Cover up synopsis

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@CAG,

in case you do not have it, here the reference for AdmTovey May 30th,1941 first report release too :

Tovey_HF_1325_30_May_1941.jpg (51.17 KiB) Viewed 4260 times

Tovey_May30_02.jpg (86.71 KiB) Viewed 4260 times

Now you can put everything together as I did.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

I see your points and I think I need to be more precise about what I consider an irrefutable fact well proven beyond any reasonable doubt versus what can be and probably will always be argument of discussions and different opinions.

Point 1 : No doubts First Blake board placed Norfolk at 11 sea miles from the enemy at 06.00, no doubts Wake-Walker signed it, no doubts WW wrote 5 days later on his report he was at 15 sea miles from the enemy and no doubts Adm Tovey wrote " astutely " around 15 sea miles on point 17 on his dispatches on July 1941 without providing the exact time for that distance measurement. No doubts Hood Second board thru " The Plot " corrected the Norfolk distance to 15 sea miles from Hood at 06.00 on August 1941. Those are ALL facts.

We can still have different opinions and doubts about the real distance of Norfolk from the enemy at various times and we are trying to better realize it.
This will not change what happened about it being well documented Official facts as I wrote above.

There's also no doubt that the ranges recorded by Norfolk's FC team support W-W's corrected ranges. There is also no doubt that Norfolk and Suffolk could not see each other at 0553-0600 when according to the the 'triangle of doom' and your estimate of the range from Suffolk to Bismarck that they should have been easily visible to one another. W-W had recorded evidence from his own vessel that the triangle of doom was incorrect, and he followed his responsibility to provide a correction ASAP.

Point 2A : The 06.13 time for the PoW turn away was first written by RearAdmiral Wake-Walker on his report at point 10, this is a fact. Adm Tovey probably took it fromthere and used it on his despatches at point 19, this is another fact. No typo and no errors.
The fact that this time was incorrect was certified by the Admiralty on 1948.
Both were intentionally written statements on Officially signed documents submitted to their superiors, this is a fact.

Unless you are thinking to tell me that those 2 Officers were not able to undestand what they were writing, ... and signing, ... those will remain 2 irrefutable facts.

W-W wrote: "...I had seen her forced out of action after 10 minutes' engagement, at the end of which her salvoes were falling short and with a very large spread indeed..." The fact that W-W first used the 0613 timing supports it being a typo or confusion due to timing errors on-board Norfolk. In any event the Admiralty Board had PoW's track charts with the timing of the various turns marked upon them, so the stated timing was not unchallenged by the documentary evidence presented or indeed, even by W-W's own statement.

Point 2B : The moving into the damages list occurred before the PoW turn away of the Y turret jamming event from after the PoW turn away as declared by Capt Leach on his written report to before the PoW turn away event, ... is another irrefutable fact done by AdmTovey on his point 19 dispatches and no one can dispute it was done intentionally.

Like above, unless you are thinking to tell me that this Officer was not able to undestand what he was writing, ... and signing, ... this will remain an irrefutable fact.

Leach stated in his detailed narrative:

"Prince of Wales" starboard 5.25" battery was now in action. Course had to be altered to starboard to avoid remains of "Hood"; meanwhile "Bismarck" had shifted main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately onto "Prince of Wales". A heavy hit was felt almost immediately. And at 0602 compass platform was hit and majority of personnel killed. Navigating Officer was wounded; Commanding Officer unhurt.

The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.

The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos. "Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825

.

Again, this statement was available to the Board as was PoW's G.A.R. with it's timeline of events.

Point 3 : This is obviously the hardest point to demosntrate, since everything before was not done thru Official documents and only the closure of it was done thru the Admiralty Board minute on September 10th,1941.

Here the only think I can tell you is that having received ALL the previous radio messages and Official communications, having at hand all the various reports and maps, ... only being complicit in those events description modification would have enabled a positive comment by the Admiralty Board.

Again, unless you are going to tell me that even in this case we were facing persons that were not capable of understanding what their were reading, commenting and signing.

The board operated during a historical period when all information was provided by analog communication via written reports and telephone while radio communication was unreliable with very low data rates. Consequently it took some time for data to collated, analysed and for firm conclusions to be reached. The data collection process by which the board came to it's ultimate conclusions is typical for this era. Ultimately, the board proved to be very capable of understanding what they were reading and they understood the circumstances by which the various reports came to be, and at the end of it all, they had praise for all concerned.

Honestly I have all I need and I am convinced about my work, ... call it a " Cover Up " ... an " embellishment " ... a " sugar coating " ... or a " can of worm " ... a series of unfortunate " innocent errors " ... which are the definitions of those events that I have read thru the years, ... I will use it for my work about this battle one day.

Again, I have to underline once again that unfortunately it will be not my " scoop " to use a journalistic therminology, ... because Graham Rhys-Jones already drafted pretty well what happened on his book, ... but I am sure that the many details and reference I will be able to provide to those events will be interesting for many persons reading thru it.

You are as good as everybody else, ... including me, ... no genius and no idiots here in.
We are only exchanging opinions about a 75 years old naval battle, ... do not forget about it.

Respect, education, fairness ... as the forum rules dictate, ... and you are among the best respecting it, ... that is why I like to exchange my opinions with you.

Lets concentrate on the map, ... here I do not think we need to spend more ink, ... over there a lot to do, ... and any help is welcome, ... of course, ...

Bye Antonio

You misrepresent Rhys-Jones as somehow supporting your conspiracy-coverup theory when he does no such thing. Admiralty analysis and criticism of operations was a standard practise and indeed similar analysis is conducted, almost universally, by all military organizations.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I have read with a lot of interest your comments that now are finally taking in the correct consideration the irrefutable reported facts that are written and signed into the Official documents.

Point 1 - I agree on all your comments, but it was you and Wadinga that time ago explained to me that distance estimation was much less precise than working thru the bearings. I evaluated it and agreed with you. Now thru the bearings and the correlation with surely accurate distance evaluations when available,we can realize a more precise situation.

In fairness it must be said that one thing is now to realize precisely an accurate situation and another thing is what they estimated during those critical minutes in real time. Just like another thing is what has been modified once home and declared after on Officially signed documents. Those are clearly 3 different things.

Point 2 A - I knew that the WW statement I have underlined several times from my side contained into the same document I posted above was going to come out again now. If that can provide a " typo " justification ( ) for a Flag Officer Officially submitting a signed document once home to his superiors on such a sensitive argument, on the other hand surely cannot provide the same " typo " coverage to Adm Tovey that at first did not corrected back the incorrect timing declaration to WW submitting that report to him, and after took it, and used " astutely " to do what we have read on his dispatches. Same logic of course do apply to the Admiralty Board, that having at hand all sort of previous messages and reports, did not get the evident error on the turn away timing (06.13) and positively commented on it.

It must be said, in fairness and with no pre-conceived approach, that WW is surely the one changing most often his declarations to come out after with " new " ones, ... it happened with the 20.000 yards (10sm) vs the 30.000 yards (15sm), ... and it happened in this case with the 05.53+10=06.03 associated with the 06.13, ... on the same document
Surely he was far to be a precise Officer on his reports and declarations.

Point 2 B - There are no possible justifications for what Adm Tovey did in this case with the Y turret jamming event. Like above for the 06.13 ,he took it and used it " astutely ". This attitude unfortunately provide a clear view of his real intentions on that moment.

In fairness once again, I like to underline here the fact that Capt Leach wrote this event correctly on his report, but this does highlight even more what Adm Tovey did with it after.

Point 3 - What the Admiralty ( Pound ) did at first and after ( Board ) is very well described by Graham Rhys-Jones on his book and I am much less knowledgeable in comparison with him about those arguments.

Finally, ... Graham Rhys-Jones wrote a book about the overall Bismarck chase, ... he did not go thru all the details of this like I am doing, ... but reading in the proper way thru his statements you have the whole scenario clearly depicted.

In fact you should have noticed I am lately using some of his statements to explain the whole events logic, ... from the beginning until the end of it.

Bye Antonio

[Byron Angel]

Wow. After a lengthy absence, I return to find that this is still going on with no end in sight.

Byron

[wadinga]

Indeed it is Byron,



There will be no end in sight until Antonio achieves his goal, and this tragic attempt at posthumous character-assassination of the wartime British administration, the upper and lower echelons of the Royal Navy and particularly several decorated officers of that organisation makes it to print. This will be followed by a critical savaging which will make the treatment of Rob Winklareth's book look like a formal tea party in comparison. A career marked by several excellent factual volumes on german warships will be forever tarnished by the desire to court controversy with an assault on established history motivated by....... well I can only quote an observation.

so sorry you get tired....Being Italian, I'm perhaps more accustomed to the Italian admirals character assassinations during naval discussions.

How dearly I have hoped the motive for this ill-considered campaign is more than stored-up resentment like that.

The dedication to remaining "on message" by the prosecution can be seen in

I see you don't remember what we have discussed several times already, and after some time you are back with your own personal and unsupported theory about Leach intention to immediately re-engage (never mentioned by Leach himself....).

by contributors whose minds are utterly closed to the activities of PoW after, say 06:15 when PoW track turns back towards the North and the enemy, as her crew struggles to repair offensive systems, whereas the Germans had themselves turned away from action, and recommenced the running away process from conflict with British forces still in sight. PoW then formed astern of Norfolk to continue the chase rather than running away back to Scapa to lick her wounds.

Admiral Tovey summarised this process with the word "temporarily", provoking the following highly-biased diatribe:

As Alberto correctly pointed out, ... ... Capt Leach never considered " temporary " is decision to break off the action, and Y turret surely jammed after his order to disengage, as everybody can verify on his radio messages and report.

You can call this shameful series of progressive modification of the data and the events on their correct sequence and timing the way you like it better ... this is the " Cover Up ".

and elsewhere

The word "temporarily" related to the disengagement was first added by Tovey in his message on May 30, based on ....nothing, and repeated in the shameful point 19 of the despatches, that was intentionally incorrectly written to embellish the whole story.....
.....

Why bother to work on unjamming the loading trolley for Y turret if Leach had no intention to re-engage after a temporary cessation? Just leave it broken for the dockyard to fix and run away home. Tell the Vickers technicians on board to stop wasting their time repairing the broken guns and have a tea break instead, the fighting is over. We have seen that the damaged wiring in the HA/DCT was repaired at sea despite its massive complication. Why bother unless you intend to use it? There was disappointment amongst the men who jury-rigged it under very trying conditions that their work was destroyed when the dockyard repair took place. There is no point in repairing offensive systems unless you plan to become offensive again.

All the best

wadinga

[paulcadogan]

In the preamble to his narrative, in explaining his reasons for disengaging, doesn't Leach state that he broke off the action "pending a more favourable opportunity"? Doesn't that indicate his intention that he was breaking off to "consolidate the position" i.e. get things back in working order, join WW and then re-engage when ordered to?

Doesn't that indicate "temporarily"??

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Byron Angel and Wadinga,

if you had took the disturb to read one of my last post a page before this one, you would have read I wrote to CAG :

Lets concentrate on the map, ... here I do not think we need to spend more ink, ... over there a lot to do, ... and any help is welcome, ... of course, ...

But since I am an educated person, respecting this forum rules and members, once asked about something I respond, as you can verify yourself above.

For the same reason I will spend some ink and words here now with you.

If you are annoyed about coming here in and read thru those arguments, you can simply avoid to do it.

If you comment, at least you should try to add some value to the discussion going on by others, while respecting their opinions and works.

@ Wadinga,

from a person like you, I was expecting at this point something of more value to this discussion than some useless philosophical statements mixing up personal considerations on myslef with some Alberto Virtuani written statements.

You appear a lot confused, and having no arguments to counter the above evidence, ... as usual you try to confuse and mix up everything once again, ... while moving, as somebody else did recently, on the personal attack mode.

Let me tell you clearly that I will NOT tolerate anymore any personal reference on myself from your side too.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

you asked :

In the preamble to his narrative, in explaining his reasons for disengaging, doesn't Leach state that he broke off the action "pending a more favourable opportunity"? Doesn't that indicate his intention that he was breaking off to "consolidate the position" i.e. get things back in working order, join WW and then re-engage when ordered to?

Doesn't that indicate "temporarily"??

You are absolutely right.

There is only a timing problem here.

Capt Leach narrative,where that statement you refer above was written, is dated June 4th,1941.

The first Adm Tovey report where that " temporarly " statement first appear was May 30th, 1941.

On Capt Leach May 27th,1941 radio message there is no reference on anyhting " temporarly " done.

Consequently Adm Tovey was the first one to use that statement on his own May 30th,1941 first report to the Admiralty.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

By May 27th PoW had already engaged Bismarck 3 times, so no need to state that she intended to re-engage later. After W-W assumed tactical command, it was not for Leach to state anything along those lines anyways.

In the preamble to his narrative, in explaining his reasons for disengaging, doesn't Leach state that he broke off the action "pending a more favourable opportunity"? Doesn't that indicate his intention that he was breaking off to "consolidate the position" i.e. get things back in working order, join WW and then re-engage when ordered to?

Doesn't that indicate "temporarily"??

Yes:

...In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.

Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity....
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 6-4352.htm

Of course Leach was fully justified in breaking off the action because of the tactical situation where he found himself outnumbered and greatly outgunned at relatively short range. As I've stated before, when this situation is gamed (PoW alone after Hood's loss with historical damage at ~0602 (including radar loss)including 5.25in FC loss and 14in turret issues), it almost always goes very badly for PoW; With every passing moment her FC and effective firepower will begin to diminish under a hurricane of shells and if she suffers underwater damage to her propulsion systems, then she is most likely doomed, with little chance of scoring sufficient damage to Bismarck to allow W-W to intervene.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Sean,
thanks, I'm honored that you mix up my statements with Antonio's ones as in your last post !

you (Wadinga) wrote: "....established history.... "

Hi Sean, clearly "established INCORRECT history" in this case: an incorrect version of facts sold for 75 years......

you wrote: "06:15 when PoW track turns back towards the North and the enemy"

I see you refer to a 360° circle from PoW to follow Norfolk...... Please try to be precise. The turn to North happened at 06:24 and at that point in time Norfolk was already between Bismack and PoW. For sure this was not a turn toward the enemy, just a "take station" maneuver......

you wrote: "Why bother to work on unjamming the loading trolley for Y turret....."

if you have ever been on board a warship, you should know that you ALWAYS try to fix any problem arising (especially to your armament during wartime....).

Dunmunro wrote: "By May 27th PoW had already engaged Bismarck 3 times...."

Hi Duncan,
yes she did, but we are speaking here of the DS battle not of other confrontations happened some hundreds miles away.
When Capt.Leach decided to disengage at around 6:01, he could not know in any way that the circumstances would have allowed him to open fire again in the evening......



@both Sean and Duncan,
instead of diverging from the main topic here (inventing hidden resentments or war-gaming the possible outcome of a prolonged battle, that we have already speculatively discussed several times), why don't you try to comment on the points fairly and factually discussed by Cag (1,2, 3) and Antonio (1, 2A, 2B and 3) regarding the "cover-up" / embellishment (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799&start=525 at the end of the page) ?

If too difficult for your agenda, please try at least to help understanding where did Tovey take the word "temporarily" from (on May 30), when Capt. Leach had not yet mentioned any "more favorable opportunity" ?


Bye, Alberto

[tommy303]

If too difficult for your agenda, please try at least to help understanding where did Tovey take the word "temporarily" from (on May 30), when Capt. Leach had not yet mentioned any "more favorable opportunity" ?

Presumably, because he was writing after the fact and knew PoW exchanged fire with Bismarck on two occasions (when Prinz Eugen detached and when Bismarck slowed to allow damage control to adjust collision mats), it would have been logical to insert the word temporarily into his narrative. It merely clarified that PoW's retreat had not been permanent and that by evening, she was ready to cover the cruisers should Bismarck try to double back on them or to attack Bismarck herself should Wake-Walker so order it

[Alberto Virtuani]

@tommy303,
Hi Tommy,
I must say that, not being English my native language, I would have intended "temporarily as related to the battle of Denmark Strait (a matter of minutes), not to the fact of opening fire more than 12 hours later when at more than 300 sm from the battlefield......
However, of course, I have to bow to the interpretation of an English speaking person.

Had I been Tovey, I would just have phrased differently his important statement at point 19: "The commanding officer considered it expedient to break off the action, waiting for the decision that the Rear-Admiral commanding CS1 would have taken regarding her role and the possibility to re-engage the enemy. At 6:01:30 he therefore turned away under smoke."


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

I understand what Alberto is saying and he's correct in it being due to interpretation.

Pending more favourable circumstances doesn't really indicate or restrict itself to a time limit. If we look at Geoffrey Brooke at page 60 he writes

" Not surprisingly, the Captain had been temporarily dazed (Also not indicating a time period, my interpretation). It was indeed fortunate that he escaped unhurt. He now went to the microphone at the back of the bridge and spoke to the ships company. He said it had been a very hard decision to break off the action as no British Naval Officer likes to retreat, but he had decided to do so because of the poor state of the ships guns (Presumably at a point when both A and Y turret had losses, my interpretation) ; Bismarck was clearly at the peak of efficiency; and he did not think it worth continuing to pit the ship against such odds when she was by no means the last card the C in C had to play (my italics) King George V Repulse and the carrier Victorious being only a 'few hours' steaming away".

I do know from IWM recorded interviews of PoW crew that there were some fights ashore between PoW and KG V men and some ill feeling that PoW had been let down by her sister ship. Hood sank at 06.00 on the 24th and yet PoW was still shadowing and at times engaging Bismarck for 20 hours without sign of the ships that would have allowed the crew to avenge the Hood. Obviously the C in C was attempting to reach the area and in reality the ill feeling was unfounded but shows the crews attitude. There is also a quite funny interview which describes the crews reaction to a speech by Dudley Pound when taking Churchill to meet Roosevelt regarding his decision to send PoW out with Hood to meet Bismarck.

Interestingly Brooke also describes the hits received by PoW and remembers the sparks and acrid burning smells around his director before the second lurch away (The first being around the Hood) that was the breaking off of the action. This acrid burning was no doubt the ships boats aflame after the Funnel hit and possibly the Funnel smoke venting out of the massive hole caused by the hit.

It is also interesting to note in Tovey's letter of the 30th that it states that further reports from subordinates would follow, which sort of confirms Rhys-Jones comment that Pound diligently went through all the reports. I think also when Ryhs-Jones comments on 'it was Tovey's description that went to the presses' he was talking about the events regarding Rodney not PoW, Leach or Wake-Walker.

I'm having a good look at the battle map again, in my researches I've looked at the Admiralty builders plans I have of PoW and Hood, specifically the turrets, and may have discovered something but need to re check my bearings and the like but will let you know once I'm sure I've not missed something and make myself look like a fool!

Best wishes
Cag.

[Cag]

Hi All

Sorry I wrote all that and missed my point! I think that Leach broke off the engagement as Brooke suggests with the express intention that at some point PoW would re engage.

Luckily for PoW Bismarck and Prinz Eugen also broke off their action rather than pursue PoW, if this had not been the case PoW would have had to fight out a running battle of some kind. The movements to join Norfolk were to rejoin the cruisers to support their shadowing of Bismarck thereby making sure that whether Bismarck and Prinz Eugen ran or tried to turn and fight contact would not be lost.

We are lucky in that we can study all this with knowledge of what happens next. Leach did not, as he turned away smoke was produced to disrupt enemy observation, he did not know as to whether Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would follow or not and a running battle was still a possibility. I'm not sure that the word temporary actually is restricted to the battle, it is probably more akin to until a more equal opportunity presents itself which the crew of PoW were definitely waiting for.

Sorry about that!
Best wishes
Cag.

[dunmunro]

@tommy303,
Hi Tommy,
I must say that, not being English my native language, I would have intended "temporarily as related to the battle of Denmark Strait (a matter of minutes), not to the fact of opening fire more than 12 hours later when at more than 300 sm from the battlefield......
However, of course, I have to bow to the interpretation of an English speaking person.

Had I been Tovey, I would just have phrased differently his important statement at point 19: "The commanding officer considered it expedient to break off the action, waiting for the decision that the Rear-Admiral commanding CS1 would have taken regarding her role and the possibility to re-engage the enemy. At 6:01:30 he therefore turned away under smoke."


Bye, Alberto

Perhaps if Bismarck hadn't been running so hard an engagement would have happened sooner. In any event after about 0610 W-W was in tactical command and it was his call whether or not to engage again.

Certainly as soon as Leach was informed about Y turret, then any thought of reengaging in a few minutes would have vanished, and this was certainly obvious to anyone else who knew about the state of PoW's Y turret.