Re: Practical ranges
Posted: Mon Jan 21, 2013 7:16 pm
One of the main limiting factors of radar directed gunfire was the problem of identifying the target on the screen as friendly or hostile. Unless the firing ship has an IFF interrogator and all friendly ships in the area have responders with appropriate codes and are operational (like any other piece of equipment there can be problems which might prevent it from operating properly--battle damage, power failures, etc.), a target on the screen is not necessarily an enemy which should be taken under fire. Thus even with IFF present, a commander would always have a certain amount of doubt and might prefer to make a visual ID before ordering his ship to open fire.
This was a problem, I believe, for the Germans during the Barents Sea action. At Surigao Strait, West Virginia, California, and Tennessee were able to track the oncoming Japanese and obtain early fire solutions, but waited until the range was down to 22--23000 yards before opening fire. The other three of Oldendorf's battleships had less capable radars; Maryland was eventually able to find the target by spotting shell splashes from the other ships, Pennsylvania could not find a target at all, and Mississippi only fired one broadside in the whole action. Why West Virginia, California, and Tennesse waited until the range closed to open fire, even though having obtained solutions earlier, might have been a tactical necessity rather than a limitation imposed by their radars. Oldendorf's battle line had, I believe, been largely assigned to fire support and had only limited amounts of APC on board, and waiting for the range to drop to below 23,000 yards would have assured an adequate hit percentage for the limited stocks of AP ammunition.
This was a problem, I believe, for the Germans during the Barents Sea action. At Surigao Strait, West Virginia, California, and Tennessee were able to track the oncoming Japanese and obtain early fire solutions, but waited until the range was down to 22--23000 yards before opening fire. The other three of Oldendorf's battleships had less capable radars; Maryland was eventually able to find the target by spotting shell splashes from the other ships, Pennsylvania could not find a target at all, and Mississippi only fired one broadside in the whole action. Why West Virginia, California, and Tennesse waited until the range closed to open fire, even though having obtained solutions earlier, might have been a tactical necessity rather than a limitation imposed by their radars. Oldendorf's battle line had, I believe, been largely assigned to fire support and had only limited amounts of APC on board, and waiting for the range to drop to below 23,000 yards would have assured an adequate hit percentage for the limited stocks of AP ammunition.