How close was the final battle?

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Byron Angel
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

dunmunro wrote: Thu Oct 19, 2023 10:03 am You are making things up, that don't correspond to the known limitations of Type 284 radar.

[ 1 ] I suggest that you refer back to BR2435/CB3213 and CB4182/45 before making such accusations.

[ 2 ] Your attempt to divert this discussion by suddenly attacking the US Mk3/FC battleship main battery fire control radar also troubles me greatly - particularly your pointing to the later Mk4/FD vertical-lobing issue at low elevations and implying that the Mk3/FC suffered the same problem - which is completely untrue. The Mk4/FD had a completely different antenna array designed to provide a vertical lobing function for ranging of AERIAL targets. The Mk3/FC (http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Radar_WWII.php) retained conventional lateral lobe switching only.

[ 3 ] Go to McMahon's Radars (https://www.smecc.org/mcmahon%27s_radars!.htm and kindly read the entire presentation, including the summary paragraph regarding practical operation characteristics of the Mk4/FD.

[ 4 ] Take your own advice about "making things up".

Color me VERY disappointed in the direction this discussion is going.
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Fri Oct 20, 2023 7:06 pm
dunmunro wrote: Thu Oct 19, 2023 10:03 am You are making things up, that don't correspond to the known limitations of Type 284 radar.

[ 1 ] I suggest that you refer back to BR2435/CB3213 and CB4182/45 before making such accusations.

Type 284 could not range on Salvo splashes at ~ 25k yds. Even Type 284M, with 6 times the transmission power, couldn't range on salvo splashes beyond ~21K yds. We have to remember that the Type 284 gunnery team was literally breaking new ground here in terms of radar ranging; we only have to look at the limited amount of 14in gunnery practise conducted by KGV and PoW to know that the radar teams were up against.

Again, we look at the data from Hood's Type 284 trials:
Tests were carried out ranging on King George V with the following results:
Outward Run. 11,000 yards … saturation of target; 14,000 yards … 10 times the
signal; 16,000 yards … 6 to 8 times the signal; 27,000 yards … VA times the
signal; 27,300 yards … the signal was lost. The echo was very spasmodic from
25,000 yards, but the plot of the run taken from RDF ranges and bearings was a
very good one. Inward run. King George V came in on an unknown bearing and
was picked up at 24,700 yards; it was thought that it would have been possible
to pick up the target earlier but for the fact that she came in on the same bearing
as land echoes. The destroyers escorting King George V were picked up at
16,300 yards.( RA Burt)
There's no false ranges being reported here, and the ranges obtained, even when intermittent were accurate when plotted. Let's refer to the GAR again:
kgvradar2.jpg
kgvradar2.jpg (154.65 KiB) Viewed 161118 times
Note this sentence from the above:
"At first there was some doubt whether the echoes were from splashes of salvoes falling short of the Bismarck, but when the range reached 22000 yds it had been decided that they were echoes from the ship."

So here we have the GAR stating, unequivocally that the ranges above 22k yds were from Bismarck not from salvos falling short! We know from the operating characteristics of Type 284 that it could not range on salvos beyond type 284M, and the limit was probably ~16k yds, and although some of the earliest splash spotting ranges were not recorded, the farthest range that was recorded was only 13600 yds!

Again there was confusion in KGV's FC team because the AFCT fall of shot hooter was misadjusted.
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Fri Oct 20, 2023 7:06 pm
dunmunro wrote: Thu Oct 19, 2023 10:03 am You are making things up, that don't correspond to the known limitations of Type 284 radar.

[ 1 ] I suggest that you refer back to BR2435/CB3213 and CB4182/45 before making such accusations.

[ 2 ] Your attempt to divert this discussion by suddenly attacking the US Mk3/FC battleship main battery fire control radar also troubles me greatly - particularly your pointing to the later Mk4/FD vertical-lobing issue at low elevations and implying that the Mk3/FC suffered the same problem - which is completely untrue. The Mk4/FD had a completely different antenna array designed to provide a vertical lobing function for ranging of AERIAL targets. The Mk3/FC (http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Radar_WWII.php) retained conventional lateral lobe switching only.

[ 3 ] Go to McMahon's Radars (https://www.smecc.org/mcmahon%27s_radars!.htm and kindly read the entire presentation, including the summary paragraph regarding practical operation characteristics of the Mk4/FD.

[ 4 ] Take your own advice about "making things up".

Color me VERY disappointed in the direction this discussion is going.
I am not attacking Mk3/4 radar, but I am pointing out that it is not the same radar as Type 284 and a display trace from Mk3/4 is not relevant to a discussion of Type 284. Yes Mk 4 had vertical and horizontal lobing, but Mk 3 had horizontal lobing where Type 284 did not. We know from the characteristics of radar lobing that it decreases signal strength and it was not till Type 284M arrived (on DoY and later ships) with a 125kw transmission power that lobing was implemented.

I too am disappointed because we have to look carefully at the data from the KGV GAR and real world test data from individual Type 284 radars to figure this all out.

The Navweaps data on the Mk3/4 is rather suspect. The MK3/4 operating manual is a much better reference:

https://maritime.org/doc/radar/part4.php#pgMK3MK4-13
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

It was you, dunmunro, who injected the USN Mk3/4 issue into this discussion. Your motive for doing so remains a mystery.

B
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Sat Oct 21, 2023 12:35 pm It was you, dunmunro, who injected the USN Mk3/4 issue into this discussion. Your motive for doing so remains a mystery.

B
I certainly did not. See post: by hans zurbriggen » Wed Oct 18, 2023 1:25 pm where he used a USN MK3/4 ranging diagram from a link that you posted.

His motive was quite transparent. He was claiming that the intermittent echo ranges reported by KGV after her initial 25100 yd range were false echos or generated by shell splashes; there is no evidence of that from the data that we have regarding actual Type 284 performance (or the generalized performance from the links you provided) and as I stated previously the KGV GAR states:
"At first there was some doubt whether the echoes were from splashes of salvoes falling short of the Bismarck, but when the range reached 22000 yds it had been decided that they were echoes from the ship."
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

dunmunro wrote: Sat Oct 21, 2023 8:09 pm
Byron Angel wrote: Sat Oct 21, 2023 12:35 pm It was you, dunmunro, who injected the USN Mk3/4 issue into this discussion. Your motive for doing so remains a mystery.

B
I certainly did not. See post: by hans zurbriggen » Wed Oct 18, 2023 1:25 pm where he used a USN MK3/4 ranging diagram from a link that you posted.

The diagram (Figure 104) copied by Hans is found on page 84 and is totally generic in nature.
Radar "Mark 4" is not mentioned until page 101 ..... 17 pages later ..... and is cited in connection with a completely different issue.

This will be my last communication with you.
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Sun Oct 22, 2023 12:34 am
dunmunro wrote: Sat Oct 21, 2023 8:09 pm
Byron Angel wrote: Sat Oct 21, 2023 12:35 pm It was you, dunmunro, who injected the USN Mk3/4 issue into this discussion. Your motive for doing so remains a mystery.

B
I certainly did not. See post: by hans zurbriggen » Wed Oct 18, 2023 1:25 pm where he used a USN MK3/4 ranging diagram from a link that you posted.

The diagram (Figure 104) copied by Hans is found on page 84 and is totally generic in nature.
Radar "Mark 4" is not mentioned until page 101 ..... 17 pages later ..... and is cited in connection with a completely different issue.

This will be my last communication with you.
So not specific to to Type 284 either... Perhaps you should have stated that as a reply to Hans, rather than to me.

MK4 is first mentioned on page 38.
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

hans zurbriggen wrote: Wed Oct 18, 2023 9:53 am Hello all,
"we now know that Type 284 could not produce a radar echo from a salvo at that range"

This is not what is written in GAR and usage of this aftermath info is supposition. Please let's try to stick to evidences: 284 radar operator reported fall of shot of first salvo as short, thus fall of shots was generating an echo (or noise was interpreted as echo, or Bismarck was misidentified as fall of shot...).

Despite lack of experience, 284 operator looked for and reported fall of shot and it was in agreement with Spotter observations. They both reported "short". Therefore corrected gun range after spotting was longer than predicted range at AFCT with first range rate (approximate one, most probably). Please see (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180)

hans

Hi Hans,
I was going through my hard drive files today and discovered that I have a copy of C.B. 4112(4) Handbook on the use of R.D.F. for Gunnery Purposes, Type 284, 19th July, 1942. This manual covers the original Type 284 as fitted to DoY on 27 May 1941. I have copied the "Ranging Capabilities" section (see below) which indicates how easily inaccurate range readings can creep into the proceedings. Type 284 was a new and relatively unknown creature with a lot of technical idiosyncrasies in May 1941 ... not only at the ranging end, but also in terms of transmitting ranging data to the T.S. and applying it to the plot (I did not copy the T.S. processes, but can do later if desired).

HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF R.D.F. FOR GUNNERY PURPOSES – TYPE 284
1942
ADMIRALTY, S.W. 1
GUNNERY BRANCH

C.B. 4112(4) Handbook on the use of R.D.F. for Gunnery Purposes, Type 284
19th July, 1942


RANGING CAPABILITIES
4. The results tabulated below show the average maximum usable ranges reported by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, from experience gained in the first five ships fitted with Type 284.

Target Average Maximum usable range.
Land Echoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 yards
Battleship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,000 yards
Large Cruiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15,000 yards
Small Cruiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12,000 yards
Destroyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000 yards
Submarine on surface . . . . . . . . 5,000 yards

Greater ranges can at times be obtained: for instance, ranges of an “Aurora” class cruiser have been taken at 28,000 yards when the Director Trainer could see the target and was keeping the aerials accurately trained, but the echoes in these cases are weak and fluctuating and cannot be relied upon in practice.

These ranges were somewhat less than were expected from the results obtained in the first sea trial referred to in paragraph 1, and the possibilities of improving on them are still under investigation.

Ranges of aircraft at heights of 4,000 ft. and below have been obtained up to 16,000 yards. It was expected that targets at fine inclinations would be more difficult for ranging but, up to date, this has not been borne out in practice.

ACCURACY OF RANGE
5. ( a ) It has been found that certain Type 284 sets require an Index Correction, which is usually in the nature of 300 yards (R.D.F. reads high). This can be allowed for by setting the Index Correction (determined by experience) on the straddle correction scale on the Range Matching Receiver with A.F.C.T. V, VI and VI*, and on the scale on the Mean Rangefinder Pen on A.F.C.T. I to IV*, VII and IX.

( b ) Instrumental errors dependent on the physical limitations of the set (small differences in sweep rates between the signal and calibration traces and small variations in the Index error), should not exceed 100 yards using the ranging scope (0 to 24,000 yards) or 200 yards using the warning scope (0 to 48,000 yards).

( c ) Random error, the accuracy of range transmitted to the Fire Control Table, is however, also dependent on the skill of the operator in interpolating between the marks of the calibration trace. There 1,000 yards is represented by a distanceof roughly one centimeter, and in consequence to read off the range of the “echo” to a greater accuracy than +/- 100 yards will not be easy.

( d ) Therefore, provided the Index Correction has been applied, the error of the range transmitted to the Fire Control Table should not exceed about 150 yards, taking into account both Instrumental and Random error. The error when using the long range (searching) scope is likely to be twice this figure but this is immaterial for tactical purposes. It must, however, be emphasized that this accuracy is dependent upon :-

( i ) The equipment being frequently calibrated with the wavemeter supplied and against targets at a known range.

( ii ) The setting up procedure laid down in the Technical Handbook being correctly carried out.

( iii ) The operator frequently checking that the ground wave is opposite the correct mark.



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hans zurbriggen
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by hans zurbriggen »

Hi Byron,
thanks a lot, a most interesting document, confirming ranging tolerance of +/-150 yards for Type 284 vs +/- 40 meters of German FuMO radars in 1941.

I wasn't aware that 284 had two panels: "ranging" scope and "warning" scope. I had always thought to 284 as dedicated gunnery radar, therefore only with a "ranging" scope. From what you have posted, it looks like initial range got on Bismarck by KGV on May 27 (25.100 yards) was obtained using less accurate "warning" scope and that 284 operator continued to look for Bismarck using this scope as "ranging" scope max range was 24.000 yards.

Also declared "max usable range" (18.000 for large ships) is very useful in trying to understand what happened on board KGV, when operator was obviously unable to get a constant (even weak) echo for Bismarck above 21.000 yards (download/file.php?id=4190) and he was possibly getting a "fluctuating echo, not reliable in practice" over 18.000 - 20.000 yards.

We will possibly never know what was 284 operator observing when constantly looking for Bismarck at about 25.000 yards (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4164) but it is quite clear that first correct range after initial one was passed to and accepted by TS personnel at 08:53 only, possibly also due to 284 operator lack of experience and bad "understanding" between him and Gunnery Control (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4169), but mainly because 284 at that time was not considered able to provide reliable ranges at more than 18.000 yards.

IMHO, 284 operator was mistaken by KGV's own fall of shot or by noise peak(s) at around 25.000 yards, and he continued to estimate range at that distance for some minutes.
In any case, after first salvo, fall of shot was reported short by 284 operator, This means he was actually seeing an echo attributed to Bismarck and other(s) attributed to KGV fall of shot (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180). Gun range was therefore increased (vs predicted range rate, possibly not yet accurate as well) and this possibly continued to happen during first minutes of battle, until 08:53, when visual observations confirmation allowed to tune AFCT accordingly.

hans
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 12:22 am
Hi Hans,
I was going through my hard drive files today and discovered that I have a copy of C.B. 4112(4) Handbook on the use of R.D.F. for Gunnery Purposes, Type 284, 19th July, 1942. This manual covers the original Type 284 as fitted to DoY on 27 May 1941. I have copied the "Ranging Capabilities" section (see below) which indicates how easily inaccurate range readings can creep into the proceedings. Type 284 was a new and relatively unknown creature with a lot of technical idiosyncrasies in May 1941 ... not only at the ranging end, but also in terms of transmitting ranging data to the T.S. and applying it to the plot (I did not copy the T.S. processes, but can do later if desired).
hans zurbriggen wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 3:35 pm Hi Byron,
thanks a lot, a most interesting document.
I wasn't aware that 284 had two panels: "ranging" scope and "warning" scope. I had always thought that 284 was a dedicated gunnery radar, therefore only a ranging scope was available. From what you have posted, It looks like initial range got on Bismarck by KGV on May 27 (25.100 yards) was got on the less accurate "warning" scope and that the 284 operator continued to look for Bismarck using this scope as "ranging" scope max range was 24.000 yards.

Also declared "max usable range" (18.000 for large ships) is very useful in trying to understand what happened on board KGV, when operator was obviously unable to get a constant (even weak) echo for Bismarck above 21.000 yards (download/file.php?id=4190) and he was possibly getting a "fluctuating echo, not reliable in practice" over 18.000 - 20.000 yards.

We will possibly never know what was 284 operator observing when constantly looking for Bismarck at about 25.000 yards (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4164) but it is quite clear that first correct range after initial one was passed to and accepted by TS personnel at 08:53 only, possibly also due to 284 operator lack of experience and bad "understanding" between him and Gunnery Control (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4169), but mainly because 284 at that time was not considered able to provide reliable ranges at more than 18.000 yards.

IMHO, 284 operator was mistaken by KGV's own fall of shot or by noise peak(s) at around 25.000 yards, and he continued to estimate range at that distance for some minutes.
In any case, after first salvo, fall of shot was reported short by 284 operator, This means he was actually seeing an echo attributed to Bismarck and other(s) attributed to KGV fall of shot (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180). Gun range was therefore increased (vs predicted range rate, possibly not yet accurate as well) and this possibly continued to happen during first minutes of battle, until 08:53, when visual observations confirmation allowed to tune AFCT accordingly.

hans
Once again, you both refer to an inaccurate document, that used the mean ranges obtained from various Type 284 sets, including those fitted on light cruisers (HMS Aurora is actually named in the document!), to obfuscate the information that we have regarding Type 284 performance from 23 - 27 May 1941, from 2 different ships and from Hood, during her Type 284 trials (probably April 1941)

from the Document C.B. 4112(4) :
Greater ranges can at times be obtained: for instance, ranges of an “Aurora” class cruiser have been taken at 28,000 yards when the Director Trainer could see the target and was keeping the aerials accurately trained, but the echoes in these cases are weak and fluctuating and cannot be relied upon in practice.
What the document is saying is that the ranges are accurate but the echos are weak and (certainly on a light cruiser) and it cannot expected to regularly obtain these extreme ranges in practise. It does not say that the ranges are inaccurate.

From KGV's GAR:
1, Narrative. On the morning of the action the ranging set, Type 284, is
considered to have been in first' class working order: Final tuning adjustments
had been made on the previous afternoon; Rodney being used as target. Before
the adjustment Rodney had been detected at 23,800 yards, which showed that
good tuning had been maintained since the ship teft harbour on the 22nd May.
from HMS Hood:
Tests were carried out ranging on King George V with the following results:
Outward Run. 11,000 yards … saturation of target; 14,000 yards … 10 times the
signal; 16,000 yards … 6 to 8 times the signal; 27,000 yards … VA times the
signal; 27,300 yards … the signal was lost. The echo was very spasmodic from
25,000 yards, but the plot of the run taken from RDF ranges and bearings was a
very good one.
Inward run. King George V came in on an unknown bearing and
was picked up at 24,700 yards; it was thought that it would have been possible
to pick up the target earlier but for the fact that she came in on the same bearing
as land echoes. The destroyers escorting King George V were picked up at
16,300 yards.( RA Burt)
So we have positive proof that Type 284 was capable of accurate ranges beyond 24K yds because of the accuracy of Hood's plot against a known target and location. Even 300yds accuracy at 25K yds was far better than a typical optical range.

Finally, we have Suffolk's RoP which gives a whole series of Type 284 ranges beyond 18K yds, the longest of these, where the stated range is unequivocally from the Type 284:
0213 (B). Type 284 contact 195°, 22,000 yards.
I have gone out of my way to emphasize that Type 284 was incapable of ranging on 14in shell splashes beyond about 16K yds because it didn't have the required transmitting power (Type 284 = 25kw vs 150kw on Type 284M) and DoY's type 284M was limited to 20K yds.

Hans insists on ignoring this sentence in the KGV GAR which directly addresses his insistence to the contrary:

"At first there was some doubt whether the echoes were from splashes of salvoes falling short of the Bismarck, but when the range reached 22000 yds it had been decided that they were echoes from the ship."
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

hans zurbriggen wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 3:35 pm Hi Byron,
thanks a lot, a most interesting document, confirming ranging tolerance of +/-150 yards for Type 284 vs +/- 40 meters of German FuMO radars in 1941.

I wasn't aware that 284 had two panels: "ranging" scope and "warning" scope. I had always thought to 284 as dedicated gunnery radar, therefore only with a "ranging" scope. From what you have posted, it looks like initial range got on Bismarck by KGV on May 27 (25.100 yards) was obtained using less accurate "warning" scope and that 284 operator continued to look for Bismarck using this scope as "ranging" scope max range was 24.000 yards.

Also declared "max usable range" (18.000 for large ships) is very useful in trying to understand what happened on board KGV, when operator was obviously unable to get a constant (even weak) echo for Bismarck above 21.000 yards (download/file.php?id=4190) and he was possibly getting a "fluctuating echo, not reliable in practice" over 18.000 - 20.000 yards.

We will possibly never know what was 284 operator observing when constantly looking for Bismarck at about 25.000 yards (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4164) but it is quite clear that first correct range after initial one was passed to and accepted by TS personnel at 08:53 only, possibly also due to 284 operator lack of experience and bad "understanding" between him and Gunnery Control (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4169), but mainly because 284 at that time was not considered able to provide reliable ranges at more than 18.000 yards.

IMHO, 284 operator was mistaken by KGV's own fall of shot or by noise peak(s) at around 25.000 yards, and he continued to estimate range at that distance for some minutes.
In any case, after first salvo, fall of shot was reported short by 284 operator, This means he was actually seeing an echo attributed to Bismarck and other(s) attributed to KGV fall of shot (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180). Gun range was therefore increased (vs predicted range rate, possibly not yet accurate as well) and this possibly continued to happen during first minutes of battle, until 08:53, when visual observations confirmation allowed to tune AFCT accordingly.

hans


Hi Hans,

Some additional commentary found in an RN radar manual –

LOCATION
<snip>
9. Range accuracy of radar is sufficient for most warning purposes, but for accurate ranging, such as required in gunnery, sets must be calibrated, vide Chapter XII. Compared to range accuracy, bearing accuracy is not so good, varying from 1-2 deg for WS sets up to 5-10 deg for WA sets. Combined inaccuracy of range and bearing may result in an irregular plot particularly.
( a ) When a target is at extreme range and the echo is weak and intermittent.
( b ) When there is a high rate of change of bearing of the target.
( c ) Under these conditions, it may take several minutes to obtain a plot which is smooth enough to deduce the targets course and speed with sufficient accuracy.
10. Gunnery ranging sets, which are fitted with beam-switching and very accurate ranging devices will, of course, give a good plot very much more quickly.

Byron note – Type 284 had neither beam-switching, nor precision ranging panels in 1941.

<snip>

MAXIMUM RANGE
12. The first detection of a new target will not usually occur at the maximum range of which a set is capable. This is because at extreme ranges the echo is very small and often only appears intermittently. It may therefore easily be missed on several sweeps, by which time the target will have closed.

13. Without P.P.I. display it is necessary to sweep round comparatively slowly, stopping perhaps several times during each sweep to take bearings and ranges of targets already being watched. While doing this a new target which has come within radar range may have closed considerably before the sweep again reached the right bearing. The trouble is accentuated if the target is a small one, whose maximum range is not great in any case, and the closing speed is high; in fact when using an old set, such as type 272P, the theoretical chance of detection of a U-boat before it comes into sight may be nil under unfavourable conditions.

14. Sets with broad horizontal beams, such as WA sets and WC type 291, can sweep much faster without fear of missing targets than can narrow beam (WS) sets not fitted with P.P.I. In general, it pays to sweep as fast as practicable except in small ships in rough weather, vide.para.51.

15. With P.P.I. display, it is possible to sweep much faster, and this is normally done (usually automatically) so that a continuous picture is painted. This overcomes the disadvantage of narrow beams and slow sweeping and greatly improves the reliability of detection. When, however, it is desired to watch for fluctuating echoes, such as those from an aircraft or an E-boat at extreme range, over a selected sector, it may be preferable to revert to hand-training. Provided the sector is a small one, this procedure will give a greater number of chances of seeing the echo and will, therefore, increase the probable detection range. Needless to say, all round warning will be lost while the sector sweep is in force.

Byron note – Type 284 was monitored by means of an A-Scope in 1941.


Effect of inclination
16. With surface warning sets the inclination of the target makes a considerable difference to the height of echo at extreme range and therefore to the maximum range obtainable. As might be expected, better maximum ranges are obtained against targets beam on as the reflecting area is then greatest.

Byron note – According to maneuver charts, BISMARCK’s inclination from the perspective of KGV was generally bow on in the minutes prior to opening of fire on 27 May 1941.

<snip>

EFFECT OF ROUGH WEATHER AND ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS

Rough weather
50. The narrow beam of a centimetric (WS) set may be lifted right clear of the horizon when a ship rolls or pitches. This seriously limits the value of earlier WS sets (e.g. type 272P), especially in small ships against small targets whose echoes become intermittent or are missed altogether. T counter this in later sets either :--
( a ) The vertical beam is made wide enough to allow for all reasonable conditions, e.g. it is 20deg in type 276.
Or ( b ) the set is stabilized, as in types 271/3Q and 277.

51. Further, the swell may actually obscure the line of sight between a small target such as a U-boat and a small ship where the WS set is mounted low down. In these circumstances it is necessary with old WS sets to sweep very much more slowly than the normal rate to make certain of detecting small targets at all, which, of course, reduces the probable detection range. With modern WS sets, however, the sweep rate should, if anything, be increased. The object in all cases is to avoid coinciding with the period of the swell which normally corresponds to a sweep rate of about 4 r.p.m.

Byron note – It is not clear to me that ship motion had any effect on the efficiency of KGV’s radar. Her type 284 radar was an old unstabilized WS (“Warning, Surface”) set, to be sure. But, even considering that her closing course placed her in heavy following seas under the prevailing gale/near-gale conditions, I cannot say with any confidence whether or not it would have affected the performance of her radar. She was, after all, a very large warship.


FWIW

Byron
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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by Byron Angel »

hans zurbriggen wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 3:35 pm I wasn't aware that 284 had two panels: "ranging" scope and "warning" scope. I had always thought to 284 as dedicated gunnery radar, therefore only with a "ranging" scope.

Hi Hans,
My apologies if anything in my earlier post(s) has proven misleading. The "precision ranging panel" was a special purpose adjunct when the range had fallen to a point when fall of shot could be detected as well as the target. When said "panel" was activated, it is my understanding that some limited +/- range zone (say, +/- 1,000 yards) centered upon the target ship was put upon the screen in greatly magnified form in order to closely examine fall of shot in relation to target ship; nothing else would be reproduced on the screen. It might well involve another screen separate and distinct from the normal A-scope, but I myself cannot say that I know that as an established fact.


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Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by hans zurbriggen »

Hi Byron,
thanks again for corrections to my wrong understanding, for explanations and additional info on 284 capabilities in 1941.

It looks clear that in 1941 284 was able to receive echoes from distant ships (even up to 28.000 yards) but that "usable" ranging was possible only below 18.000 yards because over that distance echoes were usually weak, intermitttent and fluctuating. Possibly, a well tuned 284 might have been able to start effective ranging and range rating from 20.500 yards (see KGV on May 27) or even more (Hood test) .

Re. "effect of inclination", not only Bismarck was mainly bow on (weaker signal), but her erratic course was affecting her echo strength (as you suggested in the past), making it stronger or weaker: that might have further confused 284 operator.

We can only speculate re. what 284 operator was seeing on his "A" scope on May 27 between 08:48 and 08:53, but he explicitly thought he was able to evaluate first salvo from KGV as "short", therefore clearly he was getting at least 2+ separate echoes: one he interpreted as Bismarck and other(s) as fall of shells (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180).
If 284 set was actually unable to receive fall of shells echoes from 24.600 yards (KGV) and/or 23.500 yards (Rodney) (at open fire), then his operator might have been misled by mere noise (in this case we have confirmation that enemy echo was anyway so weak to be easily confused with noise, therefore not usable for gunnery purposes), and this continued to happen during all first minutes of battle, when 284 operator looked for Bismarck always at around 25.000 yards, apparently misleading Gunnery Control, until 08:53 (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4164 & https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4169), despite in the meantime he was receiving also "correct" echoes from Bismarck (download/file.php?id=4190), still initially so weak and intermittent to be apparently confused with noise and/or fall of shells. Only at 08:51 (22.000 yards distance) 284 operator started to realise that Bismarck could have been closer than he was looking for, only at 08:52 (21.000 yards) this "correct" echo became constant, and only at 08:53 AFCT personnel accepted the "correct" range of 20.500 yards and tuned range plot (and gun range) accordingly.

IMHO KGV (my speculation, suggested by GAR statements) fired at around 25.000 - 24.000 yards all the time before 08:53 (more and more "over" as time passed), while Rodney (a fact, as we luckily have her salvo plot available) fired at 23.500 (08:47)- 22.000 (08:50), much "short" and then "corrected" firing at 24.000 (08:50) - 22.500 (08:53) yards ("over"). Actually, Bismarck distance was reducing almost constantly from 26.000 to 20.500 between 08:47 and 08:53.

hans
dunmunro
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Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

hans zurbriggen wrote: Fri Nov 03, 2023 9:08 am Hi Byron,
thanks again for corrections to my wrong understanding, for explanations and additional info on 284 capabilities in 1941.

It looks clear that in 1941 284 was able to receive echoes from distant ships (even up to 28.000 yards) but that "usable" ranging was possible only below 18.000 yards because over that distance echoes were usually weak, intermitttent and fluctuating. Possibly, a well tuned 284 might have been able to start effective ranging and range rating from 20.500 yards (see KGV on May 27) or even more (Hood test) .

Re. "effect of inclination", not only Bismarck was mainly bow on (weaker signal), but her erratic course was affecting her echo strength (as you suggested in the past), making it stronger or weaker: that might have further confused 284 operator.

We can only speculate re. what 284 operator was seeing on his "A" scope on May 27 between 08:48 and 08:53, but he explicitly thought he was able to evaluate first salvo from KGV as "short", therefore clearly he was getting at least 2+ separate echoes: one he interpreted as Bismarck and other(s) as fall of shells (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4180).
If 284 set was actually unable to receive fall of shells echoes from 24.600 yards (KGV) and/or 23.500 yards (Rodney) (at open fire), then his operator might have been misled by mere noise (in this case we have confirmation that enemy echo was anyway so weak to be easily confused with noise, therefore not usable for gunnery purposes), and this continued to happen during all first minutes of battle, when 284 operator looked for Bismarck always at around 25.000 yards, apparently misleading Gunnery Control, until 08:53 (https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4164 & https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/downloa ... hp?id=4169), despite in the meantime he was receiving also "correct" echoes from Bismarck (download/file.php?id=4190), still initially so weak and intermittent to be apparently confused with noise and/or fall of shells. Only at 08:51 (22.000 yards distance) 284 operator started to realise that Bismarck could have been closer than he was looking for, only at 08:52 (21.000 yards) this "correct" echo became constant, and only at 08:53 AFCT personnel accepted the "correct" range of 20.500 yards and tuned range plot (and gun range) accordingly.

IMHO KGV (my speculation, suggested by GAR statements) fired at around 25.000 - 24.000 yards all the time before 08:53 (more and more "over" as time passed), while Rodney (a fact, as we luckily have her salvo plot available) fired at 23.500 (08:47)- 22.000 (08:50), much "short" and then "corrected" firing at 24.000 (08:50) - 22.500 (08:53) yards ("over"). Actually, Bismarck distance was reducing almost constantly from 26.000 to 20.500 between 08:47 and 08:53.

hans
Again, we don't need to speculate, as the GAR provides the answer:
"At first there was some doubt whether the echoes were from splashes of salvoes falling short of the Bismarck, but when the range reached 22000 yds it had been decided that they were echoes from the ship."
We know the above is true because Type 284 was incapable of ranging on shell splashes beyond about 16k yds because of it's limited transmitting power and the poor radar reflectivity of water.

Here's another set of data points"
The surface equipment, Type 284, was first fitted on the
director control tower in H.M.S. King George V at a height of
90 ft in December, 1940. Trials of this set gave the following
maximum reliable ranges :-

Cruiser, Dido Class .. . .. .20000 yd

Destroyer, Town Class...... 14000 yd

Destroyer, Hunt Class .. . . 12.000 yd

Submarine on the surface. . .7000 yd
Coales, Naval Firecontrol Radar
Coales was the lead designer of Type 284.

Then we have KGV ranging on Rodney at 23800 yds on 26 May 1941 and Bismarck at 25100 yds.

Hood ranging on KGV from 27000 yds and destroyers from 16K yds

Suffolk on Bismarck from 22 yds (probably at greater ranges as well)

These ranges are all consistent with each other, given the variation in mounting heights.

This is how the study of history works; you take evidence from a variety of sources, then weigh it for accuracy and consistency. You do not take a single source then create a fictional tale around that source.
dunmunro
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Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: How close was the final battle?

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 8:12 pm
hans zurbriggen wrote: Thu Nov 02, 2023 3:35 pm I wasn't aware that 284 had two panels: "ranging" scope and "warning" scope. I had always thought to 284 as dedicated gunnery radar, therefore only with a "ranging" scope.

Hi Hans,
My apologies if anything in my earlier post(s) has proven misleading. The "precision ranging panel" was a special purpose adjunct when the range had fallen to a point when fall of shot could be detected as well as the target. When said "panel" was activated, it is my understanding that some limited +/- range zone (say, +/- 1,000 yards) centered upon the target ship was put upon the screen in greatly magnified form in order to closely examine fall of shot in relation to target ship; nothing else would be reproduced on the screen. It might well involve another screen separate and distinct from the normal A-scope, but I myself cannot say that I know that as an established fact.


Byron
Type 284 L12 ranging panel:
RPL12.jpg
(91.06 KiB) Not downloaded yet
The panel can display ranges from 0-24k yds, or 0-48k yds. I don't see any other cathode ray displays for Type 284.
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