KGV Class 14-in Turret Problems

[Nellie]

About USS Iowa!

On 19 April 1989, an explosion ripped through the Number Two 16 inch gun turret, killing 47 crewmen. Sailors quickly flooded the #2 powder magazine, likely preventing catastrophic damage to the ship. At first, the NCIS investigators theorized that one of the dead crewman, Clayton Hartwig, had detonated an explosive device in a suicide attempt after the end of an alleged homosexual affair with another sailor. This theory was later abandoned and Hartwig cleared. The cause of the explosion, though never determined with certainty, is generally believed to have been static electricity igniting loose powder.

[José M. Rico]

An interesting excerpt from “The Bismarck Episode” by Russell Grenfell (pages 199-201 on my edition):

“The other palpable breakdown was in the 14-in. turrets of the King George V and Prince of Wales. A new battleship needs a month or so to become efficient, if only because the ship’s company require about that time to get to know their ship, become accustomed to their turret machinery, and perfect their gun-drill. It is even reasonable to find sharp edges which have to be filed smooth and other small mechanical defects in a brand-new ship. But after the ‘shake-down’ period, she should be a fully capable unit. Neither the Prince of Wales nor the King George V showed herself to be so. Admittedly, the Prince of Wales had not undergone a proper working-up period. But this was not the main cause of her numerous and serious turret failures. The King George V, several months longer in commission, was almost as bad, her gunpower being dangerously depleted for long stretches during the action of May 27th through mechanical breakdowns. The truth was that there were faulty details in the design of their new-pattern 14-in. turrets. It is said that so many defects came to light during the Bismarck actions which would otherwise have remained longer concealed that more progress was made in perfecting the 14-in. turrets in the two months after the operation than would ordinarily have taken a year or more. In other words had the actions taken place in 1942 instead of 1941, the 14-in. turrets would probably have shown up nearly as poorly as they did on the earlier date.

These turrets were therefore manifesting the same characteristics that had marred most of their predecessors of the interwar period. The new design of 8.in. turrets fitted in the County class cruisers took five years or more to make reasonably efficient. In their early years, they could seldom get off the eight rounds per gun of a practice shoot without falling to pieces. The same disease afflicted the new 16-in. turrets of the Nelson and Rodney, and they too were in process of adjustment and modification for five years or more before they could be pronounced fully fit to face an enemy. Had the new 14-in. turrets come out in peace-time, it is more than likely that they would have taken an equally long time.

To excuse and explain these long periods of semi-efficiency, the gunnery authorities of the Navy began to speak of them as being due to ‘teething troubles’ in new-design mountings. It was a very dangerous slogan, tending to obscure to those naval officers who should have had it most firmly in mind the cardinal fact that a new ship, if she is to fight at all, must be ready to fight at once and with all her armament. It is no use a ship steaming into action flying a kindergarten flag meaning ‘I am still in the infancy stage. Please only fire half your guns at me’. The enemy, unfortunately, is unlikely to be so obliging.

By 1941, this ‘teething trouble’ slogan had got a serious hold in the Navy, as witness the remarks by the three officers most concerned on this occasion. Thus, Captain Leach of the Prince of Wales referred in his report of the action to ‘the practical certainty that owing to mechanical teething troubles a full output from the main armament was not to be expected’. And the Commander-in-Chief himself could allude to her turrets which, ‘of a new and untried model, were known to be liable to teething troubles….’

In the pre-1914 days, the teething trouble catchphrase was unknown in the fleet. Yes new designs of turrets were appearing then as later. The 15-in. turret, in particular, mounting a calibre of gun never before used, came out during the first world war and was taken straight into action without any difficulty. Why, then, the complacent acceptance in the 1939 war of an inevitable inefficiency in new gun mountings which earlier generations had not tolerated?

The explanation is probably to be found in the naval limitation treaties of the inter-war period. Where a fixed limit is placed on warship tonnage, there is a natural tendency to squeeze into the treaty maximum as much as possible in the way of fighting power, resulting in the attempt to squeeze too much. The endeavour to force ten guns into a ship that ought really to have had eight actually led to her having only six, since the then had such complicated mechanism that no more than two-thirds of them would normally go off at once: or at all events for the first five or six years of the new mounting’s life, until numerous modifications had been made in the light of breakdown experience. Similarly, elaborate arrangements to give new guns double the previous rate of fire would result in their producing half of it in practice. Mechanically, this sequence of cause and effect was bad enough. Psychologically, it was worse still; for the convention soon grew up that new gun mounting were bound to give poor results for some considerable time, while ‘teething troubles’ were being eliminated.

It is possible that the lesson of the 14-in. failures in action against the Bismarck has been taken to heart. But slogans, once coined, take a deal of discrediting; and that of ‘teething troubles’, in explanation of guns failing to fire, is one of the most insidious that the Navy has ever allowed itself to dally with. A motor firm that pleaded teething troubles in extenuation of frequent breakdowns in its products for the first five or six years of service would not last that length of time in business.”

[Karl Heidenreich]

José Rico:

The explanation is probably to be found in the naval limitation treaties of the inter-war period. Where a fixed limit is placed on warship tonnage, there is a natural tendency to squeeze into the treaty maximum as much as possible in the way of fighting power, resulting in the attempt to squeeze too much.

My point for the last year! The whole issue regarded in the Bismarck and her Contemporaries thread....

[RF]

But even with this point on tonnage restrictions proper run in periods for new warships and gunnery problems should still be addressed, should they not?

[yellowtail3]

Interesting thread. I generally agree with Duncan's assertion, that the problems of the KGV armament are something of battleship lore, more than real deficiency, relative to other ships of the same time.

My point for the last year! The whole issue regarded in the Bismarck and her Contemporaries thread....

How well did the 16"/45s of the North Carolinas and South Dakotas work? Were they compromised by being on 35K ton ships? I'd be interested to know - my impression is that they were reliable, very potent armament.

[RF]

Interesting thread. I generally agree with Duncan's assertion, that the problems of the KGV armament are something of battleship lore, more than real deficiency, relative to other ships of the same time.

I do notice in respect of this observation that Bismarck did not seem to have any problems running in its gunnery...... there was certainly nothing wrong at DS for example.

[Thorsten Wahl]

...North Carolinas and South Dakotas... Were they compromised by being on 35K ton ships? I'd be interested to know - my impression is that they were reliable, very potent armament.

they were little bit oversizeded to be an 35k ts ship and indeed very potent

[lwd]

...How well did the 16"/45s of the North Carolinas and South Dakotas work? Were they compromised by being on 35K ton ships? I'd be interested to know - my impression is that they were reliable, very potent armament.

I seem to recall reading that the barrels were a bit too close together thus requiring delay coils for the center gun.

[Bgile]

...How well did the 16"/45s of the North Carolinas and South Dakotas work? Were they compromised by being on 35K ton ships? I'd be interested to know - my impression is that they were reliable, very potent armament.

I seem to recall reading that the barrels were a bit too close together thus requiring delay coils for the center gun.

Each gun fired at a different time.

[lwd]

...How well did the 16"/45s of the North Carolinas and South Dakotas work? Were they compromised by being on 35K ton ships? I'd be interested to know - my impression is that they were reliable, very potent armament.

I seem to recall reading that the barrels were a bit too close together thus requiring delay coils for the center gun.

Each gun fired at a different time.

Thanks. For some reason I thought they only delayed the center gun. In any case I don't believe that this was in the original design was it? I'm not at all sure when it was added though or even if it was part of the design.

[yellowtail3]

Thanks. For some reason I thought they only delayed the center gun. In any case I don't believe that this was in the original design was it? I'm not at all sure when it was added though or even if it was part of the design.

I don't know, either, but I'll assume designed - the USN had already added 'delay coils' to the 14"/45 and 14"/50s triples during their ships' 1930s modernizations.