THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET IN WW2

[aurora]

Octagon Conference
11 Sep 1944 - 16 Sep 1944

Contributor: C. Peter Chen
The second Anglo-American Quebec conference saw a major disagreement between Winston Churchill and Ernest King regarding the British return to the Pacific. A year ago, the Americans had pressured for British presence in the Pacific, but Churchill offered limited assistance due to British aims to settle the European conflict before committing deeper against Japan. Now, with Germany starting to become pinned down, British reinforcements to the Pacific became unwanted. Churchill had political reasons for becoming involved in the Pacific, aiming to reclaim the vast territories the British Empire had lost to Japan. Admiral King did not wish to be seen assisting an European colonial power, especially now when the US Navy had already controlled the Pacific Ocean and could maintain control without British reinforcements. Churchill was started to feel irritated that he had offered the British fleet to help only to be rejected when Roosevelt stepped in to mediate.

In the end, to King's dismay Roosevelt accepted the British fleet's help in the Pacific, but the American president also rejected British request that British zone be established with a British commander. Therefore, the greatest concentration of British naval strength with four fleet carriers and two battleships, with a full compliment of cruisers, destroyers, and various support ships, became the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet Task Force 57 in Admiral Spruance's 5th US Fleet

The question arises- with 20/20 hindsight-was the effort and expenditure really necessary; and if so what precisely was gained at the war's end ???

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[RNfanDan]

I believe Churchill's aims and intentions were not as "sweeping" as King purportedly considered, according to Chen's account. I believe Winston's major focus may have been limited to recovering Singapore, not much else. To support my opinion, I must point out that Britain never lost Hong Kong (her lease there expired only many years later), had successfully maintained active bases in the Indian Ocean (especially Colombo and Trincomalee) throughout the war, and had continually-available commonwealth RN bases available to her in Australia.

Further, she did not possess Indochina before the war (it was French territory, even before Vichy capitulation), and the resources of the East Indies were predominantly in Dutch hands. To be sure, Singapore was almost surely Britain's own fault for losing in the first place, and at least one author has implied (questionable grounds notwithstanding) that Churchill should have done more to defend and supply the base before December 1941.

King, who has been described as an Anglophobe (rightly or wrongly), may have indeed feared Britain was trying to take advantage of the US by gaining material and territory at the expense of the weakened Japanese and Vichy French, perhaps by investing forces in Indochina and the Malay Peninsula, but Churchill's reluctance to abandon the European war suggests this was neither a primary goal of his, nor one to be undertaken by that of a very war-weary British public and government.

I highly doubt that Churchill, a firm benefactor and ancestral descendant of the United States, would have dared offend the Americans by such surreptitious means. Even Burma for that matter, where Britain/Australia/commonwealths and the US had fought to drive out the Japanese, was not likely to become a renewable acquisition for the UK.

King's concerns --assuming they existed to such degree-- were perhaps inflated. I cannot see how Churchill could have gotten as much out of it as King purportedly feared, beyond recovering Singapore, itself; and even if Britain HAD managed to regain Singapore, I question whether they could have afforded to keep it for long.

By the way, most of this was well within King's ability to "suss", even during the course of tending to a busy and massive Pacific campaign ...surely, he knew at least as much as I've set forth here, save perhaps for the speculative nature of Britain going anywhere beyond Singapore Naval Base.

For what it's worth...


--Dan

[aurora]

Thanks for that Dan-I think I would concur with the general thrust of what you have said.A year before Churchill had been dead set against the whole idea-he did not want the RN to be an attachment of the USN ie."a small fish in a very large pond", but he was prevailed upon by his War Cabinet of Alanbrooke,Cunningham and Portal to proffer the BPF -which Roosevelt surprisingly accepted-King ,of course was dead set against it; shrewdly guessing that the BPF would most certainly have logistical difficulties-which indeed it had.Had it not been for the largesse of the USN Pacific Admirals-Australia would be their Base.The Monab Scheme was basically a failure and all except one unit remained in Australia during the period 1944/45.
So what was gained by all this posturing; and I am going to say here and now the BPF did superb work in it's short life, but what for -in truth the Americans had the Pacific sea war all but won and they had a very big ace up their sleeve.

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[pg55555]

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Strange ideas there.

There was SEEMINGLY NO, repeat NO British ideas of expanding Imperial possessions (where the US got/gets this idea from I do not know - I have always assumed it was some sort of code or cover story).

The above "forgets" both Burma (then really part of India) where there was a long and vicious fight, and of course the general attitude to Australian interests. (Burma was a perpetual worry due to the possibility of the Japanese breaking through to the Bay of Bengal.)

The Monab scheme was NOT a failure, but it DID take a lot longer to set up than envisaged or planned, partly through a lack of shipping. By July 1945 it was basically up to the required performance.

As ever, the US tends to "forget" that the vast amount of the fighting against Japan (in terms of numbers involved) occurred away from the central "Pacific Sea War" in China, Burma and S W Pacific. Now I am more than aware that the naval campaign was, in the end, the decisive part of the Japanese war (the submarine war for effect and the island hopping campaign for air bases) - but look at the whole.

[aurora]

In answer to the previous poster (pg55555)-nobody- neither the British nor the Americans thought that a main objective was to EXPAND the British Empire-regain all or part of it perhaps -Yes
I really do not understand why you have cited BURMA because ,as you say;we are already engaged in a war to free it from the Japanese-so where does the BPF come on on this venture.
My father joined a sub unit of the MONAB SCHEME in July 1942 ,spent two years training and working up in UK, before being transferred to CEYLON to service the aircraft of the Eastern Fleet and at war's end was still there- a fully trained Maintenance Unit.
As late as 1945 ex RAF aircrew (tour expired )were being sent out to Australia to fill the manpower gaps in the sub units of each MONAB.As I said only ONE was established at MANUS and that for me indicates abject failure of the scheme.I don't whether you know this; but MONABS were to be used in the island hopping strategy and forming bases in the same way as the Seabees,for the BPF- INSTEAD of having a FLEET TRAIN.You say it was up to speed about July 1945 -one month before the war ended -that speaks volumes in itself.Then why did the Admiralty have to hurriedly cobble up a fleet train of old oilers and freighters-one has to ask.

I am sure the US were well aware of the US/British conflicts with the Japanese elsewhere in SEAC but what that has to with the BPF.I would not know;but again YES I have looked at the whole picture

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[pg55555]

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Monab and Fleet trains were very, very different. Manus was, essentially up to speed in July 1945 (sufficient as to scrap a huge number of aircraft come the end of the war !)

MONAB(s) were bases and would have tied into a putative "coast hopping" strategy against Japan (which would have been much more tied into land based air power).

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[aurora]

I have to say that I am perfectly aware of the difference between a Monab and a Fleet Train.
The setting up of bases between Sydney and the combat area posed an awesome problem; but in the end -due to expediency and American generosity-their base at Manus was made available.No other British base could have been made ready before October 1945,such was the backwardness of our organisation.The fact that Manus was able to scrap FAA aircraft AFTER the war was over says it all I'm afraid.

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[aurora]

Further to the above- regarding the BPF's Fleet Train.The PM himself had to resolve a bitter argument between the Admiralty and the Ministry of War Transport over the release of shipping for the said fleet train.On April 9th 1944 he minuted:-
"The fleet Train is limited by the need of getting an absolute irreducible minimum of 24 million tons of imports to this country this year and next.All Naval and Military requirements must be subordinated to this decisive rule;without which the life and war effort of Britain cannot be maintained.In working out your Fleet Train requirements you must observe these requirements:-
The priorities are as follows:
a)24 million tons of imports this year and next
b)The Fleet Train permissible on this basis
c)The fighting Fleet that can be carried by the said Fleet Train........6 Fleet Carriers,4 light fleet carriers,5 battleships,41 cruisers and 600 escort ships of all types.
The British industrial machine was found wanting and by 1945 the economic buoyancy which had for two centuries sustained the Royal Navy had been entirely lost.
Such was the plight of this nation at the time of forging what was to become the BPF.

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[pg55555]

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The merchant shipping problem (one COULD call it a crisis) was tied into the twin problems of feeding the UK/liberated Western Europe and reductions in lend lease, plus continued wastage of shipping.

Of all the war years it is considered that early 1945 was the worst for the UK will the early signs of malnutrition starting to show. This was partly due to food being diverted to feed liberated Europe and partly due to reduced lend lease availability and shipping capacity being needed for the continued continental war (AND continuing wastage of shipping in the Pacific as "floating warehouses").

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[aurora]

"Of all the war years it is considered that early 1945 was the worst for the UK will the early signs of malnutrition starting to show. This was partly due to food being diverted to feed liberated Europe and partly due to reduced lend lease availability and shipping capacity being needed for the continued continental war (AND continuing wastage of shipping in the Pacific as "floating warehouses")"
As I lived through all of the war years pg-1945 has stuck in my memory as the" Year of Want"-so whether Churchill's edict of 24 million tons must have been the bare minimum or it was less -that I do not know.I lived in the country-so foraging and trapping became part of life.I also was unaware that we were feeding liberated Europe.

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[pg55555]

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The problem in 1945 was that the amount of shipping (rounded grt) was fixed in strategic terms, plus starting at Xmas 1944 the USA started reducing Lend-Lease as there was a lobby in congress which wanted NO advantage to the UK by the end of the war.

The UK felt obligated to transfer some of its food (and other resources) to the liberated countries of western Europe (even some deals with the Germans over still occupied Holland). The US did some relief, but not very much - mostly to Italy.

After VE day lend lease was severely restricted and transportation for food imports had to be paid for if carried in US ships.

This led to the bad situation in the UK, but the French, Belgiums and particularly the Dutch were even worse off.

Other events caused even more pressure, especially the prelude to the Greek Civil War, where again the UK spent resources they didn't really have.

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[aurora]

"The problem in 1945 was that the amount of shipping (rounded grt) was fixed in strategic terms, plus starting at Xmas 1944 the USA started reducing Lend-Lease as there was a lobby in congress which wanted NO advantage to the UK by the end of the war."
pg -can you please expand on that particular statement of yours- has the undermentioned relevant to your satatement?????

Havlik to McKenzie King
"My first assignment was to draft a memorandum or letter from the President to Winston Churchill, in effect proposing certain reductions in lend-lease to the U. K. on specific items to bring the total down to a more modest figure. For one thing, partly, we felt the British were then mobilizing monetary resources more effectively, and American forces were getting into the war(this was in 1944). And partly, too, I think Mr. Roosevelt wanted some pressure upon Churchill for various policy reasons. There were debates going on in the background as to whether the attack should be upon the "soft underbelly" of Europe or from the north, whether there should be two fronts or one front. Mr. Roosevelt would use as counters in these debates anything he had, including the threats of reduction of lend-lease.
So, some of these memoranda and drafts were given to the President; I do not know whether he showed them to Mr. Churchill at the various conferences which they held from time to time. But I do know that some of the recommendations weren't carried out -- to reduce certain items, to eliminate some and so on.
Then I became involved in a myriad of problems concerning the eligibility of various items for lend-lease. Should our allies get whatever they wanted? What we could send them had to be related to our own availability of supplies and our own needs and needs of others. Lend-lease supplies also had to be related to whether they were bought in this country or overseas; if they were bought outside this country, there had to be a highly special situation. Also, if our ally received lend-lease supplies and commodities and wanted to use these in part to manufacture commodities which they exported commercially, what should the rules be? If they received military or other supplies and then these turned out to be surplus to actual needs, could they retransfer these supplies to any of their dependencies or other friendly countries, and, if so, on what terms and what would we get out of it? These were complicated problems."

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http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/havlik.htm

[pg55555]

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There is a HUGE amount of scholarship ( and dispute ! ) about the politics of Lend-Lease during WW2..

It can be seen as anything from benign to deeply cynical and part of the power-politics of the alliance. Roosevelt SEEMS to have started from relative generosity (but selling it rather cynically to some in Congress as a way of spending UK lives instead of US ones) but by the end of the war (indeed the middle) was using it as a way of exerting pressure on the UK. Some of Congress were really more intent on inflicting economic damage on the UK ( THIS is where I "think" the rather weird ideas about the UK's ideas of Imperial expansion came from - but it is confusing ).

There are many books about the issue, e.g. "Merchant Shipping and the demands of War", "North American Supply" (Official History), "Crisis over Convoys", The volumes of the Official Histories dealing with Lend-Lease, etc....... (huge numbers).

This is NOT a popular area of study as it ruins both nations' idealist views of how the war was run.

As mentioned above the preCivil War period in Greece or the feeding of Liberated Western Europe prior to VE-day also give a poor view of how the alliance really worked away from the war-fighting as such.

( OH ! and another little facet, I always laugh when there are quaint photo captions [or movie comments] about the US GIs giving out sweets to children as the GI food quota when they were based in the UK came from the overall shipping tonnage allocated to the UK for civilian purposes. )

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[aurora]

"It can be seen as anything from benign to deeply cynical and part of the power-politics of the alliance. Roosevelt SEEMS to have started from relative generosity (but selling it rather cynically to some in Congress as a way of spending UK lives instead of US ones) but by the end of the war (indeed the middle) was using it as a way of exerting pressure on the UK. Some of Congress were really more intent on inflicting economic damage on the UK ( THIS is where I "think" the rather weird ideas about the UK's ideas of Imperial expansion came from - but it is confusing )

Many thanks pg for sharing your obvious knowledge of this seemingly shabby deal between the US and the UK; and explains many things which happened post war eg the Palestine Mandate,The Suez Affair and the first/second Gulf Wars -the Lend Lease Debt was finally paid off in 2002-so far as I am aware

But to return to the BPF-it was deliberately kept out of the final demise of the IJN at KURE via orders from the US Administration-they did not want the British to be seen to be having anything to do with the final victory and so gain SOME kudos for it's efforts.Pretty shabby -who needs enemies with friends such as these???

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[aurora]

I am beginning to believe that a "full" British Eastern Fleet (No BPF) under Admiral Somerville and based at Trincomalee- would have enhanced our war objectives in the Indian Ocean area in 1944/45.Firstly by establishing a base on the north end of Sumatra,followed up by continuous strikes against Japanese fuel supplies points in that region; sufficient to take out the IJN elements based at Singapore. Taking Sumatra and Java and setting up a second front in Burma; after seizing control of Singapore itself.The objective being to regain our Empire by our own efforts in the SEAC area.
NB At the beginning of 1944 there were nine British Infantry Divisions that were not designated for 21st Army Group in NW Europe and were never used.



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