Long Range Gunnery

[Karl Heidenreich]

I read an article by Malcom Muir in a Journal a few years ago. Muir presents evidence that the USN (at flag command levels only) did have a pretty good idea about Yamato about mid 44.

If that's so and inteligence was shared then we have a perfect explanation for the reluctance of the USN to send their RDFC / superheavy equipped numerical superior battleline to tackle a single enemy unit. It is clear that they, in contrast of this forum USN fans, were concerned that in going down the Yamato could take some of their in the process.

[Byron Angel]

We have events in which that premise was not respected, as in Leyte where Halsey left un protected all of Kinkaid's units for a joyride against a Japanese diversion. Leyte was far more dangerous for the USN than Okinawa ever was. Anyway the USN had enough units to perform both missions at the same time. Also the US battleships could target, straddle and hit Yamato at 35K yards at the first salvoe and the superheavies will penetrate their enemy's armour quite easily, so there was not much danger, isn't it?

..... With all due respect, Karl. I think you are viewing this issue with a certain degree of selective hindsight. Halsey did not know that the Japanese carriers were a sacrificial ruse. He perceived the Japanese carrier force in the north as the principal threat to the Leyte landing effort and acted to engage it. IMO Halsey brought the six fast BB's with him because he ws anticipating a big carrier engagement and the fast BB's were powerful and important AAA components necessary for the protection of the carriers and the only such ships with the necessary cruising speed and endurance to accompany the carriers on a high speed intercept.

At the time Halsey cast his decision to dash north, MUSASHI has been sunk and Kurita had been seen to turn his force away in retreat. I'm not trying to craft an exculpation of Halsey. He was plainly taken in by the Japanese ruse and failed to consider the possibility that Kurita might (and in fact did) re-enter the fray. But Halsey's decision was based upon logical reasoning.

In my opinion, any engagement between YAMATO and the US fast BB's would have been relatively short and unfavorable to YAMATO. YAMATO would have faced at least three or four US BB's which would have inundated YAMATO with divisional fire concentration. If the visibility was good, the US BB's would have used their 4 knot speed superiority to maintain a long range where their fire control radar was more accurate in ranging than YAMATO's optical range-finder system (IIRC, YAMATO also had her own FC radar outfit by this time). I suspect that YAMATO would have been crushed in fairly short order by firepower odds of 3:1 or so.


Byron

[Karl Heidenreich]

Byron:

Good points indeed. However:

At the time Halsey cast his decision to dash north, MUSASHI has been sunk and Kurita had been seen to turn his force away in retreat. I'm not trying to craft an exculpation of Halsey. He was plainly taken in by the Japanese ruse and failed to consider the possibility that Kurita might (and in fact did) re-enter the fray. But Halsey's decision was based upon logical reasoning.

If my memory do not fail me with Willmott's book, there was an aerial warning that Kurita turned eastwards and heading to Samar. Halsey's orders were clear that protecting Kinkaid's fleet was his area of responsability. He went to the North on his own and when Kinkaid's asked for help he did not even ackowledged or answered until the situation was clear that he fell into a Japanese diversion, but by then there was nothing he could do. But Halsey was well, Halsey and he never received any heat on that.

In my opinion, any engagement between YAMATO and the US fast BB's would have been relatively short and unfavorable to YAMATO. YAMATO would have faced at least three or four US BB's which would have inundated YAMATO with divisional fire concentration. If the visibility was good, the US BB's would have used their 4 knot speed superiority to maintain a long range where their fire control radar was more accurate in ranging than YAMATO's optical range-finder system (IIRC, YAMATO also had her own FC radar outfit by this time). I suspect that YAMATO would have been crushed in fairly short order by firepower odds of 3:1 or so.

If seems that the USN command was not as optimistic as your statement reflects. I do concur that the numerical superiority would have been determinant in favour of the allies but the perception of the threat was enough for a aerial only attack. The USN admirals must knew what they were doing in these case...

[lwd]

Just going to discuss this because the rest Lee help me answering them:

No, because it is incorrect. For one thing the battleships they would have sent weren't the "carrier escorts". Nor does it mean that they expected said damage. Indeed the likelyhood is that they thought there was a significant chance that some of the escorts to the battleships would take damage and or recieve significant casualties. Given the respect for Japanese torpedoes that the US had by that time this was certainly justified.

The "carrier escorts" didn't have a lot to escort about because the only threat was Yamato. Maybe some kamikazes but cruisers and destroyers could take of that, too.

Looks like it was a bit more complicated than I thought. According to wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ten-Go

... Upon receiving contact reports early on April 7, U.S. Fifth Fleet commander Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered the gunfire support force under Admiral Morton Deyo, composed of old battleships mostly salvaged from Pearl Harbor, to intercept and destroy the Japanese task force. Deyo moved to execute his orders, but Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 preempted Deyo by launching air strikes without orders from Spruance. [14]
... Around 10:00 on April 7, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 began launching almost 400 aircraft in several waves from eight carriers (TG 58.1: Hornet, Bennington, Belleau Wood, San Jacinto; TG 58.3 Essex, Bunker Hill, Hancock and Bataan) that were located just east of Okinawa. .... A force of six battleships (Massachusetts, Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Missouri), supported by cruisers (including Alaska and Guam) and destroyers, was also assembled to intercept the Japanese fleet if the airstrikes did not succeed.

It's clever of your answer, as rethorical as ever, to point out that "there was a significant chance that some of the escorts to the battleships would take damage and or recieve significant casualties" which says, literaly, that the battleships themselves were free of being damaged.

Your inference is correct. It is highly unlikly that Yamato would have been able to hit one of the US battleships in this situaiton.

If the Yamato would face an enemy battleline I doubt she will target a cruiser or a destroyer before than New Jersey or Alabama, it can only occur in the distorsionate USN fan mentality to even said such a thing!

She would be unlikely to see an opposing battleship. The intercept would likely have been at night. If not the US battleships had practiced firing through smoke screens laid by their escorting destroyers.

And the issue of the torpedos cannot be an issue, eh Lee? Because the USN vessels with RDFC could target any incoming destroyer or cruiser at 30K yards, well before they can launch any torpedo... umh... like Nowaki, don't you think?

I think you are going overboard on the strawmen. For one thing I've never said it was easy to hit a maneuvering DD with battleship main guns at any range. Furthermore the US destroyers and cruisers by doctrine would be between the US BBs and Yamato. And Yamato is likely to get the bulk of the attention as long as she's around. Note that at least one US DD was hit by "friendly" fire at Surigao. The cruiser line and US DD's would likely be able to take care of any Japanese DDs that went for the battleships but themselves would be vulnerable to torpedo hits and the outside chance of a hit from Yamato. Of course looking at the force that was likely to go after her I don't see Yamato being operational for very long.

Basically they didn't sent them because it was obvious that none one of them could withstand a 18" hit, or several of them, and be "inmune".

No where have I claimed that US BBs were immune to damage from the Japanese 18.1" guns. However that doesn't mean that they couldn't survive a hit by one or even several hits. In this case however they would hardly be likely to have to.

[lwd]

I read an article by Malcom Muir in a Journal a few years ago. Muir presents evidence that the USN (at flag command levels only) did have a pretty good idea about Yamato about mid 44.

This article makes a similar case:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-084.htm

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Your overconfidence is more than than astonishing. If your points are true then there was no reason, whatsoever, for not sending the BB battleline to destroy Yamato, it would have been a joyride as you put it. You are too inteligent to believe such a lie.

[tommy303]

One of the reasons for the decision to launch the airstrike rather than use Deyo's battle line was Deyo's ships only had 20 rounds per gun AP. The rest was HiCap for bombardment purposes. Deyo's ships were the old dreadnoughts of the bombardment force and in preparation he had withdrawn them from naval fire support and had begun practicing battle evolutions when word came in that Yamato was on her way. Meanwhile, Mitscher had fueled and armed his planes and in fact had launched them for the airstrike. When the last was airborne, He radioed Spruance to tell him he was ready and could strike Yamato at about 12 noon unless otherwise directed. He added, " you want me to take the or do you?" Spruance radioed back, "You take them."

[Karl Heidenreich]

20 AP rounds per gun per all the ships of the battleline, using this Nowaki proof philosophy, would bave been more than enough to nail and sink Yamato. According to lwd the USN battlewagons could fire blind with 99.99% accuracy beyond 30 K yards, at night that they will hit on the first against such a huge defenseless target AND penetrate the vitals, no sweat. 20 rounds are twenty salvoes which would sink Yamato... just see how easily Bismarck sunk by gunfire after 2,000+ shells fired against her. Obviously Friedman, Raven, Garzke, Skulsky and the rest are completely wrong and ONLY navweaps sources (despite the back less grounds they have) are to be followed. The fact the USN battleships, specially the new so called "fast ones", never fought a single battle against any enemy equivalent battleship is of no regard here...

[lwd]

lwd:

Your overconfidence is more than than astonishing. If your points are true then there was no reason, whatsoever, for not sending the BB battleline to destroy Yamato, it would have been a joyride as you put it. You are too inteligent to believe such a lie.

What "overconfidence"? I have also noted that there would be significant risk to the escorting vessels. Then there's the pollitcs of the carrier admirals wanting to take their shot. Oh and there's also the impact on the AA defences of the transport fleet if you draw off that many warships for that long. I don't see any "lie" here for me to believe in.

[lwd]

20 AP rounds per gun per all the ships of the battleline, using this Nowaki proof philosophy, would bave been more than enough to nail and sink Yamato.

Strawman. I neither said nor implied that.

According to lwd the USN battlewagons could fire blind with 99.99% accuracy beyond 30 K yards,

I never said anything like that. Please don't put words in my mouth like this agian. It's contemptable. The rest of your post merits no response.

[Dave Saxton]

What ships did Deyo's battleline have? I think it was mostly or all 14" guns. The Colorado class did not use the 16" super heavy shell.

If this enccounter was likely to come off at night then that raises interesting questions. Would the same doctrines as daylight be in play?

I don't think we can assume that Yamato and its consorts would find themselves helpless in a night battle. This was the IJN after all. The Yamato and its consorts had MK2Model2 radar, and while not fully blind fire capable by itself, the additional Mk2Model1 sets was mounted to the main director, and so could supply additional bearing data if needed. Together these radars gave Yamato some night radar fighting capability that had had been worked up previously. It cannot be known for sure that Yamato did not have a Mk3Model2 option by then as well.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Karl Heidenreich wrote:

20 AP rounds per gun per all the ships of the battleline, using this Nowaki proof philosophy, would bave been more than enough to nail and sink Yamato.

Strawman. I neither said nor implied that.

No?

Your inference is correct. It is highly unlikly that Yamato would have been able to hit one of the US battleships in this situaiton.

She would be unlikely to see an opposing battleship. The intercept would likely have been at night. If not the US battleships had practiced firing through smoke screens laid by their escorting destroyers.

What "overconfidence"?

You are confusing several concepts here. One is "that something could happen" with "something will happen". You are the one getting overboard not with strawman but with neglible arguments. I don't think that even the naveweaps sacred cows will go as far as giving for a FACT something that could be JUST AN OPINION. You point out that the USN battleships could score, even without being detected, without any source or back up aside from your expert opinion. That's because you are going for the nominal or facial value of what you think is in front of you. You point out that those battleships would never even get a single hit with the same overconfidence which makes Denmark Straits a clasical: the british never thought that their main battlecruiser will blow up sky hight. But there are many other factors that, as Dave Saxton point out, may change things and not a bit but a lot. There are factors that made the admirals made their decisions the way they did instead of your way.

Every time one builds a case you cannot answer then you shout "strawman" and hide behind that. Remember the Tiger vs. Sherman argument in which, at the end, you yourself answered my question about in which one would you be in a 1 vs 1 duel? Remember the Yamato vs Iowa argument? It seems not because you came back, once and again, to the same pre fixed arguments, carbon copy of old and out of date ideas. Fifteen years ago an idea took hold of the USN fans, the idea that Bismarck's might was just a myth and from then on you have been constructing all these theories that cannot stand a scientific rigoruous scrutiny. That is why the Friedman's, Raven's and Garzke's comments are always been left un challenged.

Bottom line: it is obvious that Yamato would be sunk by Deyo's battleline. It is obvious, also, that is not a ride to the park, piece of cake. It is more than likely that Yamato (if not by a particular super lucky hit) could achieve straddle in one or several enemies and, by inference, it could produce hit (or hits) on them. Not a single USN battleship (or for that effect any battleship on Earth) was prepared for an 18" real heavy hit from Yamato. It is obvious that the RDFC from USN battleships could be determinant in getting early hits. It is also obvious that Yamato has an incredible favorable IZ against whatever shell the USN would fire at her. If (and look the use of "if') the Yamato survive the first hits from it's oponents she could also get range and hit back. If that's so then we will get a serious problem in the battlewagon that got hit by such a shell. If just one 18" shell penetrate the magazines of one of those battlewagons then it's HMS Hood blowing again. The fact that such a battleship is not a battlecruiser and flies the US flag instead of the Union Jack means nothing to the real heavy shell coming thorugh the weather deck (as once a Japanese bomb did on Arizona and blew it into History and eternity) and perforating the main armoured deck that was never designed to withstand such a shell in the first place, not even the Iowa for this purpose.

Of course, now came the disection, rethorical trick to evade the main argument and discuss on trivial issues, but always evading the punch.

Good night!

[Karl Heidenreich]

Dave Saxton:

What ships did Deyo's battleline have? I think it was mostly or all 14" guns. The Colorado class did not use the 16" super heavy shell.

The USN, as a matter of fact did assemble not one, but two (2) battlelines to fight Yamato. The famous one, that tommy 303 refers to, is:

Task Force 54, Operarion Iceberg, battleline:

BB Idaho, New Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, Colorado

Then, a force of six battleships (Massachusetts, Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Missouri), supported by cruisers (including Alaska and Guam) and destroyers, was also assembled to intercept the Japanese fleet if the airstrikes did not succeed. Of this force we are talking of all brand new battleships.

[lwd]

What ships did Deyo's battleline have? I think it was mostly or all 14" guns. The Colorado class did not use the 16" super heavy shell.

I believe we are looking at essentially the same ships as were at Surigao.

If this enccounter was likely to come off at night then that raises interesting questions. Would the same doctrines as daylight be in play?

I suspect not but am not sure.

I don't think we can assume that Yamato and its consorts would find themselves helpless in a night battle. This was the IJN after all. The Yamato and its consorts had MK2Model2 radar, and while not fully blind fire capable by itself, the additional Mk2Model1 sets was mounted to the main director, and so could supply additional bearing data if needed. Together these radars gave Yamato some night radar fighting capability that had had been worked up previously. It cannot be known for sure that Yamato did not have a Mk3Model2 option by then as well.

The problem with Yamato's radar seems to be that the officers and crew didn't trust it or use it much. Certianly they wouldn't be helpless and if the estimate is right on the 20% AP there's a serious question of when the battle lline would open fire. Furthermore if it's the older ships they can't outrun Yamato. On the otherhand when one looks at the previous engagment Yamashiro never seems to have got a firing solution on the US BBs. While there wouldn't be the ambush like that battle there would also be a lot of DDs and cruisers available to contribute both torpedos, engage the other Japanese ships, and possibly contribute to the topside damage to Yamato.

If it's the task force 58 surface action group (the fast battleships) that's an entirely different matter. Again if the 20% AP rounds is correct for the slow battleships and the decision wasd made to take out Yamato with battleships I wouldn't be surprised to see both groups committed. The USN was seldom adverse to overkill and the more the better.

[lwd]

Your inference is correct. It is highly unlikly that Yamato would have been able to hit one of the US battleships in this situaiton.

She would be unlikely to see an opposing battleship. The intercept would likely have been at night. If not the US battleships had practiced firing through smoke screens laid by their escorting destroyers.

What "overconfidence"?

You are confusing several concepts here. One is "that something could happen" with "something will happen".

I rather think you are confused as to who is confused.

You are the one getting overboard not with strawman but with neglible arguments.

Oh? Where?

I don't think that even the naveweaps sacred cows will go as far as giving for a FACT something that could be JUST AN OPINION. You point out that the USN battleships could score, even without being detected, without any source or back up aside from your expert opinion.

I don't think I've listed any opinions as facts. As for scoring without being detected. I didn't say that and I think it rather unlikely. However it is quite clear that they could get hits when their opponents were unable to aquirre (ie see) them. Surigao was a classic example. There are also a number of cruiser actions that also illustrate this. I'm sure for instance that at least some on the Yamashiro noticed the horizon lighting up when the US battleships fired on her which would have been a bit before she got hit. However that did her little good. There have also been a fair number of posts on this board that demonstrate the ability of RDFC and in particular US RDFC to aquire targets in cases where visual acquisition was difficult or impossible. I didn't think it necessary to repost all of this as I am sure you and most if not all the other regulars here are well aware of it.

That's because you are going for the nominal or facial value of what you think is in front of you. You point out that those battleships would never even get a single hit with the same overconfidence which makes Denmark Straits a clasical: the british never thought that their main battlecruiser will blow up sky hight. But there are many other factors that, as Dave Saxton point out, may change things and not a bit but a lot. There are factors that made the admirals made their decisions the way they did instead of your way.

I didn't say that Yamato wouldn't get a hit on a US battleship I said it was unlikly and it was. Especially if the fast battleships were there. Given what they knew or suspected about the Yamato at the time there would be little reason for them not to open fire at well over 30,000 yards. If they open fire at say 35,000 yards and don't attempt to either close or open the range Yamato can only close at something under 1,000 yardspe rminute. If they steer a course 30 degrees away that cuts her closure rate to under 500 yards a minute. At night or even during daylight Yamato isn't going to be able to spot fall of shot at much over 30,000 yards if that. The situation is even worse if the US is using smoke which was part of the US skill set at the time. As for Yamato's radar Japanese doctrien was to limt its use and at least at Leyte the crew of the Yamato didn't trust their radar nor did they practice much with it and appear not to have used it there even though it would have been of some value given the rain squals and smoke. In this situtation the Yamato is going to be recieving at least 5 (1,000 yard/minute closure rate) or 10 (500 yard/minute closure rate) salvos before she can open up. If the p(H) is as little as 4% and she's taking fire from the 6 US fast battleshisp that implies 2 hits per salvo so 10 to 20 hits at that point I rather suspect she's not going to be in top condition anymore. Note my assumptions above are pretty conservative.

Every time one builds a case you cannot answer then you shout "strawman" and hide behind that.

No. I call "strawman" when you produce one. A strawman is when you claim I made an easily refutable argument that I didn't make.

Remember the Tiger vs. Sherman argument in which, at the end, you yourself answered my question about in which one would you be in a 1 vs 1 duel?

But of course that was hardly the orignial question was it? The question was which was best and from the view point of a division, an army, or a country that answer is not the same.

Remember the Yamato vs Iowa argument? It seems not because you came back, once and again, to the same pre fixed arguments, carbon copy of old and out of date ideas.

I do remember it. It seems however that your memory of it differs from mine.

Fifteen years ago an idea took hold of the USN fans, the idea that Bismarck's might was just a myth and from then on you have been constructing all these theories that cannot stand a scientific rigoruous scrutiny.

This is on the edge of being a strawman. From what I can see some think that "Bismarck's might" has been greatly exagerated by others. Clearly this is the case. On the other hand some may have gone too far in the other direction. Certainly there is support for both positions.

That is why the Friedman's, Raven's and Garzke's comments are always been left un challenged.

Usually the problem isn't the quotes it's the interpretation of them.

Bottom line: it is obvious that Yamato would be sunk by Deyo's battleline.

Is it? I personally rather suspect not. The old battleships could render Yamato a useless wreck but I see her sinking to DD torpedoes.

It is obvious, also, that is not a ride to the park, piece of cake.

Is it? Not to me. Certainly the example of Surigao provides contrary evidence.

It is more than likely that Yamato (if not by a particular super lucky hit) could achieve straddle in one or several enemies and, by inference, it could produce hit (or hits) on them.

I disagree. The most likely result is that the US BBs open fire first and Yamato is burried under the weight of incoming shells. She definitly has a better chance here than if the fast battleships are present especially if it is a daylight engagement. In any case I rather suspect the cruisers and DDs in the US fleet will be at more risk than the battle ships. Again Surigao is the model although I could use other examples. Night time is also most likely given Yamato's planned route and timing.

Not a single USN battleship (or for that effect any battleship on Earth) was prepared for an 18" real heavy hit from Yamato.

Who has claimed otherwise?

It is obvious that the RDFC from USN battleships could be determinant in getting early hits. It is also obvious that Yamato has an incredible favorable IZ against whatever shell the USN would fire at her. If (and look the use of "if') the Yamato survive the first hits from it's oponents she could also get range and hit back.

Certainly it's possible. I'm just not convinced that it's likely. Sure she has a good IZ particularly against the 14" and lighter 16" rounds. However that doesn't mean that her upper works and in particular her fire control systems will stand up to the pounding she will get.

... If just one 18" shell penetrate the magazines of one of those battlewagons then it's HMS Hood blowing again.

Possibly but I believe there have been a number of ships that have taken magazine hits and survived. Then there's the quesiton of how many hits are needed before you can expect a magazine hit.

... Of course, now came the disection, rethorical trick to evade the main argument and discuss on trivial issues, but always evading the punch.

It's not difficult to evade a punch that's that far off target. No retorical tricks just fact and logic.