I have corresponded with Joseph Czarnecki and consider him rather more than highly biased. His entire argument in this article of his is based upon a perceived Japanese "failure" to meet their pre-war estimated hit percentages in a series of engagements that never involved the types of targets anticipated in their planning.
On 27 September 1941, Nelson's port torpedo station almost proved to be a liability when an Italian air-launched 18" torpedo holed the compartment behind the torpedo body room causing 3,750 tons of water to enter the vessel. Following this the Nelson's torpedo capability was said by one reference to have been removed, although according to another, the torpedo tubes were still retained in both ships in 1945.
aurora wrote:Torpedo attack was the cornerstone of the night attack, and a critical element of the day attack intended to rectify Japan’s initial 3:5 and worsening deficit in numbers in
THE JAPNANESE DECISIVE BATTLE PLAN AT NIGHT
The night attack force was to launch an intricately coordinated long-range salvo of 130 torpedoes from 11 different groups using half their ready torpedoes. This salvo was designed to converge upon and hit 10 American capital ships with 20 weapons (a rate of ~15%).
After the initial salvo at long range (20,000 meters), the four Kongo Class battleships and 17 Class A cruisers detailed to the night attack force were to break through the American screen--suicidally if necessary--and clear the way for the force’s two torpedo cruisers and the light cruiser and 14 destroyers of a destroyer squadron to expend the remainder of their ready torpedoes in a close range attack from as little as 2,000 meters.
Once all ready torpedoes were expended, the night attack force was to fight its way clear, reload torpedoes, and execute further attacks if possible. Survivors would eventually join the battle line for the “Decisive Battle” at dawn.
Further information to be found via the link provided
. In the early battles in which torpedoes were dominant (Java Sea & Sunda Strait) the IJN most certainly did not adhere to firing half-salvos at all...For the most part they fired everything they could when they could.
Regarding the Bismarck: There are absolutely no indications/observations from either the British or the Germans that Rodney's torpedoes hit their target - this possibly is as close as possible to 'Categorically'.
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