Matapan

From the Washington Naval Treaty to the end of the Second World War.
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wadinga
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Re: Matapan

Post by wadinga » Thu Jul 11, 2019 12:17 am

Fellow Contributors,

When I find which of these sources
Pollini, Giorgerini or the famous editor of that most excellent journal which only prints the most "correct" material, ERMINIO BAGNASCO
was writing so-called "nonsense", I'll keep all informed.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Matapan

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu Jul 11, 2019 9:41 am

Hello everybody,
while I don't exclude that an Italian writer could have been wrong, please don't forget to check R.Chesneau and J.Rohwer too.... :lol:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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wadinga
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Re: Matapan

Post by wadinga » Thu Jul 11, 2019 11:33 am

Fellow Contributors,

Read before laughing
BTW I've just checked the only English origin reference, Chesneau, in the English language Wikipedia article, and he makes no mention of Ambra's action against Bonaventure, so the origin is clearly one of the Italian authors, Pollini, Giorgerini or the famous editor of that most excellent journal which only prints the most "correct" material, ERMINIO BAGNASCO.
And I've checked Rohwer and Hummelchen, Zippo there too, so we are forced to the conclusion it is one of the Italian authors who has written "nonsense" contradicting official records and primary sources. the Italian authors who has written "nonsense" contradicting official records and primary sources. Deja vue anyone?

Interestingly and returning to the intelligence source element of Matapan, Rohwer & H point out it was an inaccurate German intelligence assessment based on false claims from a Luftwaffe torpedo attack of 16th March, that suggested only one British battleship remained operational, and thus it was a good time for an Italian foray. This was the basis of the bullying message which forced Supermarina to send Iachino to sea and keep the enterprise going even when the northern force was spotted.

All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Matapan

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu Jul 11, 2019 2:45 pm

Hello everybody,

then, apparently, the wikipedia author has picked up from a (largely fantasy) account available in the network or in other books.

I repeat (hopefully for the last time to this insistent forum member who MUST find an Italian author who invented something to vindicate the British authors who wrote about the Denmark Strait...) that I have both the operation orders sent to all the involved commands and the original mission report of Ambra.
Therefore the English version of wikipedia is wrong. Deja vue anyone? Full Stop.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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wadinga
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Re: Matapan

Post by wadinga » Fri Jul 12, 2019 2:54 pm

Fellow Contributors,
I have both the operation orders sent to all the involved commands and the original mission report of Ambra
Do these orders relate to the original mission:
On March 5, 1941 she was deployed along with ten other submarines off Crete to search for British convoys on the route Alexandria to Piraeus. These convoys were a part of Operation "Lustre", an attempt by the British to bring in 58,000 men from Egypt to Greece in anticipation of the German invasion. Ambra failed to detect any enemy ships.
Which was the first occasion when the Mediterranean Fleet sailed through the trap, March 20-24th and returned to Alexandria, or the second return trip when interception also failed?
On March 22, 1941 Ambra together with Ascianghi and Dagabur was sent to patrol along Alexandria - Cape Krio line and arrived in her assigned area on March 24, 1941. The submarines deployed as a defensive screen for the Operation "Gaudo", an anticipated sortie by the Italian fleet into the Aegean which would end with a catastrophe in the Battle of Cape Matapan.
Of course, the submarines were sent out to support of the main operation, but the key (weak) point is that they were not aware of it.
It would indeed be criminally stupid not to inform the submarine trap that Italian surface vessels could have been operating south of Crete, pursuing a defeated British squadron, :wink: thus incurring the danger of a blue on blue incident.



Once again
The submarine suffered damage to a variety of her equipment, including both gyroscopic and magnetic compasses. Once the escorts moved away, Ambra surfaced and using Celestial Navigation made her way back to Augusta.
Who could have invented this level of detail? And why? No British source could know this, it surely can only have come from an Italian source
Does anyone have a copy of "Gaudo e Matapan by Admiral Iachino?

Once again the combative stance,
who MUST find an Italian author who invented something to vindicate the British authors who wrote about the Denmark Strait..
It's not really a MUST, but it would be simply hilarious. Doubly so if it were Bagnasco.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Matapan

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Fri Jul 12, 2019 5:35 pm

Hello everybody,
once again, please read the official documents or stop this discussion that is becoming ridiculous and very embarrassing when using wrong sources....

The orders I speak about are related to the Ambra mission started on March 21 (not 22) (viewtopic.php?f=9&t=8567&start=30#p84188)...

"incurring the danger of a blue on blue incident. "
....no comment...(any suitable comment would be surely redacted)
I have already posted the main operation orders map (download/file.php?id=3540), graphically showing that no incident could happen as the Italian battlefleet was not allowed to get so easterly as the submarines patrol areas.... Study it, please.
Of course the operative orders (of Supermarina to Iachino and the ones from Iachino to the involved Divisions) clearly specify this limitation; we speak about 150 sea miles or more....




Btw, the only fault of Bagnasco is to have been the former director (from 2015 just honorary president...) of a magazine that published Antonio's 2005 battlemap. A map that (ameliorated in 2017) annoys so much Mr.Wadinga... I suggest him to find another map less "annoying" in a new publication...
The only hilarious thing here is the impotent anger against Italian authors, after the British ones (e.g. Kennedy) were found so blatantly wrong....


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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wadinga
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Re: Matapan

Post by wadinga » Sat Jul 13, 2019 9:48 am

Fellow Contributors,
graphically showing that no incident could happen as the Italian battlefleet was not allowed to get so easterly as the submarines patrol areas.... Study it, please.
Moltke the Elder said
No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength
Just because Supermarina drew a turnback point on the assumption of no enemy contact doesn't mean the Commander "had to obey orders". Jellicoe didn't plan to end up off the German coast.

Of course I tend to forget the tendencies of some administrations to interfere with the initiative of commanders at sea. Telling Iachino exactly how far he was allowed to go, even in pursuit of a "flying enemy" going east would be one thing, and telling a submarine commander to remain rooted to his patrol area instead of aggressively chasing and continuously engaging a convoy, or fleet travelling to the west would be another.

I wonder why no comment can be made about the danger of a " blue on blue" incident and therefore the paramount need to keep commanders aware of the potential presence of friendly forces? All navies were just as likely to attack a mistakenly-identified force, especially at night. At Matapan Warspite fired at Havock.

Signor Bagnasco has been a co-author with Enrico Cernuschi of Le navi da guerra italiane 1940-1945.

There is no anger on my part, impotent or otherwise, against Italian authors, or Japanese or Moldavian ones provided they stick to facts and reasonable speculations and don't invent things based on their intuitions, otherwise known as prejudice.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Matapan

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun Jul 14, 2019 7:06 am

Hello everybody,
"Just because Supermarina drew a turnback point on the assumption of no enemy contact doesn't mean the Commander "had to obey orders". "
Sure, as well as Lutjens could have disobeyed orders following PoW after Hood demise....or he could have chosen to sail to the Indian ocean, instead of raiding in Atlantic.... A strange interpretation of "orders"....

Both Iachino and the submarines had their boundaries in terms of longitude and latitude, clearly written in very strict operative orders: no "incident" could have happened (150 or 200 sm are enough to ensure that).
I agree however that the interference of Supermarina was impacting the efficacy of any operation during WWII...


"Bagnasco has been a co-author with Enrico Cernuschi of Le navi da guerra italiane 1940-1945."
...and what is "blatantly wrong" in this book, according to this "expert" :?:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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