact, there is (IIRC) a good deal of testimony from distant observers at both Jutland and Denmark Strait to the effect that the cordite deflagrations they witnessed were strangely silent.

- - - - -

As far as I can see Campbell reproduces Groos' depiction of the BCF in en echelon formation at this time. What he does say on p48 in my edition is -
At that time [16:15] the Lion was going far over, and had been continuously going over for at least the previous six minutes, her gun range reaching a maximum of c23,000 yds, while the Princess Royal , after a pause of five minutes, reopened at the correct range.
So for 16:11 onwards the actual range was lot less than 23,000 yds.

>>>>> I don't like to take out the map case from Corbett's "Naval Operations", as the maps are a hundred years old are a bit delicate to handle. Nevertheless, here is what the maps present with respect to relative positions of Lion and Lutzow between 3:40 and 4:20 [Map 23 = 3:40-4:00; Map 24 = 4:00-4:20]. -
3:40 - Lion heading approx 80deg; Range to Lutzow about 20,000 yds on relative bearing Red 15; Lutzow heading approx 125deg.
Between 3:45 and 4:00, Lion steadily alters heading to starboard (estimated radius of turn - 7,000 yds) After a temporary 2 point alteration to starboard to close the range shortly prior to opening of fire, Lutzow remains on a heading of approximately 125deg.
4:00 - Lion heading approx 170deg; Range to Lutzow approx 16,000 yds on relative bearing Red 115deg.
Between 4:00 and approx 4:10, Lion continues on a heading approx due S, while Lutzow continues approx SE until about 4:08-4:10. Estimated range at 4:10 is approx 22,000 yds.
4:10 to 4:20 - Lion slowly alters course to port and steadies upon a heading of 120deg; Lutzow and 1SG execute a simultaneous turn to the S, forming a line of WNW bearing formation relative to Lutzow. Range from Lion to Lutzow now approx 16,000 yds, with Lutzow bearing approx Red 45 from Lion.

- - - - -

The Lutzow scored three hits on the Lion between 1601 and 1603, and her claim of six hits between 1548 and 1607 when she temporarily ceased firing, is thus correct.

If Lion really increased the range by making a radical turn and continuing it until the range had increased by 3 miles, Lutzow must have done very well to hang onto her target. I don't see Campbell saying Lutzow ceased firing at Lion because she moved out of range. She might just be invisible behind her own smoke having turned (briefly) 30 degrees. Princess Royal became a more attractive target.[/quote]

>>>>> See my above. According to Corbett's track chart, range at 4:10 was about 22,000 yds ... well beyond Lutzow's main battery Jutland period gun range of about 20,500 yds. Staff ("Skagerrak", p.59) states that - "... Lion had sheered out of line at 1705 hrs (6:05 GMT) and had disappeared from view".

- - - - -

Gary Staff ( who I am sad to discover passed away some time ago) wrote two books covering the battlecruiser action. The excerpts I reproduced above come from Skaggerak pub Pen & Sword p46. Although he references Der Krieg zur See band 5 he does not describe whose translation into English and it is even possible he has been forgetful in parenthesising his own inserted comments (unlike HH Frost). The "strange anomaly" sentence closes the paragraph. It is clear two different translators depending on the freedom of their approach may express things differently, but this is directly contradictory.

>>>>> Gary Staff's passing was both a shock and a blow. It is my understanding that Mr Staff may himself have been fluent in German (the author's flyleaf on this book states that he translated documents from the original German), so may well have read KzS in the original German.

- - - - -

We all know, now, that there no submarines from either side involved in the action, but decisions made at the time cannot be informed, or judged by this hindsight. Campbell says, p46 -

, At about 16:11 supposed periscopes were reported to port and starboard of the British battlecruisers, as well as a torpedo track from either side.

Campbell notes torpedoes were fired from both British and German battlecruisers from underwater tubes at high deviations from original launch orientation and extreme ranges of 11,000 yds plus. Where these went or whether any reached the other line is unknown. In retrospect the L class struggling up the engaged side were a nuisance, but there was destroyer action in which they could have taken part, but presumably missed, having been ordered to clear the range. Additionally as a screen, if a German attack had been forthcoming, they would have been ideally placed. As it was it was British destroyers from the head of the line which initiated the attack. On p50 he notes ten torpedoes being fired at the British battlecruisers by German torpedo boats at c9,000yds at 16:33-35, however Beatty's counter march at 16:40 nullified these long range efforts.

>>>>> "Periscope fever" seems to have been a problem with Beatty. Do we know of any other senior flag officer with such sharp eyes? He personally "saw" one at Dogger Bank and, again, at Jutland. One wonders when he found time to scan the surface of the sea for hun periscopes while managing the affairs of a small fleet in the midst of pitched battle. Strictly my opinion, of course.

- - - - -

If the maintain LOB 302 degrees signal was not rescinded, maybe the Groos rendition is what actually happened when Beatty's ships turned SE. There was nothing to be done about smoke drifting downrange, the wind, such as it was, was blowing towards the Germans. Each ship was leaving its smoke behind at 26 knots. A revised LOB on Lion's port quarter on the new heading would have helped.

The order to form line-if-bearing NW was in fact effectively rescinded by the 3:46 signal:
3:45 - SO BCF > Battle Cruisers (flags) - Form on a line bearing NW.
3:46 - SO BCF > General (flags) - Alter course together to ESE.

- - - - -

"By comparison, 1SG was well situated bearing-wise to receive the approaching BCF within its own A arcs."
Indeed for the first few minutes the BCS effectively had their T crossed, but then they were always going to turn and attempt to cut Hipper off from his base. As I have observed previously, Beatty had been under immense pressure to catch and defeat Hipper since the War started, that meant getting into gun range as quickly as possible, with rushed and sometimes unwise dispositions. I believe Chatfield actually ordered open fire since Beatty was elsewhere doing Admiral things (reporting to Jellicoe?), as the range closed..

Chatfield does state that he ordered fire to be opened immediately upon 1SG opening fire.

- - - - -

As Bill Jurens noted elsewhere Antonio Bonomi and Alberto Virtuani have published a 144 page paperback "dossier" Le Navi de Battaglia Bismarck e Tirpitz 2022 advertised as:
This new DOSSIER, the work of Antonio Bonomi and Alberto Virtuani, signatures already known to our readers for their previous work on the units of the Kriegsmarine, reconstructs in an absolutely exhaustive way and according to the most up-to-date information, the construction characteristics, the armament, the equipment, the camouflage schemes, the organization on board and the operational history of the major units of the German Navy in the Second World War, become legendary for their respective events. The work, of course, is accompanied by a very rich iconographic apparatus that, in addition to many rare images, also includes numerous technical drawings, schemes and color profiles specially made for publication.

via Storia Militare and available in Italian only. It would be interesting to hear what they have committed to record..

Nice to see AB & AVputting their time to better use.

wadinga · Post by **wadinga** » Mon Aug 08, 2022 12:58 pm

Hello Byron (and hopefully others),

On the subject of what happened with Lion between 16:00 and 16:09 Harper's recalculated navigation is available at:

https://www.jutland1916.com/wp-content/uploads/051.jpg

However unlike your splendid 100 year old maps these online renditions pixelate when you expand them sufficiently to show detail. Grrr

He shows Lion making a slight turn to starboard and turning back to port later. As we know there was some enmity between Harper and Beatty so if this deviation had been more extreme I expect it would have been identified.

Beatty was not alone in imagining periscopes P216 of Campbell

The 6th division steadied on course 178 at about this time , but turned sharply to port again to avoid supposed torpedoes, and an imaginary submarine,

Later on the same page:

As usual imaginary submarines were sighted. The Calliope signalled the presence of one.......

p250

There were the usual sightings of imaginary submarines between 1945 and 2015 The Hampshire, Shannon and Duke of Edinburgh firing at one of these supposed targets.

I expect Beatty had flunkeys and minions to do the scanning for him and they pointed "threats" out to him. Beatty is a contentious and perhaps over-rated commander but given the performance of some of the other senior officers, eg Evan-Thomas, Arbuthnot for instance he might not be as bad as some paint him. OTOH he might be. For me Chatfield's cold-hearted comment:

This seemed at the moment just a disappointment. The Indefatigable was a smaller and more weakly protected ship than those of the first division and was not really a serious tactical loss.

is a bleak indictment of attitude. At least Beatty was moved to some human emotion when his ships and men were destroyed.

I don't see that the 15:46 signal countermands the 15:45. One is about formation and the second is about the course of the formation. The idea might have been that with the ships on Lion's starboard quarter, smoke blowing downwind to the east would dissipate a bit by the time the next astern reached it. In reality it didn't because the wind was so light. This starboard echelon does fit with Harper's depiction of Indefatigable's sinking well to the west of Lion's track, although even Harper's best efforts must be qualified when McCartney has shown considerable error in Indefatigable's location.

Gary Staff may well have done his own translation and included his own comments without parentheses (or proper editorial scrutiny).

AB &AV: I don't expect (hope) with only 144 pages to play with their more extreme theories have made it to print.

All the best

wadinga

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