..... Horishi was second in command of AA/secondary armament under Lt Cdr Ikeda (the man who preserved Hayashi's sketch). Horishi's action position aboard Kirishima was (according to USSBS - Interrogation of Japanese Officers) in the control top - about as far away from the hull of the ship as it was possible to get. Your reliance upon Washington's action report is quite interesting. Nowhere in the Washington's action report (including the report of the gunnery officer) is there a single mention of the number of hits believed to have been scored on any of the targets taken under fire by Washington that night. Lee's report mentions a possible eight hits on Kirishima, but there is NO citation by Lee as to where he obtained that figure; maybe Horishi emailed Admiral Lee. Where did Morison obtain his nine hit figure? Oh look! He took it from the USSBS interrogation of Horishi - the ONLY officer from Kirishima interviewed by the USSBS. So now the information of poor Commander Hayashi (THE CHIEF DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER!!!) comes to light many years later in Japan, where no US historians had ever conducted any native language research, and it is dismissed as crap. Why? Because it does not fit the accepted narrative.alecsandros wrote: ... The action report that we have (Washington's), does not fit Lundgren's analysis, which is the only source mentioning 22 heavy hits. This source draws exclusively from 1 (key) eye wittness.
..... Very simple answer. Only Hayashi's sketch of physical hit locations survived the war, thanks to Lt Cdr Ikeda. The detailed damage report did not. Read Lundgren's paper more carefully and you will see this to have been the case.alecsandros wrote: This source does not mention any underwater concusion damage, underwater splinter damage,
..... You are committing the following errors of logic:alecsandros wrote: and does not explain why would 16" shells explode 1-2-3 meters behind 150mm of vertical armor, OR on hitting Kirishima's decks (instead of traveling ~ 20m and exiting on the other side, at least for the shells fired in the first stage of the firing)
[ 1 ] You are assuming that the 16in shells passed cleanly through whatever initial armor they struck and then were free to travel as if in a vacuum without encountering any further obstruction in the interior of the ship. I brought this up before and your totally ignore the point.
[ 2 ] You are assuming that the holes in the deck above the secondary battery were caused by 16in deck hit impacts. Unlikely IMO. I suggest that these holes were the result of ammunition explosions in the secondary battery. By the way, these holes were seen and related by Lt Cdr Ikeda, officer in charge of the secondary battery. He must be a lunatic as well.
[ 3 ] Your post-fuze initiation projectile travel analysis is faulty. Assuming that the 16in shells hitting the hull did in fact pass into a magical obstruction-free vacuum within the hull of Kirishima, and further assuming that they suffered absolutely no loss of velocity whatsoever after striking the hull, they would only have travelled about 67 feet into the ship. Kirishima as originally constructed had a beam of 92 feet; after her inter-war bulging, her beam was 102 feet. Allowing for an average target inclination of 30 degree versus the line of fire, a projectile would have had to travel at least 106 feet to exit the opposite side of the ship - and that is based upon the original 92 foot beam. Even at a perfect 90deg inclination to the line of fire, the projectile still explodes within the hull of the ship. Do the math yourself if you do not believe my calculations. The USN did not design AP fuzes to permit their projectiles to pass through a capital ship without exploding.
[ 4 ] Your belief in the impossibility of below the official waterline hits ignores the fact that Kirishima was making 26 knots at the time of the engagement which would have produced a distinct sine curve waterline trace exposing more of her side depth amidships. In any case, an examination of Hayashi's hit sketch (as interpreted by Mr Lundgren) and the film taken by Dr Ballard show hits 7, 15, 16 and 20 all precisely where Lt Cdr Hayashi had marked them on his sketch.
..... Absolutely, positively untrue. See "AMP Report No 79.2R - Accuracy of Gunfire of the Main Batteries of U.S, Battleships" of July 1944.alecsandros wrote: The total number of claimed hits does not fit with US 16" 9-battery night trial firings,
..... Horishi made the assertion on the basis of a comment made to him by an anonymous engine room crewman after their rescue and it may very easily be explained as the crewman's misunderstanding of the order of Kirishima's captain to flood the port engine room in an attempt to keep Kirishima on an even keel while the rescue of the crew was in process. In any case, this has absolutely nothing to do with the hit sketch - which is really the subject of this discussion.alecsandros wrote: It also fails to explain why did Horishi testified that Kirishima was "scuttled".
..... Now that Rodney's situation versus Bismarck has been exposed as a completely different case from that of Washington, now we have to examine KGV and Hood at Dakar? Why are you silent about the case I raised concerning Iron Duke shoot versus Konig at Jutland?????????? OK, let's do KGV first:alecsandros wrote:It also does not fit with % of hits obtained by any other navy's battleship, under any conditions (KGV versus Bismarck ? Hood bombarding Dunkerque ? )
From "Progress in Naval Gunnery - 1942" regarding the final Bismarck action involving Rodney and KGV:
> Although hits by the smaller calibre guns were usually quite
plain, it was difficult to spot those of A.P. shell, except at the very
short range at the close of the final action.
> The unexpected error made by the (KGV's) R.D.F. screen operator in mistaking
the echoes of the Bismarck, which at the beginning were very
indefinite, for those of splashes should be noted.
> The comparative ease with which the echoes of splashes were
observed at medium ranges was a valuable lesson of which full
advantage must be taken. As a first step, it is essential that the
observer at the R.D.F. screen should be provided with a hooter or
similar device connected to the fall of shot unit of the fire control
table so that he can identify own ship's fall of shot (the King
George V has since fitted a lamp for this purpose).
(Byron note: i.e. - KGV was shooting in concentration with Rodney.
Due to lack of a fall of shot clock for the radar operator, he was
unable to distinguish KGV's shots from those of Rodney.)
> King George V's Type 284 set was put out of action by shock of
gunfire after half an hour ...
> Although satisfactory at times, spreads in general appear to
have been large and in consequence there must have been many
false straddles and wasted rounds. The excessive spreads of the
capital ships' main armament salvos at the close of the final action
(range 3-4,000 yards) was possibly due to fatigue of layers as the
flatness of the trajectory could not have been wholly responsible ;
the need for more stringent pointer-following drills is indicated.
> A misunderstanding over the use of W/T communications
showed the need for more practice with F/C procedure,
although, in this instance, with the range becoming very low and
the two ships having different armaments, periodical reversion to
sector firing would probably have handicapped rates of fire to an
undesirable extent. The importance of the fire control W/T not
interfering with R.D.F. is clear.
> The performance of the King George V's turrets in the
important first half-hour of her action, during which some 40 to 50
salvos were fired, was satisfactory but after that the output was
very seriously reduced by breakdowns.
It also bears mention that KGV commenced firing upon Bismarck at about 24,000 yards at 8:49am, falling to about 2,500 yards at the time of cease fire at 10:21pm. During that time A turret was disabled for a half-hour; Y turret was out of action for 7 minutes and one other main battery gun was placed out of action for 30 minutes due to a cordite mishap. In other words the conditions under which KGV fought were, once again, vastly different from those encountered by Washington.
BTW - here is an excerpt from the report of Washington's gunnery officer. Please note bolded point for special interest:
USS WASHINGTON GUNNERY REPORT
< excerpted >
In the second phase target had been tracked by radar ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably obtained on first salvo and certainly on the second.
The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely”
Collective fire, Director (forward main battery director) controlling in train.
Group 1 controlling in Plot.
Director IV (Stable Vertical I) controlling in continuous level and cross-level.
Director IV controlling firing circuit.
Radar ranging by indicating and voice.
Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual target. During the time when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated (generated = using the rate of train derived from previously observed relative motion of firing ship and target), a turret spread in deflection was fired.
The selected train firing key was used in plot to insure that the firing pointer could see the light that indicates when the director train is on target. It has been the standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target.
On the second main battery target, the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least five minutes. When the target finally came into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on.
It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) “overs” as well as “shorts” could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.