What happened in DS?I am going to read up on this as it says a lot which can apply about what happened at Denmark Straits.
It would requiere a totally new torpedo. The German could develop the GNAT because they already had an electric torpedo, adding the sonar and the guidance was quiet simple. But the Long Lance had no bateries. They would have to choose between:Firing at such unbelievably long ranges would have been a much more viable matter if the integral acoustic guidance system developed by the Germans for the "Gnat" could have been fitted to the Long Lance.
Good Idea! Worth trading a bit of payload and/or a bit of fuel.-maintaining the propulsion system and addind bateries just for the sonar and guidance electronics
At DS the Torpedo Officer could see it was obvious the British would change course radically in a few moments, so there was no point in wasting shots. I think the Prinz's Captain under Hood's fire was quite keen to get rid of hundreds of kgs of virtually unprotected explosives sitting on his upper deck as soon as possible.In the case of DS I think that the minimum distance achieved in the engagement would barely allowed their use, and the probability of a hit were minimal.
How many of those were close range shots against unaware non-manoeuvring merchantmen? Some even at night from the surface a few hundred metres away.the Uboats achived a 20% hit rate, which is quiet high, specially comparing to artillery.
Most of them!How many of those were close range shots against unaware non-manoeuvring merchantmen? Some even at night from the surface a few hundred metres away.
I recommend to read something new, like a T.Womack's book about Java battle:HvKleist wrote: ↑Sat May 04, 2019 4:59 pmWe know that the torpedo which hit & sank KORTENAER was from HAGURO because that salvo was launched ~20 mins later than the 43 launched earlier by DesRon 4/NAKA + DDs.
And the next large torpedo salvo launch (by DesRon 2/JINTSU + DDs) was not for another 30-40 mins, or so.
Looks like most long lances exploded, the salvo itself was unaimed. What chance to hit something by such salvo? Unlikely CA's achieved that success with their ill-prepared crews."Captain Nagasawa, repeatedly pressed Captain Horie, "Not yet Chief Torpedo Officer?" Clearly unhappy with the answer he snapped, "Open them! Hurry up!" Again the crewman reported that the valves refused to budge. At 1652, Captain Nasagawa finally lost patience with Nachi and Horie and ordered Haguro to launch on her own. Her target was the Houston at range of some 22,000 yards. As soon as the torpedoes went into the water, several exploded almost immediately. So did most of the others after a short run, creating monstrous columns of water in the open ocean. The Japanese were initially mystified. The 5th Cruiser Squadron action report credited the explosions to timer controlled Allied torpedoes, large-caliber super cannons or a controlled mine field controlled from Bawean. Not until later was it determined that Haguro had fired her torpedoes with little regard to angle, target speed or other key variables inherent to a successful torpedo attack. In the end, Nachi was unable to launch any torpedoes and Captain Horie was thoroughly humiliated, both personally and professionally. After the battle the "locked" valves were found to have a deceptively simple fix. As it turned out, they had already been fully opened and no one noticed in the heat of the battle."
Hi Marcelo,marcelo_malara wrote: ↑Fri May 10, 2019 8:46 pmThat already exists:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_93_t ... 93_torpedo
Can we compile the number of torpedoes fired to achive this?
and 2 on USS Northampton resulting in her sinking.USS Minneapolis - hit by 2 Type 93s, had to return stateside for repairs and was out of service until Sep 1943 (10 months)
USS New Orleans - hit by 1 Type 93, had to return stateside for repairs and was out of servie until Aug 1943 (9 months)
USS Pensacola - hit by 1 Type 93, had to return stateside for repairs and was out of service until No 1943 (12 months)
The vanguard American destroyers had wanted to fire at 7,000 yds on approaching targets, so actual runs would have been shorter but were ordered to wait. In the event all 20 missed because they had passed their enemies' beam and so they were overtaking shots. Tanaka's cruiser targets were in line ahead, 1000 yds between ships. Some of his ships fired before reversing course, some after so ranges varied. The article says Minneapolis was hit at 23:27 probably by torpedoes fired by Suzukaze, only 4 minutes previously, whereas Northampton's hits were at 23:48 having apparently been fired by Kawakazi at 23:33, ie a 15 minute run time. Northampton had apparently stolidly deviated by as little as possible from the line of battle course and speed, and duly paid the price. Honolulu manoeuvred radically, increased speed and came through unscathed, as her measures rendered the Japanese fire control solution obsolete.The Americans were still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes and the effectiveness of Japanese night battle tactics. In fact, Wright claimed that his ships must have been fired on by submarines since the observed position of Tanaka's ships "make it improbable that torpedoes with speed-distance characteristics similar to our own" could have caused such damage, though Tanaka states that his torpedoes were fired at a range as short as three miles. The Americans did not recognize the true capabilities of their Pacific adversary's torpedoes (particularly the surface-ship-fired Type 93 "Long Lance") and night tactics until well into 1943.