Precisions on operation BERLIN

[Francis Marliere]

Gentlemen,

I am looking for information on the beginning of operation BERLIN. On the early morning of 28 January 1941 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau tried to make their way into the Atlantic through the Iceland-Faroe passage but were sighted by HMS Naiad. The cruiser belonged to the screen of the Home Fleet and immediatlely reported to the flagship (HMS Nelson). Eventually, the cruiser lost sight (visibility was poor - just 7 nm) and the battlecruisers escaped.
As a naval wargamer, I find that this episode is a good basis for a realistic and interesting scenario. The battlecruisers detected Naid with radar and had enough time to reverse course and hide in a squall. Had their radar failed, they may have clashed with the Home Fleet.
Unfortunately, I couldn't find enough precisions on these events, such as the weather (sea state, etc.) or the disposition of the Home Fleet. I request your help and thank every fellow that will help me.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

[paulcadogan]

Hi Francis,

Here's some info on the precise movements of the Home Fleet:

25th - At 2320 hours NELSON (Flag CinC HF), RODNEY, battlecruiser REPULSE, light cruisers ARETHUSA, GALATEA (Flag RA CS2), AURORA, MAURITIUS, NAIAD (Flag RA CS15), PHOEBE, EDINBURGH (Flag VA CS18) and BIRMINGHAM escorted by destroyers BEDOUIN (D6), MATABELE, TARTAR, PUNJABI, ESCAPADE, ECHO, ELECTRA, BEAGLE, BRILLIANT, KEPPEL and the Polish ORP PIORUN sailed from Scapa for position 61-30N, 17-30W, south of Iceland to cover the Denmark Strait and Iceland-Faroes gap.



(The reason for this deployment was a report from the Admiralty during the afternoon of 25/1/41. Admiralty message 1152 was received reporting a D/F fix of an unknown enemy unit between Rockall and the Hebrides, and this was followed later by Admiralty message 1751 giving information of an A2 report from the British Naval Attache at Stockholm that two heavy ships, believed to have been the SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU had passed through the Great Belt northwards during the forenoon of 23/1/41)



26th - Patrolling south of Iceland.



27th - Patrolling in vicinity of position 62N, 21-30W, south of Iceland.

At 1200 hours, with no further news having been received of the enemy, RODNEY, EDINBURGH, BIRMINGHAM, MAURITIUS and destroyers BEAGLE, BRILLIANT, KEPPEL and PIORUN detached and returned to Scapa.

At 1354 hours the CinC made general signal, 'intend to cruise in this area with objective of covering convoys and acting on reports. HX 103 may be sighted at about 1630 hours'.



28th - At 0640 hours, two hours before daylight, the Fleet was on course 090¼, speed 15 knots, with the cruisers ARETHUSA, GALATEA, AURORA, NAIAD and PHOEBE disposed 30¼ on each bow, 60¼ on each quarter and one astern at visibility distance of seven miles. At this time the NAIAD, on the port bow, saw what were thought to be two large vessels bearing 120¼ at a distance of about seven miles and steering a converging course. The NAIAD made an immediate report timed 0649 hours, of two unknown vessels bearing 110¼, and she turned towards them and increased speed. The bearing continued to draw ahead, and NAIAD consequently hauled round to port reporting at 0658 hours their course estimated to be 040¼.

At 0700 hours the NELSON was in position 62-38N, 18W.

At 0712 hours the NAIAD had worked up to 30 knots but had lost sight of the two unknown vessels.

At 0738 hours REPULSE, BEDOUIN, TARTAR, MATABELE and PUNJABI were detached with orders join NAIAD.

At 0800 hours the NELSON had worked up to 21 knots and all cruisers in company were directed to proceed on a course of 70¼ at best speed.

At 0830 hours the NAIAD reported that at 0800 hours she had been detected and held by radar, but the echo had later faded; and that she intended to maintain his present course of 55¼ at 31 knots until daylight and then to search to the south east. The receipt of NAIAD's report tended to strengthen the conviction of the CinC Home Fleet that original sighting was false.

At 0930 hours the NELSON sighted the trawler NORTHERN REWARD which the CinC believed could have been in the position in which smoke was reported by NAIAD at 0715 hours.



(The vessels that the NAIAD sighted were indeed the SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU (Flag Admiral Luetjens). The German ships had sailed from Kiel at 0600/23/1/41 on Operation BERLIN and had proceeded through the Great Belt [where they had been sighted and reported]. On leaving the Skagerrak they had steered west the northerly. At 0400/27/1/41 they turned on to course 214¼. At 0618/28/1/41 the SCHARNHORST detected a radar contact on the bearing 230¼, range 15700 yards; the ship was thought to be a Tribal class destroyer. But it was the NAIAD, who had been detected by the enemy 22 minutes before she made her sighting. Luetjens reversed course and his ships worked up to 30 knots and lost their adversary)

from: http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-01BB-Nelson.htm

Have no idea on weather conditions though...

Paul

[Francis Marliere]

Paul,

thanks for your kind help. however, I already know this page which unfortunately dosen't tell me all what I would like to know (sea state, disposition of the destroyer screen, etc.). Due to my poor English I am not sure to understand the disposition of the cruisers. may be you could explain me in more simple English ?

Thanks,

Francis

[paulcadogan]

I think the "1/4" somehow means "degrees".

So the fleet (Nelson, Repulse, 5 light cruisers and 6 destroyers, since Rodney, 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers had left to return to Scapa) was on a course of 90 degrees, that is, due east with Naiad stationed 30 degrees off Nelson's port (left) bow, with another cruiser 30 degrees off the starboard bow, one each 60 degrees off the port and starboard stern (quarter) and the last directly astern. I think they are saying each was seven miles off - the furthest they could be and still be seen (visibility was 7 miles).

They don't mention the 6 remaining destroyers, but I would assume they were fanned out around Nelson and Repulse as a screen (much closer than the cruisers) so when Naiad made her report Repulse and 4 of them were detached to go to her support.

For the weather conditions, you probably might at least find a wind speed and direction in the ships' logs, maybe S&G's war diaries if they are available? If you get a wind speed, you can translate that into sea conditions, and you can get the direction of the sea current from today's marine weather data for that time of year at that location.

Hope all this helps.

Paul

[Francis Marliere]

Thanks a lot Paul.

[Thorsten Wahl]

KTB part 1

[Thorsten Wahl]

[Thorsten Wahl]

[Thorsten Wahl]

[Thorsten Wahl]

[Francis Marliere]

Thorsten,

Thanks for the documents. unfortunately, I don't speack German. Could you please tell me if there is something in those documents that answer my questions ?

Best,

Francis

[RF]

The battlecruisers detected Naid with radar and had enough time to reverse course and hide in a squall. Had their radar failed, they may have clashed with the Home Fleet.

If I may be permitted to interject with an observation, more likely Naide would have been quickly sunk by a battery of eighteen 11 inch guns, possibly without getting off a sighting report.
Aclash with the Home Fleet was by no means certain.

[Thorsten Wahl]

Whetherforecast 28th 0000 hour
high pressure area 1030millibar eastwind strenght 3-4 at night up to 5
sight morning 15 sm
0104 course 250 degrees 27 sm
0450 hours Gn failure of EM2 by short circuit
0600 hours cours 250 degrees 27 sm
0602 hours 40 degrees turn StB
0618 hours Sch EM2 detection 14,4 km bearing 230 degrees distance quickly reduced to 12,7 km -------------CAUTION--------------
0620 hours Sch EM2 detection shadow visible on BB 80 degrees turn (new course 330 degrees) to StB
0620 hours Gn radar clear ships sighted visually
0624 hours ---------------ALARM-----------------
.............4 ships count by EM2
0626 hours gn shadow sighted 25 degrees BB, shadow bigger than Destroyer
0627 hours 90 degrees turn to StB(new course 50 degrees) distance ca 3,500 m -No fire permit -further breakthrough
0630 hours speed 28 sm 90 degrees turn to StB
...opponent keeps in touch
0636 hours 30 sm
0715 hours 2 minutes fogging
0720 hours Gn radar clear ships sighted visually
0748 hours further EM2 contact
---it appears from plotting of the contacts a strip outpost distance 5 NM between the unknown ships with general course 60 - 70 degrees
0834 hours turn 90 degrees StB
0920 hours sunset no enemy visible
further pass of favored by rain squalls
0930 hours Gn further failure of EM2
1040 hours general course 60 degrees
1125 masts sighted in 247 degrees relative bearing cours set to 100 degrees -cruiser contact according to heigt
----distance increases fast masts visible until 34 km

the night was extremly clear no far-reaching beneficial for EM2

[Dave Saxton]

This is what I worked out before Thorsten posted. I'm relieved to see that I'm essentially in close aggreement with Thorsten.

It may be easier to present the essential info from SH’s perspective first.

0536- Gneisenau reports that its radar has failed.
0600 -course is 250* true, speed is 27 knots. Wind is from east south east at 5 knots, see state is 2-3 but rising, visibility is good, temp is -4*.
0602-Fleet command requests recon at 4* (true?)
0605- Own radar finds nothing there.
0618- In the direction 230* at range 14400 meters two targets are (radar) detected. ….. Fleet command is informed. Look outs are alerted.
0621-Application of course to 330*
0624- At direction 300* enemy in sight, perhaps a D class destroyer or a cruiser…. Alarm is sounded. Radar reports one strong pip at 14400 meters and 4 smaller pips on the same bearing, ranging from 11000 meters to 14000 meters.
0626- Applying course to 50*
0628- Applying course to 90*
0636- From Fleet Command; go to speed 30knots. Continue tracking each target precisely with radar as long as possible, and observe targets astern from the aft position if possible. Own radar at bearing 305* has a target 10700 meters and more up to 8000 meters beyond that.
0646-From Fleet command speed 26 knots. Change course to 60*……….
0647-From Fleet speed 27 knots
0702 -Radar tracks pips on bearing 270*, from 13600 meters distance. Targets can no longer be seen by optics. Apply course 60*
0714- Several pips tracked from 14700 meters distance.
0733- Radar reports targets on bearing 263* range from 13900 meters.
0745-At direction 185* in the light (a possible target) range 8000 meters. Report to Fleet command.
0751 – From Fleet; adjust course to 80* about 2 degrees starboard.
0752 -GN reports at about 0* two possible targets, no range given. (These were radar detected targets (GN’s radar) that were considered innocuous because they obviously were completely unaware of the German battle cruisers)
0758- Targets to starboard have disappeared…
0800- Stern is clear. Now very good visibility………..


The GN data:
0200- Radar has stopped reporting.
0450-Firstly, the coupling between the antenna and the receiver had come undone. Secondly, some wires going to the indicator had therefore shorted causing the failure of a vacuum tube.
The radar was repaired and tested clear by 0620 hours, just as enemy mast heads had been spotted, so the radar was not used in advance. However, it was used during the following evasion of the enemy….
0620- SH reports that it has radar targets, we turn 8 degrees starboard. Onboard GN the targets are thought to be destroyers and perhaps a cruiser…..
0626-Six minutes later GN has targets in sight. These are perhaps modern destroyers of the Tribal class and/or a smaller cruiser.

Later at 1126 hours a second alarm is sounded. For the second time, GN’s radar wasn’t working. (Two wire couplings going to the indicator module from the power supply module had come undone.) Hereafter this radar set checked clear. Visibility was about 20nm at the time. GN had already spotted the mast heads of the target visually before it closed. GN eventually identified the target as a possible Gloucester class or Dido class cruiser. Apparently the cruiser did not see them and the Admiral turned away to refuel from a tanker before trying again.

[Francis Marliere]

Thanks a lot for your wonderfull answers.

BTW, I am not saying that a clash with Home Fleet was inevitable if German radars had failed. I was just thinking that it was possible (if radar failed AND British lookouts performed better, and ...).

Best regards,

Francis Marliere