Could US Carrier doctine have been improved mid-1944?

[tnemelckram]

Hi Board!

I was wondering what everybody might think about this question - would US carrier doctrine have been better if designated carriers had the sole task of conducting all fighter operations for the task group, while the sole or primary duty of the others was bombing and torpedo operations? For purposes of this question, it seems to me that the by mid-1944 it is safe to assume the following 18 facts:

1. Task Force (3)(5)8Halsey/Spruance could count on having 8 to 12 Essex CVs and 6 to 8 Independence CVLs operational at all times.1

2. US Doctrine would slipt those ships into four Task Groups having 2-3 CVs and 1-2 CVLs each.

3. Broadly speaking, the planes they carried had five roles:
a. attack torpedo bombers (ATB)
b. attack projectile bombers (ADB)2
c. attack escort fighters (AEF)
d. defense anti-air fighters (DAF)
e. scout roaming fighters (SRF).

4. The targets of the attacks would be either ships (including enemy carriers) or land based targets.

5. The need for defense would be created by planes from enemy carriers or land based planes.

6. Many of the attacks were pre-planned and the timing of launches and landings of ATBs, ADBs and AEFs was often under control.

7. However, the timing of many attacks was often not under control being dictated by sudden emerging enemy threats, which then suddenly become targets to attack.

8. For the same reason as 7, the timing of launches and landings of large groups of DAFs was always not under control because the need emerges suddenly.

9. Launching a group of ATBs, ADBs and AEFs, or a group of DCF's, requires a surge of activity that ties up the deck, elevators, hangars and crews of each carrier for a long time.

10. DAF's and SRF's require two different cycles. First, a small number of CAP DAFs and SRFs must always be flying which requires deck, elevators, hangars and crew to be constantly available for a predictable cycle of individual launches and landings. On the other hand, a threat requires a sudden surge of DCF activity like in 9.

11. The catapult-less decks of the CVs and CVLs, the location of their elevators, and to a lesser extent the hangars and crews, could not support simultaneous launches and landings. When launching, deck parked planes are moved toward the stern, for landing, they are moved toward the bow. Both operations require the carrier to head into the wind.

12. The reasons stated in 4 to 11 can pose a hopeless and potentially dangerous conflict when each ship is always required to have planes ready for all roles stated in 3. For example, Nagumo at Midway.

12. By mid 1944 the US Navy had determined that the ideal ratio of total AEF/ DAF/SRF planes to total ATB/ADB planes was one to one.

13. AEFs, DAFs and SRFs basically require stocks of fuel, replacement parts and machine and cannon gun rounds to reload their weapons. ATBs and ADB require all those things, and in addition stocks of torpedoes, bombs and rockets for reloading.

14. Stocks of machine and cannon gun rounds require much less space than stocks of torpedoes, bombs and rockets, and are not nearly as volatile in case of battle damage. And obviously, a larger stock of aviation fuel is more dangerous than a smaller one.

15. The 28,000 ton Essex CVs were designed and built for their purpose, with three elevators (two in line and one side), a large wide hangar that did not restrict movement and availability of planes, 100 plane capacity, and had a crew of about 3,500.

16. The 11,000 ton Independence CVL's were improvised from converted CL hulls, had two in line elevators, mcuh smaller, narrow hangars that restricted plane movement and availability, 50 plane capacity and a crew of about 1,500.

17. In general, fighters are less demanding than bombers to recycle for combat. Fighter guns are faster, simpler and require less space to reload than bombs or torpedoes; bomber guns are another, instead of the only, weapon to reload. Fighters are more fuel efficient. Unarmed bombers already use more fuel because they are built heavier to support an ordinance load; then carrying about that added weight requires even more fuel.

18. Each rearmed and refueled fighter on the deck is ready for all three missions ( AEF, DAF, SRF), the only further requirement is making a choice by giving orders to one or more pilots. Likewise, doing the same thing in the hangar will always prepare each plane for all three missions. Moreover, one of these missions is offensive, one defensive and one reconnaissance, so you have greater instant flexibility even though the planes are all the same. By contrast, ATBs and APBs can only stand ready for, and be prepared for, attack missions.

Considering all of these facts, I decided to toss out one specific way of doing this - designate the CVL's for AEF/ DAF/SRF operations only and use the CVs solely for ATB/ADB operations along with some AEF operations.

The CVL's have inherent deck, elevator and hangar limitations because they are not purpose built. It might be better to simplify their role to three instead of asking then to perform all five. Because the CVLs are less than half the size of the CVs and have less room to stock the larger weapons required by the ATB/APB roles, giving them the job that requires the least space for weapon stocks seems sensible. Economies of size matter in terms of resisting damage and might result in the half sized CVLs having only a third of the CV's ability to sustain damage, but whatever the increased degree of vulnerability is, it makes sense to not enhance it with stocks of the more volatile ATB/APB weapons. At the same time, the smaller weapons stocks might free space and allow the CVLs to carry and support say 60 AEF/DAF/SRF instead of a 50 plane mix that includes ATB/APB. Economies of size also matter in terms of number of crew, so the less variety of skills demanded from the smaller crew the better.

Overall, there seem to be many aspects of the AEF, DAF and SRF operations by fighters that put them at cross purposes with ATB and DPB operations and using the same decks, elevators and and hangars for all three is undesirable. Fighters can perform attack, defense and scouting roles while bombers are exclusively for attack. Small number of fighters launch and land constantly in their DAF and SRF roles, while the DAF role sometimes also requires an unexpected surge with large numbers of takeoffs and later landings, and the AEF role, like the ATB and APB roles for bombers, requires both unexpected and planned surges with large numbers of takeoffs and later landings. Each fighter is always capable of doing three roles while each bomber is only capable of one. Fighters are less demanding to recycle than bombers. Thus the question of whether it is better to dedicate any carrier to fighter operations is different from the question of whether the Independence class were best for that role.

I have no real attachment to this idea - I just want to see what you all think and then decide.


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1. Averaging the slightly larger Saratoga and slightly smaller Enterprise into 2 Essex for simplicity's sake.

2. For lack of a better word, I use "projectile" to include Dauntless dive bombs, Corsair rockets and any other ordinance they carried.

[Bgile]

What is an APB? a DCF?

I think you are underestimating the people responsible for carrier air wing composition. They undoubtedly spent many, many hours trying to improve on the very things you are suggesting and I don't think their operations were quite as disruptive as you suggest.

For example, Nagumo had only four carriers and any one of them could be disabled, so he pretty much had to have mixed airwings on each. The Japanese compensated for this by tasking each carrier to launch a particular type of aircraft for an attack and they would all form up into one large force after launch. For example, Akagi might launch only torpedo planes in the first attack of the day, and only dive bombers in the second. That way they had a form of specialization without the loss of one ship crippling the fleet.

If I'm not mistaken the USN did task some of the small carriers for fighter operations only.

Scouts were usually dive bombers early on and I think TBF/TBM were used later on. I don't think fighters were normally used for scouting. The didn't have as many eyes and they didn't have a dedicated radio operator able to communicate with morse code, which is longer range than voice. They were also usually shorter ranged. I don't know what your "scout fighter" is supposed to represent.

[Dave Saxton]

Certainly there is always room for improvement, but in mid 44 I don't see the problems, particularly the fighter control problems, as stemming from the dispositions of the carrier air wings.

In mid 44 even up to the end, the primary problems were three fold:

1) The poor state of aircraft radio communications. Four years after the British and many more years after the Germans had replaced High Frequency AM radio with VHF FM radio, the USN flyers were still relying for the most part on obsolete and static ridden HF radios that often didn't get through or pick up, or at best (worse?) a mixture of HF and VHF-FM.

2) IFF. Radar operators in CIC's were still often scratching their heads trying to determine if the radar contacts represented a foe, or was it a friendly ship or aircarft that had neglected to turn on his transponder, or a friendly ship or aircraft that simply didn't have a functional transponder??? Many airmen and ships' commands refused to operate IFF transponders because the system was known to be insecure. Even by late 44 less than 1/2 of Allied warships were equipped with functional IFF equipment.

3) Lack of precise height finding capability of the long range air warning radar systems. Height finding using the SK was very hit and miss. A very skilled SK operator could make a rough guess as to height from the amplitude of various lobes by using his A-scope instead of his PPI, but in many cases fighters were vectored to intercept at the wrong altitude and this often caused a miss of the intercept all together. Many operators only used the easier to use PPI and ignored his other possible tools.

[tnemelckram]

Hi Bgile and Dave Saxton!

Thanks for your helpful responses.

Leaving aside the question of whether US carrier doctrine could have been improved mid 1944 for a second, I think that my OP asking that question can be improved. From your responses I think that my OP has at least the following three problems:

1. I picked mid-1944 because that is when enough carriers became available to allow each task group to have a carrier dedicated to fighter operations. But the ultimate problem I had in mind didn't become evident until spring 1945, when damage from swarms of kamikazes began to get out of hand, one good countermeasure would be swarms of readily available defensive fighters, and a dedicated fighter carrier might be the best way to do that. I should have been more specific about this.

2. Early in the OP, I defined the various roles of the planes and gave those roles abbreviations such as APB and DCF intended to distinguish and break down those roles by attack, defense, scouting, bomber, fighter and armament. I can see that these abbreviations would be hard to follow because the rest of my OP post was so long.

3. What Bgile said about bombers, not fighters being used for scouting makes sense and I agree with him. That makes my OP's assumption that the scouts were fighters incorrect.

Getting back to whether the doctrine could have been improved . . . . .

1. Bgile says that the the USN did task some of the small carriers for fighter operations only and that by definition would be a complete answer to the question! What more could I ask when what I suggest as an improvement was actually done? But I was under the impression that these were the CVE's that were too slow to keep pace with the fast CVs and CVLs. That led to my thought that maybe this could be carried over into the four fast carrier task groups themselves. I'm going to look into this but Bgile, I'd appreciate as well any info you have or might find on the subject.

2. Dave Saxton's post about what the three biggest carrier operation problems actually were in mid 1944 was very interesting I'm inclined to think he's right. That is, until the kamikazes got serious and numerous in Spring 1945 and presented a new and larger problem. Again this made me curious and I'm going to look into it but I also welcome Dave's input. Here's what I'm wondering: (1) what caused these problems; (2) what was done to fix them; and (3) to what degree were they in hand by spring 1945?

I'm surprised to learn about the plane radio problems, especially when better technology was available and other Atlantic countries were actually using it. It reminds me of Amelia Erhart's radio problems eight years before. I wonder if the wide range of Pacific operations was a factor, or atmospheric quirks unique to the Pacific?

I know one thing I would have done if IFF was still a problem at the same time as the kamikazes - told my guys to use IFF or else!

I know that radar picket destroyers were used to address the long range radar warning problem, including the unfortunate William D. Porter, DD 579.1 I learned a lot about the early operational use of radar in the context of my Holland Shadows Bismark Instead thread where your informative posts led me to do more research.2

3. Reading between your lines, I sense that based on the historical record, it will be hard to find a need for major improvement in doctrine I generally agree. Although handicapped by a standing start and total lack of experience, these operations were innovative, creative, massive, complex, wide ranging, executed with skill and courage, economical in human and material cost, effective, relentless, devastating, and decisive. That high standard and tempo of operations was maintained constantly from start to finish. No other operation in military history combines so many positive attributes.

4. However, by spring 1945 the kamikazes were severely testing that enormously successful doctrine. As of mid-1944 (say June 30), the question of how doctrine could be improved was probably among our Admirals' top concerns, and for good reasons.
(a) They were planning operations on an unprecedented scale.
(b) They had no idea how good they would prove to be at the operations.
(c) Now operations will be on the enemy's home surf and turf, where he has kept most of his
resources, which are connected by shorter interior lines, and closer to their base. The US,
on the other hand, is moving further from its base and around longer exterior lines.
(d) The most prudent presumption is that Japanese sea and land maritime air power still has
equal resources and competence. Philippine Sea is a few months away.
________________________________________________________
1. Unluckiest Ship thread.
viewtopic.php?f=9&t=1920&st=0&sk=t&d=a&start=15#p23760

2. These are the relevant posts:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1810&st=0&sk=t&sd=a#p20826
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1810&st=0&sk=t&sd=a#p20833
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1810&st=0&sk=t&sd=a#p20841
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1810&st=0&sk=t&sd=a#p20842
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1810&st=0&sk=t&sd=a#p20853

[Dave Saxton]

Well, I think your thinking is going down the correct path in that the key to more effective air defense for any task force are fighter planes-first and foremost. Nonetheless, fighter plane wings need to be vectored to favorable intercept positions, as far out, and as early as possible, to be most effective.