Leyte gulf

Naval and military history books, recent releases, magazines, related documents, articles, etc.
paul.mercer
Senior Member
Posts: 647
Joined: Fri Mar 26, 2010 10:25 pm

Leyte gulf

Post by paul.mercer » Mon Aug 05, 2013 8:31 pm

Gentlemen,
Can anyone recommend a book on the naval battle at Leyte Gulf?

User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7525
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: Leyte gulf

Post by RF » Thu Oct 10, 2013 8:28 am

This is an interesting question and I'm struggling to think of an answer. The problem here I think is that Midway tends to be seen as the decisive naval battle in this theatre and because of that it overshadows the Philippine Sea and Leyte battles.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.

Thorsten Wahl
Senior Member
Posts: 669
Joined: Mon Apr 27, 2009 4:17 pm

Re: Leyte gulf

Post by Thorsten Wahl » Sat Oct 12, 2013 4:29 pm

Accession Number : ADA501937
Title : Tarnished Victory: Divided Command in the Pacific and its Consequences in the Naval Battle for Leyte Gulf
Descriptive Note : Master's thesis
Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
Personal Author(s) : Drew, James P.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA501937
Report Date : 12 JUN 2009
Pagination or Media Count : 75
Abstract : The Battle for Leyte Gulf in October 1944 was the largest naval battle of World War II, both in terms of the number of ships involved and the expanse of area the battle covered. The battle was a decisive victory for the Allied Forces, who effectively crushed the might of the Japanese Navy for the remainder of the war. The Joint Chiefs made the decision to keep command in the Pacific divided in the early months of the war. The Joint Chiefs were presented with opportunities to resolve this problematic command structure as the war progressed, but they chose to perpetuate the division. This decision directly contributed to disunity of effort, differing objectives, poor communication, and tragically, the unnecessary loss of life during the Battle off Samar.


Accession Number : ADA003026
Title : The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume I. Preliminary Operations until 0719 October 17th, 1944 Including Battle off Formosa
Descriptive Note : Battle evaluation rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Bates, Richard W.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA003026
Report Date : 1953
Pagination or Media Count : 597
Abstract : An in-depth study of the preliminary phases was deemed necessary to an understanding of the developments leading to the Allied victory at Leyte Gulf. This volume provides such an analytical examination. Based on Allied and Japanese Data, it scrutinizes the initial moves in this engagement, including reconnaissance and deployments, then proceeds to a particularized account of the opening actions from 9 October to the morning of 17 October 1944. Notable is the treatment of the forays in the Ryukyus and off Formosa, which served the strategic purpose of incapacitating Japanese air power and preventing the use of Formosa and its air potential in the struggle for Leyte. Here are demonstrated the capabilities of Allied carrier-based aircraft opposing Japanese land-based air forces.


Accession Number : ADA003027
Title : Diagrams of the Battle for Leyte Gulf October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume I. Preliminary Operations until 0719 October 17th Including Battle off Formosa
Descriptive Note : Battle evaluation rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Bates, Richard W.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA003027
Report Date : 1953
Pagination or Media Count : 84
Abstract : This separate section provides diagrams and chronologies of the events therein depicted for the air searches and movements of force in the preliminary operations of the Battle for Leyte Gulf from 10 October to 0719, 17 October 1944.


Accession Number : ADA003028
Title : The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume II. Operations from 0719 October 17th until October 20th (D- Day)
Descriptive Note : Battle evaluation rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Bates, Richard W.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA003028
Report Date : 1955
Pagination or Media Count : 554
Abstract : This second volume in the chronology of the Battle for Leyte Gulf follows immediately upon the preliminary stages covered in Volume I, a study of which is vital to an understanding of these later developments. It focuses on the operations of the Seventh Fleet advance forces in Leyte Gulf preceding D-Day and on the Japanese responses to these moves. The Allied offensive and Japanese defensive missions are defined and their implementation described in detail. Diagrams and explanatory records of events depicted therein follow the main text.


Accession Number : ADA003029
Title : The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume III. Operations from 0000 October 20th (D-day) until 1042 October 23rd
Descriptive Note : Battle evaluation rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Bates, Richard W.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA003029
Report Date : 1957
Pagination or Media Count : 1102
Abstract : Volume 3 in the analysis of the operations conducted in the Battle for Leyte Gulf comprises the chronological record of the Allied and Japanese actions from 20-23 October, during which the Southwest Pacific Area forces, supported by Pacific Ocean Area forces, captured footholds in the Leyte Gulf region of the Philippines. The prior phases dealt with in Volumes 1 and 2 are essential to a comprehension of these later developments in the course of the battle.

Accession Number : ADA003030
Title : The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume V. Battle of Surigao Strait October 24th-25th
Descriptive Note : Battle evaluation rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Bates, Richard W.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA003030
Report Date : 1958
Pagination or Media Count : 1089
Abstract : Based on Allied and Japanese records and data, this volume recounts the chronology of the operations of both sides in the Battle of Surigao Strait. In this engagement, which was part of the major Battle for Leyte Gulf, the steps are shown whereby the Japanese Third Section was virtually destroyed and their Second Striking Force was compelled to withdraw. A section of diagrams with accompanying explanatory texts follows the main body of the analysis.

Accession Number : ADA209582
Title : SHO-1 versus KING II - Victory at Leyte Gulf - Was it United States Luck or Japanese Mistakes?
Descriptive Note : Study project
Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Personal Author(s) : Crowell, Charles D
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA209582
Report Date : 31 Mar 1989
Pagination or Media Count : 89
Abstract : The Battle for Leyte Gulf was the greatest naval battle of all time in terms of number of ships involved, losses of ships and aircraft and size of area over which the battle was fought. The American victory effectively marked the end of the Japanese Navy in World War Two. The battle was marked by furious surface, air and submarine action at sea and fierce fighting ashore on Leyte Island by US Army and Marine ground forces. While U.S. Navy dealt devastating losses to the Japanese fleet and claimed a resounding victory, the battle continues to be discussed for the significant operational, tactical and judgmental errors made by commanders of both sides. This study examines the errors made, the reasons for the errors and the effect the errors had toward deciding the outcome of this battle. It investigates the Japanese plan for the battle and the Japanese philosophy toward the war in 1944 and how these issues affected the outcome. It also considers the American chain of command in the Pacific theater and the problems caused by that unique setup. The paper discusses what we have learned, if anything from Leyte Gulf, and if in a similar situation would we make the same mistakes again. Finally the paper evaluates the composite effect of errors on both sides.

Accession Number : ADA265315
Title : Operations Analysis: The Battle for Leyte Gulf
Descriptive Note : Final rept.,
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS
Personal Author(s) : Robertson, D. C.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA265315
Report Date : 22 FEB 1993
Pagination or Media Count : 32
Abstract : The naval operation at the Battle for Leyte Gulf is analyzed by comparing today's concept of the operational art with the command organizations, operation plans, and operational designs of the U.S. and Japanese naval forces of 1944. The fleet actions are examined to determine the operational failures and to validate current operational principles. The principle finding in examining the planning and execution of the U.S. and Japanese forces is the lack of unity of command, which limited force effectiveness in command, control, and communications.


Accession Number : ADA463797
Title : Halsey at Leyte Gulf: Command Decision and Disunity of Effort
Descriptive Note : Master's thesis Aug 2005-Jun 2006
Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
Personal Author(s) : Coleman, Kent S.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA463797
Report Date : 16 JUN 2006
Pagination or Media Count : 131
Abstract : In October 1944, US forces executed amphibious landings on the Japanese-occupied island of Leyte in the central Philippines. Japanese naval forces, severely outnumbered by the US Third and Seventh Fleets, attempted to stop the invasion by attacking US amphibious shipping in Leyte Gulf. Due to the divided US area commands in the Pacific theater during World War II, the Third and Seventh Fleet commanders, Adm. Halsey and Vice Adm. Kinkaid, reported to separate superiors, Adm. Nimitz and Gen. MacArthur, even though both fleets were supporting the operation. Although the Japanese were soundly defeated, one of the Japanese forces, under Vice Adm. Kurita, nearly reached its objective. Many historians have criticized Halsey for ordering his carrier force to close with a Japanese carrier force that was acting as a decoy, thus leaving the US forces in Leyte Gulf unprotected. Although Halsey was effectively decoyed, the divided US naval chain of command amplified problems in communication and coordination between Halsey and Kinkaid. This divided command was more important in determining the course of the battle than the tactical decision made by Halsey and led to an American disunity of effort that nearly allowed Kurita?s mission to succeed.

Accession Number : ADA144046
Title : The Military Strategies of Spruance and Halsey
Descriptive Note : Student rept.
Corporate Author : AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
Personal Author(s) : Montman, James H.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA144046
Report Date : APR 1984
Pagination or Media Count : 55
Abstract : Presents a review, analysis and comparison of the World War Two military strategies of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance at the Battle of Midway, and Admiral William F. Halsey at the Battle of Leyte Staff College Strategy Process Model.

Accession Number : ADA513946
Title : Intelligence Failure: How a Commander Can Prevent It
Descriptive Note : Final rept.
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
Personal Author(s) : Dahlin, Rob A.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA513946
Report Date : 23 OCT 2009
Pagination or Media Count : 26
Abstract : Intelligence Failure: How a Commander Can Prevent It The job of intelligence is to provide the decision maker with sufficient understanding of the enemy to make the correct decisions on how, where and when to utilize friendly forces to accomplish the mission. To do this, the Intelligence Officer (J2) employs the intelligence process to bring the power of the intelligence community to bear in support of the commander's requirements. During each operation in the intelligence process there are potholes which can result in suboptimal or even faulty intelligence. This paper examines potential intelligence problems so that decision makers can understand what those are and how they or their intelligence officers can take action to avoid or minimize those problems and prevent them from resulting in mission failure. The Battle of Leyte Gulf provides the historical case study examples to reinforce these lessons.

Accession Number : ADA209223
Title : Jointness or Jointless at Leyte
Descriptive Note : Individual study rept.
Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Personal Author(s) : Jefferson, Kenny J.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA209223
Report Date : 31 MAR 1989
Pagination or Media Count : 86
Abstract : This study examines the joint operation ability of the Leyte Campaign during October-December 1944. It bases the evaluation on the principles of war and how they were applied during the Leyte operations. The study addresses the various naval battles during the Leyte Gulf campaign. The Land Campaign is also examined to determine the joint operational support from the navy and the air force. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the joint problems experienced at Leyte and makes an evaluation of the coordination activities of the armed services - whether the activities of their campaigns were a joint effort or a jointless effort.
Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!

User avatar
aurora
Senior Member
Posts: 685
Joined: Thu Jul 12, 2012 2:31 pm
Location: YORKSHIRE

Re: Leyte gulf

Post by aurora » Sat Dec 06, 2014 3:20 pm

ADMIRAL KUTITA'S TURN AWAY

While Kurita headed north at 1300,just as McCain's aircraft came in for their final attack and although they inflicted little damage they did confirm Kurita;s decision to avoid Leyte Gulf but he did continue his search for the American carriers-to thisend he haf called up every aircraft from Luzon but still drew a blank.BY this time his destroyers were low on fuel and Kurita and his staff were utterly exhausted.

Kurita saw retirement from the field of battle as his only alternative.Towards dusk hid Centre Force headed for San Bernardino Strait,which he entered at 21.30.That night they steamed at best possible speed across the Sibuyan Sea. Kurita had escaped with 4BB's,2 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruise along with 7 destroyers-a powerful force for a offensive action.Even though an answer is given above for his action -there is the nagging thought-was that the real reason????

Because there was no enemy to the north, at least nowhere close by. Halsey was still 200 miles away, racing back-too late to try to catch the Japanese. Shortly before dusk, Kurita turned his fleet to the west and passed back through the San Bernardino Strait. The fleet was attacked again the next day (at his post on the bridge wing, Koitabashi was badly wounded by shrapnel; during our interview, he took off his shoe and sock so I could feel the hard piece of metal,a memento of the Yanwn, still under his skin.) Kurita's fleet,halved in size, limped back to Lingaan. The Japanese Imperial Navy was effectively finished as a sea-fighting force.

Second-guessing started right away. In his battle report, Kurita justified his tum away from Leyte to the north on the morning of 25 October, writing he had received a telegram from an airbase at Manila that said a U.S. fleet had been sighted at 0945, 1 10 miles north of the lighthouse at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. That was the enemy fleet Kurita had turned to attack-but there was no U.S. fleet.Naval experts later guessed that a reconnaissance plane from Manila had spotted stragglers from Kurita's own fleet at 0945, which would mean that by circling back to attack,Kurita had in effect been chasing his own tail. No one in Japan has been able to find any record of the actual telegram. Some critics of Kurita suspect he and his staff concocted the telegram as an excuse.

Others wonder if it was a clever ruse by the Americans, who had broken the Japanese code and were capable of sending a false message. Had Halsey, who liked gambits (and whose staff was proudly nicknamed"the Department of Dirty Tlicks"), tried to cover his mistake in leaving the San Bemardino Strait unguarded by sending a false signal to confuse the Japanese? If so,one would think that Halsey's men would have bragged about it after the war; this is a mystery that warrants further investigation.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call

Jim

Post Reply