Long Range Gunnery

[lwd]

I think it was likely to get hit, but I don't know if a hit percentage can be derived from it, as the salvo pattern is irregular...

That's the nature of random phenomena and that's what statistics are designed to describe.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Lee,

When you try your rethorical tricks is a real wear. Like with this:

They were also well within visible range. So what's your point?

You are far from dumb, you know very well what I'm refering is that the Nowaki incident is an equivalent to what the Japanese did at Leyte, only that the Japanese did it without RDFC. In both cases, we can argue, the actions are far from revealing a scientific certainty.

In case you haven't noticed there were two US battleships involved. As far as SoDak missing it's probably a combination of a rather confused radar environment and crew not completely up to par with the new equipment.

Yes I notice. In the barrage in which South Dak failed to achieve any hits also Washington failed. USS Washington, in saving South Dak from becoming a wreck, did achieve, finnaly, it's hits in a combination of RDFC, flares and search lights. About what happened to South Dak there have to be many issues, technical and human, as you point out.

Hardly. The IZ doesn't mean she was immune even in that zone and the latter is even further off base.

Quite ambigous, don't you think? Yamato was designed to withstand the punishment of it's own guns, which were unique, so it was very well protected to the lesser 16" of the Iowa Class. In Skulsky's book those capabilities are very well defined. On the other hand the Iowa was designed to withstand it's own 16" (?) which leaves open the capanility of Yamato to destroy her at almost any available range for her 18". As simple as that and has been discussed, a year and a half ago, in the Iowa vs Yamato thread. Maybe we should bring forth some of the direct quotes and specs that I posted then (and which obviously the USN fans alredy forgot or ignored for not fitting their superiority complex).

[Dave Saxton]

Thanks guys for some interesting information.
I was thinking that at Leyte Yamato opened fire at 31km, and then with spotter aircraft. The visibility was good, IIRC. Maybe the targets weren't "high" enough?

According to the reports of the US pilots on the scene this visibility was relatively poor. One pilot stated that he could just make out the IJN battle line on the horizion in the haze as he climbed out after being launched. Yet the Japanese had already straddled one of the CVEs before he was catapulted. I can't find a reference that confirms the IJN was using spotting aircraft, and I suspect that if they were, the US pilots would have eliminated that first thing. The US already had a CAP up before sun up too. It was these that first reported the presence of the IJN battle fleet. The IJN was in the proccess of forming an AA defensive formation when they became aware of the US ships.

Kurita's report does state that they opened fire at 31km or ~34,000 yards.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Dave:

I can't find a reference that confirms the IJN was using spotting aircraft, and I suspect that if they were, the US pilots would have eliminated that first thing. The US already had a CAP up before sun up too. It was these that first reported the presence of the IJN battle fleet. The IJN was in the proccess of forming an AA defensive formation when they became aware of the US ships.

Kurita's report does state that they opened fire at 31km or ~34,000 yards.

Willmott do not made any reference on spotter aircraft used on that action. As a matter of fact Kurita's planing and execution was very poor, otherwise the USN units there would have been easily destroyed.

Kurita's report turns out to be one of the longer range combats in WWII I think: 34,000 yards against another fleet is quite a range for those days. The issue of the smoke is very interesting, because if it was present and still the IJN could target and straddle individual small targets (destroyers) then some other actions in which such a screen has been deployed and taken for granted it "made invulnerable" the defender is to be reconsidered.

Regards,

[Byron Angel]

In the barrage in which South Dak failed to achieve any hits also Washington failed. USS Washington, in saving South Dak from becoming a wreck, did achieve, finnaly, it's hits in a combination of RDFC, flares and search lights. About what happened to South Dak there have to be many issues, technical and human, as you point out.

WASHINGTON engaged KIRISHIMA with radar ranging and optical train, aided by 5in star shells after the second salvo. It was a clear night with prominent landmarks visible at 12 sea miles even after the setting of the moon. No searchlights or flares were involved in this engagement. Nevertheless, WASHINGTON had remained unseen by the Japanese until it opened fire on KIRISHIMA.

[lwd]

Lee,
When you try your rethorical tricks is a real wear. Like with this:

What tricks?

They were also well within visible range. So what's your point?

You are far from dumb, you know very well what I'm refering is that the Nowaki incident is an equivalent to what the Japanese did at Leyte, only that the Japanese did it without RDFC. In both cases, we can argue, the actions are far from revealing a scientific certainty.

So straddling a DD at over 35,000 yards is the same as straddling one at under 15,000 yards? I don't think so. Who by the way said anything about "scientific certainty"?

In case you haven't noticed there were two US battleships involved. As far as SoDak missing it's probably a combination of a rather confused radar environment and crew not completely up to par with the new equipment.

Yes I notice. In the barrage in which South Dak failed to achieve any hits also Washington failed. USS Washington, in saving South Dak from becoming a wreck, did achieve, finnaly, it's hits in a combination of RDFC, flares and search lights. About what happened to South Dak there have to be many issues, technical and human, as you point out.

I was of course talking about the Nowaki incident where you implied only one BB was involved.

Hardly. The IZ doesn't mean she was immune even in that zone and the latter is even further off base.

Quite ambigous, don't you think? Yamato was designed to withstand the punishment of it's own guns, which were unique, so it was very well protected to the lesser 16" of the Iowa Class.

No it wasn't designed in general to "withstand the punishment of its own guns". It was designed to resist those guns at certain ranges and under certain conditions. Not the same thing at all. Note that parts of her like all battleships were subject to damage by even smaller guns. Hiei and Bismarck provide rather graphic examples of that.

... As simple as that and has been discussed, a year and a half ago, in the Iowa vs Yamato thread. Maybe we should bring forth some of the direct quotes and specs that I posted then (and which obviously the USN fans alredy forgot or ignored for not fitting their superiority complex).

Feel free. But the point that I have tried to make in this context is a 16" shell that hits is going to do a lot more damage than an 18.1 that misses.

[lwd]

Thanks guys for some interesting information.
I was thinking that at Leyte Yamato opened fire at 31km, and then with spotter aircraft. The visibility was good, IIRC. Maybe the targets weren't "high" enough?

.... Yet the Japanese had already straddled one of the CVEs before he was catapulted. I can't find a reference that confirms the IJN was using spotting aircraft, ....

The report of the Yamato getting a first salvo hit was attibuted to her spotter aircraft. It was apparently shot down not too long after that.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

What tricks?

Yours. You like a lawyer, not someone discussing technical things... but you already know that....

So straddling a DD at over 35,000 yards is the same as straddling one at under 15,000 yards? I don't think so. Who by the way said anything about "scientific certainty"?

Both were in excess of 30 K yards, one with RDFC and one without it. However I'm not claiming that Yamato's Leyte straddles confirm anything with the exception that it confirms that the USN straddles on Nowaki are far from conclusive.

No it wasn't designed in general to "withstand the punishment of its own guns". It was designed to resist those guns at certain ranges and under certain conditions. Not the same thing at all. Note that parts of her like all battleships were subject to damage by even smaller guns. Hiei and Bismarck provide rather graphic examples of that.

Rethorical, as usual. The implication comes to the point that Yamato was pretty much armoured than Iowa, period. It could stand more punishment. I think I will need to look back in a thread two years old and find the quotes and the technical specs to support something as easy to understand as that.

Feel free. But the point that I have tried to make in this context is a 16" shell that hits is going to do a lot more damage than an 18.1 that misses.

You Americans as so dam arrogant. You are the ones that sound like the nazis of your Hollywood movies. You DO NOT KNOW, for a fact, that Yamato will miss. We KNORW for a fact that South Dak DID MISS a barn at 8 K yards using RDFC against multiple targets. We DO NOT KNOW, for a fact, if the Nowaki incident was more than that: an INCIDENT, isolated. Let's remember that it was the USN decision not to send a battleline of brand new RDFC battleships to intercept lonely Yamato on the basis that it was safer to send planes. Why? It would be "cheaper" in loses, which implies that they expected to have severe damage (or tragical damage) if one of the carrier escorts got hit by Yamato. Basically it is the only reason that makes sense. Isn't it?

[Karl Heidenreich]

Byron:

WASHINGTON engaged KIRISHIMA with radar ranging and optical train, aided by 5in star shells after the second salvo. It was a clear night with prominent landmarks visible at 12 sea miles even after the setting of the moon. No searchlights or flares were involved in this engagement. Nevertheless, WASHINGTON had remained unseen by the Japanese until it opened fire on KIRISHIMA.

Sorry, by flares I meant the starshells. The fact remains that Washington got RDFC aided by conventional targeting methods in order to nail old Kirishima.

[lwd]

lwd:

What tricks?

Yours. You like a lawyer, not someone discussing technical things...

That's your opinion. I am not in agreement with it.
]quote]

So straddling a DD at over 35,000 yards is the same as straddling one at under 15,000 yards? I don't think so. Who by the way said anything about "scientific certainty"?

Both were in excess of 30 K yards, one with RDFC and one without it. However I'm not claiming that Yamato's Leyte straddles confirm anything with the exception that it confirms that the USN straddles on Nowaki are far from conclusive.
[/quote]
I've seen nothing to indicate that Yamato straddled any DDs at over 30,000 yards. There are indications that she did straddle a CVE at just over that range however the CVE was not maneuvering evasivly nor was it moving very fast. I haven't seen anything to indicate whether or not she got additional straddles at this range. This was close to the theoretical max range of her optics so while good shooting hardly compares with multiple straddles of a fast evading destroyer at over 35,000 yards.

No it wasn't designed in general to "withstand the punishment of its own guns". It was designed to resist those guns at certain ranges and under certain conditions. Not the same thing at all. Note that parts of her like all battleships were subject to damage by even smaller guns. Hiei and Bismarck provide rather graphic examples of that.

Rethorical, as usual. The implication comes to the point that Yamato was pretty much armoured than Iowa, period. It could stand more punishment.

No not rehtorical at all. You implied a lot more than Yamato being better armored than Iowa. If that's all you had said I wouldn't have disagreed with you.

Feel free. But the point that I have tried to make in this context is a 16" shell that hits is going to do a lot more damage than an 18.1 that misses.

You Americans as so dam arrogant.

Another opinion and a rather derogatory and off topic one. Worth what I paid for it though.

.... You DO NOT KNOW, for a fact, that Yamato will miss.

When have I said she would. What I do know is that over 30,000 yards Iowa has a significantly better p(h) than Yamato. The same would hold true in rain, fog, at night, or firing through smoke.

We KNORW for a fact that South Dak DID MISS a barn at 8 K yards using RDFC against multiple targets.

We also know that this was early in the war and that there was a confused radar picture at the time. Indeed a stronger case could probably be made by siteing the "battle of the pips". However the same can hardly be expected from a crew that is worked up and very familiar with their equipment.

We DO NOT KNOW, for a fact, if the Nowaki incident was more than that: an INCIDENT, isolated.

Yes an "INCIDENT" but one that rather graphically demonstrates the potential of late war US battleships in long range engagements.

Let's remember that it was the USN decision not to send a battleline of brand new RDFC battleships to intercept lonely Yamato on the basis that it was safer to send planes. Why? It would be "cheaper" in loses, which implies that they expected to have severe damage (or tragical damage) if one of the carrier escorts got hit by Yamato. Basically it is the only reason that makes sense. Isn't it?

No, because it is incorrect. For one thing the battleships they would have sent weren't the "carrier escorts". Nor does it mean that they expected said damage. Indeed the likelyhood is that they thought there was a significant chance that some of the escorts to the battleships would take damage and or recieve significant casualties. Given the respect for Japanese torpedoes that the US had by that time this was certainly justified.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Just going to discuss this because the rest Lee help me answering them:

No, because it is incorrect. For one thing the battleships they would have sent weren't the "carrier escorts". Nor does it mean that they expected said damage. Indeed the likelyhood is that they thought there was a significant chance that some of the escorts to the battleships would take damage and or recieve significant casualties. Given the respect for Japanese torpedoes that the US had by that time this was certainly justified.

The "carrier escorts" didn't have a lot to escort about because the only threat was Yamato. Maybe some kamikazes but cruisers and destroyers could take of that, too. It's clever of your answer, as rethorical as ever, to point out that "there was a significant chance that some of the escorts to the battleships would take damage and or recieve significant casualties" which says, literaly, that the battleships themselves were free of being damaged. If the Yamato would face an enemy battleline I doubt she will target a cruiser or a destroyer before than New Jersey or Alabama, it can only occur in the distorsionate USN fan mentality to even said such a thing! And the issue of the torpedos cannot be an issue, eh Lee? Because the USN vessels with RDFC could target any incoming destroyer or cruiser at 30K yards, well before they can launch any torpedo... umh... like Nowaki, don't you think?
Basically they didn't sent them because it was obvious that none one of them could withstand a 18" hit, or several of them, and be "inmune".

[Byron Angel]

The "carrier escorts" didn't have a lot to escort about because the only threat was Yamato. Maybe some kamikazes but cruisers and destroyers could take of that, too.

..... The new US BB's were the principal AAA escorts to the fast carriers. To have withdrawn them in the face of the ongoing and sustained Japanese Kamikaze campaign would have dangerously exposed the fast carriers, which could be put out of action by a single well delivered kamikaze strike. Your suggestion that the kamikaze threat was mild enough to rely upon AAA protection from cruisers and destroyers suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the true situation. At the very time that YAMATO was under attack, a Japanese kamikaze attack against the US fleet off Okinawa scored hits on USS HANCOCK, USS MARYLAND, and heavily damaged destroyer USS BENNETT. HANCOCK was forced to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs and was out of action (including transit times) for approximately four months. USS MARYLAND was likewise returned to stateside for repair and overhaul and did not return until the end of the war in August. Those were the effects of a single raid WITH the BB's escorting the fast carriers.

Basically they didn't sent them because it was obvious that none one of them could withstand a 18" hit, or several of them, and be "inmune".

..... The fast BB's were not sent because (a) they had a more important task to pursue, and (b) a MUCH better solution for the YAMATO threat was easily at hand. The air strike sank YAMATO for the loss of only 10 aircraft and 12 men.

[Karl Heidenreich]

..... The new US BB's were the principal AAA escorts to the fast carriers. To have withdrawn them in the face of the ongoing and sustained Japanese Kamikaze campaign would have dangerously exposed the fast carriers, which could be put out of action by a single well delivered kamikaze strike. Your suggestion that the kamikaze threat was mild enough to rely upon AAA protection from cruisers and destroyers suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the true situation. At the very time that YAMATO was under attack, a Japanese kamikaze attack against the US fleet off Okinawa scored hits on USS HANCOCK, USS MARYLAND, and heavily damaged destroyer USS BENNETT. HANCOCK was forced to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs and was out of action (including transit times) for approximately four months. USS MARYLAND was likewise returned to stateside for repair and overhaul and did not return until the end of the war in August. Those were the effects of a single raid WITH the BB's escorting the fast carriers.

That is correct but not necesarily to be done so. We have events in which that premise was not respected, as in Leyte where Halsey left un protected all of Kinkaid's units for a joyride against a Japanese diversion. Leyte was far more dangerous for the USN than Okinawa ever was. Anyway the USN had enough units to perform both missions at the same time. Also the US battleships could target, straddle and hit Yamato at 35K yards at the first salvoe and the superheavies will penetrate their enemy's armour quite easily, so there was not much danger, isn't it?

[alecsandros]

This is a very interesting situation: Operation Ten-Go.
As Karl said, the US navy decided to destroy Yamato by air power, and not by gun power.
Of course it may have been a "maximum utility " decision, i.e. fewest possible losses/biggest possible damage. But maybe the USN had a glimpse of Yamato's size and power? (I'm not sure at all this is the case; I;m asking you guys )

After all, Musashi's resistance at Leyte may have raised an eye-brow or two... Maybe they knew this was the same class?

[Dave Saxton]

I read an article by Malcom Muir in a Journal a few years ago. Muir presents evidence that the USN (at flag command levels only) did have a pretty good idea about Yamato about mid 44.