Battle of the Coral Sea May 1942-An Overview

[aurora]

The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought in the waters southwest of the Solomon Islands and eastward from New Guinea, was the first of the Pacific War's six fights between opposing aircraft carrier forces. Though the Japanese could rightly claim a tactical victory on "points", it was an operational and strategic defeat for them, the first major check on the great offensive they had begun five months earlier at Pearl Harbor. The diversion of Japanese resources represented by the Coral Sea battle would also have immense consequences a month later, at the Battle of Midway.

The Coral Sea action resulted from a Japanese amphibious operation intended to capture Port Moresby, located on New Guinea's southeastern coast. A Japanese air base there would threaten northeastern Australia and support plans for further expansion into the South Pacific, possibly helping to drive Australia out of the war and certainly enhancing the strategic defenses of Japan's newly-enlarged oceanic empire.
The Japanese operation included two seaborne invasion forces, a minor one targeting Tulagi, in the Southern Solomons, and the main one aimed at Port Moresby. These would be supported by land-based airpower from bases to the north and by two naval forces containing a small aircraft carrier, several cruisers, seaplane tenders and gunboats. More distant cover would be provided by the big aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku with their escorting cruisers and destroyers. The U.S. Navy, tipped off to the enemy plans by superior communications intelligence, countered with two of its own carriers, plus cruisers (including two from the Australian Navy), destroyers, submarines, land-based bombers and patrol seaplanes.

Preliminary operations on 3-6 May and two days of active carrier combat on 7-8 May cost the United States one aircraft carrier, a destroyer and one of its very valuable fleet oilers, plus damage to the second carrier. However, the Japanese were forced to cancel their Port Moresby seaborne invasion. In the fighting, they lost a light carrier, a destroyer and some smaller ships. Shokaku received serious bomb damage and Zuikaku's air group was badly depleted. Most importantly, those two carriers were eliminated from the upcoming Midway operation, contributing by their absence to that terrible Japanese defeat.

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/even ... ralsea.htm

[alecsandros]

... I always wondered why the IJN didn't redeploy Shokaku's airgroup to Zuikaku in order to have 5 fleet carriers present at Midway. With Zuikaku and ~ 65 warplanes (survivors from Coral Sea), the IJN would have had parity in aircraft numbers and would have had better chances of a stalemate at Midway, instead of a crushing defeat.

[historically the 4 IJN carriers had about 260 warplanes, while the 3 USN carriers had 233 warplanes, and Midway helped with ~ 100 more. The Japanese lost all their planes, and the Americans about 150 to all causes]

[aurora]

Before dawn on 8 May, both the Japanese and the American carriers sent out scouts to locate their opponents. These made contact a few hours later, by which time the Japanese already had their strike planes in the air. The U.S. carriers launched theirs' soon after 9AM, and task force commander Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher turned over tactical command to Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, who had more carrier experience. Each side's planes attacked the other's ships at about 11AM. At that time the Japanese were partially concealed by thick weather, while the Americans were operating under clear skies.

Planes from USS Yorktown hit the Shokaku, followed somewhat later by part of USS Lexington's air group. These attacks left Shokaku unable to launch planes, and she left the area soon after to return to Japan for repairs. Her sister ship, Zuikaku, was steaming nearby under low clouds and was not molested.

The Japanese struck the American carriers shortly after Eleven, and, in a fast and violent action, scored with torpedoes on Lexington and with bombs on both carriers. For about an hour, Lexington seemed to have shrugged off her damages, but the situation then deteriorated as fires spread through the ship. She was abandoned later in the day and scuttled. Yorktown was also badly damaged by a bomb and several near misses, but remained in operational condition.

By the end of the day, both sides had retired from the immediate battle area. The Japanese sent Zuikaku back for a few days, even though her aircraft complement was badly depleted, but they had already called off their Port Moresby amphibious operation and withdrew the carrier on May 11th. At about the same time USS Yorktown was recalled to Pearl Harbor. After receiving quick repairs, she would play a vital role in the Battle of Midway in early June.

Source-as Post1

[Garyt]

I always wondered why the IJN didn't redeploy Shokaku's airgroup to Zuikaku in order to have 5 fleet carriers present at Midway. With Zuikaku and ~ 65 warplanes (survivors from Coral Sea), the IJN would have had parity in aircraft numbers and would have had better chances of a stalemate at Midway, instead of a crushing defeat.

It was not their doctrine to break up groups like that. The US would have and did, but Japanese doctrine would not allow them to do so. Does not make much sense to me either though. Would have made a difference at Midway though.

I wonder if the US still would have attempted to stop the Japanese at Midway had the Shokaku and Zuikaku been part of the operation?

What strikes me as interesting abut the battle though is the US lost 69 planes, the Japanese 92. Now, some were probably from the Shoho that was sunk, but still the US would have lost a fair amount less in aerial losses. And this is with a superior dogfighter at this point in the war, the Zero, and pilots at least as killed if not better than the US pilots. Had much to do with the combustibility of the Japanese planes.

The other point I find interesting is while the Shokaku and Zuikaku pilots were well trained, they were considered second in status from the rest of the Kido Butai pilots. The only thing I can think of is the two crane sisters were launched right before the war, and probably had some newer pilots aboard recently out of training, though at this point in the war the Japanese carrier pilots graduated very well trained, though they did not graduate many.

[Garyt]

I might add the comparative losses of both sides in Coral Sea and the slow rate of Japanese pilot replacement was a foreboding of the future, a death spiral that Japanese Naval Aviation would never recover from.

[alecsandros]

I always wondered why the IJN didn't redeploy Shokaku's airgroup to Zuikaku in order to have 5 fleet carriers present at Midway. With Zuikaku and ~ 65 warplanes (survivors from Coral Sea), the IJN would have had parity in aircraft numbers and would have had better chances of a stalemate at Midway, instead of a crushing defeat.

It was not their doctrine to break up groups like that. The US would have and did, but Japanese doctrine would not allow them to do so. Does not make much sense to me either though. Would have made a difference at Midway though.

I wonder if the US still would have attempted to stop the Japanese at Midway had the Shokaku and Zuikaku been part of the operation?

What strikes me as interesting abut the battle though is the US lost 69 planes, the Japanese 92. Now, some were probably from the Shoho that was sunk, but still the US would have lost a fair amount less in aerial losses. And this is with a superior dogfighter at this point in the war, the Zero, and pilots at least as killed if not better than the US pilots. Had much to do with the combustibility of the Japanese planes.

The other point I find interesting is while the Shokaku and Zuikaku pilots were well trained, they were considered second in status from the rest of the Kido Butai pilots. The only thing I can think of is the two crane sisters were launched right before the war, and probably had some newer pilots aboard recently out of training, though at this point in the war the Japanese carrier pilots graduated very well trained, though they did not graduate many.

... Heavy losses for the IJN indeed.
I remember reading about a torpedo attack at dusk on May 7th , attempted by the Japanese forces, with dire results. They did not found the Americans, and most of them got lost and had to ditch in the ocean. About 20 planes were lost in that operation, IIRC.

[aurora]

LOSS OF LADY LEX

While the American carrier planes were en route to attack the Japanese, some seventy of the latter's aircraft were flying the other way. USS Lexington spotted them on radar just before 1100 and both she and Yorktown increased speed and launched more defending fighters. The Japanese caught the large and relatively unmanoeuverable Lexington in a converging "anvil" attack and planted two torpedoes on her port side, one amidships and one forward. The enemy dive bombers struck virtually simultaneously, hitting Lexington with two bombs, one on the port side of the flight deck and one in the island, and added several damaging near misses.

Despite her damage, and the loss of many lives, Lexington soon corrected a seven degree list and resumed flight operations. However, deep inside her hull, gasoline fumes were making their way through the forward part of the ship. At 1247, a big explosion set fires and gravely impared internal communications. Even so, the carrier steamed at 25 knots, while continuing to land her planes.

However, her crew was fighting a losing damage control battle. After two more hours, another explosion caused more internal havoc. Lexington's problems were now out of control. She suspended flight operations and asked for help from other ships. By 1630, she was forced to secure her engines. Shortly after 1700, her crew was ordered to abandon ship.A destroyer was detailed to sink the carrier-five torpedoes did just that.

[Rick Rather]

I might add the comparative losses of both sides in Coral Sea and the slow rate of Japanese pilot replacement was a foreboding of the future, a death spiral that Japanese Naval Aviation would never recover from.

It was bad enough for the Japanese that an SBD pilot by the name of "Swede" Vejtasa was aloft at Coral Sea. "Dauntless" indeed!
Dogfights: Long-Odds Part 1-of-2
Dogfights: Long-Odds Part 2-of-2
It got worse when they transferred him to fighters.
It got much worse when they brought him back to the states to teach other pilots how to fly & fight like him.
I only wonder how they got his enormous brass balls out of the cockpit.

[aurora]

The first major use of the SBD in combat was at the Battle of the Coral Sea where SBDs and TBD Devastators sank the Japanese light aircraft carrier (CVL) Shōhō and damaged the Japanese fleet carrier Shōkaku. SBDs were also used for antitorpedo combat air patrols (CAP) and these scored several victories[citation needed] against Japanese aircraft trying to attack the Lexington and the Yorktown.

Their relatively heavy gun armament—with two forward-firing .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns and either one or two rear flexible-mount .30 in (7.62 mm) AN/M2 machine guns—was effective against the lightly-built Japanese fighters, and many pilots and gunners took aggressive attitudes to the fighters that attacked them. One pilot—Stanley "Swede" Vejtasa—was attacked by three A6M2 Zero fighters; he shot two of them down and cut off the wing of the third in a head-on pass with his wingtip.

[Garyt]

Interestingly enough, The Val and Kate maneuvered extremely well at slower speeds, able to match many fighters at this, but they were never overly effective against other planes in Air to air to my knowledge.

Must have had much to do with poor armament and the old no armor or self sealing tanks issue

[dunmunro]

Lundstrom was not able to verify Vejtasa's kill claims at Coral Sea.

[Rick Rather]

It would have been difficult to do so. The only witnesses were those engaged. I noticed that in the above video links, they described the damage, but avoided calling them "kills".

[aurora]

The Japanese called off the invasion of Port Moresby fearing that the Americans still had the capacity to destroy many of their landing craft. In numerical terms, the Japanese came out best in the Battle of Coral Sea. The loss of the 'Lexington' was great and far outweighed the loss of the 'Shoho'. The Japanese lost 43 planes to the Americans 33.
However, the battle is seen as an American victory simply because it stopped Japan doing what it had set out to do - capture Port Moresby and isolate Australia. In this sense, it was a strategic victory for America. The Battle of Midway was to do the Japanese far more damage.

[dunmunro]

It would have been difficult to do so. The only witnesses were those engaged. I noticed that in the above video links, they described the damage, but avoided calling them "kills".

The IJN records from the battle have survived intact and Lundstrom failed to find any IJN A6M losses that would correspond to Vejtasa's kill claims. I suspect that his 7 kill claims at Santa Cruz are also somewhat optimistic.

[Garyt]

The IJN records from the battle have survived intact and Lundstrom failed to find any IJN A6M losses that would correspond to Vejtasa's kill claims. I suspect that his 7 kill claims at Santa Cruz are also somewhat optimistic.

I guess it's not always how good of a pilot you are, but how well you publicity department works!

Of course, this goes back to the days of Julius Caesar and prior, overly optimistic records of battlefield accomplishments.