Bismarck firing procedures at DS

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Alecsandros,

you correctly wrote in response on why I keep on providing explanations here in this forum :

For thousands of ridiculous questions that have been answered a very long time ago, but that need to be dug up again and again, and AGAIN by people having way too much time on their hands.

Antonio isn't working on the " Cover Up " book - that's only what the busy people manage to grasp.

Antonio has been working on a functional map and timetable for the Denmark Strait battle.

THAT is what he will publish, along with Alberto.

The Court Martial episode will be another page in the book, JUST LIKE IT IS IN SEVERAL OTHER BOOKS ALREADY.

Well, first of all I have to sincerely applaud your above statements, that are all absolutely correct !!!

Second we will be adding some more details about the whole Op. Rheinubung coverage, ... especially regarding the many parts that have been lightly described and explained before, ... like the night before the Denmark Strait battle, ... or the loss of contact, ... etc etc ...

The difference will be made by the hundreds of evidence we will publish in support of the narrative, ... that are the results of dozens of years of researches in all the aspect of this historical event.

Who, ... just like you are doing, ... is following this forum has already had a preview on some of them, ... but I can guarantee you that there will be much more, ... like never published evidence in support of a story that many think has been already well explained, ... but in reality very poorly researched until today into the archives.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Northcape,

Thank you for your invaluable contribution in exposing mistranslation from German, and robustly challenging Antonio when he does it, especially when adds in fabricated details to make things look more convincing.

Nobody (except you) knows why you have added (not mistranslated) the wrong and misleading term "dead reckoning".

This 1978 map was just an guesstimation from the photographs, further refined, apparently, by M-R and Schmalenbach in 1990.

These unwarranted additions created by Antonio to real material will undoubtedly comprise most of the "hundreds of evidences" to be presented in the future. Fabricated "facts" borne of intuition, hidden amongst real information.

If Antonio were in the least bit interested in the truth, rather than building a reputation (notoriety) by floating a Conspiracy theory based on an assault on RN veracity, he would submit all the german language material he has for proper translation by someone who understands maritime phraseology and has no ulterior motive for adding in extras to change and modify the material. It would also be very handy if the various illegible annotations by Brinkmann to the PG KTB could be deciphered. Maybe the copy in his possession is in better condition that the excellent Ulrich used for his translation here. If the letter to Raeder from Jasper, always assuming it exists of course, were given such treatment there might be much to be learned. He always boasts of the wealth of material he has from the Bundesarchiv, but if it is only presented in translated form, who knows how much is of German origin and how much Italian.

For Alberto,

Now, to try to be credible, Mr.Wadinga MUST tell us all at what time in his speculation Bismarck turned to 270° and how long she was on that course !

Look at the Baron's and Schmalenbach's map most recent map 1990, and see for yourself. Lutjens turns away to starboard at 05:55 in compliance with his instructions to avoid entanglement with British ships. Somewhere between the generated estimate of closure rate based on the inaccurate initial inclination estimate and McMullen's huge range reductions because of the long intervals between salvoes, he probably strikes lucky on salvo 6. (There is no Bismarck timing of hits received, there is no confirmation of a hit on salvo 6). Bismarck commences a swing back to port at about 06:00, which makes perfect sense as her opponent has just lost 50% of his force. The need to withdraw in line with orders has just disappeared. Unfortunately the cruiser has also turned to starboard and crosses the flagship's bow at a few hundred yards, so Bismarck turns further to port to pass clear astern of her.

Even you are now accepting:

that is at least until 6:00:30 - 6:00:40, AFTER Hood exploded.

which would mean 06:03 being wrong and the collapse of the timetable and all those speculative identifications of individual salvoes at 06:xx:xx (what no tenths?)

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Wadinga wrote: "Look at the Baron's and Schmalenbach's map most recent map 1990, and see for yourself. Lutjens turns away to starboard at 05:55 in compliance with his instructions to avoid entanglement with British ships."

Alleluia !
Mr.Wadinga has opted now and (I hope definitively) for the 1990 map, that is proven wrong by McMullen salvo plot (I don't even listen at his speculation about McMullen lucky hit at salvo 6, because it was repeated at salvos 9 and 13... http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... encIVa.gif), and is not even respecting the original PG track.... :

Had Bismarck been on course 270° since 5:55, no distance reduction at all would have happened from 5:55 till 6:00 and ALL McMullen salvos would have fallen half way between him and the target,.. Is this geometry and mathematics expert aware of this simple fact ?

Any other denier is ready to support this crazy fantasy ?


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Your religious exultation is surprising, I have stated my preference for the 1990 Mullenheim-Rechberg/Schmalenbach 1990 map for several years now.

(I don't even listen at his speculation about McMullen lucky hit at salvo 6, because it was repeated at salvos 9 and 13

Even McMullen did not know which salvoes actually hit Bismarck- "No hits were observed, but it is likely from results observed that fire was effective between salvoes 5 and 16." This was true even when badgered by the overbearing First Lord Alexander. As I pointed out, for a considerable period of time it was considered Hood had scored all the hits (the only British fairy tale about Denmark Straits)

I do not believe anyone has accurately timed the Bismarck hits or even definitively decided in which order they were made. No description of entry or exit angles exists as in the case of PoW. At the crudest level of analysis a line drawn between the 6th and 9th points suggests a Bismarck course of less than 200T and between 9th and 13th more than 230T. The "suggested" course for Bismarck at the top of the sheet appears to be 212T (have you a clearer copy?) Bismarck's dotted course is pure guesswork.

If the drawn length of the salvoes is to scale (for instance either 7 or 8 is definitely incorrect) then the point of origin is wrong and the fabricated track of PoW is incorrect. This makes sense, since it was generated from the AFCT data which has no ship's track, and it leaves out the second turn to port and emergency turn to starboard experienced by Brooke and seen aboard the German ships.


All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

I have written: "Any other denier is ready to support this crazy fantasy ? "

Very happy to see that NOBODY dared to support Mr.Wadinga crazy theory of Bismarck turning west at 05:55 and sailing 270° until 6:00...

I guess any sane person should be able to see that on course 270° Bismarck would NOT have closed the range vs Hood and PoW. Instead, she passed from 21150 yards at 05:56:10 (salvo 6 landing) to 16450 yards at 6:00:00 (salvo 13 landing). BOTH salvo 6 and 13 were straddles, (despite his denial attempt to say that we don't know when PoW hit Bismarck... ) , therefore this distance change is surely CORRECT and Mr.Wadinga is once again rubbished in his desperate attempt to find a weak point in Antonio's reconstruction, by far the best available one .

Is Mr.Wadinga able to realize (despite his mathematical deficiency...) that such a closure rate (almost 4000 yards in 4 minutes) is simply physically impossible with Bismarck on course 270°?
Were Hood and PoW flying on the water @ 55+ knots following Bismarck in an (almost) stern chase ?

Therefore simply the 1990 map is TOTALLY WRONG (+ methodologically incorrect, as it does not respect even PG own track).
End of story (at least if Mr.Wadinga doesn't want to propose another theory about PoW firing against...fishes due to a "mirage" while Hood was hitting Bismarck instead.... ... or that it was BC1 running north toward BS, as he ridiculously tried to state in his delirious post above ).



Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

that NOBODY dared to support Mr.Wadinga crazy theory of

Sadly Messrs Mullheim-Rechberg and Schmalenbach are no longer with us. Besides it is me supporting them, not vice versa.

(despite his denial attempt to say that we don't know when PoW hit Bismarck.

No, nobody knows when PoW hit Bismarck..............produce the evidence. I have produced McMullen, who have you got?

All the best

wadinga

[northcape]

I did not dig into any archives, so I have a straightforward question to the ones with more knowledge on the topic: is there a statement of any witness on when, relative to a fixed point (e.g explosion of Hood) the PoW hit Bismarck? The Baron did not give any indication, nor does Esmonde Knight. So McMullen does not give any hint? I am talking of actual first-hand observations and not reconstructions. Thanks.

I have a very thin German publication from the 80ies or so on the Bismarck (basically just detailed fotos taken during outfitting). It also contains a map (no reference given), and this map actually shows the hits of PoW shortly before Bismarck opened fire. It also indicates that PE and Bismarck opened fire at the same time. But I doubt that the author of this thin book did a lot of research on his own, and from this publication alone it is impossible to judge the reliability of the times given in the map.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Wadinga wrote: "Besides it is me supporting them..... nobody knows when PoW hit Bismarck..:"

Only Mr.Wadinga, among the deniers here, supports the error of the Baron, who published in his late book version a map copied by an old one, but NEVER mentions in his book that Bismarck turned away after opening fire. McMullen gives us the straddles, if Wadinga prefers to speculate (based on his unlimited fantasy) that a "lucky hit" in a short or over salvo hit instead (or that it was Hood to hit Bismarck ), he is free to do it.
NOTHING CHANGES and I'm personally not much interested in this aspect, even if, IMHO, it was the first hit ("most probably" at salvo 6) that pushed Lutjens to split the fire of his units ordering PG to fire against the PoW.
The straddles anyway confirm Bismarck distance and consequently her converging course from 5:58 till 6:00...

Instead of his quibbles and attempts to divert the discussion when cornered, he should try to answer this arguments:

I guess any sane person should be able to see that on course 270° Bismarck would NOT have closed the range vs Hood and PoW. Instead, she passed from 21150 yards at 05:56:10 (salvo 6 landing) to 16450 yards at 6:00:00 (salvo 13 landing). BOTH salvo 6 and 13 were straddles, therefore this distance change is surely CORRECT and Mr.Wadinga is once again rubbished in his desperate attempt to find a weak point in Antonio's reconstruction, by far the best available one .

Is Mr.Wadinga able to realize (despite his mathematical deficiency...) that such a closure rate (almost 4000 yards in 4 minutes) is simply physically impossible with Bismarck on course 270°?
Were Hood and PoW flying on the water @ 55+ knots following Bismarck in an (almost) stern chase ?

Therefore simply the 1990 map is TOTALLY WRONG (+ methodologically incorrect, as it does not respect even PG own track).
End of story (at least if Mr.Wadinga doesn't want to propose another theory about PoW firing against...fishes due to a "mirage" while Hood was hitting Bismarck instead.... ... or that it was BC1 running north toward BS, as he ridiculously tried to state in his delirious post above "

He has no answer, as usual....


Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

While it is clear that no hit can be scored without the salvo having straddled the target, it is equally true that a straddle does not guarantee a hit. In plain words, a straddle does not automatically = a hit. To argue that any such direct equivalency exists between the two terms is false logic.

The fact of the matter is that, while McMullen was pretty reliably able to sense straddles made, he was unable at any time during the action to conclusively sense any of the hits made and the gunnery report plainly states as much. The general inability of an observer to identify penetrating hits by AP projectiles at normal battle ranges was a widely understood fact of naval gunnery life.

B

[Bill Jurens]

At the risk of being perceived as overly pedantic, it technically IS possible to get a hit without a straddle. Such would occur if the target were hit by a projectile at either end of the pattern. Straddles without hits, are of course, relatively plentiful.

That picky correction being made, the previous posting is both relevant and reasonable.

Bill Jurens

[wadinga]

Hello All,

The general inability of an observer to identify penetrating hits by AP projectiles at normal battle ranges was a widely understood fact of naval gunnery life.

Especially since two of the damaging hits were "shorts" penetrating PoW's and Bismarck's hulls underwater and beneath their armoured belts! So both straddles and short salvoes may be the source of hits.


Although this is not correct thread, since he is here, I hoped we might draw a response from Bill based on his extensive knowledge of 20th Century gunnery techniques, on the chances of Claude Aylwin nearly hitting any German warship at all, since the shells seen on film actually landed near Prinz Eugen, with two single gun salvoes fired from his "rudimentary" fire control system in turret Y. The first has to be fired after he has missed by several thousand yards, but only 5 seconds after those shells land. Would Bill say it was likely, not very likely, unbelievably unlikely or about as likely as hitting Scharnhorst in harbour in Brest, from the same location. Then, speaking probability-wise what of the chances of Claude doing the same thing with his second single salvo, given that both he and his target are turning continuously? Oh, and BTW no-one actually on the British side actually logged or reported even seeing where any of the three salvoes landed.


All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

Anything is possible, Wadinga. It I recall correctly, the Japanese at the Battle of the Yellow Sea were surprised by the "close" fall of the opening Russian shots from about 15,000 yards. But the likelihood of Aylwin landing any shells "close" to either German ship would have been remote under the circumstances: first fire under local control after own ship had just evaded away under radical helm; target also maneuvering; vision hindered by smoke; turret range-finder presumably still washed out by spray; neither deflection nor range rate known; the single or two shot salvoes impossible to sense for MPI.

Of course, it is also fair to say that the answer ultimately depends a very great deal upon the Italian sense of the term "close" - 100 yards, 1000 yards, a mile ..... I trust you get my drift.

Strictly my opinion, of course, as I would not presume to speak for Mr Jurens.

B

[Bill Jurens]

The record regarding the firing at Denmark Strait are so incomplete rendering ranges and bearings at any particular time, especially later in the action after Prince of Wales had turned away, that meaningful analysis is probably impossible.

The lack of information on fall-of-shot, etc. essentially precludes useful analysis, and about the best that can be done is to perform some sort of (one hopes reasonably objective) mathematical simplification.

One quick way to do this would be to begin by estimating parameters regarding the probable error (or uncertainty) of range and bearing and comparing the area of the resultant 'beaten zone' with the area of the target. If my math is correct, the area of the 'beaten zone', a partial annulus, is equal to {(3.1416* RH^2) - (3.1416 x RL^2)} * AE/360 where:

RL = Boundary of lowest probable range
RH = Boundary of highest probable range
AE = Angular error (in azimuth) degrees

For a range boundary of 10000 to 11000 meters and an angular error of 3 degrees (which are representative values, not necessarily the most appropriate ones) this would seem to come out at about 546,150 m^2.

Taking Bismarck to be a rectangle 250 meters long and 36 meters wide, which makes some allowance for underwater 'shorts' and hits in the superstructure gives her a target area of about 9000 m^2.

Dividing these two together yields a hit percentage of about 1.65% Note again, that this is just an illustrative figure, computed to illustrate the computational process.

The advantage of this method, admittedly crude, but probably as statistically valid as possible considering the uncertainty in the original figures, lies in the fact that users can substitute their own values into the equations, and thereby generate alternative estimated hit percentages. That being said, my guess is that in most cases where reasonable values are assumed, the hit percentage would remain quite small.

An interesting corollary of this sort of analysis assigns no correlation between the location of shell splashes and the target ships at all, i.e. that just because a given projectile might be seen to have fallen closer to target 'A' than target 'B", this does not mean that this means that that means that target "A" was the one intended.

I don't know if this reasonably addresses the question(s) at hand, and suspect that there is no real possibility of simultaneously satisfying both sides in this issue, but it's the sort of place I would consider starting from...

Bill Jurens

[northcape]

Hi Mr. Bill Jurens,

I'm not quite sure about the purpose of that calculation. If is a mathematically correct procedure to estimate the probablity that a object of a certain size is hit by one shell, assuming that the final destination of this shell is within a certain area which encompasses the other ship.

I understand that this calculation serves as one simple solution only, but I personally still doubt the usefulness of this estimation due to the over-simplification. A more accurate probability analysis would be to set up a mathematical model which allows for moving objects (speed and courses), salvos with variation in range but not or very little in azimuth, and uncertainties in all these (partly correlated) parameters. Once this model exists, again everyone can put in their desired uncertainty ranges (largely representing wind and sea state), and calculate the probablitiy of a hit.

However, as pointed out, we know very little of the input uncetainties and variables (as course and speed), so this whole effort very likely is in vain and an acdemic excersise only. I guess I'm overall much more pessimistic for obtaining any robust hitting probablities for these battles of the past.

[Bill Jurens]

I would concur completely. In my opinion, the the problem, though not ENTIRELY intractable, is really not well-enough defined justify any more sophisticated analysis. Programs to do this do exist -- I have used them -- but anything other than a very crude approximation would not be very useful or applicable here.

Bill Jurens