Battleship Top Ten

[Serg]

"in the real world " means that real shells also have primers, fuzes and fillers, all of which are subject to the laws of physics.
And yes, the USN tested shells up to 16" against STS decks.

Are this 16" shells were with primers, fuzes and fillers? From here on please enlarge on this question. I will be glad to know in details.

No. In this case the penalty was more mass but that was compensated for too some extent by thining the lower belt I believe.

There also increasing of main deck area over the belt which closely connected with stability problem. Please compare vertical heights.

[lwd]

But a shell ricothetting on a verticle belt will also penterate either the bottom or the side well below the waterline. In either case however it will not be inside the protected volume and can be compesated for by counter flooding.

Presumably a vertical belt would be external hence any richocheing(sp?) wo+uld be into the water?

Don't know why but for some reason I was assumeing an internal belt. A fairly rare creature I believe.

[lwd]

No. In this case the penalty was more mass but that was compensated for too some extent by thining the lower belt I believe.

There also increasing of main deck area over the belt which closely connected with stability problem. Please compare vertical heights.

Or decreasing the internal volume. The beam on the Iowa's was fixed due to the canal. This pretty much fixed the main deck area over the belt as well. So the trade off was in the protected volume.

[alecsandros]

[quote="Serg"] [Are this 16" shells were with primers, fuzes and fillers? From here on please enlarge on this question. I will be glad to know in details.
I don't udnerstand...

[boredatwork]

In the Iowa and S. Dakota the outer two TDS compartments are liquid filled, so no list is generated by "flooding" in those compartments.

Please correct me if I'm wrong but the third compartment was void and still external to the belt so depending on the direction the richochet happens it could be easy for the shell to bounce off the belt and out the 3 thin bulkheads of the TDS causing flooding.

South Dakota got pummeled about as much as one would expect from a large number of shells, and flooding wasn't a problem at all.

Most of the shells that hit did so relatively high up on the ship. The only 3 which hit close to the waterline did cause some flooding.

2. Minor flooding resulted from one hit below the waterline and two hits close to the waterline. The list of about 3/4* which developed was removed by shifting fuel oil.

The question is "is SD at second Guadalcanal representative of the number of such hits likely in a fleet action?"

Also note the triangular space above the TDS (which ends at the aproximate W/L.) AFAIK that space was void. While in SD case damage to it wouldn't have matter greatly, in a protracted jutland style fleet engagement culmulative Torpedo and Shell damage *might* increase draught sufficiently that the integrity of that reserve buoyancy might come into play (see the German BCs at jutland for example).


For refference the 3 hits in question are:

Hit NO.4
Photos 3 and 4
17. This hit struck between. frames 46 and 47 about a foot above the third deck. It penetrated longitudinal torpedo bulkhead No. 2 and detonated on the 12.2-inch longitudinal armor bulkhead about 2 feet 2 inches above the third deck. The armor was not indented, but the projectile left a black circle about 6 inches in diameter within a partial black ring about 8 inches in diameter on the face of the armor. The force of the explosion blew the third deck down about 3-1/2 inches over a 15 by 30-inch area and fragments penetrated the third deck between torpedo bulkhead No.2 and the longitudinal armor bulkhead in two places. Torpedo bulkhead No. 2 above the third deck was blown outboard between frames 46 and 47 by the force of the explosion. The following tanks were reported to have been flooded as a result of the hit: A-ll-F, A-21-F, A-23-F, A-33-F and A-39- F. Although it was not mentioned in the report, A-27-V probably flooded also.

Hit No. 11
Photos 16 and 1'7
25. An estimated 6 or 8-inch projectile detonated upon contact with "N" strake of the shell just aft of frame 83 between the second and third deck levels. A hole about 3 by 2 feet was blown in the shell and torpedo bulkhead No. 2 was holed in numerous places by fragments. A tear in the shell plating extended forward to about frame 81-1/2. The rivets in "N" strake were loose or missing between frames 82-1/2 and 84-1/2. Transverse bulkhead 83 was ruptured and distorted between the shell and torpedo bulkhead No.2 from the second to the third deck.. A;s a result of this hit, B-23-F, B-31-F and B-39-F flooded.

Hit No. 25
Photo 34
35. An estimated8-inch AP projectile hit the shell at the second deck, frame 109-1/2. The projectile pierced the shell at a seam between a 25-pound and a 50-pound STS strake, furrowed through the 20-pound STS second deck, pierced lO-pound longitudinal torpedo bulkhead No.2 and penetrated the 12.2-inch longitudinal armor bulkhead to a depth of 7 to 8 inches at the top edge of the armor. Fragments went aft and pierced and distorted frames 109, 110, 111 and 112 and penetrated the thi rd Jeck between torpedo bulkhead No.2 and the longitudinal armor bulkhead. Although the hole in the shell was above the waterline, compartments B-71-F, B-75-V, B-7'7-F and B-79-F flooded as a result of this hit.

And an extra one for Karl:

Armor Performance
40. It is to be noted that the armor performed as designed. No projectile penetrated the armored box. Hits Nos. 3, 4, 17, 24, 25 and 26 struck armor before detonation and failed to penetrate.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Gentlemen,

It seems that my last posts have caused an extraordinary effect, like kicking a wasp nest or something alike. Good. I will want to address several things because the asnwers came from two sides, lwd and boreatwork (I'm not intending to ignore some other posts, but those are urgent, I think).

Boreatwork, as he usually is, is correct. I commited a mistake when posting those old quotes and my interpretation of them specially because there was no need to do so, maybe I rush up to conclusions that were not even needed at that moment. The original posting regarding Friedman's pages 303 to 317 are more than enough to close an un ending argument.

I admit that bringing them and tie them together was dumb and it work against my own case bringing unnecesary material for unnecessary rebuttals of the main issue, which it seems unanswered up to this moment, except for boreatwork's counter arguments.

Regretably I must answer lwd's point due that they are evading the main issues posted in the original Friedman's quotes, which are way long to be out of context because there is no such manipulation of information here.

After answering lwd I will try to come forth to face boreatwork in some of the remaining things.

Regards,

Karl

[Karl Heidenreich]

Lee:

Again, I think that if you post an opposing argument will be better to go in this kind of extensive, tiresome piecemeal answering method. I answer because I cannot leave this unanswered and will not be polite. But I'm doing it under protest.

I also tell the readers that if they want to skip this it's not a bad idea, because lwd original post and this, by effect, do not regard the original arguments from Friedman: there is not a single heavy argument (or argument for that matter) that comes and deals with Friedman's main arguments on South Dakota or Iowa; there is no one rebuttal on the USN's document stating that the Iowas were finally approved and built JUST because of their speed and capacity to escort the fast carriers (which is why Halsey took them all at Leyte leaving Kinkaid alone without any protection).

Having said that, in a way of an argument, let's dissect lwd's answer:

Karl Heidenreich wrote:

FACT: SOUTH DAKOTA DID PRESENT A POOR PERFORMANCE AT II GUADALACANAL DUE TO DESIGN ISSUES. THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED FOR MORE THAN A YEAR AND HERE IS A DOCUMENTAL SUPPORT OF THIS.

Misleading. While there were some design issues that contributed to the problem human error clearly played a major part. Furthermore those designn issuses were quickly and easily fixed once it was clear that they existed.

Lee, you are 100% correct: human error contributed a lot in what happened to South Dak. Granted. But you stated it was the MAIN reason whilst not acknowledging any technical problem. But there was a technical problem. Now your last sentence is terrible: "Furthermore those designn issuses were quickly and easily fixed once it was clear that they existed" But the problem was then, there, November 15th, 1942 when if not by USS Washington presence the South Dakota fate was at stakes. Using your logic, which is incredible no one else have objected to the moment, if Bismarck could have made it to France some of the problems that the USN fans faction has pointed out could also have been quickly and easily fixed... specially those un protected cables that put South Dakota in peril whislt are not present in Bismarck overall demising picture.
You are misleading bringing those poor arguments. I expected more from you.

FACT: IOWA IS A DESIGN HEIR OF SOUTH DAKOTA AND SHARED THE SAME PROBLEMS THE SMALLER BATTLESHIP HAD.

Fallacious assumption. While some of the issues that affected South Dakota may have been inhereted by the Iowa ceratainly not all of them were. In particular the ciruit breaker problem seems to have been fixed before Iowa's commsiioning.

It is not an assumption. Friedman's clearly states it as also Raven & Roberts and Garzke and Dullin do so. However you go to the specific of the breaker circuit breaker problems in a clear smoke screen. Friedman and Company are refering to armor, armament and general layout. As a matter of fact Friedman is clear declaring that Iowa do not bring nothing new over it's predecesor.
But it is good that you are acknowledging that the South Dak had, beside the lateral armor problem and the upper armor deck weakness also the breaker problem.

FACT: THE USN KNEW ALL THIS AND THAT'S SOME OF THE REASONS WHY ANOTHER BATTLESHIP WAS DESIGNED, DEPARTING FROM THE SOUTH DAKOTA-IOWA SCHEME: THE MONTANAS.

The Montana's were builty to fulfill a different role under different design constraints than the Iowa's. Just like the Iowa's in comparison to the SoDak's and so on. Advancements in technology also affected these designs. Note that all the naval powers that built modern battleships in WWII had more modern designs on the boards.

In first place the Montana was designed with LESS constraints than Iowa, which I don't know if can be interpreted from your rethoric trick as "different design constraints". But let's allow that's what you meant, my friend. I don't see that, doctrinal, South Dakota or Iowa were concieved for different roles: they were used for escorting fast carriers and shelling enemy shores all the war. The Guadalcanal was an incident in which the USN sent to fight the only capital ships they have for that particular combat.
Now, after moving on from your carefully laid smokescreen the Montana's design departure from Iowa shows, whatever the doctrinal differences or missions they were thought for, that the BuShips was not that happy with the Iowas as main battleship killers. Again: that has been pointed out even from a USN document that you continue to ignore.

THESE BATTLESHIPS WERE NOT BJUILT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MORE NEED OF BATTLESHIPS IN AN ERA DOMINATED BY THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

Incorrect. There was quite obviously still a role for battleships. However building them was not costeffective in terms of cash, material resources, and inparticular slips and time. The US essentially stopped tank production in early 45 as well for similar reasons.

There is no argument here. What you are saying does not even contradict what I am saying. I think that you like to yell: wrong only to others to look you do that, maybe those you coach will feel stronger but there is no need to. You know that when I'm wrong I admit it. So, let's ignore this point: there were no need, or nor will to built, battleships.

THE IOWAS WERE FINNALY BUILT TO ESCORT THE CARRIERS DUE TO THEIR SPEED.

That was undoubtedly one of the reasons
.

Correct, it was the MAIN reason for them to be built according to the UNITED STATES NAVY, Norman Friedman, Raven, Roberts, Garzke and Dullin and many of us that have studied the issue. There could have been another reasons.
You know that I saw USS Iowa firing it's guns in 1986 off the shores of my country. So, I was happy they were built.

THERE WAS NO DOCTRINAL INTENTION OF USING THEM FOR WHAT THEY WERE NOMINALLY CALLED: BATTLESHIPS.

Sorry wrong again. The doctrine was still there the opponents weren't.

Already answered in the previous dissections... what an awfull term.

FACT: DESIGN STUDIES REVEAL NO IMPROVEMENT IN DESIGN AND PROTECTION OF THE IOWAS OVER SOUTH DAKOTA,

And that's been refuted earlier in this thread.

Correct: covered in page 307 of Friedman's "US Battleships"

FACT: ALL THES ISSUES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT, ONCE AND AGAIN, TO THE FORUM AND ALWAYS THE DISPUTE COMES FROM MINOR DETAILS OR WRITING ISSUES, LEAVING THIS UNATTENDED.

Fact. You are stating your opinions as facts they are not and many have been completely or partially refuted. The matter has been dealt with.

Lwd, with all due respect I'm bringing the issues as literally as possible from the original sources. I admit that maybe I am reinforcing certain aspects but, at least, and I'm gratefull that boreatwork, Alex, Steve and you and pointing them out. From the time I have been in this forum it is me, not you, the one that has changed it's position upon evidence, remember that.

NO ONE IS TRYING TO PROOF THAT THE SOUTH DAKOTAS OR IOWAS WERE "BAD" BATTLESHIPS, ONLY THAT THEY WERE NOT WHAT SOME CLAIM THEY WERE. PERIOD.

Agreed no one seems to have tried to prove it although some have claimed it while at the same time making excessive claims for other ships.
By the way "yelling" doesn't increase the validity or the logic of your points it just makes things a bit harder to read.

I apologize if it look like that. To be honest it was because I started writing that when eating a twisted churro and writing with one finger and look fine to me at the moment. I reckon it looks like yelling and it's not appropiate.

Remember that I do not feel any animosity to any of the USN fans, which I reckon that can be perceived by the way I have been writing lately, but that's not true and if you, Steve, Jon, boreatwork (i don't regard Alex as part of the USN faction) and the rest have feel that animosity I apologyse: if I could buy all of you beers and have some BBQ at my backyard I will do it as happy as I have been! (including all the other guys here with one sole exception that all of you know of).

[Karl Heidenreich]

boreatwork:

What do you mean "not addressed?"

I'll stop wasting my time typing if you're not going to read what I'm typing.

Sorry, it was not what I meant. You have been more than patient with two factions in these un ending argument. I hope it ends with this thread... sometime in 2015.

Because you're NOT realizing the point:

Not that SD and Iowa MAY or MAY NOT be flawed but rather the "very good" R&R reason you keep posting is FACTUALLY BOGUS.

They've completely missed that SD has the tapering lower belt EXACTLY like the one in Iowa they praise, so they are criticizing SD for it's supposed absence.

Look on page 284 of Friedman's US BBs now that you have access to it - SD has the lower belt R&R are criticizing her for it's supposed absence.

Open up G%D US Battleships - I'm sure there's diagrams to compare - SD has the lower belt R&R are criticizing her for it's supposed absence.

Obtain a set of blueprints from the archives - SD has the lower belt R&R are criticizing her for it's supposed absence.

I see what you meant but will need a couple of days to study the Friedman on this. However it seemed odd to me that there is such a mistake in R&R. However it is important to point out that, even acknowleding this, there are arguments from the rest of the authors criticize heavily the lateral protection of these vessels.

Visit one of the 2 surviving SD BBs and beg the curators to open up the inspection hatches so you can physically see for yourself the lower belt R&R are criticizing them for it's supposed absence.

I will try to do that someday. I imagine that will take me to Camden NJ and up to Massachussets, isn't it.

R&R didn't do enough basic research on the foreign ships in their comparison, as I pointed out to you before, to understand the ships they're comparing therefore any conclusions drawn are at best suspect.

However you've turned around and used this factually flawed conclusion both as evidence that the internal belt of SD is flawed and that since Firedman says Iowa and SD share identical protection schemes Iowa must be flawed too, despite the fact that the R&R comparison states the Iowa was SUPERIOR because she had a feature that (they believed) SD didn't.

I reckon I screw that up. I admit it and I hope that's enough. However you have to reckon that the Friedman's comments, from Design & Development and those from the US Battleship are a starting point to analyse and rebut the myth of the perception of superiority these vessels have, not on the actual community of naval researcher but from a focal group that exists.

There is a very uncommon comment you did that needs answer and I will try to do it after my dinner.

Regards,

[Karl Heidenreich]

boreatwork:

And an extra one for Karl:

Armor Performance
40. It is to be noted that the armor performed as designed. No projectile penetrated the armored box. Hits Nos. 3, 4, 17, 24, 25 and 26 struck armor before detonation and failed to penetrate.

I will answer with this quote from Friedman's US Battleships, page 303 (bold is mine):

" BuShips concluded that structural damage to the ship [South Dak] was limited because she was hit by armor piercing rather than high explosive shells, that is, because her thin superstructure plating did not detonate them. That had, after all, been the logic of U.S. "all or nothing" protection for thirty years. The effect of the thin plating was accentuated by a peculiarity of Japanese shells. They have been designed to penetrate a ship's armor after striking the water and traveling underwater. Therefore they have relatively long fuze delays: 0.08 seconds for 6 inch, 0.4 seconds for 8 inch, and above, compared with 0.02 and 0.035 seconds for U.S. shells. They also had special caps designed to break off upon striking water, leaving a shape better suited to an underwater trajectory...
...The problem of underwater hits by just such shells had been a major factor in South Dakota design. It is ironic that such shells, if they hit above water, were subtancially less effective than conventional ones..."

[boredatwork]

I see what you meant but will need a couple of days to study the Friedman on this. However it seemed odd to me that there is such a mistake in R&R. However it is important to point out that, even acknowleding this, there are arguments from the rest of the authors criticize heavily the lateral protection of these vessels.

I think any source can have it's flaws. R&R work dated from the 70s and focussed primarily on British battleships. In the intervening years both the number of resources has increased as material is declassified and it becomes more readily available for researchers to find. Hence the reason in the 70s it was in vogue to deride the Bismarck as a faster version of Baden instead of acknowledge the various factors that went into her construction.

There are indeed reasons for criticising any protection system, including the one Iowa & SD share within the context of a specific threat. Not only the authors but some officers of the US Navy were equally critical. (Though in fairness officers of all navies are usually critical of their ships design because every ship is a compromise to meet the needs of various competing factions.) The specific allegation R&R make against SD just isn't one of them.

Visit one of the 2 surviving SD BBs and beg the curators to open up the inspection hatches so you can physically see for yourself the lower belt R&R are criticizing them for it's supposed absence.

I will try to do that someday. I imagine that will take me to Camden NJ and up to Massachussets, isn't it.

As much as I grew up being impressed with the Iowas I found NJ to be somewhat dissapointing when I visited her last year. She seemed to be suffering from a lack of funds - maintenance was suffering (most of the teak deck was in poor shape) and much of the ship is innacessible (no visiting the machinery spaces, or the shell storage or the magazines for example). The stern crane, small mainmast, and multitude of light AA which IMO made the topside more pleasing to look at have long since been removed, and she sits at least 5' and more likely 10' above her deep load draught - making her look somewhat odd IMO.

Remember that I do not feel any animosity to any of the USN fans, which I reckon that can be perceived by the way I have been writing lately, but that's not true and if you, Steve, Jon, boreatwork (i don't regard Alex as part of the USN faction) and the rest have feel that animosity I apologyse

No offense taken - I'm certainly not a US Navy fan - I just believe everyone gets more out of the forum discussion by listening to what everyone else is saying rather than arguing with ones fingers in ones ears trying to ram one's opinion home.

And if you wish you may call me Michael or Mike if the context warrant's it =P

[boredatwork]

...The problem of underwater hits by just such shells had been a major factor in South Dakota design.

Uh...

I'm not clear on the point you were trying to make so just to be clear this is how I read that paragraph:

a) Overall it supports the conclusion in my quote - (as Friedman likely used the same document I quoted from as a source for his work)

b) When he refers to the "problem" being a major "factor" in South Dakota's design he means that US Designers ANTICIPATED that underwater shell hits would be a problem BEFORE she was designed (late in the North Carolina's design process) and thus devoted considerable ingenuity to SOLVING that problem as they design South Dakota. Thus they gave her the tapered lower belt that both Friedman and R&R credit as providing excellent protection against such hits. (in R&R case praising the Iowa for such protection without realizing that SD had the identical system.)

NOT that SD design had a problem with underwater shell hits.

c) It DOESN'T mean the system DIDN'T have OTHER shortcomings. (note the double negative!)

[lwd]

A seperate post to perhaps clear up the main issue before addressing the sub issues.

Lee:
Again, I think that if you post an opposing argument will be better to go in this kind of extensive, tiresome piecemeal answering method. ....

My "opposing argument" has almost always been that you are drawing unwarrented conclusions from the data and material presented. In some cases you may indeed be correct (although there is usually evidence to the contrary that you ignore) but your argument is fundamentally flawed as I have shown. To show that it isn't necessary to produce a counter thesis it's mearly sufficint to show that some of the assumptions or logic is incorrect. That is what I have done. Unfortunatly you seem to think when I do this I am firmly entrenched in an opposing position. I'm not. In some cases I hold an opposing position but a well supported logical arguement could certainly change that.

[Serg]

Or decreasing the internal volume.

How so? It is impossible due to incompressible internal compartments (machinery, magazines etc)
BTW, SD&Iowa's plate was 10.5' which gave vertical height only 9.9'. Very shallow main belt. Any comparable battleship better in this aspect of protection.

I don't udnerstand...

In other words, are you have description of 16" american tests? I know only that Americans used scale model for side armor tests (1/11 scale against one-pounder gun, the simulation of 14"). And no tests were done against deck armor, only tests on the turret roof. It is far from real testing such as Hessen trials.

[Serg]

Hit No. 25
Photo 34
35. An estimated 8-inch AP projectile hit the shell at the second deck, frame 109-1/2. The projectile pierced the shell at a seam between a 25-pound and a 50-pound STS strake, furrowed through the 20-pound STS second deck, pierced lO-pound longitudinal torpedo bulkhead No.2 and penetrated the 12.2-inch longitudinal armor bulkhead to a depth of 7 to 8 inches at the top edge of the armor.

Actually it is bad thing when battleship armour almost completely perforated by 8" shell.

[Serg]

there is no one rebuttal on the USN's document stating that the Iowas were finally approved and built JUST because of their speed and capacity to escort the fast carriers (which is why Halsey took them all at Leyte leaving Kinkaid alone without any protection).

For truth's sake, at least one book disagreed with Iowa's role as escort of fast carriers. Muir's The Iowa class battleships p11: "... the General Board enthusiasitically listed a number of missions that could be fulfilled only by battleships of very high speed and great offensive power. They could,of course, buttress the battle line, but they looked especially valuable for certain 'eccentric operationes', as one oficer from the War Plans Division put it. This missions included dealing with enemy battlecruisers (the Kongos) detached from the japanese battle line. The Iowas would also be perfectly suited for chasing down enemy heavy units operating, as German ships were later to do, against trade routes. On other side of the coin, the General Board envisioned the Iowas acting as raiders themselves, or more presciently, combining with other ship types to form a striking force in advanced areas... Some popular naval authors wrote in 1960s and 1970s that the Iowas had been designed specifically to protect the fast carriers. Such reasoning is 'post hoc proper hoc'"
Seems, Iowas were not intended to fight with enemy battleships in battle line and were alike old battlecruisers of Great War.