WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1922

[aurora]

The major nations that participated in the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) entered the negotiations from differing positions of power and departed with differing levels of satisfaction:

Britain had been the world's largest naval power, but crushing debt incurred during the war rendered them receptive to limitations on their power.
The United States had the most powerful navy by the end of the war. Its position of leadership was solidified by a generally robust economy that was only temporarily slowed by a brief recession during the Harding administration. Nevertheless, ample criticism in the press arose about the United States' acceptance of the Washington treaties; in particular, surrendering its naval superiority and its opportunity to strengthen its Pacific bases.
Japan had maintained a smaller and less powerful navy, but was offended by being asked to accept a lesser ratio under the terms of the Five Power Pact. Acceptance was gained only at the price of a promise by Britain and the United States not to further fortify their bases in the Pacific. Several exceptions were made, however, including the right for the U.S. to effect military improvements in Hawaii.
France had entered World War I as a leading naval power, but its fleet was severely reduced by war's end. Most of their efforts in the 1920s would be devoted to the development of a strong army to resist any future German threat. Naval construction was a much lesser concern, but that fact did not prevent the French from resisting acceptance of a small ratio. In fact, French opposition was so strong that it threatened to wreck the conference on at least one occasion. One important victory was won by the French delegation, which successfully insisted that that the naval ratio be applied only to capital ships*, not to lesser vessels such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
The Washington Conference was clearly a compromise endeavor, not a victory for any one nation. The Four-Power Pacts were well-intentioned efforts to calm tensions in the Pacific, but the lack of any real enforcement mechanism doomed the accords' effectiveness. However, a major benefit was gained by Britain and the United States by the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
The naval limitation provisions did provide an important degree of savings for participating nations, but as time went on, funds were simply diverted to the construction of smaller vessels not covered under the agreement. In addition, many naval experts believed that the future significance of the giant battleships had already been eroded, citing the Battle of Jutland as evidence for their position.
Later efforts were made to try to close loopholes in the Washington treaties. An effort at Geneva in 1927 failed. Some success was gained in London in 1930, when the powers extended the construction moratorium to 1936 and offered other concessions to Japan.
The postwar experiment at disarmament and limitation of arms came to an end in 1936, when Japan ended its participation.

NB*Capital ships were those vessels exceeding 10,000 tons or bearing guns in excess of an eight-inch caliber, effectively denoting battleships and aircraft carriers
What were the discernible results???

http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1356.html


aurora

[Rick Rather]

NB*Capital ships were those vessels exceeding 10,000 tons or bearing guns in excess of an eight-inch caliber, effectively denoting battleships and aircraft carriers

Not quite correct. The treaty did not apply to aircraft carriers. You may or may not have missed this loophole, but the Japanese definitely did not!

What were the discernible results???

[aurora]

EXTRACTED FROM THE CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION -WASHINGTON 1922

CAPITAL SHIP
A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 millimetres).

AIRCRAFT CARRIER
An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched there from and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be.

Sorry about that faux pas Rick-I can see now how I made this mistake.
You proffered Pearl Harbour as a discerned outcome.I would be grateful if you would enlarge on this point please.

aurora

[Rick Rather]

In short, Motive & Method.

Objectively, the 5-3 ratio was not a bad deal for the Japanese, since the US had to divide its fleet between two oceans, and the RN could not afford to deploy a substantial fraction of its fleet to the Pacific. The Japanese did not see it that way. They saw it as an insult - that they were considered a "second-class" power (I do not see being grouped with France & Italy as being a bad thing, but that's me). The rise in ultra-nationalism in Japan inevitably led to an "us versus them" mentality. This "unfair" treaty provided tangible evidence (in their minds) that the foreign powers were trying to "keep them down", "deny them their rightful destiny", blah-blah-blah, etc. I'm not saying that the Pacific War wouldn't have happened without the treaty (I believe it was tragically inevitable), but it was a conspicuous boulder in the avalanche.

As I mentioned before, the loophole that the treaty limited BBs & BCs, but not CVs was exploited by Japan to a greater extent than any of the other signatories. Indeed,, as the war with America approached, the Imperial Navy had arguably the largest and best carrier strike force in the world. I do not think this would have been the case without the treaty. Akagi & Kaga would have been finished as battlecruisers. Would there have been sufficient impetus to build the rest of the carrier fleet so large or so quickly? If BB & BC construction had continued unabated, then certainly less material (steel, man-power, shipyard capacity, etc.) would have been available for carriers.

The up-shot is that I think Japan would have had a much smaller carrier fleet at the start of hostilities. The attack on Oahu, although conceived as a surprise-attack, nonetheless had to face the possibility of - and plan for - fighting its way in to an alerted target. The Combined Fleet estimated that they might lose up to 1/3rd of the strike-force - two carriers - in the operation. As such, the Navy General Staff objected strenuously to the risky endeavor. If the Imperial Navy had only 2 - 3 large carriers available (instead of 6) then I do not believe that the Pearl Harbor operation would have ever been given the go-ahead.

[aurora]

Rick I cannot fault your reasoning re.whether PH was on or off; but there is the nagging doubt that the Americans expected PH; and they wanted the Japanese to strike first-so the fact that Japan cheated on the Treaty and built carriers not battleships and therefore played into American hands- especially as the US carrier fleet was at sea and not at PH.It is almost as if the Americans knew all their plans.The US did by the way maintain a Black Operations Room which monitored their evey move.see below:-
"What was unknown to the participants in the Conference was that the American "Black Chamber" (the Cypher Bureau, a US intelligence service), under Herbert Yardley, was spying on the delegations' communications with their home capitals. In particular, Japanese communications were thoroughly penetrated, and American negotiators were able to get the minimum possible deal the Japanese had indicated they would accept, below which they would leave the Conference. As this ratio value was unpopular with much of the Imperial Japanese Navy and with the increasingly active and important ultranationalist groups, the value the Japanese Government accepted was the cause of much suspicion and accusation among Japanese between politicians and Naval officers"


aurora

[aurora]

The Washington Conference was clearly a compromise endeavour, not a victory for any one nation. The Four-Power Pacts were well-intentioned efforts to calm tensions in the Pacific, but the lack of any real enforcement mechanism doomed the accords' effectiveness. However, a major benefit was gained by Britain and the United States by the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
The naval limitation provisions did provide an important degree of savings for participating nations, but as time went on, funds were simply diverted to the construction of smaller vessels not covered under the agreement. In addition, many naval experts believed that the future significance of the giant battleships had already been eroded, citing the Battle of Jutland as evidence for their position.Later efforts were made to try to close loopholes in the Washington treaties. An effort at Geneva in 1927 failed. Some success was gained in London in 1930, when the powers extended the construction moratorium to 1936 and offered other concessions to Japan.

aurora

[MikeBrough]

The major nations that participated in the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) entered the negotiations from differing positions of power and departed with differing levels of satisfaction:

The United States had the most powerful navy by the end of the war.

aurora

Aurora, I find that assertion quite surprising. Do you have the figures to back that up? I'd have thought the RN was still the most powerful navy as at 11/11/1918.

[RNfanDan]

The Royal Navy was indeed, the largest; she also had a fair number of ships still on the slipways.

Oh, and on September 3, 1939 the Royal Navy was STILL larger than that of the USN, but IIRC, not categorically so...

[aurora]

Mike-the statement refers,agreed not particulrly clearly,to the end of WW2

"Britain had been the world's largest naval power, but crushing debt incurred during the war rendered them receptive to limitations on their power.
The United States had the most powerful navy by the end of the war.



aurora

[RNfanDan]

Uh, no. It would seem the cited text reference is erroneous. There is no literal or figurative reason to make the leap 25 years ahead from what is a discussion of Britain's willingness to attend the (then) forthcoming talks.

While sources are somewhat conflicting in the categorical numbers and ship-types definitions, Britain was unquestionably the largest fleet at the end of WW1. The British Navy had, for quite some time, used what was known as a "Two-power Standard" in determining their fleet composition. Simply put, their navy was to be equal or greater than the sum of the next TWO largest navies, regardless of their nationality. Even after WWI, the RN still exceeded the next-largest fleet.

The WNC did nothing, initially, to cause Britain's navy to become smaller than that of the United States. The manifold effects of the WNC and its military implications are beyond the scope of my post, but suffice it to say that the US Navy was not the most powerful at war's end, nor was it greater than Britain's on the day WWII began in September 1939.

Gathering statistics, even from reliable sources, doesn't lend itself easily to the issue; for example, one US archival site lists the USN as having 17 "frigates" in September. Really--FRIGATES? Britain had frigates, to be sure, but since it was they who resurrected the term (technically applied to "twin-screw corvettes"), but the USN? This seems erroneous, too. That same source credits the US as having 110 destroyers in its inventory. Okay, but did these include the reserves of old WW1 "flush deckers"? By the same token Antony Preston, in one of his numerous naval publications, states that Britain had about almost as many, but separately listed some 68 "older" destrovers not included in the original 100+, putting the number at over 180; this did NOT count destroyers then being built in UK shipyards, and within six months some of these were commissioned, as well. None of the USN Fletchers were yet laid down, as of that date.

Britain had six aircraft carriers in commission--not counting seaplane carriers-- to the USN's five. The US had two more soon to commission (Wasp and Hornet), while Britain was about to commission Ark Royal. The US had 15 battleships, the Royal Navy 12; Britain also had 3 battlecruisers (counting Hood), while the US had zero. Fuzzy parity, yes?

In cruisers, the US source does not separate heavy (8" gunned) from light (6" or less), but I did some further research and arrived at 17 heavies and 18 lights, for a total of 35; Britain could count 40 light cruisers alone, plus 15 heavies (including her commonwealth navies, which fought as RN during WW2), for 55 total. Both nations had cruisers planned or building, but Britain's count outpaced that of the US until the latter's industrial base got rolling, later on.

It appears that the one category in which the USN comfortably exceeded the Royal Navy, on 03 September 1939, was submarines. No real surprise there.

Now, the numbers on paper are just that---but the real question is how one measures "powerful". Britain had Empire possessions and interests literally around the globe. The US did not. As referred to elsewhere, the 5:5 "parity" delineated by the treaties after WNC gave the two nations rough equality in tonnages and other categories; but that "equality" allowed the USN to "eat better" than Britain, whose navy needed truly global reach.

In the WNC and following treaties of the early '20s, Britain's leadership dropped the ball, and the US pulled off a pretty good coup in the process. Had Britain better sense and long-visioned leadership, they should have demanded at least a 7:5:3:3 ratio among the leading four signatory powers. Their "acquisition" to the US essentially led to their demise, and the US even got them to pay for more of it, later.

[aurora]

The nearest I can come to reconciling the original statement vis a vis the Great War is as follows.Not all the Grand Fleet was available to put to sea at any one time, because ships required maintenance and repairs. For a list of ships which were present at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916 see the article, Order of battle at Jutland. A number of others missed the battle for one reason or another. Actual strength of the fleet varied through the war as new ships were built and others were sunk, but the numbers steadily increased as the war progressed and the margin of superiority over the German fleet progressed with it. This led to a slowly less cautious approach to the war as the strength increased. The fleet was at its weakest at the start of the war, when it was also least experienced at this sort of warfare and a number of minor but embarrassing losses occurred because of this inexperience.
After the United States entered the war, United States Battleship Division Nine was attached to the Grand Fleet as the Sixth Battle Squadron, adding four, and later five, dreadnought battleships.

aurora

[simonharley]

Never trust Wikipedia, even if it's referenced (which the Grand Fleet article most definitely isn't.)

At the end of the Great War the Grand Fleet alone was composed of a nominal 31 dreadnought battleships, nine battle cruisers, 2 large light cruisers, four armoured cruisers, six aircraft carrying vessels, 34 light cruisers, and I couldn't be bothered counting up the six destroyer and four submarine flotillas. That doesn't include the U.S. Battle Squadrons in British waters. Hundreds of ships from dreadnought battleships to trawlers were located elsewhere throughout the world.

The U.S. Navy had I think more men on the books, but unless it was going to send Naval Divisions to fight on the continent I don't think it could deploy anything like the power the Royal Navy could.

[aurora]

Simon the Fleet you indicate- is that which existed at war's end; but that was not the size is pretty quickly became (Wiki notwithstanding)Economy cuts.scrapping and the Geddes Axe saw to that-10 battleships 3 battlecruisers and 3 aircraft carriers-hybrids was the figure at 1921/22.

aurora

[MikeBrough]

Aurora, I don't mean to be rude but I'd dispute those totals.

We need to remember that the RN had scrapped a number of capital ships in 1921 in readiness for a post-war rebuilding programme that never came. Dreadnought and all of the battleships and battlecruisers built from 1907-1910 (14 of them!) were sold for scrap.

Much depends on the date you take your count but I count 32 capital ships for the RN in 1921, falling to 24 after Washington.

Just before Washington

In his excellent Warships After Washington, John Jordan shows the following totals in service on 12 November 1921.

RN - 4 x 12" battleships and 2 x 12" battlecruisers, 12 x 13.5" BBs and 3 x 13.5" BCs, 10 x 15" BBs and 5 x 15" BCs
USN - 8 x 12" BBs, 11 x 14" BBs, 1 x 16" BB

That’s 32 vs 20 (RN vs USN).

RN After Washington (late 1922)

18 battleships: Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Iron Duke, Benbow, Marlborough, Emperor of India, Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Warspite, Malaya, Valiant, Royal Sovereig, Royal Oak, Revenge, Ramilles and Resolution.

6 battlecruisers/battlecruiser-carrier hybrids: Tiger, Renown, Repulse, Glorious, Courageous and Hood.

[aurora]

All I am trying to get over to you Mike- is that first eight battleships you have listed- were all in line for scrapping or downgrading post 1922-which leaves the ten frontline battleships that I have stated for use during the inter war years.I know that Nelson and Rodney were added in the 1930's


aurora