Tribal class dd

[dunmunro]

According to Barnett http://www.amazon.com/Engage-Enemy-More ... 0393029182 and quoting Roskill, and the DNO and others, HACS was an unmitigated diaster. Worst AA system of the era.

Yes, Roskill does say that in Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol 2 and he's been endlessly quoted ever since, and then quoted secondarily by further authors. However, Roskill made that statement at a time when USN AA claims during WW2 were accepted verbatim, whereas RN AA kills had already been well established; naturally the comparison between the USN's inflated claims and the RN's actual kills wasn't flattering to the RN. Roskill then made the blanket statement that the RN had the worst AA of any navy in WW2, which is demonstrably not true.

After Roskill's death Lundstrom published his two volume "First Team" books and western historians began to take a harder look at USN AA performance and by extension, we can examine it's actual comparative advantage, if any, over HACS and FKC and I, for one, don't see any USN advantage until the USN deployed VT ammo and massive numbers of Bofors guns.

[Dave Saxton]

The evidence refered to isn't statistical comparison to USN reports but trial shoots and evaluations, and then poor performances once the war started. Roskill was there on the scene rather than refering to statistical analysis after the fact. It wasn't just Roskill but the DNO and others. The DNO said HACS was a "menace to the fleet." Perhaps it was because it fell so short of expectations. Air power and warship impotency against it came as a rude reality. I agree that it was probably not much worse than other systems of the era, and that in actual combat they all performed rather poorly.

[pgollin]

According to Barnett ................

.

Always amused when Americans quote Barnett, he is the epitome of the left-wing, anti-establishment revisionist, and yet ....................

.

[Dave Saxton]

Ah, I did not know anything about him. Should everything he writes be dismissed because of that? The real issue here is what Roskill and the DNO reported, and they had first hand knowlege. I have found that the Royal Navy and the KM tend to be much more critical of their own than the USN does.

[Steve Crandell]

Ah, I did not know anything about him. Should everything he writes be dismissed because of that? The real issue here is what Roskill and the DNO reported, and they had first hand knowlege. I have found that the Royal Navy and the KM tend to be much more critical of their own than the USN does.

Interesting. I just finished reading "Death Traps" about the M4 Sherman Tank by the maintenance officer of the 3rd AD in Europe. Prior to that I read a book about USN destroyers in the Pacific that was absolutely scathing about their torpedoes, and there are many AARs that USN detractors like to quote here, particularly numerous ones quoted by dunmunro, and yet you don't think the US forces are critical of their equipment. I seldom see any British AARs which are very critical at all. Seemingly there aren't many. Maybe I just don't read the right things?

[dunmunro]

Ah, I did not know anything about him. Should everything he writes be dismissed because of that? The real issue here is what Roskill and the DNO reported, and they had first hand knowlege. I have found that the Royal Navy and the KM tend to be much more critical of their own than the USN does.

Interesting. I just finished reading "Death Traps" about the M4 Sherman Tank by the maintenance officer of the 3rd AD in Europe. Prior to that I read a book about USN destroyers in the Pacific that was absolutely scathing about their torpedoes, and there are many AARs that USN detractors like to quote here, particularly numerous ones quoted by dunmunro, and yet you don't think the US forces are critical of their equipment. I seldom see any British AARs which are very critical at all. Seemingly there aren't many. Maybe I just don't read the right things?

Yes, there were USN officers who were critical of their equipment and who said so, but we know from the "great torpedo scandal" that the USN powers that be, IE BuOrd, did not take criticism well. In this case the "powers that be" were also in the USN BuOrd which was able to refute criticism of their AA systems by pointing to the huge numbers of downed IJN aircraft (conveniently complied by BuOrd) and this line of defence has held up until Lundstrom began publishing his seminal works about the airwar in the Pacific. Roskill had his critics within the RN but they had no weapons to refute his arguments because RN AA seemed to have fared so poorly in comparison to the USN. Yet the fact is that RN AA shot down more aircraft over PQ-18 than the USN did in all the major carrier battles of 1942 but we simply didn't know this until the last decade or so.

RN officers were impressed with Mk33/37; it seemed have all the elements in place that gunnery specialists, like Roskill, argued were necessary for successfully engaging aircraft at sea, and the icing on the cake, for Roskill was that it was apparently, a huge success at sea as well. Roskill never said an unkind word about Mk 37 yet he must have known about it's drawbacks and the criticisms levelled against it. He also was well aware of the scientific and technical reasons that led the RN to adopt a non-tachymetric AA system, yet he makes no attempt at an even handed history to give his readers some background on that decision. Instead we are left with the impression of huge blunders by wooden headed nincompoops, rather than a decision implemented for solid technical reasons with sound scientific backing.

[alecsandros]

Yet the fact is that RN AA shot down more aircraft over PQ-18 than the USN did in all the major carrier battles of 1942 but we simply didn't know this until the last decade or so.

... So you have resorted to lying alltogether ?

PQ-18 lost 11 ships , and his close escort (20 DDs, 10 corvettes/trawlers, 2 AA gunships, 1 AA cruiser, 1 CVE), especialy CVE Avenger, carrying 15 Sea Hurricanes, destroyed 35 German planes (He-115, He-111, Ju-88), and damaged 27 others, in exchange for 5 Hurricanes lost.

USN at Santa Cruz destroyed ~ 100 Japanese planes.

[Dave Saxton]

Ah, I did not know anything about him. Should everything he writes be dismissed because of that? The real issue here is what Roskill and the DNO reported, and they had first hand knowlege. I have found that the Royal Navy and the KM tend to be much more critical of their own than the USN does.

Interesting. I just finished reading "Death Traps" about the M4 Sherman Tank by the maintenance officer of the 3rd AD in Europe. Prior to that I read a book about USN destroyers in the Pacific that was absolutely scathing about their torpedoes, and there are many AARs that USN detractors like to quote here, particularly numerous ones quoted by dunmunro, and yet you don't think the US forces are critical of their equipment. I seldom see any British AARs which are very critical at all. Seemingly there aren't many. Maybe I just don't read the right things?

I don't see the kind of introspection in BuOrd literature as I do in say the AVKS and NEK evaluations within the KM, or the evaluations on RN equipment compiled in ADM281. What ADM281 has to say on Type 277 radar is scathing for example. There was book on the BuOrd compiled after the war, and when it was released it caused a stir. Comparing an early (un washed) edition to a later edition is very interesting.

[Steve Crandell]

How about the crew of the British cruiser that went to sea with a Mark 37 system, having previously deployed with British equipment? Wasn't that about as direct a comparison as is possible?

Also, BuOrd was not the only voice when it came to USN equipment. Why ignore all the others? Many USN sailors who actually used the equipment thought of BuOrd as horrible to deal with when it came to criticism from the fleet. That doesn't in itself mean the equipment was universally terrible and always worse than the British equivalent; only that it was sometimes difficult to get needed changes.

[dunmunro]

Yet the fact is that RN AA shot down more aircraft over PQ-18 than the USN did in all the major carrier battles of 1942 but we simply didn't know this until the last decade or so.

... So you have resorted to lying alltogether ?

PQ-18 lost 11 ships , and his close escort (20 DDs, 10 corvettes/trawlers, 2 AA gunships, 1 AA cruiser, 1 CVE), especialy CVE Avenger, carrying 15 Sea Hurricanes, destroyed 35 German planes (He-115, He-111, Ju-88), and damaged 27 others, in exchange for 5 Hurricanes lost.

USN at Santa Cruz destroyed ~ 100 Japanese planes.

We are having a polite conversation and then you start with these kinds of accusations - please stop.

You obviously haven't read Lundstrom. He details USN AA victories in the Pacific during 1942 by accessing IJN records and his assessment is that the USN AA shot down 10 aircraft in their first 3 carrier battles and 25 at Santa Cruz, (mainly using CIWS). In those 3 battles the USN lost 3 fleet carriers, each heavily defended by destroyers, cruisers and at Santa Cruz an AA cruiser as well. USN air and AA assets in any of these battles dwarfs that of the RN around PQ 18. Avenger carried 15 Sea Hurricanes but no more than 8 were ever active at one time and they made only 5 kill claims. Protecting a slow (~10-12 knots) convoy, which is spread over several square miles, and must remain in range of Luftwaffe bases for several days is a more far difficult proposition than defending a single 30 knot carrier, which the defenders are certain will be the primary focus of the attack. The USN had this to say:

German

German air attacks against our surface forces were more effective than those of the Japanese, prior to the latter's use of suicide tactics, for the following reasons:

German aircraft were superior.

German pilots possessed greater skill.

German attacks were more highly co ordinated.

Our own air defense was weaker.

Our surface forces were not as modern or heavily armed as those in the Pacific.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... index.html

The Ju-88, for example, was a far superior attack aircraft to anything possessed by the IJN in 1942 being much faster, tougher and carrying a heavier bomb load with superior, heavier bombs than anything aboard an IJN carrier. Even the HE-111 could carry two torpedoes and much heavier bombs than its IJN land based counterparts. The land based Ju-87 had a short range, but the RN was forced to operate for days at a time within its range, and consequently the Ju-87 was attacking RN ships with 500kg and 1000kg bombs (also for the Ju-88) where the IJN's Val was limited to 250kg. The long range Ju-87r could still carry the same bomb load as a Val over the same range as a Val.


You state that the RN had an AA cruiser ( 4 x 4.5in guns and HACS ), two AA Aux cruisers (max ~15 knots and 8 x 4in each with HACS) many destroyers with FKC, most with 40 deg elevation 4.7in guns (including 4 Tribal class), but if HACS and FKC were completely ineffective, as Roskill claims, what would it matter how many ships the RN placed in the screen? One of HMS Scylla's GCO's, Robert Hughes, wrote a classic book on RN AA: Flagship to Murmansk and you can read excerpts here:
http://www.world-war.co.uk/scylla_story.php3

You can also watch Scylla in action:
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/convoy-to-russia

Participants in the PQ-18 battle praised RN AA and claimed it was highly effective.

[dunmunro]

How about the crew of the British cruiser that went to sea with a Mark 37 system, having previously deployed with British equipment? Wasn't that about as direct a comparison as is possible?

Also, BuOrd was not the only voice when it came to USN equipment. Why ignore all the others? Many USN sailors who actually used the equipment thought of BuOrd as horrible to deal with when it came to criticism from the fleet. That doesn't in itself mean the equipment was universally terrible and always worse than the British equivalent; only that it was sometimes difficult to get needed changes.

Yes, except that Roskill never makes it, except in passing, and never quotes any hard evidence. Delhi's actual performance in combat was less than spectacular but why would HMS Delhi be able to do what the USN, demonstrably, couldn't do with the same equipment; namely shoot down large numbers numbers of aircraft? That Delhi's Mk 37 was superior, on paper, to HACS/FKC is not in dispute. What is in dispute is that Mk37 could overcome it's limitations in RPC, computer solution times, and gun density, (due to the increased weight of Mk 37 and associated guns) to actually perform better in combat than an equivalent ship with RN pattern guns and HACS/FKC, especially given that neither system could handle manoeuvring targets. Was Delhi actually a superior AA cruiser to smaller C class AA cruisers that mounted 4 x 4in twin mounts along with HACS 3? Delhi was originally planned to carry the 4 x 4.5in twin mounts that went into Scylla showing what could be carried for the same weight as Delhi's MK37/5in/38 armament.*

I'm not saying that USN Mk37 and the 5in/38 was "terrible" only that it didn't perform in combat as the USN hoped for (and as BuOrd falsely claimed it was doing)



* 8 x 4.5in and twin HACS systems were slightly heavier than twin Mk 37 and 5 x 5in/38, but overall equivalent since the HACS HADT was much lighter, and the reduced topweight allowed for more 4.5in guns.

[alecsandros]

You obviously haven't read Lundstrom. He details USN AA victories in the Pacific during 1942 by accessing IJN records and his assessment is that the USN AA shot down 10 aircraft in their first 3 carrier battles and 25 at Santa Cruz, (mainly using CIWS). In those 3 battles the USN lost 3 fleet carriers, each heavily defended by destroyers, cruisers and at Santa Cruz an AA cruiser as well. USN air and AA assets in any of these battles dwarfs that of the RN around PQ 18. Avenger carried 15 Sea Hurricanes but no more than 8 were ever active at one time and they made only 5 kill claims. Protecting a slow (~10-12 knots) convoy, which is spread over several square miles, and must remain in range of Luftwaffe bases for several days is a more far difficult proposition than defending a single 30 knot carrier, which the defenders are certain will be the primary focus of the attack. The USN had this to say:

Duncan,
Fairly, I do not know if RN AA defense was superior or inferior to that of the USN.

The fact here was the claim comparing PQ-18 to Santa Cruz, which is not correct.

Losses of Lutfwaffe during PQ-18 can be found here: http://www.luftwaffe.no/SIG/Losses/tap422.html

A compilation done on Axis Forum showed 35 total losses (all causes) and 27 damaged (all causes) during the time of PQ-18 attacks (3 days).

===

According to IJN sources, at Santa Cruz they lost 101 planes (all causes), with an unknown number of damaged aircraft, in 1 day of fighting.

According to USS Enterprise official action report, the total number kill of claims done by her fighter aviators (F-4F + SBD Dauntless) was 33 Japanese planes shot down. [ http://cv6.org/ship/logs/action19421026.htm ]
USS Hornet's official action report was lost, but due to her heavy damage and transfer of the surviving squadrons to USS Enterprise, the expectation is they had a smaller kill claim.

And we all know how inflated fighter claims were.

This leaves ~ more than 50-60 Japanese planes lost to other causes than fighter attack. Most of those must have been lost to AA gunfire, because there are not reports of Japanese planes forced to ditch for lack of fuel / getting lost / etc...

[N.B.: Lundstrom mentions the confirmed planes lost to AA. You shoudl know that other planes were badly damaged by AA, but returned to their carriers only to be ditched immediately overboard to heavy damage. Some others were badly damaged by AA gunfire and later shot down by fighter CAP, while others were damagd by CAP and later destroyed by flak. ]

[N.B. 2: Flak kills overclaliming is siply explained. When you have 5 ships firing at a single plane, which explodes in the air, all 5 of them will submit a kill claim. Total number of IJN planes claimed shot down by flak at Santa Cruz was ~ 130]

===

[alecsandros]

A compilation done on Axis Forum showed 35 total losses (all causes) and 27 damaged (all causes) during the time of PQ-18 attacks (3 days).
[the number of 35 includes 5 He-115 floatplanes and 3 recon planes , all shot down by Hurricanes from Avenger and the 3 CAM ships. The total number of planes lost in the air is 27, with 8 more lost during landings, or who landed but were so badly damaged - 80-90% - that they were declared total losses. Many of the returning planes were damaged by the Hurricanes. According to the reports, about half of the losses were due to enemy fighters, and half to flak and other causes]

Summary: PQ-18 destroyed 35 planes, while USS Hornet+Enterprise destroyed 101 planes at Santa Cruz.

Of those, the best estimate for total losses is ~ 15-20 planes to flak at PQ-18 and 50-60 at Santa Cruz.

[dunmunro]

Avenger's Sea Hurricanes only claimed 5 kills over PQ-18 and it would be amazing if they all were correct, but even so that leaves at least 30 AA kills.


Several IJN carriers had their flight decks knocked out, forcing many returning IJN aircraft to ditch:

Lundstrom states that:
29 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN CAP while attacking the USN carriers,
25 IJN aircraft were shot down by AA (Gatch stated that only 5% were destroyed by 5in gunfire).
13 IJN aircraft were shot down by USN strike aircraft defensive fire and by their fighter escorts while attacking the IJN carriers,
28 IJN aircraft ditched
4 were lost aboard the damaged carriers
99 IJN carrier aircraft were lost while104 IJN carrier aircraft survived.


IIRC, IJN AA scored no kills.

Admiral Murray (CO TF 16) stated:

Within a carrier Task Force, the carrier is the only ship capable of effectively breaking up a dive bombing attack, hence its armament must be provided with this as the primary consideration. The only weapon which gives promise of accomplishing this is the 40-mm. quadruple mount.

Against all forms of aerial attack, torpedo planes, dive bombers, and horizontal bombers, 20-mm. guns in carriers are ineffective in stopping such attacks before bombs or torpedoes are dropped, primarily because of their inadequate range.

5"/38 caliber guns in carriers are ineffective against dive bombing attacks and are of little value when employed against torpedo plane attacks with the circular screen at 2,000 yards from the carrier. This gun, installed in the carrier, may be used with some effect, to break up high level bombing runs before dropping point is reached. However, the ships in the screen should be assigned this function as one of their primary missions and the carrier armament should be concentrated primarily on dive-bombing attacks.

USN AA summary June-Dec 1942, p.93.

[Francis Marliere]

Gentlemen,

with respects, I would argue that the comparison of two exemples does not mean a lot IMHO. As far as I understand things, the effectiveness of flak depends on a lot of parameters - especially luck, not only the guns and FC that the ships carry. I am not competent enough to quote and rate all these factors and will just cite a few exemples. In the first AA shots of the Pacific War, flak shot down very few planes because of the lack of experience and many 5" rounds were duds. In the other hand, during Watchtower, admiral's Turner's ships - which had roughly the same guns and directors - shot down almost all the Rikkos that attacked them at Guadalcanal.

Tactics, visibility, etc. also are important. A system that may destroy many planes in a "classic" (ie the kind of medium scale raid of 1942 carrier battles) attack may prove ineffective against surprise or saturation attacks (such as the Japanese did at the end of the war) because the directors has not enough time to engage the target or cannot engage enough targets at once. In the carrier battles, the Japanese pilots usually delivered their ordnance at point range, exposing themselve to flak, because of their mindset and the importance of the target. The German and Italian pilots that attacked cargoes in the Mediterranean or off Norway often delivered their bombs and torpedoes at longer range. They got fewer hits but suffered fewer looses from flak. One can argue also that German and Italian planes were often more resistant (with armor and self sealing tanks) and sometimes faster, hence garder to shoot down than Jpanese ones.

Last, but not least, an escort defending a convoy off Norway works in a more difficult environnement than a carrier defending itself in the Pacific. During a carier battle, almost all the planes attack the carriers, which have usually a lot of AA guns, while the escort of a convoy is scattered along a large area. In the first case, almost of the guns of the Task Force can engage, and most of tem (those of the carriers) with no deflection. In the second case, only a fraction of the escort may be in position to engage, and with a lot of deflection (according to Friedman, escorting ships are 3 times less efficient than the ships actually under attack).

Best,

Francis Marliere