Steve-M wrote:The British appeared to have some trouble with their magnetic pistol as well, at least in the case of trying to torpedo HMS Sheffield. Of course, what makes the American case special was BuOrd's initial response in assuming their sub skippers were incompetents who didn't know how to handle torpedoes.
VoidSamukai wrote:So basically, until the US Navy got around adressing the problem, their torps were the worst. They could go off course, go off before they reach the target and those that do hit usually dont explode.
VoidSamukai wrote:Okay then, that's one more to how US Early torps suck.
As for the best, in terms of killing ships like cruisers and DDs, would I be wrong to count the Japanese Type 93 as a good canadate for one of the strongest torps?
Steve-M wrote:The Type 93 was certainly a potent weapon, so much so that the Allies didn't really realize its potential at first. Of course, even the Type 93 had its faults, namely in terms of safety. The crews were extensively trained in safe handling and the tubes were given some protection from splinters; however, at least a few heavy cruisers were seriously damaged or lost as a result of torpedoes cooking off.
It's also notable that for reasons unknown, the Type 93 didn't connect with SoDak at Guadalcanal, in spite of the ship being blind, deaf, and dumb in the words of Admiral Lee. Indeed, there's some irony that the Type 93 never took any big game aside from USS Hornet, which was already dead/abandoned.
Steve Crandell wrote:The submarine version scored an impressive success. Wasp, O'Brien, and North Carolina were all hit by the same spread of type 95 torpedoes. Wasp was sunk and O'Brien sank later under tow, and North Carolina was out of action for several months.
Steve Crandell wrote:The reason more US Battleships were not hit is there were none in any off the surface engagements around Guadalcanal except one, and they got the destroyers in that one.
Byron Angel wrote:Two-thirds of warship losses suffered by the Allies in the Solomons campaign came at the hands of the Type 93 Long Lance torpedo. One can argue, with truth, that much of this success was due to the intensive pre-war IJN preparation and training for night combat. But much of the success of IJN torpedo attacks was a function of USN commanders placing themselves in exposed tactical positions on the basis of a mistaken belief that Japanese torpedoes possessed performance characteristics similar their own USN types. This aspect was directly attributable to the Type 93's prodigiously superior speed versus range performance characteristics.
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