Tribal class dd

[alecsandros]

Lundstrom states that:
29 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN CAP while attacking the USN carriers,
25 IJN aircraft were shot down by AA (Gatch stated that only 5% were destroyed by 5in gunfire).
13 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN strike aircraft defensive fire and by their fighter escorts while attacking the IJN carriers,
28 IJN aircraft ditched
4 were lost aboard the damaged carriers
99 IJN carrier aircraft were lost while104 IJN carrier aircraft survived.

Duncan,
According to USS Enterprise official action report, her squadrons claimed 33 IJN planes shot down. Hornet must have had a smaller kill claim, as she was knocked out early and her squadrons went to Enterprise.

42 planes lost to USN fighters/SBDs (29 + 13) is very much, judging from the kill claims.

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Why did the 28 planes ditch ? Shokaku and Zuiho were damaged, but Zuikaku and Ryujo were operational and easy within range of returning airplanes. Moreover, they suffered so heavy casualties of their own strike groups that they had plenty of space for 28 more aircraft.

[dunmunro]

Lundstrom states that:
29 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN CAP while attacking the USN carriers,
25 IJN aircraft were shot down by AA (Gatch stated that only 5% were destroyed by 5in gunfire).
13 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN strike aircraft defensive fire and by their fighter escorts while attacking the IJN carriers,
28 IJN aircraft ditched
4 were lost aboard the damaged carriers
99 IJN carrier aircraft were lost while 104 IJN carrier aircraft survived.

Duncan,
According to USS Enterprise official action report, her squadrons claimed 33 IJN planes shot down. Hornet must have had a smaller kill claim, as she was knocked out early and her squadrons went to Enterprise.

42 planes lost to USN fighters/SBDs (29 + 13) is very much, judging from the kill claims.

====

Why did the 28 planes ditch ? Shokaku and Zuiho were damaged, but Zuikaku and Ryujo were operational and easy within range of returning airplanes. Moreover, they suffered so heavy casualties of their own strike groups that they had plenty of space for 28 more aircraft.

The USN claimed over 60 aerial kills, and many of the IJN aircraft that were shot down were fighters, which could not have been hit by AA so this proves that USN fighters were scoring heavily.

104 IJN aircraft did survive, but the rest ditched because of confusion as to which carriers to land on, and because Zuikaku and Junyo were preparing another strike and could not immediately land on aircraft.

[pgollin]

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alecsandros


No one believes the immediate reports of shooting down of aircraft, whether air force or naval.

Post war analysis WHERE POSSIBLE has shown that most claims were wildly inaccurate.

The best known example are the Battle of Britain claims where both sides initial (and publicised) claims were ridiculous. Both sides also kept more accurate measures based on detailed de-briefings (and on the British side comparisons with available crash sites) and these scores were more accurate (the Germans a little, the British much more so) HOWEVER THEY WERE STILL INACCURATE.

The Air force referred to the publicised claims as "cricket scores" (i.e. as ridiculously large) but they let the propaganda go ahead to boost morale, but even they tended to believe the still wrong, nut much more accurate, de-briefed figures.

So much care is needed for aerial (and other) claims in WW2.

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Some work has been done is comparing late war figures with known numbers of gross losses (which would include accidents, pilot error, poor maintenance, etc....) and it can be demonstrated that ALL nations claims are excessive.

.

[alecsandros]

The USN claimed over 60 aerial kills, and many of the IJN aircraft that were shot down were fighters, which could not have been hit by AA so this proves that USN fighters were scoring heavily.

Duncan,
USS Enterprise's aircrews claimed 33, and it is just that: a claim. The real number of shot down aircraft by USN aircrews was most likely smaller than that.

Zuikaku and Junyo launched all their available strike aircraft by the time the planes of the first wave were returning back, so I don't see how they "couldn't land due to flight operations". Flight operations of what ?
Most likely those 28 planes ditched because of damage, suffered by AA and fighters.

A key figure here is the number of aircrew lost : 148 ! This means that most aircrews from those ~ 100 planes lost were killed ! And I doubt they were killed during their forced water landings...

[alecsandros]

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alecsandros


No one believes the immediate reports of shooting down of aircraft, whether air force or naval.



.

Agreed,
But here we have reports from the Japanese showing 100 planes lost, and kill claims from USS Enterprise showing 33 enemy planes shot down.

The actual number of IJN planes shot down by USS Enterprise's air group was certainly lower than 33... leaving AT LEAST 67 for AA, Hornet's airgroup, and other causes.

[alecsandros]

Avenger's Sea Hurricanes only claimed 5 kills over PQ-18 and it would be amazing if they all were correct, but even so that leaves at least 30 AA kills.

Lufwaffe Norway mentions:
- 18 Ju-88, He-111, He-115 as lost to flak
- 5 lost to Hurricanes,
- 7 flak + fighters,
- 5 lost on take-off / landings (2 collided on the runway)
- 27 damaged by all causes, including take off/landing accidents

TOTAL: 35 lost and 27 damaged from 337 sorties.

more here: http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=24420

[alecsandros]

@Duncan

The total number of operational Japanese planes at the end of the day of battle of Santa Cruz can easily be observed by numbering the FINAL STRIKES conducted by Zuikaku and Junyo, all targeting the heavily damaged Hornet.

[dunmunro]

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alecsandros


No one believes the immediate reports of shooting down of aircraft, whether air force or naval.



.

Agreed,
But here we have reports from the Japanese showing 100 planes lost, and kill claims from USS Enterprise showing 33 enemy planes shot down.

The actual number of IJN planes shot down by USS Enterprise's air group was certainly lower than 33... leaving AT LEAST 67 for AA, Hornet's airgroup, and other causes.

I've already given you a breakdown of IJN losses according to Lundstrom, but I should add that 2 additional IJN aircraft flew to land bases.

Lundstrom has spent a very considerable time researching this, with full access to IJN records, so I don't think you can dispute his numbers quite so easily. German aircraft historians such as Harold Thiele ( Luftwaffe aerial torpedo aircraft and operations) have examined the Luftwaffe's records and war diaries and and Thiele states that the Lufwaffe lost 41 aircraft attacking PQ 18 including 33 torpedo bombers.

On the one hand you want to reduce USN fighter kills at Santa Cruz but then increase FAA kills over PQ-18.

[alecsandros]

Duncan , I do not claim anything.
I read the available records that's all.
Lutwaffe Norway has an open database with all planes lost to all causes in Norway in all war years. Queries xan indicate the names serial numbers and context of each individual planes loss or damage.

According to their database, 30 planes were lost over the convoy, 5 more badly damaged and destriyed on landings or take offs, or written off due to to much damage. [of the 27 planes damaged, some may have been later written off or canibalised for parts, I do not know. If you open the link you will see some planes with 50-70% damage, so they may have been tracked by Thiele as ultimate total losses]

I have privided you withca link to a page that lists allthe names of all the crewmembers lost over pq18.

As far as Santa Cruz goes, you may be confusing the numbers with eastern solomons. that is were a large number of ijn planes ditched for various reasons other then combat damage.

[and I insist on this because another online database is that of combinedfleet.com. They have active research and all year round updates. At Zuikaku TROM they list 6 planes from Shokaku which were forced to ditch the water, and that's it. Not 28, but 6.]

I have provided a link to enferprjses batrle report, claiming 33 air kills. the actual number probably is far smalller. and ststill 100 planes lost by the japanese....

[Steve Crandell]

The LW was attacking with twin engine bombers, which are much easier targets for flak because they aren't as agile, can be seen more easily, and are simply larger targets. Didn't the IJN stop attacking USN warship formations with torpedo carrying Bettys because their losses were disproportionately greater than with single engine attackers? Of course it's easier for fighters to spot them as well.

[alecsandros]

The LW was attacking with twin engine bombers, which are much easier targets for flak because they aren't as agile, can be seen more easily, and are simply larger targets. Didn't the IJN stop attacking USN warship formations with torpedo carrying Bettys because their losses were disproportionately greater than with single engine attackers? Of course it's easier for fighters to spot them as well.

... Still, after the first strike, the Japanese had 18 torpedo bombers operational out of the initial ~ 57 on board the carriers (or 32%). Of the Kates actualy used in the first attack, only 19% were still operational (7 of 36)

The Germans, after 3 days of combat, had about 40 operational torpedo bombers out of the initial ~ 100 (or 40%).

[dunmunro]

The LW was attacking with twin engine bombers, which are much easier targets for flak because they aren't as agile, can be seen more easily, and are simply larger targets. Didn't the IJN stop attacking USN warship formations with torpedo carrying Bettys because their losses were disproportionately greater than with single engine attackers? Of course it's easier for fighters to spot them as well.

The USN introduced VT ammo in Jan 1943.

Attacking fleet carriers (with large numbers of embarked fighters and fighter capable SBDs) with small numbers of highly flammable, and comparatively slow IJN TE bombers was a losing proposition for the IJN. However, attacks by large numbers of Ju-88s combined with He-111 torpedo bombers was a much tougher proposition for the defence and the USN said so. The USN considered Luftwaffe aircraft superior to IJN aircraft ( see my post of Tue Oct 07, 2014 10:52 pm) - and they were; Luftwaffe aircraft were faster, they had armour and self sealing tanks carried heavier bomb loads of superior bombs while the He-111 was also tougher than it's IJN counterparts and carried two torpedoes per mission. The JU-88 was highly manoeuvrable, could use a variety of attack profiles, and was faster than any IJN attack aircraft (in 1942) and after it had dropped it's bombs it could probably outrun and out climb an F4F-4, at low altitude. By 1942 Luftwaffe aircraft carried enough armour, backed by self sealing tanks, that the .303 MGs carried by the Sea Hurricane and Fulmar were no longer very effective and armament was the one area that the Martlet/F4F had a clear advantage over the Sea Hurricane IB, when dealing with Luftwaffe aircraft.

[dunmunro]

One of the claims made by it's detractors is that HACS/FKC could not accurately track aircraft, and could not provide accurate predicted fire with MT fuzed ammo. IOW, with accurate inputs, HACS could not provide accurate outputs, or so the story goes.

I located the the AAR for HMS Ulster Queen for PQ-18 and it can be read here:

http://www.russianarcticconvoymuseum.co ... Eckert.pdf

I would encourage everyone to read it carefully before commenting further on RN AA/HACS.

One snippet from the above:

The last phase of the main air attack commenced at 1240A the next day, 15th September but no torpedo planes came out. A continuous high level bombing attack by Ju88s was kept up until 1630A but the enemy seldom left cloud cover. Bombs fell amongst the convoy and as far out as 5 miles but no ships were hit though some fell most uncomfortably close.
The after control carried out one excellent controlled run with Type 285 commencing unseen, but obtaining a fortunate correction through a cloud gap, hit the aircraft which was seen to lose height and at least one parachute left the machine. No other ships were firing and the aircraft was almost certainly destroyed.

So we have a Luftwaffe aircraft probably flying a straight course in cloud. The HADT is tracking the aircraft by type 285 radar, which also provides range rates to the HACS computer. The aircraft is glimpsed briefly through a gap in the cloud, and this allows the HADT to provide target elevation data to the HACS computer, which uses it to input accurate target elevation and the HACS computer than provides extremely accurate train and deflection orders to the guns, along with accurate fuze timing to the 4in fuze setting machines, and the result is a 4in AA kill.

[Steve Crandell]

One snippet from the above:

The last phase of the main air attack commenced at 1240A the next day, 15th September but no torpedo planes came out. A continuous high level bombing attack by Ju88s was kept up until 1630A but the enemy seldom left cloud cover. Bombs fell amongst the convoy and as far out as 5 miles but no ships were hit though some fell most uncomfortably close.
The after control carried out one excellent controlled run with Type 285 commencing unseen, but obtaining a fortunate correction through a cloud gap, hit the aircraft which was seen to lose height and at least one parachute left the machine. No other ships were firing and the aircraft was almost certainly destroyed.

So we have a Luftwaffe aircraft probably flying a straight course in cloud. The HADT is tracking the aircraft by type 285 radar, which also provides range rates to the HACS computer. The aircraft is glimpsed briefly through a gap in the cloud, and this allows the HADT to provide target elevation data to the HACS computer, which uses it to input accurate target elevation and the HACS computer than provides extremely accurate train and deflection orders to the guns, along with accurate fuze timing to the 4in fuze setting machines, and the result is a 4in AA kill.

Why again is the Mark 37 not capable of this? It never shot down any aircraft in comparable circumstances?

Oh, and how was the HACS at surface fire control?

[dunmunro]

[

Why again is the Mark 37 not capable of this? It never shot down any aircraft in comparable circumstances?

Oh, and how was the HACS at surface fire control?

I have no doubt that Mk 37 was capable of it, but the fact is that many people think that HACS wasn't. The only advantage that HACS would have over Mk 37 (assuming it had time to come to solution via automatic rate control) was that HACS had better control over dead time and thus more accurate fuze timing.

HACS/FKC was always paired with an AFCC or a FCB, although the HACS/FKC had a minimal ability to engage surface targets.