The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

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Cag
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Cag »

Hi All

Hi Alberto, I'm afraid it is another phrase open to interpretation, to press home the action in my personal opinion would generally mean to make a decisive attack, to inflict real damage on your opponent, to press any damage/action home.

This is what confuses me about the comparison with Troughtbridge dependant at what time on the 25th it was made, I presume after Bismarck had been lost, at that time there was no real detail of the battle on which to base this comment on, we can assume Churchills comment was regarding the DS battle not any of the other engagements or due to the apparent frustration at Wake-Walkers reasons for not re engaging Bismarck with PoW.

It was not known that during the battle 3 guns from A turret, both B turret guns and 3 guns of Y turret had had problems, the falling off of PoW gunnery, the number of hits on PoW was not known nor was the actual reasons why the tactical decision to disengage was made.

Even on the 26th Pound was unaware that PoW was also facing Prinz Eugen which was participating in the battle, and scoring hits. The opinion had gone from the worst thing since Troughtbridge on the 25th to being unsure if it was wise on the 26th.

On the 25th there were indications that both PoW and Bismarck had been damaged in the battle, but not how much, but despite this Churchill had the belief that Bismarck was headed for Norway, the Admiralty that France was the end destination.

I'm sure you've seen in the Roskill letters what Tovey thought of Churchills tactics in dealing with the navy and how his denigration was used as a weapon as can be seen in his beration of Pound and Alexander regarding PoW and Crete. We can now understand why Pound included this unsure comment in the war cabinet meeting and perhaps why he wanted people court martialed before the facts were known.

Again all of this is open to interpretation of course and makes no difference to either sides argument.

Best wishes
Cag.
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

CAG, I thank you for your sincere fairness showed above.

As you may have realized lately I am not used to see a lot of this into the forum, ...and this is either making me really sad as well as maybe stimulate some personal reactions I had that I am not used to have, ... and I beg you pardon for that, ... but I am just human.

I fully recognize to you your efforts and mostly your immediate sharing of all the information you had acquired, ... and your attitude should be an example for everybody.

I thank and applaud your for that ... :clap:

Because this is the reason of this forum existence, why we are here spending time, money and efforts.

We should be all here only for the historical research pleasure and for the fair sharing of the information.

Surely we should not be here for the stubborn side taken blind and negative position approach that some are keeping despite the evidence, and you may have read a recent show up of one of the worst example of this attitude.

The ones approaching this way are not only becoming ridiculous on the eyes of everybody, but are paying a huge price in terms of personal dignity.

I do not think that a discussion about an historical event occurred 76 years ago should stimulate this type of attitude by a correct and fair person, a real balanced personality able to manage the reality of a series of events that we can only read on Official papers and evaluate, using today technology and tools, surely we will not change anything of what occurred, just exchange opinions and thoughts.

But this is the problems an history researcher will always face, a stubborn reaction of the side taken persons that do not want the first declarations to be changed because they are comfortable with those and do not like them to be discussed and of course never to be changed.

In this case we are really touching a very sensible argument, I am fully aware of this since the very beginning of it back on 2013, but when I decided to discover the truth I had to take a decision and I did it, just as I did it on request many years ago when I was asked to re-construct the historical event of the sinking of the HMS Glorious on another forum.

I did this research, and when I left that website forever my name was eliminated on purpose :

https://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharn ... njuno.html

It is exactly the same story for me, very similar.

An event occurred, for some reasons the Admiralty during war time decided not to declare the truth and " covered up " the reality with another version of the facts. Many years after the reality surfaced and was even showed on TV in UK.

The difference between the 2 cases is that on the HMS Glorious work, I was asked by the son of one of the 2 destroyers commander ( Barker -> HMS Ardent ) to do the job and I had no oppositions at all, just the intention to know the truth.

In this case it seems to me that many are just against the truth, they simply do not like it or want it to surface.

This on 2017 is simply ridiculous, because we have a lot of possibilities to research and compare, to learn and share, and the reality is very easy to be found and published.

The reality about this Court Martial attempt and how it was later managed, was preserved and declared even by British historians and your acceptance of it is what I think any average fair and open minded person on 2017 can do.

The only " defense " position one can take talking about a reality that nobody can avoid to admit any longer, is to focus on the needs of that historical moment ( summer 1941 ) and evaluate what was the effect of certain rules ( very strong discipline - was it still needed on 1941 ? ) and approaches ( immediate formal inquiry - why ? ) on a time where the war propaganda need was becoming a crucial factor for the population morale, ... and the availability of information was forcing maybe over the necessary needs ( remote driving from a war room ) the decisions of the Officers at sea.

But this is a very different approach on the analysis of this historical event, compared to what I am reading here in lately.

I will open now a thread about the Admiralty request for re-engagement and what I wrote above will be surely a key argument to be discussed.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Cag wrote: "....to press home the action in my personal opinion would generally mean to make a decisive attack, to inflict real damage on your opponent, to press any damage/action home.........we can assume Churchills comment was regarding the DS battle not any of the other engagements or due to the apparent frustration at Wake-Walkers reasons for not re engaging Bismarck with PoW"
Hi mr.Cag,
I fully agree with your interpretation above.

I will not comment here again on the opportunity/appropriateness of the judgement/comparison from Pound and WSC and about the info they had available at the time their comments were made, as this is not the topic.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Yes I agree the first sentence is all about Leach and the Denmark Straits but no, we cannot "stop with Crete". It is one and the same event happening at the same time. It would very convenient for your argument if individual sentences or phrases could be taken out of context. The Bismarck Chase is not the only thing happening at this time in the War Room of the Admiralty. There is one paragraph by Colville and it concerns both DS and Crete. Winston does not say he wants anybody court martialled on the 24th, on the 25th or any other time, and nobody reports he does. You choose to infer it.

You knew very well the Churchill histrionics happened at Chequers on the 24th, and not at the War Room on the 26th. There is no evidence at all they were repeated to any officers, and there is no mention by Churchill or anybody else in government of criticism of naval officers or tactics in the War Cabinet Papers. We infer that it was the source of whatever Pound said to Tovey on arrival, and was probably the result of phone calls over the weekend 24/25th.

I love this phrase
I will not comment here again on the opportunity/appropriateness of the judgement/comparison from Pound and WSC and about the info they had available at the time their comments were made, as this is not the topic.
Of course it is the topic. As Cag has wisely said, how can Winston's observation have any value or significance when he knows nothing of the detail of the action and only knows two British BBs attack one German and lose.................. Hence uninformed histrionics, and no further action on these lines.

Equally, despite the bluff and confusion created by other versions of this legend, if Tovey heard a threat made it was made when KG V reached Scapa, therefore it was before Pound knew any details of the battle. Therefore it was never a serious threat, if it ever happened. The "threat" cannot be considered without the context ie no knowledge.

For Antonio:

Welcome back, I thought you had stopped discussing things because there is nothing more to be discovered, what you allege is right and nobody has a right to contradict you.
I do not think that a discussion about an historical event occurred 76 years ago should stimulate this type of attitude by a correct and fair person
then stop using phrases like "a couple of cowards".
The reality about this Court Martial attempt and how it was later managed,
The reality is there is no other source than Tovey writing about it 20 years after it allegedly happened. If it happened at all, if Tovey didn't just misinterprete what Pound actually said, the threat was made without even knowing what happened at Denmark Straits because the reports had not even been submitted to be reviewed. Pound was a competent First Sea Lord and such irrational behaviour would be most unprofessional.

I realise you truly consider yourself as a crusader for truth, but your attempts to blacken the reputations of "a couple of cowards" together with a number of other officers has nothing "positive" about it and is not the action of a "correct and fair person" and pointing out the non-existence of your evidence is not "negative" at all.

You keep accusing me of trolling:
a person who sows discord on the Internet by upsetting people, by posting inflammatory messages in an online community ,


Judge not yet ye be judged. :negative:

BTW have you read John Winton's HMS Glorious?

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: " I agree the first sentence is all about Leach and the Denmark Straits"
Hi Sean,
thanks, this is all I needed from you. The sentence : "The PM cannot understand why the PoW did not press home her attack yesterday and keeps on saying it is the worst thing since Troubridge turned away from the Goeben in 1914." is referred to the Denmark Strait ONLY and is a clear allusion and menace of a Court Martial (Troubridge was indeed inquired and Court Martialled, no inference here). :negative:

I have already admitted Crete was important in WSC mind, but Crete has NOTHING to do with the Troubridge comparison.



you wrote: "The Bismarck Chase is not the only thing happening at this time in the War Room of the Admiralty." :shock:
Please now you MUST POST a documentary proof of what you say happened in the War Room, your speculation above is deprived of any foundation, I have not seen anything stating that, within the War Room, Crete situation was particularly looked at. It possibly was as all other theaters were, but the attention was for the Bismarck only. :stop:

Here an extract from Adm.Davies long notes (from Roskill papers). Davies was in the War Room (as Deputy Director of Operations (Foreign) at the Admiralty) and he described these critical hours of the Bismarck hunt. These are the clear sentences related to Churchill presence and behavior in the War Room, NO MENTION of any interest of WSC in other subjects than the Bismarck chase. Crete is NEVER mentioned by Davies. :negative:
The PM "hardly left the War Room" during the final stages of the hunt. Apparently Crete could wait. :wink:
Davies_War_Room_Churchill.jpg
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Just a small appetizer, to demonstrate there is A LOT new that can still be discovered, would just some of the "deniers" not be intending to hide material when annoying (e.g. the ADM 205/10 final proof of what had been done to "adjust" things (at crystal clear pag. 331, 332, 333 and 334), that you had in your hands since a while and NEVER showed us, saying that there was nothing interesting in it :shock: ). Possibly, someone was just unable to read and understand the importance of these papers.... :think:

I do suggest you to get some material, to study and to understand it before exposing yourself to such miserable errors, writing false statements like the above one, ONLY to support your preconceived view.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
I have not seen anything stating that, within the War Room, Crete situation was particularly looked at.
See Barnett pages 356-358 for specific criticism of Cunningham's actions by signal from the COS committee headed by Sir Dudley Pound on the 23rd through 26th May and originating from the Admiralty. On the 26th, the Mediterranean fleet including two Battleships and an aircraft carrier sailed to attack Scarpanto airfield and during the afternoon, whilst Churchill made a swift visit to the War Room after only returning from Chequers in the afternoon and attending the War Cabinet at 17:00, the Formidable was crippled by dive bombers and the Nubian had her stern blown off. Things that might be a bit more important than a silly diatribe about whether Leach's action was at all like Troubridge.

That is why, at the War Cabinet that afternoon, Crete was discussed at length and after Pound's pusillanimous statement was read, nothing more was recorded about Bismarck. On the 27th the decision was made to evacuate Crete and through the 28th-31st May it was carried out with further losses. And the First Sea Lord has nothing better to do than think about threatening Wake-Walker and Leach?
I do suggest you to get some material, to study and to understand
BTW who told you of the existence of the Cabinet Papers and file 205/10? :cool:

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
again, I'm not saying that the situation in the Mediterranean was neglected in any way during the Bismarck operation, however, based on Adm. Davies, who was present in the War Room, the very special attention (for "an eventful 10 days" period, according to Davies) was for the Bismarck only.

According to Davies the Bismarck hunt was followed by "WSC, Eden, Alexander, Mr.Winant (Special US representative), Adm.Ghormley (US NAval representative), and apparently Lord Beaverbrook.
The following naval officers were working on the Bismarck chase: Pound (albeit he had to mainly manage.... WSC), Tom Phillips (who actually managed the operation according to Davies), Ralph Edwards (Director of Ops), Charles Daniel (Director of Plans) and the Director of Naval Intelligence, who were just the most active. In addition J.Terry and Bowhill (CinC Costal Command) and Davies himself (Director of Operations (Foreign)) were involved too.

There is NO evidence of any special interest re. Crete or the Mediterranean or the Far East, or the West Indies, or any other theater, except signals that surely were sent out to ALL theaters, but no special attention was given to any other operation except the Bismarck, according to Davies.

If you have a documentary evidence of the contrary, and that a special section was dedicated in the War Room to follow the Mediterranean theatre, please post it. :stop:


I have posted above the evidence of Churchill very special interest on the Bismarck. Re. Crete we have only the critics from the PM related by Colville and no evidence at all that any disciplinary action was ever imagined by anyone.


you wrote: "BTW who told you of the existence of the Cabinet Papers and file 205/10? "
I have thanked you for the War Cabinet minutes reference. :clap:

The ADM 205/10 however was suggested as being the key repository by Roskill, whose book was still not in our hands at the time when you were saying that nothing interesting was in it at pag.331, 332, 333, 334..... :shock:
You have even tried to say that Roskill was getting the Court Martial story from Kennedy, when you had already "Churchill and the Admirals" clear statement of Roskill re. the letters he got from Tovey..... :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
You have even tried to say that Roskill was getting the Court Martial story from Kennedy, when you had already "Churchill and the Admirals" clear statement of Roskill re. the letters he got from Tovey.....
Once again you fail to acknowledge the source of information.....me :D

Here is me telling you and Antonio about Barnett and the 1961 letter to Roskill from Tovey from Nov 2013:
Pound and Tovey. The whole Court Martial threat business is mentioned in Ludovic Kennedy's book in the notes on the Epilogue. Initially there was only the pointed message to WW about intentions for re-engaging. This is mentioned in Grenfell but the Court Martial threat was apparently revealed by Tovey only in the 1960s, and is described thus by Corelli Barnett in "Engage the Enemy More Closely":

QUOTE Immediately after Admiral Tovey's return to Scapa Flow at the end of the hunt for Bismarck, Pound was to telephone him to say (according to Tovey's later account) that;

....he wished wake-Walker and Jack Leach brought to trial by Court-Martial for not re-engaging the Bismarck. I explained to him that the action taken by both these officers was exactly what I wished, the last thing I wanted was fror the Bismarck to be pushed further to the West and away from my own force. He stated that he still wished them to be brought to trial. I replied that nothing would persuade me to do so. He informed me that the Admiralty would order a trial. I replied that if they did I would act as Prisoner's Friend, if necessary resigning my command to do so. I heard no more about it. UNQUOTE

Barnett points out this was in a letter from Tovey to Roskill dated 14th December 1961. Kennedy provides plenty of detail showing Tovey's disagreements with Churchill's interference and Pound's weakness in being pressured by Winston. KGV to run out of fuel if necessary etc. PQ 17 etc etc Kennedy also points out Tovey's memory was none to good late in life.

Churchill was under immense pressure at this time, Averell Harriman (US ambassador) was staying at Chequers, the PM's country retreat when the terrible news of Hood's loss was receved early in the morning. At the same time terrible news was coming in about the struggle for Crete and there too, Wiston was accusing the Navy of lack of determination. (Yes Alberto even ABC was under criticism.) Later Bismarck escapes, Winston wants heads on poles. At that point he was carrying on about Troubridge and the Goeben escape.
Please read what I write before you accuse me. Roskill cites Kennedy quite deliberately in Churchill and the Admirals (of which again I informed you of the existence) because he wants to offload responsibility for this unverifiable slur and distance himself from it. Having read Kennedy's caveats he knows how unreliable it is.

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Roskill cites Kennedy quite deliberately in Churchill and the Admirals (of which again I informed you of the existence) because he wants to offload responsibility for this unverifiable slur and distance himself from it. Having read Kennedy's caveats he knows how unreliable it is. "
Hi Sean,
I usually recognize when you post new material (as I did with the War Cabinet minutes). You did mention Roskill, Correlli-Barnett and the ADM 205/10 but you failed to post the meaningful parts of them, just verbosely pretending they were without significance in this discussion.... :shock: .
Anyway, you must be joking with your above sentence, as usual without any documentary evidence to corroborate what you desperately try to say...... :negative:

Roskill explains "officially" why he did not insert the CM threat story in "War at Sea" in his "Naval Policy",never mentioning any personal doubt about Tovey account (even if the true reason for not publishing it at that time is clearly written in another letter from Tovey to Roskill that I will post for your "pleasure" when I will have time enough.....).
Roskill_Naval_Policies_Vol2_464.jpg
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You cannot say that "he wants to offload responsibility for this unverifiable slur and distance himself from it", as he confirms it in "Churchill and the Admirals" footnote (see below).

You cannot say "he "knows how unreliable" Tovey was because it's exactly the opposite. Roskill contradicts Kennedy in the letter below, when the latter unfairly tried to insinuate that Tovey was possibly not reliable..... :shock:
Roskill_Churchill_Admirals_footnote.jpg
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Roskill to Kennedy_13-09-1973.jpg
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The only thing you can say is that, probably, Roskill did not want the responsibility to be the one who unveiled this shameful story, opening the "can of worms"......possibly because he was afraid of reactions like the ones we are seeing here in this forum.
You will see in Tovey's letter, when I will have posted it.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

So once again we have:

Roskill to Kennedy_13-09-1973.jpg

but nothing in this says Tovey was remembering accurately, does it? He can be very interested in Roskill's work and bring letters and papers and still recount things that never happened. In fact we know he remembered inaccurately several things as far back as 1953 and Roskill didn't use them either because they were verifiably wrong.

There is no can and no worms, merely a bit of salacious gossip about an unenforceable threat or maybe a threat of a threat, or maybe even just a recounting of something Churchill said he wanted on the 24th, before he got over his "Black Dog" disappointment that Bismarck had sunk Hood, when he had been so counting on good news to impress Harriman and counter the ongoing Cretan shambles. It is clear Roskill duped Kennedy into publishing so he could subsequently cite him. Roskill had the letter for many years, and admitted supplying it, but got Kennedy to put the story into print, so if there were a backlash his hands were clean. :angel:

Roskill was quite willing to open cans of worms and revel in the contents where they actually existed, like Sparviento and Admiral North's case, not to mention PQ 17 and Churchill's interferences in Norway.

I thought allusions were things that only happened in poetry.
Allusion is a figure of speech, in which one refers covertly or indirectly to an object or circumstance from an external context.[1] It is left to the audience to make the connection;[2] where the connection is directly and explicitly stated (as opposed to indirectly implied) by the author, it is instead usually termed a reference.[3
and is a clear allusion and menace of a Court Martial


Prime Ministers don't need to make allusions if they want something done, they give instruction. If Winston instructed Pound by phone to CM these men on the 24th there is no record of it and no record of the machinery of evidence gathering etc happening. There is no evidence that Alexander who would actually have set the process in motion, as for Somerville and North, was informed of such a thought.

I contend my description of the salient documents in 205/10 (when I did not have the capability to post photos) is correct. I admit I misinterpreted the origin of Pound's and Alexander's letters, but whether it is signed by an authorised minion or by the great men themselves makes little difference. What is important are the dates. Two months after, and four months after.

I am just researching the fractious signal exchange between Cunningham and Pound on the 25th May. Davies was asked about the Bismarck Campaign, so he ignored the major action off Crete.

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "but nothing in this says Tovey was remembering accurately, does it? "
Hi Sean,
of course it does. The sentence is referred to Kennedy "insinuation" (using Paffard's judgement). It demolish Paffard and it confirms that Tovey had a quite agile and ready mind, in order to review Roskill work (not a poor old sailor attitude....).
Roskill to Kennedy_13-09-1973.jpg
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Of course if you still don't want to believe to the CM threat, you are free to do it. We don't need your consensus as we have the evidences (Churchill and Pound's words, Tovey's letter, McMullen account, Roskill (and all historians + Henry Leach) confirmation, War Cabinet minutes AND the subsequent ADM 205/10 papers showing that something was actually under investigation (or waiting for "explanations" if you prefer), plus of course the intentional alteration of the DS story/reports done to counter the menace).
You have nothing at all to support your "mild" interpretation of just a "blurt" of the PM.

you wrote: " What is important are the dates. Two months after, and four months after. "
Exactly ! :clap: A long time needed to "adjust" the reports and to alter the facts in order to be able to close the "regrettable aftermath". Tovey's despatches are from July, the second shameful board in August, Barnes answer to Tovey is in September...... :D

you wrote: "I contend my description of the salient documents in 205/10 (when I did not have the capability to post photos)"
You could have posted the text in quotes (as I do when not allowed to post document photos), instead of saying nothing relevant was in them.
Either you were unable to understand the importance of the papers or you were annoyed by their content..... Your choice.....:negative:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Once again the same material
It demolish Paffard and it confirms that Tovey had a quite agile and ready mind, in order to review Roskill work
but it does not negate the fact that Tovey had already supplied inaccurate information about the run out of fuel message and the "coast of France" to Roskill. He may well have been a hermit only at the end of his life, but was telling Roskill things that didn't happen as early as 1953.

Churchill said nothing about Court Martialling anybody, as far as we know. Pound's words are recounted only by Tovey. McMullen only heard it from Tovey. No historian mentions it before Kennedy, who gets it from Tovey, second hand from Roskill, who then can conveniently cite Kennedy. . etc etc
Tovey's despatches are from July, the second shameful board in August, Barnes answer to Tovey is in September..
Do you really think that it took two months to come up with this? It was two months because nobody was interested. And it was four months because still nobody was interested. Pond's underling had to guess what the "certain matters" were after two months and latched onto pusillanimous Pound's equivocal support for Leach. In fact the real question was why do British Battleships blow up so easily? This was answered by the August Board of Enquiry about which there was nothing shameful.

Anyway, answering your request for documentary proof the Admiralty and Churchill was at least as interested in the Crete crisis as in one german battleship, on 23rd through 27th May, here is Churchill himself from "The Grand Alliance":

Image
Image
Image

The Great Man was unhappy with both Cunningham and Wavell and the Admiralty "replied at once", telling the former his plans were inadequate. When the Admiralty overrode Cunningham and directly ordered some reinforcements to Crete in some of his ships, Glenroy, with Calcutta and other escorts, Cunningham countermanded them, whereupon the Admiralty countermanded him, until later sanity prevailed.
At 11am on the 23rd May a stick of bombs was dropped by a highflying aircraft about 500 yards astern of the Glenroy. Frequent air alerts followed until 3pm, when an order was received to return to Alexandria. This order was rescinded by special instructions from the Admiralty and the three ships turned north again at about 6pm. However, it soon became clear that the Glenroy could not reach Tymbaki Bay before it was light, and that if she continued northwards daylight would expose her to the worst possible danger from enemy air attacks. Finally she was ordered again to return to Alexandria. 2nd Queen’s disembarked in the early morning of the 25th.


This is what Pound and the Admiralty was doing as well as handling Bismarck. They had no time for a silly vendetta.

As for Churchill's famous blurt, here is a direct account of the intense depression and foul temper the Great Man was in that Saturday morning. From Martin Gilbert's "Finest Hour"

Image
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His ill informed observation about Leach's actions was merely a product of this grumpy mood ("bitter disappointment and grief to me") and was undoubtedly forgotten sometime after Colville noted it. It should also be noted in passing, that Troubridge was exonerated by his Court Martial, and promoted two years after to Vice Admiral and to full Admiral after that.

Neither Leach nor Wake-Walker were ever sanctioned, but instead rewarded with Honours. Churchill arranged for both Longmore and Wavell to be sacked from their posts, but rejected Cunningham's offer to stand down, made because he thought the Admiralty had lost their confidence in him. He knew Cunningham had failed to save Crete, and had most of his fleet sunk or put out of action, but he also knew it was a pointless gesture because there was never going to be a seaborne invasion. A few hundred mountain troops in some fishing boats were never going to make a difference, and Enigma decodes of GAF signals had given the whole airborne plan of attack.

There is no evidence for CMDS other than Tovey's recollection, and he kept no diary and had a poor memory. The Ziggurat of Supposition has been built on these flimsy foundations.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Once again the same material "
Hi Sean,
the "same" material, coming from a reputed historian (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6728&start=885#p76920), is better than just the "same" Kennedy / Paffard insinuation about Tovey reliability, that you still want to trust. :negative:
Roskill was well aware about the "signal" Tovey said he received on May 26, and he tried to find it. Despite this minor error in the ToR of a single signal (if it was an error and the message was never sent, which I still have some doubts about....), Roskill considered Tovey to be otherwise VERY reliable and confirmed all what he was saying re. the Court Martial story.

Your attempt to discredit his memory regarding such an event is just ridiculous, in front of the evidences:
1) letter from Tovey to Roskill (this is a written proof and can be countered ONLY by another evidence, or by a medical certificate stating Tovey was somehow insane in 1961), that you don't have),
2) McMullen testimony (same as above),
3) historians advise (Roskill, Correlli Barnett, Graham Rhys-Jones) that are possibly more able than you to judge what had happened between Downing Street and the Admiralty at that time....
4) Sir Henry Leach confirmation (if he had even a minimum doubt about the "saga", he would have said that in the Wills book),
5) War Cabinet Minutes and ADM 205/10 papers , clearly showing (if you finally try to open your eyes) that "certain aspects" were under investigation.
6) Even this modern DS battle author (before he decided to join the "RN hooligans" side, refusing "a priori" all evidences), was apparently convinced of the Pound threat to Tovey, despite he still apparently lacked, according to mentioned bibliography, Roskill late books, McMullen, Sir Henry, War Cabinet minutes and ADM 205/10...(http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... olland.htm, last paragraph of "Finding the Range" chapter). :wink:

You now have ONLY Kennedy (a poor historian....) account of Paffard recollections, denied by Roskill...... :negative:



Re. papers on Crete, again, thanks for posting undoubtedly interesting pages, but please open a separate thread to discuss about Crete crisis, as you have NOT posted a single document showing that "This is what Pound and the Admiralty was doing as well as handling Bismarck" (as per your words) in the Admiralty War Room during the days of the Bismarck hunt. :negative:
I have no doubts that Crete could have been strategically even more important, but the War Room tactical attention was for the Bismarck only, at least if you are unable to find a document stating the contrary and listing WHO was handling Crete, WHERE and WHEN in the War Room.
I have already posted (here below again for everybody convenience) the extracts of the account of Adm.Davies regarding the War Room activity and the interest of Churchill for the Bismarck. Not a single word is dedicated to Crete. :negative:
Davies_War_Room_Churchill.jpg
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According to Davies the Bismarck hunt was followed by "WSC, Eden, Alexander, Mr.Winant (Special US representative), Adm.Ghormley (US Naval representative), and apparently Lord Beaverbrook.
The following naval officers were working on the Bismarck chase: Pound (albeit he had to mainly manage.... WSC fury), Tom Phillips (who actually managed the operation according to Davies), Ralph Edwards (Director of Ops), Charles Daniel (Director of Plans) and the Director of Naval Intelligence, who were just the most active. In addition J.Terry and Bowhill (CinC Costal Command) and Davies himself (Director of Operations (Foreign)) were involved too.


you wrote: "His ill informed observation about Leach's actions was merely a product of this grumpy mood ("bitter disappointment and grief to me") and was undoubtedly forgotten sometime after Colville noted it. It should also be noted in passing, that Troubridge was exonerated by his Court Martial, and promoted two years after to Vice Admiral and to full Admiral after that. "
You "forget" (I'm sure it's not a lapse of yours) the War Cabinet on June 2nd, that mentioned "certain aspects" that, "prima facie" needed explanations, NOT yet forgotten (after 6 full days from Bismarck sinking) apparently...... and the subsequent ADM 205/10 papers showing that the "displeasure" lasted at least until September 1941 (accompanied by full discussions of the PM with Tovey and Leach regarding these aspects, incorrectly "explained" by the Tovey's despatches), when Alexander wrote him:
Alexander_Churchill_25-9-41.jpg
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and Churchill minuted his final :"Leave it" at pag.334. :D

Incidentally, Troubridge was inquired, the Inquiry sent in front of a CM, that exonerated him, but he and Milne NEVER saw a command at sea anymore.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Cag
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Cag »

Hi All

From the Broadhurst book Churchills Anchor

"Corelli Barnett in his book Engage the enemy more closely claims that Churchill had more or less become a permanent fixture (in the Admiralty War Room) because of his fascination with the hunt for the Bismarck. In fact Churchill had been told about the loss of the Hood on the morning of the 24th while at Chequers. He did not leave Chequers until 12.30 on Monday 26th May and thus could not have reached the Admiralty War Room until 14.00 at the earliest. Certainly he would have been in constant touch with the Admiralty, and very probably with Pound, and Coleville says in his diary ' The PM cannot understand why the PoW did not press home her attack yesterday and keeps on saying it is the worst thing since Troughtbridge turned away from the Goeben in 1914. He rates the First Lord and the First Sea Lord continuously."

So we can see this opinion was based on no or very little real information and no doubt prompted Pounds unsure comment in the Cabinet meeting at 17.00 hrs that evening whilst information was still unavailable.

However from the same book we have a letter from Pound to Cunningham dated 19th June

"In the battle for the Bismarck we were both unlucky and lucky, and I cannot remember any 48 hours in which I jumped so frequently from great hopes to black despair. It was a sickening moment when it was reported that Hood had been sunk, and the partially effective PoW who had barely got through her teething problems was left to deal with Bismarck alone. There is no doubt that Hood with her third salvo got two or three hits on Bismarck and I think this started leaks in her oil tanks"

Obviously he was still unaware that it had been PoW that hit Bismarck but it is understandable that exact details were still unknown. If one goes onto the IWM website there are PoW crew interviews which also cast light on Pounds view, especially his speech to PoW crew regarding the Bismarck action and their reaction to this.

Best wishes
Cag.
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wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

I'm disappointed you don't consider Winston Churchill's account of the interest he and the Admiralty took simultaneously in the Crete and Bismarck battles to be of value. To develop a separate thread would be temporally irresponsible. Pound and Churchill were concerned equally in both events at the same time. I am equally disappointed that with an eye witness description of WC's irrational behaviour on the 24th and 25th you still place any value whatsoever in the Troubridge observation. It is clearly a baseless "blurt".

How do you know what the certain aspects and the prima facie are? Does it actually specify? Anywhere? Of course not. In order to support the fantastical supposition you have jointly conjured, you want them to be, but there is no indication they are anything to do with PoW. There is no "displeasure" mentioned at all in the 205/10 papers and it is only guesswork by some nameless bureaucrat on the 31st July (which is certainly just shy of two whole months after June 2nd) that identifies them as anything to do with PoW. There is no "displeasure" in the Secretary of the War Cabinet's enquiry, after nearly two whole months, as to whether there is any kind of report outstanding or indeed any urgency indicated. Since obviously Pound and Churchill will have talked over the whole Bismarck business there is no requirement.

Equally the tired insinuation (correctly used) that because Churchill and Tovey and Leach had talked fully about the Bismarck episode this indicates that Churchill was still going on about his baseless, embarrassing blurt, months later, is pure hyperbolic speculation. When Churchill joined PoW for the Placentia voyage he was aboard some hours before the ship sailed. It is likely Tovey was there even though he did not sail to Newfoundland. Churchill was Leach's guest aboard his ship. What would they talk about but Bismarck? Golf, Fishing, Arsenal's chances in the Cup, Bricklaying maybe? We have seen a nice picture of Pound, Churchill and Leach having a congenial chat on the quarterdeck. They are cosying up with a man Antonio chooses to call a "coward".

Wikipedia says:
Troubridge never had another seagoing command, but did command naval detachments and flotillas on the Danube during the Balkan campaigns, winning the respect of Serbian Crown Prince Alexander. After the war he served on the Danube Commission and was promoted to admiral, but remained out of favour with the Admiralty. He spent several years as president of the commission, retiring in 1924 and dying in 1926.


Not bad considering this National Archives site http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blo ... roubridge/

says he was on half pay! Personally I'd have wanted a raise as well as that double promotion and Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George! :D

Churchill says Cunningham was responding to the Admiralty on the 26th, which is the very afternoon Churchill arrived from Chequers. Cunningham signs off with the hot news Formidable and Nubian have just been disabled. Who do you imagine he was telling if not Pound? Churchill was not solely concerned with naval matters, he was giving instructions to both Wavell and Freyberg, at the same time as the Bismarck Hunt.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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