Yamato + Musahi - Damage taken

[Garyt]

Its not really a gray area. The Japanese had collected hard data. Their findings indicated that a V/L/V layered system like that of the North Carolina (KGV was similar) or like the German design* worked equally the best. The Italian Pugliese cylinder design was the largest per hull volume although the Japanese didn't test it.

Gray area being did a v/v/v allow the ability to counterflood more effectively, and if so was this enough to counter the v/v/v not being as effective as a v/l/v to reduce shock.

The main problem was the rigid lower belt could not deform to help absorb shock. And South Dakota did demonstrate a vulnerability to the shock of its own guns firing to knock out its electrical power.

I think it's a known that this was a concern, but the Yamato class had this same issue. Bearing in mind they took 12-20 torpedoes (and bombs) to sink, it seems in the overall scheme of things it was not as big of an issue as it may have thought to have been.

[Dave Saxton]

The main problem was the rigid lower belt could not deform to help absorb shock. And South Dakota did demonstrate a vulnerability to the shock of its own guns firing to knock out its electrical power.

Are you saying that somehow a rigid lower belt caused South Dakota's breakers to trip when firing her main guns? Yamato also had a rigid lower belt. That sounds extraordinary. Were all ships with rigid lower belts like this?

No I am not. And you know it.

[Steve Crandell]

The main problem was the rigid lower belt could not deform to help absorb shock. And South Dakota did demonstrate a vulnerability to the shock of its own guns firing to knock out its electrical power.

Are you saying that somehow a rigid lower belt caused South Dakota's breakers to trip when firing her main guns? Yamato also had a rigid lower belt. That sounds extraordinary. Were all ships with rigid lower belts like this?

No I am not. And you know it.

Why mention the South Dakota electrical problems? I missed the point somehow.

[Dave Saxton]

Because we were talking about the POW electrical failures caused from torpedos, and the idea was introduced that the South Dakota/Iowa TDS design would protect its ship better from shock compared to the KGV TDS.

If a ship already has such a defect as shock knocking out its electrics, as was the case of the South Dakota class; it goes without saying that it's unlikely that a TDS design that can deal with shock effects less effectively will protect its ship better.

[Steve Crandell]

South Dakota opened fire with the main battery at 0018. She experienced electrical failures resulting in loss of power to the after part of the ship at 0033. Power was restored by 0036 (3 minutes later) except for 5" mounts 6 and 8. Later, when the ship came under concentrated fire from the Japanese, there were extensive shorts and related electrical failures caused by the extensive damage to the forward superstructure during this period, as I would expect in unarmored parts of any ship in a similar situation. At no time did the ship lose power to engines or ship control. Several circuit breaker defects were identified as a result of this engagement and were corrected in South Dakota and other ships using the same type of breakers.

This sounds to me like a problem which occurred during the one engagement, a fix was identified, and it was permanently corrected. I was under the impression that the problem on PoW lasted longer than three minutes.

I also don't believe this had anything to do with the TDS, although I agree that the TDS was flawed for the reasons noted by Dave Saxton.

[Dave Saxton]

The reason the engineer tied the breakers together in the first place was because the ongoing problem of shock tripping the breakers was becoming an annoying problem. He wanted to prevent any losses of electrical power going into combat. This seems to have been a much more chronic problem. Not a one time thing. Similar problems were noted on other fast battleships, even into the late war periods.

[Steve Crandell]

The reason the engineer tied the breakers together in the first place was because the ongoing problem of shock tripping the breakers was becoming an annoying problem. He wanted to prevent any losses of electrical power going into combat. This seems to have been a much more chronic problem. Not a one time thing. Similar problems were noted on other fast battleships, even into the late war periods.

The problems on South Dakota are discussed in her damage report, and how they were corrected long term.

Is there somewhere we can read about these problems in the fast battleships as a whole? That's pretty serious. It doesn't seem to have stopped Washington and Massachusettes in their engagements. It just seems to me that if all of those ships had serious reliability problems it would be more widely known. Heck, they wouldn't have been terribly useful as AA platforms either, let alone shore bombardment.

I spent some time at Pearl Harbor with an Interior communications tech from New Jersey while he was working on some of his equipment in my shop. We talked about some problems he was having, but he never mentioned anything about chronic power failures, and that would have been part of his job.

[Dave Saxton]

Good thing you mention the New Jersey. In the March 21 BB62 AR it states that the power for the search radars was lost briefly every time a salvo was fired. Why after the second salvo Washington fired east of Savo was power lost to all the radars, forcing BB56 to fire on generated FC data? Why did the chief on South Dakota feel it necessary to tie the breakers to the secondary battery and firecontrol systems power supplies to other breakers? This was a much more pervasive problem during WWII than you seem to be aware of. With solid state equipment this isn't such a big deal. But with vacuum tube technology used during the 1940s, it as you state: a pretty serious problem.

[Steve Crandell]

Good thing you mention the New Jersey. In the March 21 BB62 AR it states that the power for the search radars was lost briefly every time a salvo was fired. Why after the second salvo Washington fired east of Savo was power lost to all the radars, forcing BB56 to fire on generated FC data? Why did the chief on South Dakota feel it necessary to tie the breakers to the secondary battery and firecontrol systems power supplies to other breakers? This was a much more pervasive problem during WWII than you seem to be aware of. With solid state equipment this isn't such a big deal. But with vacuum tube technology used during the 1940s, it as you state: a pretty serious problem.

Yes, most navies had problems with losing radar to the shock of battleship main battery firing. Why pick on the USN? IIRC Bismarck had the same thing happen.

How did Washington's radar problem affect the outcome of the engagement? Can you give any instance at all where it did?

[Dave Saxton]

Yes, most navies had problems with losing radar to the shock of battleship main battery firing. Why pick on the USN? IIRC Bismarck had the same thing happen.

In these cases it was not losing the radar itself to shock of main battery firing (although there are numerous examples of that too) but it was the ship's power supply servicing those radars. A very different thing.

[Dave Saxton]

In the case of POW it appears that the main breaker ring was knocked out by the shock of the first torpedo hit. Other problems were the loss of dynamoes and diesel plants to flooding, as well as physical shock and short circuits.

[Steve Crandell]

In the case of POW it appears that the main breaker ring was knocked out by the shock of the first torpedo hit. Other problems were the loss of dynamoes and diesel plants to flooding, as well as physical shock and short circuits.

US ships typically had diesel generator compartments widely separated in the ship for backup power in case of casualties to the turbine generators, one forward and one aft.

[Steve Crandell]

Yes, most navies had problems with losing radar to the shock of battleship main battery firing. Why pick on the USN? IIRC Bismarck had the same thing happen.

In these cases it was not losing the radar itself to shock of main battery firing (although there are numerous examples of that too) but it was the ship's power supply servicing those radars. A very different thing.

And this might happen once or twice for a very short time until the fault was isolated, correct? We aren't talking about an extended outage, and never the entire ship. In fact, generally only one of multiple main battery fire control radars would be affected. You seem to be implying that these ships couldn't fight very long without a serious electrical fault disabling the ship. In fact, they spent many hours in shore bombardment with very few casualties of this nature, and nothing that would send them away from their mission. At least that is my impression, because if you look at their logs it never seems to say "we had to leave because the electrical system was too unreliable", right? You can read all sorts of fire missions and in general, electrical faults aren't even mentioned.

[Dave Saxton]

If it was of such little consequence then why did the chief tie the breakers together?

Loosing power to magnetron powered radars even for a split second was not just a matter of waiting a few minutes for the radar to begin operation again. For example, it took Mk3/4 about 40 minutes after start or re-start before it would function properly.

And it did affect the engagement Washington was involved in. Washington was ineffective against Hashimoto's ships and it was unable to effectively support its own destroyers as they were cut to pieces.

[Steve Crandell]

Let me make sure I understand you here. Is it your opinion that USN battleships were unable to engage in effective gunnery because of their poor electrical systems, and that this situation was present during the entire war?